Husserl: Evidence

In this article from 1928, translated here for the first time, Tanabe Hajime examines the concept of self-evidence, mainly in the light of Husserl and Brentano. The author starts out by establishing, through a preliminary analysis of the Cartesian cogito, two criteria for self-evidence, namely adequate fulfillment of the intention of Sosein, and the coextension of Dasein and Sosein (being-there, or existence, and being-such, or essence/properties). He then proceeds to consider four domains of knowledge through the prism of the question (...) of their claim to self-evidence: knowledge of mathematical objects, categorial intuition, the ontological proof for the existence of God and finally, outer perception. Dedicating the last paragraph to a critical assessment of Husserl’s account of perception, the author concludes that all self-evidence is founded on inner perception. Outlining a creative appropriation of phenomenology while elucidating the conditions for certainty, this text constitutes an important milestone in a period leading up to Tanabe’s break with Nishida as well as to his critique of Heidegger, thus laying the groundwork for his independent philosophical stance. (shrink)

La determinación husserliana de la evidencia como cumplimiento [Erfüllung] llevó a una tácita identificación de la evidencia con la conciencia plena. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de su fenomenología revela que en todo caso se presenta como una síntesis particular de plenitud y vacío, configuración que resulta modal por tratarse de una conciencia de posibilidad aunque en un sentido material y no cualitativo. Los Prolegómenos aportan un primer elemento en esta línea –que sólo en la fenomenología genética resulta explícita–: la evidencia (...) como vivencia de la verdad supone que la validez de un enunciado se sustenta en la posibilidad de la existencia de otros enunciados idénticos de la misma forma y materia; con las Investigaciones lógicas, estas multiplicidades posibles serán comprendidas como momentos en un nuevo contexto descriptivo: la mención y el cumplimiento, lo cual otorga estatuto intencional a la objetividad que se configura como escorzo de sentido, esto es, el modo en que la unidad determinada de plenitud y vacío –en cuanto horizonte de cumplimiento posible– conforma la evidencia objetiva.Husserlian determination of evidence as fulfillment [Erfüllung] brought a tacit identification of evidence with full consciousness. However, the development of his phenomenology reveals that it always appears as a particular synthesis of fullness and emptiness, configuration that turns out to be modal because it is a consciousness of possibility though in a material and not qualitative sense. The Prolegomena introduce a first element in this perspective –that only in the genetic phenomenology becomes explicit–: evidence as experience of truth supposes that the validity of a judgment supports itself in the possibility of existence of other identical judgments with the same form and matter; with the Logical Investigations, this possible multiplicities will be understood as moments in a new descriptive context: mention and fulfillment, whereby objectivity –configured as adumbration of sense– acquires intentional status, i. e., the mode in which the determined unity of fullness and emptiness –as horizon of possible fulfillment– shapes objective evidence. (shrink)

It is well known that Husserl considered phenomenology to be First Philosophy—the ultimate science. For Husserl, this means that phenomenology must clarify the ultimate phenomenological-epistemological principle that leads to ultimate elucidation. But what is this ultimate principle and what does ultimate elucidation mean? It is the aim of this paper to answer these questions. In section 2, we shall discuss what role Husserl’s principle of all principles can play in the quest for ultimate elucidation and what it means for a (...) principle to be ultimately elucidating and ultimately elucidated. We will see that the Husserlian thesis that originary presentive intuitions are an immediate and the ultimate source of justification qualifies as the ultimate epistemological principle. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl (...) transforms his 1901 philosophy in his 1913 revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, affirming that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by empty contiguity acts. I demonstrate how he overturns the two core doctrines of his theory from the Investigations in these revisions, claiming that empty intentions are not composed of Gehalt and asserting that those acts break with the continuum of fullness. Husserl implements these changes to solve problems that arise from his recognition of two new kinds of intentions; darker and completely dark acts. Finally, in the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by indicating that, in 1913, Husserl transforms his theory of fulfillment on the basis of his new insights about empty acts. (shrink)

The term “clear and distinct” is used by both Descartes and Husserl when they talk about the truth of an idea and the evidence of judgment. Although the words “clear” and “distinct” are juxtaposed with the conjunction “and,” this does not mean that their status is equal. If the concept of “evidence” can be used to characterize the hierarchical relationship between them, then we can say that, for Descartes, distinct evidence is higher than clear evidence. For Husserl, on the contrary, (...) clear evidence is higher than distinct evidence. Their opposing views concerning the hierarchy between clarity and distinctness is symptomatic of the differences between their two understandings of the epistemological relationship between intellect and sensibility, as well as of their respective ontological reach. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and (...) Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness. (shrink)

This essay explores Edmund Husserl's significance for contemporary truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations, it argues that early Husserl's conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the complexity of the experiences (...) within which propositional truth claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl's conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively meant and intuitively given, Husserl's approach provides a way to resituate propositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth. (shrink)

If the idea of a phenomenological aesthetic evidence is far from being obvious, it may yet become necessary in the description of the aesthetic experience. For the way a work of art can imperiously impose on the viewer reveals a kind of power that may suggests that this evidence is more than just a subjective feeling. Although Husserl’s phenomenology doesn’t consider such an evidence, and although this concept may even be regarded as a contradiction—since evidence particularly characterizes the givenness of (...) perceptive objects—we may yet find the conditions of possibility of such an aesthetic evidence in Husserl’s work. (shrink)

Evidence is a central theme in Husserl´s transcendental phenomenology. This article investigates not only the theoretical aspects of evidence, but also tries to develop prolegomena for a phenomenological theory of moral evidence and moral truth. Nevertheless, this endeavor is based upon the theoretical insights of Husserl: the importance of intersubjectivity and the relevance of time, which are reviewed in the first two chapters. The temporal aspect, under the title of perpetuation, is crucial for the understanding of the concept of evidence. (...) But it becomes even more important when the question of moral truth is considered. Perpetuation is not only stressed in the understanding of values, but also in the unanimity of the ethical and loving person. As evidence of any kind can only be falsified by a higher evidence of the same character, moral evidence cannot be understood isolated from the living process of any prefigured moral settings of a society, moral evidence can give itself only in an interpersonal community and its moral tradition and demands the community’s own readiness for a critical habituality. (shrink)

The article deals with the problem of phenomenological interpretation of Cartesian idea of evidence. The author demonstrates that implicit but constitutive characteristic of evidence is a property of excessiveness. The analysis of its conceptual versions and methodological representations in Husserl, Marion and Derrida’s philosophies deconstructs some stereotype interpretations of evidence as an attribute of I-centric philosophical systems and also as a carrier of qualities of fullness and presence. The author claims that excessiveness of evidence has two main aspects: (1) non-belonging (...) to the system assured by this very evidence and (2) tendency to self-surpassing (hyperbolization). The excessiveness of evidence is shown in particular with regard to the system of thinking governed by the “truth-falsehood” opposition. The author brings to light a trend to the increasing of degrees of evidence as a consequence of phenomenological critique and deconstruction as methodological hyperbolizations of Cartesian doubt. The common ground between Marionian and Derridian critiques of Husserl’s conception of evidence is found that is inconsistency between the principle of fulfillment of intention and the unrealizable regulative of the “Idea in Kantian sense” as two main ways of representation of evidence idea in Husserlian phenomenology. It is shown that in accordance with the paradigm of possibility as the common denominator of phenomenological attitude in general the very same criticized evidence becomes assimilated in Marion’s conception of “saturated phenomena” (a principle of hyperbolical givenness) and in Derridian deconstruction (hyperbolicity-excessiveness as heterogeneity and impossibility within the framework of his critique of presence). The author uncovers the essential connection between the idea of evidence and basic elements of deconstructive discourse, such as the metaphorical concept of secret and the quasi-concept différance. (shrink)

Pour résister à la destruction de la vérité qui menace la pensée contemporaine, on se propose de revenir à la thèse de Husserl : à la position d’un point de vérité qui s’identifie à l’évidence absolue de l’ego cogito, telle qu’il se donne dans sa chair. Mais cette évidence apodictique n’est pas forcément adéquate : il faut alors se demander ce que doit être la vérité de l’ego pour s’entrelacer à de la non-vérité et ce que doit être la chair (...) pour que l’auto-donation incarnée de l’ego se dissimule à elle-même. Une reconstruction transcendantale de la théorie merleau-pontyenne du chiasme tactile permettra de répondre à ces interrogations.In order to resist the destruction of Truth in contemporary Thinking, we need to come back to Husserl. According to him, there is a point of Truth which is identical to the absolute self-evidence of the Ego Cogito, giving itself in its own Flesh. However, this apodictic self-evidence is not necessarily adequate. What could be the Truth of the Ego, if it intertwines itself with Non-Truth ? And what could be the Flesh, if the carnal self-giving of the Ego could conceal itself to itself ? A transcendental reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontyan theory of the tactile chiasm will help us to answer those questions. (shrink)

Addressing Walter Hopp’s original application of the distinction between agent-fallibility and method-fallibility to phenomenological inquiry concerning epistemic justification, I question whether these are the only two forms of fallibility that are useful or whether there are not also others that are needed. In doing so, I draw my inspiration from Husserl, who in the beginnings of his phenomenological investigations struggled with the distinction between noetic and noematic analyses. For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations (...) he criticizes the First Investigation as having been “one-sidedly” noetically directed and as having thus neglected the noematic aspects of meaning (XVIII 13–14). Also, in an addendum to the Fifth Investigation he notes that in the transition from the First Edition to the Second he has learned to broaden the concept of “phenomenological content” to include not only the “real” ( reell ) contents (noetic, subjective) of consciousness but also the “intentional” (noematic, objective) (XIX/1 411). The fact that, in gradually moving from consciousness (noesis) to what consciousness is of (noema), Husserl struggled with this distinction is an indication of the immensity of the perplexing problems and potential solutions that Hopp has led the phenomenology of knowledge into by introducing his useful notions of agent-fallibility and method-fallibility. Like Husserl, he has focused mainly and mostly on the noetic issues; like Husserl as well, I will try to move step by step from the noetic area into the noematic. I conclude that Hopp’s approach has the potential to become seminal. (shrink)

If Husserl is correct, phenomenological inquiry produces knowledge with an extremely high level of epistemic warrant or justification. However, there are several good reasons to think that we are highly fallible at carrying out phenomenological inquiries. It is extremely difficult to engage in phenomenological investigations, and there are very few substantive phenomenological claims that command a widespread consensus. In what follows, I introduce a distinction between method-fallibility and agent-fallibility, and use it to argue that the fact that we are fallible (...) phenomenologists does not undermine Husserl’s claims concerning the epistemic value of phenomenological inquiry. I will also defend my account against both internalist and externalist objections. (shrink)

This paper deals with the concept and meaning of apodicticity or apodictic self-evidence from a phenomenological point of view. The foremost aim of phenomenology is to return to original intuitions, that is, to bring everything to original intuitive givenness and to provide an intuitive basis for philosophical theories. Phenomenology gives a broad interpretation of the concept of intuition. The notion of apodicticity for Husserl is closely related to this conception of self-givenness of objects in intuition. This paper deals partly with (...) the Husserlian concept of apodicticity and also tries to discover the opportunities and possibilities of apodictic self-evidence in phenomenological philosophy, in it’s own right, as a phenomenological analysis of the concept. Furthermore, this paper will also set out to address how and to what extent phenomenology can transgress, in an apodictic manner, the immediate sphere of the present and hence gain insights through subjective consciousness about the fields of other minds, historicity, worldhood and psychology. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Evidence is the very core of Husserlian phenomenology, with the term “evidence” signifying for Husserl the phenomenological perspective on the question of truth. In contrast to the conventional philosophical understanding of “truth” in mainly epistemological terms, Husserl’s notion of “evidence”, as elaborated in his Logical Investigations (1900–1), is more essentially ontological, pointing to the way in which a phenomenon becomes clear to us in its constitution. Husserl’s main point in the Sixth Investigation was that we can “see” how evidence functions (...) when we compare something in the fullness of its presence with the emptiness of its absence. This paper considers the example Husserl offers of the room where the lights go off in order to illuminate the breakthrough for phenomenology achieved by Logical Investigations in its move beyond logic and epistemology to the primary level of pretheoretical experience as the reality of the real. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 6, Edition 2 August 2006. (shrink)

A historical and analytical presentation of Lev Shestov's existential critique of Husserl's theory of self-evident truth.

This study approaches the philosophy of Edmund Husserl as a theory of reason through an elaboration of his developing phenomenological determination of the experiential and methodological dimensions of the experience of evidence. The task is, then, two-fold: to trace Husserl's deepening understanding of the nature and theoretical centrality of the phenomenological concept of evidence and to uncover at the same time its relation to his growing insight into the nature of reason. To this end, the study is divided into chapters (...) corresponding to the major stages in the development of Husserl's philosophic vision. The four chapters will consider, in order, the following: the nature of the logic and the relation of meaning to experience through an examination of the ideality of truth in relation to the subjective experience of knowing; the normative idea of evidence and the ideal of "first philosophy" as rigorous science; the relativization of evidence and truth which results from a genetic analysis of the orders of intentional experience; the unification of Husserl's insights into evidence and reason across the whole life of conscious experience, theoretical and practical. Here both the idea of an "in-itself" as well as the ideal of true-knowledge will emerge as horizonally determined teleological ideas of totality which all acts of intentional life, despite their essential relativity, approximate and aspire to. In the end, both reason and evidence will be characterized as the infinite openness of self-validating inquiry itself. This characterization will have profound consequences for the determination of the method proper to philosophical research and the problem of the definitiveness of truth. Finally, this ideal of reason will be considered in its relation to history and the nature of man in his genuine humanity. Thus, Husserl's progressive enlargement of the problematic of evidence--as both the apriori and telos of intentional life--overcomes and reconciles the traditional opposition between experience and reason . Indeed, as a structural form which belongs to the unity of life as such it will be seen that a life of consciousness cannot exist without including evidence. (shrink)

The text "The Apodicticity of Recollection" dates from 1922-23, and may be viewed as Husserl's clear recognition of the extent to which the descriptive phenomenology of immediacy is bound up with a reconstructive phenomenology of justificiation. Such recognition is manifest through the original treatment he gives the analysis of internal time-consciousness, and especially memory. In addition, his remarks on the nature of the transcendental ego add much strength to the interpretation of this text as a contribution to Husserl's longstanding concern (...) with 'phenomenology of reason.' In the following brief introduction, I will indicate the text's contributions to the analysis of time-consciousness as well as the new understanding of the relation between immediate experience and authentic truth which the analysis entails. -/- . (shrink)

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl proposed intentionality as the basic mode of objective reference. When the mind's intention is satisfied by the limiting self-givenness of the object, then the subject has evidence for his assertion. The evidence Husserl means is self-evidence, and since self-evidence provides the ideal form of knowledge, it is in self-evidence that the judging subject can experience the certitude which alone constitutes the rational foundation of knowledge. For Husserl, philosophic certainty is a kind of insight. ;Husserl's theory (...) of the ideal nature of meaning is the foundation of the notion of intentionality. The ideality thesis should establish that meanings are objective, that they are internally related to the mental life of persons, and that they serve as media of reference. The ideality thesis is meant to preclude the notion of mental privacy and to situate the thinking subject in the communicative world. For this, Husserl needed a criterion of identity that only the ideality thesis can provide. ;But the argument of this essay reveals that Husserl's notion of self-evidence is not credible since he cannot relieve the experiential aspect of the having-of-evidence from its contingent character. The argument further shows that the alleged relationship between ideal objects and evidence is circular: he refers to evidence to establish the thesis that there are ideal objects, which he can do only if evidence guarantees truth; but the assertion that evidence guarantees truth is itself established by the proposition that evidence consists in perception of ideal objects. ;Accordingly, the essay concludes that the intentional relation does not imply the self-evidence thesis. Husserl's argument for the possibility of indubitable knowledge depends on the complete convergence of the mean and the given. But since we are always given more than we mean, and we always mean more than we are given, the concept of the intentional relation implies, instead, the dialectic, not the coincidence, of the meant and the given. Husserl's theory of the intentional relation and his notion of philosophic certainty are contrary lines of thought. Intentionality implies the openness of experience. (shrink)

The central place which the concept of evidence or self-evidence has in Husserl’s philosophy puts him fully in the rationalist tradition. One of the criticisms which has been leveled against this tradition from several sides is that from the time of Descartes at least, it has conceived of consciousness solely as an observer of the world and not as a participant in it. In one fashion or another this tradition treats truth as founded on evidence for consciousness, and this leads (...) to such problems as Cartesian dualism with its “ghost in the machine,” or solipsism, either mundane or transcendental. Such philosophy, it is charged, fails to acknowledge the interactive component of human experience. According to this view, Husserl’s particular mistake is to make visual perception the only paradigm of evidence, and therefore, of all experience of things as they truly are. (shrink)