Husserl: Metaphysics

This paper reviews the concept of ‘essence’ in Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas as found presented by Edith Stein in her Festschrift article, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Attempt at a Comparison,’ in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung (1929, 370). The aim of the paper is to perform an analysis of Stein’s understanding of the principal similarities and differences in the understandings of essence found in the writings of Husserl and Aquinas, and primarily in (...) terms of the immediacy of the intuition or cognition of essences. I begin by a basic analysis of this commonality and difference with a focus on the interweaving of the following themes: essence and existence; essence and sensual knowledge; essence and its objective ground; essence as intuited, as actively acquired and as passively received; insight into essence, immediate and mediate knowledge. Despite certain misunderstanding arising between the phenomenological movement and the scholastic tradition in this sphere, Stein recognises a number of points of agreement, namely, 1) the beginnings of all knowledge in sense experience, 2) the intellectual ‘work’ (erarbeiten) that is required to achieve a clear vision of essences, and 3) the finally passive nature of the act of understanding. I critically analyse each of these enumerated points of agreement towards clarifying how Stein conceives of the possibility of using the phenomenological method for achieving an understanding of essences coherent with a Thomistic metaphysical worldview, and how she parses and explains the further disagreements over the question of the mediacy or immediacy of human knowledge of essences of different kinds. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology, starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments against this attempt (...) : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter. (shrink)

Considering the importance of possible-world semantics for modal logic and for current debates in the philosophy of modality, a phenomenologist may want to ask whether it makes sense to speak of “possible worlds” in phenomenology. The answer will depend on how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. As that latter question is the subject of the debate about possibilism and actualism in contemporary modal metaphysics, my aim in this paper is to get a better grip on the former question by (...) exploring a Husserlian stance towards this debate. I will argue that the phenomenologist’s way to deal with the problem of intentional reference to mere possibilia is analogous to the actualist’s idea of how “possible worlds” are to be interpreted. Nevertheless, I will be pointing to a decisive difference in the metaphilosophical preconditions of what I call "phenomenological actualism" and analytical versions of actualism. (shrink)

In The Human Place in the Cosmos Max Scheler argues the question of philosophical anthropology must address three problems: the difference between man and animal; the Cartesian problem of the mind and body; and the essence of spirit. In a recent issue of Human Studies, two articles by Cristian Ciocan and Christian Ferencz-Flatz addressed the first of these problems through investigations of Husserl’s Nachlass. In this paper, I respond primarily to Ciocan by drawing on Scheler’s phenomenology and the implications this (...) has for understanding Husserl’s phenomenology. By looking at Husserl’s published comments, we can see how the attempt to differentiate between man and animal is bound up with his understanding of spirituality. This allows an alternative way of understanding normality and abnormality which shifts emphasises away from how far we can empathise with the Other to emphasise what it means to be normal or abnormal. This will allow us to address an ambiguity of Husserl identified by Ferencz-Flatz. (shrink)

The concept of possibility has an essential function within Husserlian phenomenology. Firstly Husserlian phenomenology is an eidetical one, which is based on a subjective relation towards mere possibilities; secondly phenomenological reduction reduces all effective objects to mere possible objects of thought; thirdly the thesis of transcendental idealism implies a supremacy of possible sense over reality; and each type of transcendental constitution presupposes an “I can”, that is a practical possibility or capacity of the subject. This paper wants to focuse the (...) way on which Husserl conceives a concept of possibility which is different from the Aristotelican concept of δύναμις, from the Leibnizian conception of the being of possible worlds and from the Kantian conception of the possible as a modality of subjective knowledge: where does possibility have to be situated, on the subjective or objective level? And in which domain do modalities have their origin: in the subjective sphere of stands, in the ideal... (shrink)

ABSTRACTDuring his philosophical life, Husserl sought to develop his phenomenology as a “science of true beginnings, or origins” that is metaphysically neutral. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger and Derrida, Husserl’s phenomenology remains a kind of metaphysics of presence in that it presupposes a metaphysical notion of “origin”. This paper attempts both to correct Heidegger and Derrida’s misunderstandings of Husserl’s notion of “origin” and to clarify the reason why Husserl’s phenomenology and its pursuit of “origin” is still a metaphysical project.

Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito (...) di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to deal with E. Husserl’s and E. Stein’s analyses on the anthropological and metaphysical questions. To perform this task it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, first of all in Husserl and then in E. Stein, underscoring the novelty of their approach to the knowledge of human being, world and God. The essay is divided in four parts; two are dedicated to Husserl’s and Stein’s investigation on the human being and (...) two to their development of metaphysical themes. Regarding the first topic we discover a significant connection between the two thinkers, regarding the second one we notice that it is possible to find a metaphysical approach to reality even in Husserl and an original development of the theme in Stein’s analysis linked up with the medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

The main goal of the present paper is to offer a preliminary study of the relations between phenomenology and metaphysics in Husserl. After a brief presentation of what Husserl means by the term “metaphysics”, the rest of our research will consist of a detailed commentary on §60 of the Cartesian Meditations. Our aim is to explain in what sense, according to Husserl, the “outcomes” of the phenomenological constitution of monadological intersubjectivity entail the solution to a traditional metaphysical problem, i.e., that (...) of the existence of just one real world. The present investigation does not pretend to be more than an introduction. Besides shedding some light on a specific text, it will pave the way for a future inquiry into the relations between phenomenology and metaphysics in Husserl. (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo et Raimo Tuomela (...) traitant de problèmes généraux de la philosophie de l'esprit et de l'action. Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Phénoménologie, ontologie et philosophie de l'esprit, nous avons regroupé, autour d'un texte de Nicolas Kaufmann, quatre études qui traitent diversement de la contribution de la phénoménologie classique, principalement de la phénoménologie de Husserl, à des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine dans les domaines de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la théorie de l'action et de l'ontologie formelle. La troisième partie de l'ouvrage, Causalité et naturalisme, réunit trois contributions qui portent sur des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine. Daniel Laurier se penche sur la question de savoir si le normativisme sémantique est compatible avec le naturalisme sémantique, alors qu'André Leclerc et Wilson Mendonça s'intéressent à la notion de causalité mentale et examinent différents arguments qui contestent le bien-fondé de cette notion. La dernière partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Rationalité et décision réunit trois contributions logico philosophiques de Storrs McCall, Mathieu Marion et Michel Paquette qui traitent de la rationalité des agents lors de leurs prises de décision et délibérations. (shrink)

The debate between speculative realism and phenomenology has become quite heated over the past years. The matter of contention is the possibility of a metaphysics that can provide knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The speculative realists accuse phenomenology of denying this possibility, confining knowledge to the sphere of subjectivity. What has been overlooked in this debate is the similarity between the speculative project of Quentin Meillassoux and a Husserlian metaphysics. This article looks at these positions from a (...) reconciliatory point of view. After outlining the debate, conceding the problematic nature of realism for phenomenology to the speculative realists, it will be shown that there is a place for a realist metaphysics within phenomenology. After showing the similarities between Meillassoux’s philosophy and a phenomenological metaphysics, and the legitimacy of qualifying the latter as a speculative realism, the conclusion will reflect on the modal notions at play in them. (shrink)

La lógica es para Husserl una ciencia de la ciencia, una ciencia de lo que todas las ciencias tienen en común respecto de sus modos de validación. De este modo, la lógica trata por un lado con leyes universales relacionadas con la verdad, la deducción, la verificación y la falsación; y, por otro lado, con leyes relacionadas con la teoría como tal, y con lo que produce la unidad teorética. Ambos tipos de leyes se refieren por una parte a las (...) proposiciones de una teoría y por otra parte al dominio de objetos al que esas proposiciones se refieren. Este ensayo presenta una perspectiva sistemática del punto de vista husserliano sobre estos temas tal como él lo expone en sus Investigaciones Lógicas. Se muestra la manera en que su teoría de los significados lingüísticos en tanto especies de actos mentales, su ontología formal de la parte, el todo y la dependencia, su teoría de las categorías significativas, y su teoría de la intuición categorial combinada con su teoría de la ciencia conforman un todo singular. Finalmente, este trabajo explora la forma en que las ideas de Husserl sobre estos temas pueden ser reactivadas para resolver problemas en la filosofía del lenguaje, la lógica y la matemática de un modo que haga justicia al rol de la actividad mental en cada uno de estos dominios, evitando al mismo tiempo caer en los problemas del psicologismo. (shrink)

e following essay is organized around eighteen theses concerning the relationship between freedom, responsibility and self- awareness that I believe are both correct and consistent with specic doctrines and the overall positions advanced in Husserl’s published writings. e eighteen theses are not meant to represent a deductive argument. Most of them are not unique to Husserl or phenomenological philosophy, but I’m not aware of any other thinker who has hat brought all of them together as does Husserl.

Zur Rationalität gehört die Logik, dis als insgesamt synthetisch angesehen wird, ferner der löckenlose faktische Zusammenhang. Löcken in Zusammenhang und unbeweisbare Axiome deuten auf Irrationalität hin. Unwissenschaftliche Rationalität entsteht durch spekulative Annahme von Axiomen. Widerspruchsfreiheit ist Bedingung der Realität und gilt auch im Irrationalen. Zum Erkennen gehören drei existentielle Fähigkeiten: Begriffe, Anschauungen und Einfühlung. Unterschiedliche Bewertung ist unzulässig. Überschreitung des Rationalen führt auch zur Metaphysik. Auf drei Vorschläge einer wissenschaflichen Metaphysik, die von H. Scholz, von Hegel und von Husserl wird (...) hingewiesen, von denen der letzte als beste Lösung agesehen wird. (shrink)

Clarifying the nature of possibility is crucial for an evaluation of the phenomenological approach to ontology. From a phenomenological perspective, it is ontological possibility, and not spatiotemporal existence, that has pre-eminent ontological status. Since the sphere of phenomenological being and the sphere of experienceability turn out to be overlapping, this makes room for two perspectives. We can confer foundational priority to the acts of consciousness over possibilities, or to pre-set possibilities over the activity of consciousness. Husserl’s position on this issue (...) seems to change over time. Ultimately, the establishment of a phenomenological perspective must involve a rejection of any hypostatization of pre-set possibilities, but not all implications of this theoretical step seem to be drawn in Husserl’s texts. This paper is devoted to an illustration of how the phenomenological notion of possibility should change when we reject the hypostatization of possibility, that is, when we reject the idea that all acts of consciousness are to be conceived as realizations of pre-set “ideal forms”. We examine this question, first, by trying to clarify the conceptual constellation of “possibility” in Husserl’s texts. This leads to an overall classification of the features of constituted possibilities. Then we distinguish such constituted possibilities from their constituting conditions, which outlines a different sense of “possibility”. In the last instance two “possibilizing” dimensions are shown to lie at the root of all ontic possibilities. This leads to a final suggestion on the nature of the relation between experience and possibility. Actual experiences create the room for possibility: they are possibilizations. In this sense, experience is to be taken as a generative sphere which goes beyond the customary boundary between epistemic and ontological. From this point of view all experience is to be conceived as emergence. (shrink)

Hedwig Conrad-Martius was honoured with the Bundesverdienstkreuz, the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, on March 1st, 1958. What follows is her acceptance speech on that occasion. In this speech, Conrad-Martius not only gives an account of her biography as a phenomenologist who studied directly with Husserl, but also demonstrates that Husserl’s work is open to a peculiar form of subjective materialist interpretation that can explain his transcendental turn. The speech is an important document for those who (...) support the possibility of a Husserlian transcendental materialism. (shrink)

Résumé — Dans sa contribution, Dan Zahavi discute de la relation entre la phénoménologie et la métaphysique. La phénoménologie est-elle métaphysiquement neutre ou est-elle sans rapport métaphysique ? Est-elle une sorte de propédeutique vis-à-vis de la métaphysique ou la phénoménologie est-elle au contraire une forme de métaphysique, peut-être même le sommet d’une sorte particulière de métaphysique ? Alors que la position de Husserl dans les Logische Untersuchungen peut être décrite comme métaphysiquement neutre, Zahavi argumente que la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl (...) ne reste pas neutre ou indifférente à la question de la relation entre phénomène et réalité, et que par conséquent cela a nécessairement des implications métaphysiques.— In his contribution, Dan Zahavi discusses the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics. Is phenomenology metaphysically neutral, or is it without metaphysical bearings ? Is it a kind of propaedeutics to metaphysics, or is phenomenology, on the contrary, a form of metaphysics, perhaps even the culmination of a particular kind of metaphysics ? Whereas Husserl’s position in Logische Untersuchungen can be described as metaphysically neutral, Zahavi argues that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology does not remain neutral or indifferent to the question of the relation between phenomena and reality, and that it therefore necessarily has metaphysical implications. (shrink)

This paper analyzes and compares the attempts at solving the paradox of non-existence put forward by Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl. It will be argued that Meinong’s solution is not convincing since he retreats from the field of predicate logic, in which the paradox arises, to a version of propositional logic. On the other hand, Husserl´s approach is more promising since he moves forward to an extension of predicate logic, in which judgments may be evaluated in relation to different contexts (...) or, in Husserl´s terminology, “spheres”. More precisely, to Husserl, existential judgments have to be interpreted as a kind of cross-sphere judgments, and thus existence fulfills a function loosely analogous to that of modal operators in possible-worlds semantics. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra’s doctrine of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the ‘problem of essence’. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist phenomenology because: 1) Yogācārins, especially late Yogācārins represented (...) by Xuanzang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; 2) Husserl’s phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal sense that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism. (shrink)

I argue that Husserlian phenomenology is metaphysically neutral, in the sense of being compatible with multiple metaphysical frameworks. For example, though Husserl dismisses the concept of an unknowable thing in itself as “material nonsense”, I argue that the concept is coherent and that the existence of such things is compatible with Husserl’s phenomenology. I defend this metaphysical neutrality approach against a number of objections and consider some of its implications for Husserl interpretation.

I argue that Edmund Husserl's phenomenology maintains a substantive relationship to the metaphysical tradition in Western philosophy. I also argue that it offers resources for philosophical thought that seeks to recover the insights of that tradition from contemporary dismissals. ;In Part One, I claim that metaphysical philosophy is characterized by two orders of philosophical reflection and their interrelationship. Metaphysical philosophy is not simply an ontology of entities , but is also concerned with the conditions under which such an account emerges (...) in our experience , as well as the relationship both kinds of reflection bear to our action . I discern a "classical" metaphysical project in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas before moving to Rene Descartes' transformation of it. In Descartes, I argue, we find the origins of modernity's negative reception of metaphysical philosophy in his narrow conception of second-order reflection. ;In Part Two, I argue that Husserl's phenomenology represents an extreme attempt to think through the negative potential of Descartes' discovery of subjectivity by reflecting upon his radical doubt. In a discussion of spatial perception, eidetic predication, intersubjectivity, genetic phenomenological method, and Husserl's conception of God, I show that Husserl's phenomenological method is an attempt to recover the classical conception of second-order reflection. I also attempt to show that Husserl's metaphysical thinking lies in his analyses of synthesis in consciousness as it is accessible to present consciousness. ;In Part Three, I examine critiques of Husserl's phenomenology provided by Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Both of these phenomenologists critique Husserl's attempt to invest synthesis with metaphysical significance. Heidegger suggests that all such syntheses are conditioned by the difference of being and beings, a relationship that is never a synthetic act of consciousness. Fink argues that all such syntheses refer back to primal acts of synthesis that occur before reflection comes on the scene, and so reflection can only construct them hypothetically. While both critiques have their merit, I argue that both also miss key elements of Husserl's analysis of synthesis and of phenomenal presence that are worthy of development. (shrink)

The Introduction to this study takes into consideration the Kantian distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to" applied to concrete situations. In a summary way, the author proposes Husserl's position, as starting point of a phenomenology of freedom. Hereby issues as temporality of consciousness and the consequent historical character of the ego as well as its reflection upon itself, are stepping stones leading to the paramount point of Husserl's conception, i.e. self-regulation as the superior form of freedom. J.P. Sartre, as (...) well as M. Merleau Ponty, acknowledge Husserl's phenomenology as the source of their thought; from this starting point on each of them produces a new philosophy that grasps freedom in the corresponding perspective. The second and the third moment of this study expose these positions. The survey of Sartre's thoughts introduced by means of a short reference to A. Camus. Actualization of freedom implies a multifaceted realm of issues: The relation between freedom and situation is not free from conflicts. The case - for sure, an hyperbolic one - that has been chosen to depict such difficult relationship is The flies, Sartre's version of Electra, the tragic subject that Aeschylus pre-announced and that inspired Sophocles as well as Euripides. There is a second reason for the choice of this text: therein Sartre's telling about Orestes' deeds in relation to freedom is close, if not equal, to that of Merleau Ponty.En la introducción a este estudio se retoma la distinción kantiana entre"libertad de" y "libertad para", aplicada a situaciones concretas. Como punto de partida de una fenomenología de la libertad, se expone, de manera resumida, la posición de Husserl, quien desde la temporalidad de la conciencia y la consecuente historicidad del yo, así como de la reflexión sobre sí mismo, señala la autoregulación como forma superior de la libertad. Tanto J.P. Sartre como M. Merleau Ponty reconocen su filiación respecto de la fenomenología husserliana, a partir de la que cada uno de ellos produce su propia filosofía y, enfoca la libertad, desde la correspondiente perspectiva. El segundo y tercer momento de este trabajo expone sus respectivas posiciones. Antes de comenzar la exposición de Sartre se alude brevemente a la de A. Camus. El ejercicio efectivo de la libertad trae consigo una problemática compleja. La dificultad de la relación de la libertad con la situación puede desembocar en un conflicto. El caso - hiperbólico, por cierto - que se elige aquí para ilustrar esa dificultad es una obra de teatro, Las Moscas, versión sartreana de Electra, tema trágico que preanunció Esquilo e inspiró tanto a Sófocles como a Eurípides. La segunda razón por la que se opta por este texto es que en él la posición de Sartre se acerca a la de Merleau Ponty. (shrink)

In terms of Husserl's phenomenology, the "facts" usually referent in the real world in all occurred practical or situation , a non-rational and accidental there area. The "essence" is required that the nature of things the same idea , with absolute and inevitable features. According to the "facts" and "nature" is basically a group of opposing concepts, or association between the two, but should not be confused with each other. On the other hand, Husserl is clearly not as "facts" and (...) "essence" of the two is completely against the concept of mutually exclusive, on the contrary that originally belonged to the accidental fact that the field experience also has the nature of transcendence and absolute . How should this point to understand it? This paper attempts to the above question is to clarify the issue. In this article, I aim at showing how Husserl explains the concept of "factum" in his phenomenology. There are three main focuses in my research: Firstly, I will elucidate the essence of fact which is constituted by the transcendental subjectivity. Secondly, I intend to demonstrate how Husserl can characterize the factum as "absolutness" and "nonnecessity". On the basis of that, finally, I will clarify the difference between "contingence" and "nonnecessity" of factum. (shrink)

De início, analisamos como a associação entre realismo metafísico e relatividade conceitual deixa em aberto a possibilidade de uma dúvida cética radical acerca do conhecimento da realidade. Em seguida, avaliamos se os projetos fenomenológicos de Husserl e de Merleau-Ponty fornecem alguma resposta a tal dúvida. Centramo-nos principalmente na obra de Merleau-Ponty, que, segundo nossa interpretação, caracteriza-se inicialmente por uma postura idealista, a qual é abandonada em prol de um tipo de realismo que qualifica o ser como sensível.

The Absolute in Husserl's phenomenology. In this first part I review Husserl's phenomenology and his concept of Absolute as well as the role this concept played in his philosophical thought. I also present the rationale for my choice of Husserl's phenomenological method as a tool for this research. ;The Absolute as experienced through natural knowledge. Having evaluated Husserl's stand on the notion of the Absolute as well as its importance in his thought, I distance myself from his philosophical thought retaining (...) only the phenomenological method as a tool in my attempt to ground the experience of the Absolute stressing altogether the importance and the fundamental role of the intuition and experience in the cognitive process. ;The Absolute as the Metaphysical object of our experience. In this section of my research I argue that the Absolute is experienced on a Metaphysical level, thus reaching beyond natural knowledge. The concept of the Absolute brings forth a disclosure of the self. ;The Absolute as the principle and the finitude of human experience. Having dealt with the experience of the Absolute in 'Natural Knowledge' and with the experience of the Absolute as a 'Metaphysical experience' I will ascertain my position and attempt to clarify the contention that the experience of the Absolute is the principle and the end of human experience, altogether remaining aware of the lacunae present in different approaches. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

This paper takes its start from the unpublished Leibnizian manuscript of which a critical edition and an Italian translation are presented by the Author in the same issue of “Discipline filosofiche‘ -- in particular from some passages concerning what we might roughly call teleological projections. A parallel analysis of Leibniz’s and Husserl’s attitudes to the attribution of teleological properties, at various levels of complexity, factuality, ideality, to the natural world and to human history, shows in Husserl’s teleology a mix of (...) ingredients very similar to those of Leibniz’s own one -- ingredients that Husserl always relished -- but with quite different results. On the one hand, for Husserl the universal order is teleologically realised in humanity, albeit with a reference to transcendence that has never been made by him completely clear. On the other hand, perhaps thanks to being unaware of Kant’s future contributions to the field, Leibniz seems more capable to avoid certain naïver forms of teleological attribution to which Husserl might seem more prone. (shrink)

Even the most cursory reader of Husserl’s writings must be struck by the frequent references to essences (“Wesen”, “Essenzen”), Ideas (“Idee”), kinds, natures, types and species and to necessities, possibilities, impossi- bilities, necessary possibilities, essential necessities and essential laws. What does Husserl have in mind in talking of essences and modalities? What did he take the relation between essentiality and modality to be? In the absence of answers to these questions it is not clear that a reader of Husserl can (...) be said to understand him. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how the concept of “possible world”, that Husserl inherits from his study of logics, is capital for the understanding of his phenomenology. This concept is a fine tool that provides him a possibility to articulate the question of the physical and the cultural dimensions of some objects. A cultural object as a book or a painting has in fact two dimensions: a “material” one and a “spiritual” one. The author examines which are (...) the relationships between those two dimensions. This question leads him to an interrogation on the genesis of the ideality of the cultural world. Is there not a contradiction between the ideality of the meaning and his historical genesis? In order to provide an answer to this question, the author suggests that one may use the notion of a “linked ideality”, i.e. ideal but linked up to the earth. (shrink)

One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind-independent sedimented meaning-contents. These meaning-contents serve (...) as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning-constitution. (shrink)

Husserl's theory of "transcendental ego" is often read as a metaphysical absolute idealism. The author attempts to fight this view and to give its phenomenological meaning to the "ego". It is the name of the "presence" the consciousness-life owns, beyond all metaphysical construction. So Husserl gives a new chance to egology, related to the frame of phenomenality itself. In this way a non-metaphysical re-reading of the cartesian cogito seems authorized.

Western philosophy since Kant has been essentially operating within a Kantian anti-metaphysical paradigm. German-language philosophy, and a fortiori Husserl's phenomenology, is no exception to this. Here I argue that despite his putative eschewal of metaphysics in the phenomenological reduction or epoché Husserl deploys an ontological, even fundamental ontological, vocabulary and may be read as a metaphysician malgre lui . To the extent to which this interpretation is viable, one escape route from the critical paradigm would seem to be opened up.

L’intérêt durable porté par Edmund Husserl aux travaux de William James en dépit de la divergence de leurs projets philosophiques s’explique sans doute par deux traits saillants de la psychologie de James qui l’inscrivent dans le prolongement de celle de Franz Brentano et lui confèrent même une certaine supériorité par rapport à cette dernière. Ces deux traits sont d’une part la capacité de James à articuler de manière particulièrement convaincante les analyses de psychologie descriptive aux explications en termes neurophysiologiques et (...) d’autre part sa capacité à penser le caractère dynamique du flux de conscience et la genèse en lui de la structure intentionnelle. Bien plus, loin de la condamner au psychologisme, ces deux traits de la pensée de James s’inscrivent sur fond d’une critique très sévère de la « psychologist’s fallacy » commise notamment dans l’école associationniste, critique qui marqua profondément Husserl.The long lasting interest which Edmund Husserl has taken in William James’ work in spite of their very different philosophical projects can be explained by two significant features which place James’ psychology in the continuation of Franz Brentano’s and even confer it some superiority compared to the latter. These features are on the one hand James’s ability to combine analyses of descriptive psychology with explanations of neurophysiology and on the other hand James’ ability to study the dynamic nature of the stream of consciousness as well as the intentional structure arising from this stream. Furthermore, far from condemning him to psychologism, both these features of James’ thought take their roots in a very strong criticism of the « psychologist’s fallacy » made in the associationist school, criticism which impressed Husserl deeply. (shrink)

L’une des tâches de la phénoménologie transcendantale, que Husserl lui-même définit comme une science éidétique des phénomènes transcendentalement réduits, est de découvrir des lois a priori matérielles d’un type spécial : des lois éidétiques descriptives établies sur la base de concepts descriptifs purs. Cet article s’attache d’abord à préciser la notion husserlienne d’essence au le sens large, définie comme une fonction d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsfunktion) ; une telle fonction noématique est le corrélat « objectif » de cette fonction propositionnelle que nous appelons (...) « concept » et qui est une partie de la proposition, c’est-à-dire de la visée-d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsmeinung) par laquelle on projette un état-de-choses. En revanche, par essences au sens étroit ou strict on entend ces essences pures que Husserl appelle « Eide ». Le concept d’essence pure propre à l’éidétique descriptive phénoménologique est ainsi clarifié par une explication de la notion husserlienne de « concept descriptif pure », dans le but de montrer comment ces concepts, qui sont des pures concepts de types, se distinguent des concept descriptifs impures, et notamment des concepts dénotant des genres naturels. Fondées exclusivement sur des concepts descriptifs purs, les lois éidétiques descriptives (Wesensgesetze) possèdent des conditions de vérités particulières et nécessitent de modalités d’examen tout autant spécifiques. La place propre à la méthode appelée « variation éidétique » est justement celle de examiner, falsifier ou justifier des lois éidétiques descriptives présumées. A partir de cas exemplaires d’états-de-choses familiers confirmant les lois présumées, la variation libre, qui opère dans la pure imagination, a pour tâche de construire des contre-exemples possibles dont le but est de falsifier la loi éidétique présumée. La propriété d’être falsifiable par des contre-exemples construits dans la pure imagination permet de distinguer les lois empiriques des lois éidétiques descriptives de l’éidétique husserlienne. La possibilité de falsifier par des contre-exemples fictionnels ou factuels montre que la phénoménologie transcendantale est une entreprise scientifique ouverte à l’examen intersubjectif, et cela justement en raison de son caractère éidétique. (shrink)

Es wird versucht nachzuweisen wiesehr Husserl neben der immer erneuten Übung der Phänomenologie als ein Instrument genauester philosophischer Analyse immer mit metaphysischen Fragen „alten Stils” beschäftigt gewesen ist : Ursprung der Welt, Existenz Gottes, Möglichkeit und Sinn der Geschichte, Unsterblichkeit. Solche und ähnliche Probleme hat er angeschnitten und neu zu beantworten versucht auf dem von ihm nie verlassenen Boden der transzendentalsubjektiven Phänomenologie. Die Frage ist eben wie eine solche Phänomenologie, die vom Bewusstsein als dem Absoluten, das „nulla ‘re’ indiget ad (...) existendum” ausgeht und daran immer festgehalten hat mit der metaphysischen Problematik ins Reine kommt, namentlich wenn das mit der Transzendenz Gottes gemeinte Absolute dem Bewusstseinsabsoluten gegenüber als „ total verschieden” und „übertranszendentalsubjektiv” bezeichnet wird. Stösst das transzendentale Bewusstsein irgendwo auf Absolutes, das es unter Verzicht auf seinen konstitutiven Leistungscharakter ohne weiteres hinzunehmen hat ? Von Fink stammt die Bemerkung dass man Husserl als dem „Philosophen des Kleingeldes” seine unspekulative Gesinnung nicht als Schwachheit anrechnen darf, weil in der sorgfältigen Analyse eben seine Stärke liege. Ich möchte demgegenüber betonen dass eine „manque d'esprit métaphysique” sich bei Husserl eben nicht nachweisen lässt, wie auch aus seinen geschichtsphilosophischen Bemühungen eindeutig hervorgeht. In dieser letzten Beziehung liesse sich fragen inwiefern eine Philosophie, die den Ursprung der Geschichte in die transzendentale Subjektivität verlegt auf die „wirkliche” Geschichte als das „grosse Faktum des absoluten Seins” sich zu berufen ein Recht hat. Jedenfalls dürfte klar sein dass es neben Husserl, dem geduldigen, sorgfältigen, auf das Detail hinsehenden phänomenologischen Analytiker einen durch metaphysische Fragen in andauernder Unruhe versetzten Husserl gegeben hat. (shrink)

Loin d'être une « égologie cartésienne » ou un « apriorisme kantien », la phénoménologie husserlienne se veut, d'un bout à l'autre de l'œuvre, une subversion des alternatives classiques dont relèvent selon elle Descartes et Kant et par lesquelles se définit la métaphysique au sens large. S'il est vrai que Husserl revendique un « idéalisme transcendantal », c'est en approfondissant la réfutation kantienne de l'idéalisme, et cela en un geste qui, par le biais de l'intentionnalité comme autotranscendance subvertissant l'opposition principielle (...) du sujet et de l'objet, préfigure déjà l'annulation heideggérienne du « scandale » qui préoccupait encore Kant, mais selon une voie qui n'oublie pas pour autant de rendre compte de la possibilité de la connaissance. Far from being a « Cartesian egology » or a « Kantian apriorism », phenomenology is meant, from one end to another of the Husserlian work, to overthrow the traditional alternatives, i.e. metaphysics in a wider sense, including Descartes and Kant. Though Husserl asserts to be a « transcendantal idealist », one may get over the fundamental opposition between subject and object only by looking further into the Kantian refutation of idealism by the means of a reinterpretation of intentionnality as selftranscendence. Such an approach forecasts the Heideggerian cancelling of the scandal that used to bother Kant, but according to a new way not eschewing to give an account of the possibility of knowledge. (shrink)