Summary |
When I see an
object, its givenness is always somewhat “empty” and indeterminate: not all of
it is in plain view like the front side, and even what is in plain view is not
given in complete detail. However, it is always part of my visual experience of
the object that I am implicitly or explicitly aware of ways in which I could
bring further aspects of it into plain view, and avail myself of further
aspects and details. This more or less tacit awareness is the horizonality of
visual experience. Husserl distinguishes inner and outer horizons of the
perceptual object, the former being the anticipated perspectival changes
of the object relative to the perceiver, the latter, its anticipated ways of
interacting with other objects. The notion of horizonality can be extrapolated
from the case of visual experience, to discuss other, relevantly analogous
kinds of experiences. Husserl uses the notion broadly, for various levels and kinds of experience. |