Husserl: Metaphysics

This paper analyzes and compares the attempts at solving the paradox of non-existence put forward by Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl. It will be argued that Meinong’s solution is not convincing since he retreats from the field of predicate logic, in which the paradox arises, to a version of propositional logic. On the other hand, Husserl´s approach is more promising since he moves forward to an extension of predicate logic, in which judgments may be evaluated in relation to different contexts (...) or, in Husserl´s terminology, “spheres”. More precisely, to Husserl, existential judgments have to be interpreted as a kind of cross-sphere judgments, and thus existence fulfills a function loosely analogous to that of modal operators in possible-worlds semantics. (shrink)

The Absolute in Husserl's phenomenology. In this first part I review Husserl's phenomenology and his concept of Absolute as well as the role this concept played in his philosophical thought. I also present the rationale for my choice of Husserl's phenomenological method as a tool for this research. ;The Absolute as experienced through natural knowledge. Having evaluated Husserl's stand on the notion of the Absolute as well as its importance in his thought, I distance myself from his philosophical thought retaining (...) only the phenomenological method as a tool in my attempt to ground the experience of the Absolute stressing altogether the importance and the fundamental role of the intuition and experience in the cognitive process. ;The Absolute as the Metaphysical object of our experience. In this section of my research I argue that the Absolute is experienced on a Metaphysical level, thus reaching beyond natural knowledge. The concept of the Absolute brings forth a disclosure of the self. ;The Absolute as the principle and the finitude of human experience. Having dealt with the experience of the Absolute in 'Natural Knowledge' and with the experience of the Absolute as a 'Metaphysical experience' I will ascertain my position and attempt to clarify the contention that the experience of the Absolute is the principle and the end of human experience, altogether remaining aware of the lacunae present in different approaches. (shrink)

Loin d'être une « égologie cartésienne » ou un « apriorisme kantien », la phénoménologie husserlienne se veut, d'un bout à l'autre de l'œuvre, une subversion des alternatives classiques dont relèvent selon elle Descartes et Kant et par lesquelles se définit la métaphysique au sens large. S'il est vrai que Husserl revendique un « idéalisme transcendantal », c'est en approfondissant la réfutation kantienne de l'idéalisme, et cela en un geste qui, par le biais de l'intentionnalité comme autotranscendance subvertissant l'opposition principielle (...) du sujet et de l'objet, préfigure déjà l'annulation heideggérienne du « scandale » qui préoccupait encore Kant, mais selon une voie qui n'oublie pas pour autant de rendre compte de la possibilité de la connaissance. Far from being a « Cartesian egology » or a « Kantian apriorism », phenomenology is meant, from one end to another of the Husserlian work, to overthrow the traditional alternatives, i.e. metaphysics in a wider sense, including Descartes and Kant. Though Husserl asserts to be a « transcendantal idealist », one may get over the fundamental opposition between subject and object only by looking further into the Kantian refutation of idealism by the means of a reinterpretation of intentionnality as selftranscendence. Such an approach forecasts the Heideggerian cancelling of the scandal that used to bother Kant, but according to a new way not eschewing to give an account of the possibility of knowledge. (shrink)

Es wird versucht nachzuweisen wiesehr Husserl neben der immer erneuten Übung der Phänomenologie als ein Instrument genauester philosophischer Analyse immer mit metaphysischen Fragen „alten Stils” beschäftigt gewesen ist : Ursprung der Welt, Existenz Gottes, Möglichkeit und Sinn der Geschichte, Unsterblichkeit. Solche und ähnliche Probleme hat er angeschnitten und neu zu beantworten versucht auf dem von ihm nie verlassenen Boden der transzendentalsubjektiven Phänomenologie. Die Frage ist eben wie eine solche Phänomenologie, die vom Bewusstsein als dem Absoluten, das „nulla ‘re’ indiget ad (...) existendum” ausgeht und daran immer festgehalten hat mit der metaphysischen Problematik ins Reine kommt, namentlich wenn das mit der Transzendenz Gottes gemeinte Absolute dem Bewusstseinsabsoluten gegenüber als „ total verschieden” und „übertranszendentalsubjektiv” bezeichnet wird. Stösst das transzendentale Bewusstsein irgendwo auf Absolutes, das es unter Verzicht auf seinen konstitutiven Leistungscharakter ohne weiteres hinzunehmen hat ? Von Fink stammt die Bemerkung dass man Husserl als dem „Philosophen des Kleingeldes” seine unspekulative Gesinnung nicht als Schwachheit anrechnen darf, weil in der sorgfältigen Analyse eben seine Stärke liege. Ich möchte demgegenüber betonen dass eine „manque d'esprit métaphysique” sich bei Husserl eben nicht nachweisen lässt, wie auch aus seinen geschichtsphilosophischen Bemühungen eindeutig hervorgeht. In dieser letzten Beziehung liesse sich fragen inwiefern eine Philosophie, die den Ursprung der Geschichte in die transzendentale Subjektivität verlegt auf die „wirkliche” Geschichte als das „grosse Faktum des absoluten Seins” sich zu berufen ein Recht hat. Jedenfalls dürfte klar sein dass es neben Husserl, dem geduldigen, sorgfältigen, auf das Detail hinsehenden phänomenologischen Analytiker einen durch metaphysische Fragen in andauernder Unruhe versetzten Husserl gegeben hat. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to deal with E. Husserl’s and E. Stein’s analyses on the anthropological and metaphysical questions. To perform this task it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, first of all in Husserl and then in E. Stein, underscoring the novelty of their approach to the knowledge of human being, world and God. The essay is divided in four parts; two are dedicated to Husserl’s and Stein’s investigation on the human being and (...) two to their development of metaphysical themes. Regarding the first topic we discover a significant connection between the two thinkers, regarding the second one we notice that it is possible to find a metaphysical approach to reality even in Husserl and an original development of the theme in Stein’s analysis linked up with the medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Husserl's theory of "transcendental ego" is often read as a metaphysical absolute idealism. The author attempts to fight this view and to give its phenomenological meaning to the "ego". It is the name of the "presence" the consciousness-life owns, beyond all metaphysical construction. So Husserl gives a new chance to egology, related to the frame of phenomenality itself. In this way a non-metaphysical re-reading of the cartesian cogito seems authorized.

The aim of this paper is to show how the concept of “possible world”, that Husserl inherits from his study of logics, is capital for the understanding of his phenomenology. This concept is a fine tool that provides him a possibility to articulate the question of the physical and the cultural dimensions of some objects. A cultural object as a book or a painting has in fact two dimensions: a “material” one and a “spiritual” one. The author examines which are (...) the relationships between those two dimensions. This question leads him to an interrogation on the genesis of the ideality of the cultural world. Is there not a contradiction between the ideality of the meaning and his historical genesis? In order to provide an answer to this question, the author suggests that one may use the notion of a “linked ideality”, i.e. ideal but linked up to the earth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how the concept of “possible world”, that Husserl inherits from his study of logics, is capital for the understanding of his phenomenology. This concept is a fine tool that provides him a possibility to articulate the question of the physical and the cultural dimensions of some objects. A cultural object as a book or a painting has in fact two dimensions: a “material” one and a “spiritual” one. The author examines which are (...) the relationships between those two dimensions. This question leads him to an interrogation on the genesis of the ideality of the cultural world. Is there not a contradiction between the ideality of the meaning and his historical genesis? In order to provide an answer to this question, the author suggests that one may use the notion of a “linked ideality”, i.e. ideal but linked up to the earth. (shrink)

Hedwig Conrad-Martius was honoured with the Bundesverdienstkreuz, the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, on March 1st, 1958. What follows is her acceptance speech on that occasion. In this speech, Conrad-Martius not only gives an account of her biography as a phenomenologist who studied directly with Husserl, but also demonstrates that Husserl’s work is open to a peculiar form of subjective materialist interpretation that can explain his transcendental turn. The speech is an important document for those who (...) support the possibility of a Husserlian transcendental materialism. (shrink)

I argue that Edmund Husserl's phenomenology maintains a substantive relationship to the metaphysical tradition in Western philosophy. I also argue that it offers resources for philosophical thought that seeks to recover the insights of that tradition from contemporary dismissals. ;In Part One, I claim that metaphysical philosophy is characterized by two orders of philosophical reflection and their interrelationship. Metaphysical philosophy is not simply an ontology of entities , but is also concerned with the conditions under which such an account emerges (...) in our experience , as well as the relationship both kinds of reflection bear to our action . I discern a "classical" metaphysical project in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas before moving to Rene Descartes' transformation of it. In Descartes, I argue, we find the origins of modernity's negative reception of metaphysical philosophy in his narrow conception of second-order reflection. ;In Part Two, I argue that Husserl's phenomenology represents an extreme attempt to think through the negative potential of Descartes' discovery of subjectivity by reflecting upon his radical doubt. In a discussion of spatial perception, eidetic predication, intersubjectivity, genetic phenomenological method, and Husserl's conception of God, I show that Husserl's phenomenological method is an attempt to recover the classical conception of second-order reflection. I also attempt to show that Husserl's metaphysical thinking lies in his analyses of synthesis in consciousness as it is accessible to present consciousness. ;In Part Three, I examine critiques of Husserl's phenomenology provided by Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Both of these phenomenologists critique Husserl's attempt to invest synthesis with metaphysical significance. Heidegger suggests that all such syntheses are conditioned by the difference of being and beings, a relationship that is never a synthetic act of consciousness. Fink argues that all such syntheses refer back to primal acts of synthesis that occur before reflection comes on the scene, and so reflection can only construct them hypothetically. While both critiques have their merit, I argue that both also miss key elements of Husserl's analysis of synthesis and of phenomenal presence that are worthy of development. (shrink)

The main goal of the present paper is to offer a preliminary study of the relations between phenomenology and metaphysics in Husserl. After a brief presentation of what Husserl means by the term “metaphysics”, the rest of our research will consist of a detailed commentary on §60 of the Cartesian Meditations. Our aim is to explain in what sense, according to Husserl, the “outcomes” of the phenomenological constitution of monadological intersubjectivity entail the solution to a traditional metaphysical problem, i.e., that (...) of the existence of just one real world. The present investigation does not pretend to be more than an introduction. Besides shedding some light on a specific text, it will pave the way for a future inquiry into the relations between phenomenology and metaphysics in Husserl. (shrink)

One major difficulty confronting attempts to clarify the epistemological and ontological status of abstract objects is determining the sense, if any, in which such entities may be characterised as mind and language independent. Our contention is that the tolerant reductionist position of Michael Dummett can be strengthened by drawing on Husserl's mature account of the constitution of ideal objects and mathematical objectivity. According to the Husserlian position we advocate, abstract singular terms pick out weakly mind-independent sedimented meaning-contents. These meaning-contents serve (...) as the ‘thin’ referents of abstract singular terms, but are ultimately founded in prior acts of meaning-constitution. (shrink)

De início, analisamos como a associação entre realismo metafísico e relatividade conceitual deixa em aberto a possibilidade de uma dúvida cética radical acerca do conhecimento da realidade. Em seguida, avaliamos se os projetos fenomenológicos de Husserl e de Merleau-Ponty fornecem alguma resposta a tal dúvida. Centramo-nos principalmente na obra de Merleau-Ponty, que, segundo nossa interpretação, caracteriza-se inicialmente por uma postura idealista, a qual é abandonada em prol de um tipo de realismo que qualifica o ser como sensível.

The debate between speculative realism and phenomenology has become quite heated over the past years. The matter of contention is the possibility of a metaphysics that can provide knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The speculative realists accuse phenomenology of denying this possibility, confining knowledge to the sphere of subjectivity. What has been overlooked in this debate is the similarity between the speculative project of Quentin Meillassoux and a Husserlian metaphysics. This article looks at these positions from a (...) reconciliatory point of view. After outlining the debate, conceding the problematic nature of realism for phenomenology to the speculative realists, it will be shown that there is a place for a realist metaphysics within phenomenology. After showing the similarities between Meillassoux’s philosophy and a phenomenological metaphysics, and the legitimacy of qualifying the latter as a speculative realism, the conclusion will reflect on the modal notions at play in them. (shrink)

This article attempts to develop the abandoned occasionalist model of causation into a credible present-day theory. If objects can never exhaust one another through their relations, it is hard to know how they can ever interact at all. This article handles the problem by dividing objects into two kinds: the real objects that emerge from Heidegger’s tool-analysis and the intentional objects of Husserl’s phenomenology. Each of these objects turns out to be split by an additional rift between the object as (...) an enduring unit and its plurality of traits. This explains Heidegger’s notorious ‘fourfold’ model of the thing. This article shows that Heidegger’s Geviert must be reinterpreted as a system of four tensions that can be identified as time, space, essence, and eidos. Time and space can no longer be left as peerless dimensions of the cosmos. Instead, they are shown to arise from the tensions between things and their qualities. And for this reason they are joined by essence (in the classical sense of the term) and eidos (in Husserl’s sense, not Plato’s) as two out of four basic features of the fabric of the world. (shrink)

The Introduction to this study takes into consideration the Kantian distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to" applied to concrete situations. In a summary way, the author proposes Husserl's position, as starting point of a phenomenology of freedom. Hereby issues as temporality of consciousness and the consequent historical character of the ego as well as its reflection upon itself, are stepping stones leading to the paramount point of Husserl's conception, i.e. self-regulation as the superior form of freedom. J.P. Sartre, as (...) well as M. Merleau Ponty, acknowledge Husserl's phenomenology as the source of their thought; from this starting point on each of them produces a new philosophy that grasps freedom in the corresponding perspective. The second and the third moment of this study expose these positions. The survey of Sartre's thoughts introduced by means of a short reference to A. Camus. Actualization of freedom implies a multifaceted realm of issues: The relation between freedom and situation is not free from conflicts. The case - for sure, an hyperbolic one - that has been chosen to depict such difficult relationship is The flies, Sartre's version of Electra, the tragic subject that Aeschylus pre-announced and that inspired Sophocles as well as Euripides. There is a second reason for the choice of this text: therein Sartre's telling about Orestes' deeds in relation to freedom is close, if not equal, to that of Merleau Ponty.En la introducción a este estudio se retoma la distinción kantiana entre"libertad de" y "libertad para", aplicada a situaciones concretas. Como punto de partida de una fenomenología de la libertad, se expone, de manera resumida, la posición de Husserl, quien desde la temporalidad de la conciencia y la consecuente historicidad del yo, así como de la reflexión sobre sí mismo, señala la autoregulación como forma superior de la libertad. Tanto J.P. Sartre como M. Merleau Ponty reconocen su filiación respecto de la fenomenología husserliana, a partir de la que cada uno de ellos produce su propia filosofía y, enfoca la libertad, desde la correspondiente perspectiva. El segundo y tercer momento de este trabajo expone sus respectivas posiciones. Antes de comenzar la exposición de Sartre se alude brevemente a la de A. Camus. El ejercicio efectivo de la libertad trae consigo una problemática compleja. La dificultad de la relación de la libertad con la situación puede desembocar en un conflicto. El caso - hiperbólico, por cierto - que se elige aquí para ilustrar esa dificultad es una obra de teatro, Las Moscas, versión sartreana de Electra, tema trágico que preanunció Esquilo e inspiró tanto a Sófocles como a Eurípides. La segunda razón por la que se opta por este texto es que en él la posición de Sartre se acerca a la de Merleau Ponty. (shrink)

L’intérêt durable porté par Edmund Husserl aux travaux de William James en dépit de la divergence de leurs projets philosophiques s’explique sans doute par deux traits saillants de la psychologie de James qui l’inscrivent dans le prolongement de celle de Franz Brentano et lui confèrent même une certaine supériorité par rapport à cette dernière. Ces deux traits sont d’une part la capacité de James à articuler de manière particulièrement convaincante les analyses de psychologie descriptive aux explications en termes neurophysiologiques et (...) d’autre part sa capacité à penser le caractère dynamique du flux de conscience et la genèse en lui de la structure intentionnelle. Bien plus, loin de la condamner au psychologisme, ces deux traits de la pensée de James s’inscrivent sur fond d’une critique très sévère de la « psychologist’s fallacy » commise notamment dans l’école associationniste, critique qui marqua profondément Husserl.The long lasting interest which Edmund Husserl has taken in William James’ work in spite of their very different philosophical projects can be explained by two significant features which place James’ psychology in the continuation of Franz Brentano’s and even confer it some superiority compared to the latter. These features are on the one hand James’s ability to combine analyses of descriptive psychology with explanations of neurophysiology and on the other hand James’ ability to study the dynamic nature of the stream of consciousness as well as the intentional structure arising from this stream. Furthermore, far from condemning him to psychologism, both these features of James’ thought take their roots in a very strong criticism of the « psychologist’s fallacy » made in the associationist school, criticism which impressed Husserl deeply. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra’s doctrine of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the ‘problem of essence’. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist phenomenology because: 1) Yogācārins, especially late Yogācārins represented (...) by Xuanzang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; 2) Husserl’s phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal sense that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In terms of Husserl's phenomenology, the "facts" usually referent in the real world in all occurred practical or situation , a non-rational and accidental there area. The "essence" is required that the nature of things the same idea , with absolute and inevitable features. According to the "facts" and "nature" is basically a group of opposing concepts, or association between the two, but should not be confused with each other. On the other hand, Husserl is clearly not as "facts" and (...) "essence" of the two is completely against the concept of mutually exclusive, on the contrary that originally belonged to the accidental fact that the field experience also has the nature of transcendence and absolute . How should this point to understand it? This paper attempts to the above question is to clarify the issue. In this article, I aim at showing how Husserl explains the concept of "factum" in his phenomenology. There are three main focuses in my research: Firstly, I will elucidate the essence of fact which is constituted by the transcendental subjectivity. Secondly, I intend to demonstrate how Husserl can characterize the factum as "absolutness" and "nonnecessity". On the basis of that, finally, I will clarify the difference between "contingence" and "nonnecessity" of factum. (shrink)

This paper presents an interpretation of Husserl''s phenomenological epoché or bracketing ( Einklammerung), which makes it possible to compare his position with philosophical programs developed within the framework of modern analytical philosophy. At the same time it asks in what sense Husserl''s phenomenology is a form of idealism or exceeds the traditional discussion of idealism versus realism.

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question of species-integrity, arguing (...) in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

Even the most cursory reader of Husserl’s writings must be struck by the frequent references to essences (“Wesen”, “Essenzen”), Ideas (“Idee”), kinds, natures, types and species and to necessities, possibilities, impossi- bilities, necessary possibilities, essential necessities and essential laws. What does Husserl have in mind in talking of essences and modalities? What did he take the relation between essentiality and modality to be? In the absence of answers to these questions it is not clear that a reader of Husserl can (...) be said to understand him. (shrink)

e following essay is organized around eighteen theses concerning the relationship between freedom, responsibility and self- awareness that I believe are both correct and consistent with specic doctrines and the overall positions advanced in Husserl’s published writings. e eighteen theses are not meant to represent a deductive argument. Most of them are not unique to Husserl or phenomenological philosophy, but I’m not aware of any other thinker who has hat brought all of them together as does Husserl.

Gilbert Ryle never pursued research under Edmund Husserl. However, Ryle was indeed Husserl’s student in a broader sense, as much of his own work was deeply influenced by his studies of Husserl’s pre-World War I writings. While Ryle is the thinker whose name typically comes to mind in connection with the concern over category mistakes I argue that (1) Husserl deserves to be known for precisely this concern as well, and (2) the similarity between them is no accident. Developing this (...) reading of Ryle’s Husserlian pedigree forces a broader reevaluation of each of their roles in twentieth-century thought. (shrink)

This paper takes its start from the unpublished Leibnizian manuscript of which a critical edition and an Italian translation are presented by the Author in the same issue of “Discipline filosofiche‘ -- in particular from some passages concerning what we might roughly call teleological projections. A parallel analysis of Leibniz’s and Husserl’s attitudes to the attribution of teleological properties, at various levels of complexity, factuality, ideality, to the natural world and to human history, shows in Husserl’s teleology a mix of (...) ingredients very similar to those of Leibniz’s own one -- ingredients that Husserl always relished -- but with quite different results. On the one hand, for Husserl the universal order is teleologically realised in humanity, albeit with a reference to transcendence that has never been made by him completely clear. On the other hand, perhaps thanks to being unaware of Kant’s future contributions to the field, Leibniz seems more capable to avoid certain naïver forms of teleological attribution to which Husserl might seem more prone. (shrink)

The concept of possibility has an essential function within Husserlian phenomenology. Firstly Husserlian phenomenology is an eidetical one, which is based on a subjective relation towards mere possibilities; secondly phenomenological reduction reduces all effective objects to mere possible objects of thought; thirdly the thesis of transcendental idealism implies a supremacy of possible sense over reality; and each type of transcendental constitution presupposes an “I can”, that is a practical possibility or capacity of the subject. This paper wants to focuse the (...) way on which Husserl conceives a concept of possibility which is different from the Aristotelican concept of δύναμις, from the Leibnizian conception of the being of possible worlds and from the Kantian conception of the possible as a modality of subjective knowledge: where does possibility have to be situated, on the subjective or objective level? And in which domain do modalities have their origin: in the subjective sphere of stands, in the ideal... (shrink)

Western philosophy since Kant has been essentially operating within a Kantian anti-metaphysical paradigm. German-language philosophy, and a fortiori Husserl's phenomenology, is no exception to this. Here I argue that despite his putative eschewal of metaphysics in the phenomenological reduction or epoché Husserl deploys an ontological, even fundamental ontological, vocabulary and may be read as a metaphysician malgre lui . To the extent to which this interpretation is viable, one escape route from the critical paradigm would seem to be opened up.

The aim of this paper is to state, by scrutinizing Formal and Transcendental Logic, that: 1) transcendental phenomenology doesn't dismiss the idea of nomology, which was the core of the 1901 platonism; 2) its main point is, on the one hand, to root in the transcendental ego the logical « an sich » and, on the other hand, to ground on it the idea of sapientia universalis ; 3) the 1929 solution of the later point leads Husserl to put forward (...) an « universal a priori ontology » which, in fact, calls into doubt the 1901 « material a priori ». Il s'agit de montrer, par une analyse de la doctrine du jugement développée dans Logique formelle et logique transcendantale, que : 1) la phénoménologie transcendantale ne renie pas l'idée de nomologie qui était au cœur du platonisme des Recherches logiques; 2) son objectif primordial est, d'une part, de penser l'enracinement de l'en soi logique dans la subjectivité transcendantale, et d'autre part, de fonder sur lui l'idée de sapientia universalis; 3) cette fondation, telle que l'établissent les analyses de 1929, conduit Husserl à réhabiliter une « ontologie a priori universelle » qui, en réalité, remet en question la notion d' « a priori matérial » qu'avaient élaborée les Recherches. (shrink)

La lógica es para Husserl una ciencia de la ciencia, una ciencia de lo que todas las ciencias tienen en común respecto de sus modos de validación. De este modo, la lógica trata por un lado con leyes universales relacionadas con la verdad, la deducción, la verificación y la falsación; y, por otro lado, con leyes relacionadas con la teoría como tal, y con lo que produce la unidad teorética. Ambos tipos de leyes se refieren por una parte a las (...) proposiciones de una teoría y por otra parte al dominio de objetos al que esas proposiciones se refieren. Este ensayo presenta una perspectiva sistemática del punto de vista husserliano sobre estos temas tal como él lo expone en sus Investigaciones Lógicas. Se muestra la manera en que su teoría de los significados lingüísticos en tanto especies de actos mentales, su ontología formal de la parte, el todo y la dependencia, su teoría de las categorías significativas, y su teoría de la intuición categorial combinada con su teoría de la ciencia conforman un todo singular. Finalmente, este trabajo explora la forma en que las ideas de Husserl sobre estos temas pueden ser reactivadas para resolver problemas en la filosofía del lenguaje, la lógica y la matemática de un modo que haga justicia al rol de la actividad mental en cada uno de estos dominios, evitando al mismo tiempo caer en los problemas del psicologismo. (shrink)

This essay explores an ideal notion of form (mathematical structure) that embraces logical, phenomenological, and ontological form. Husserl envisioned a correlation among forms of expression, thought, meaning, and object—positing ideal forms on all these levels. The most puzzling formal entities Husserl discussed were those he called ‘manifolds’. These manifolds, I propose, are forms of complex states of affairs or partial possible worlds representable by forms of theories (compare structuralism). Accordingly, I sketch an intentionality-based semantics correlating these four Husserlian levels of (...) form—thereby integrating logic, phenomenology, and ontology. (shrink)

L’une des tâches de la phénoménologie transcendantale, que Husserl lui-même définit comme une science éidétique des phénomènes transcendentalement réduits, est de découvrir des lois a priori matérielles d’un type spécial : des lois éidétiques descriptives établies sur la base de concepts descriptifs purs. Cet article s’attache d’abord à préciser la notion husserlienne d’essence au le sens large, définie comme une fonction d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsfunktion) ; une telle fonction noématique est le corrélat « objectif » de cette fonction propositionnelle que nous appelons (...) « concept » et qui est une partie de la proposition, c’est-à-dire de la visée-d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsmeinung) par laquelle on projette un état-de-choses. En revanche, par essences au sens étroit ou strict on entend ces essences pures que Husserl appelle « Eide ». Le concept d’essence pure propre à l’éidétique descriptive phénoménologique est ainsi clarifié par une explication de la notion husserlienne de « concept descriptif pure », dans le but de montrer comment ces concepts, qui sont des pures concepts de types, se distinguent des concept descriptifs impures, et notamment des concepts dénotant des genres naturels. Fondées exclusivement sur des concepts descriptifs purs, les lois éidétiques descriptives (Wesensgesetze) possèdent des conditions de vérités particulières et nécessitent de modalités d’examen tout autant spécifiques. La place propre à la méthode appelée « variation éidétique » est justement celle de examiner, falsifier ou justifier des lois éidétiques descriptives présumées. A partir de cas exemplaires d’états-de-choses familiers confirmant les lois présumées, la variation libre, qui opère dans la pure imagination, a pour tâche de construire des contre-exemples possibles dont le but est de falsifier la loi éidétique présumée. La propriété d’être falsifiable par des contre-exemples construits dans la pure imagination permet de distinguer les lois empiriques des lois éidétiques descriptives de l’éidétique husserlienne. La possibilité de falsifier par des contre-exemples fictionnels ou factuels montre que la phénoménologie transcendantale est une entreprise scientifique ouverte à l’examen intersubjectif, et cela justement en raison de son caractère éidétique. (shrink)

Dan Zahavi raises doubts about the prospects for combining phenomenological and analytical approaches to the mind, based chiefly on the claim that phenomenology is a form of transcendental philosophy. I argue that there are two ways in which one might understand the claim that phenomenology is transcendental: (1) as the claim that the methods of phenomenology essentially involve addressing transcendental questions or making transcendental arguments, or (2) as the claim that phenomenology is committed to substantive theses of antirealism and the (...) like, which are sometimes thought to follow from atranscendental approach. I argue that while (1) is appropriate, it in no way leads to conflicts with analytic work in philosophy of mind. Moreover, adopting this method and practicing phenomenology in no way commits us to claims of type (2) that might be thought to conflict with common assumptions in analytic philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Zur Rationalität gehört die Logik, dis als insgesamt synthetisch angesehen wird, ferner der löckenlose faktische Zusammenhang. Löcken in Zusammenhang und unbeweisbare Axiome deuten auf Irrationalität hin. Unwissenschaftliche Rationalität entsteht durch spekulative Annahme von Axiomen. Widerspruchsfreiheit ist Bedingung der Realität und gilt auch im Irrationalen. Zum Erkennen gehören drei existentielle Fähigkeiten: Begriffe, Anschauungen und Einfühlung. Unterschiedliche Bewertung ist unzulässig. Überschreitung des Rationalen führt auch zur Metaphysik. Auf drei Vorschläge einer wissenschaflichen Metaphysik, die von H. Scholz, von Hegel und von Husserl wird (...) hingewiesen, von denen der letzte als beste Lösung agesehen wird. (shrink)