Husserl, Misc

It is an intimate experience for us to think, to understand and to perceive things as being identical to themselves, and to suppose, consequently, that things are truly “what” they are. Something is always conceived as itself. The given is given full of itself in all its modifications. For instance, I can think or perceive partially some lips, I can see them almost in their whole or in some of their aspects, or just see them disappear. But it does not (...) seem to be possible to think or to perceive a given as almost itself, as an aspect or as part of itself. It is the aim of this work to study the assumptions and conditions for the original position of sameness in experience, just as it occurs in the synthesis of the datum singular and distinct. The polarization of single tone (einstimmig) intentional rays in an αvτó already contains the aporiae peculiar to the experience of the identical, whose revelation shall lead us, on the one hand, to one of the nuclei of the analysis of passive synthesis, and, on the other hand, to point up how critical revision of the numerical or extensional model of self-identity is for the unity of meaning. Then, it will be a question of pointing out the reasons why in a phenomenology of identity, the renunciation of the phenomenological legitimacy of the αvτó as a guarantee for the different positions of identity must be observed. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_13 . (shrink)

In his book, 'History as a Science and the System of the Sciences', Thomas Seebohm articulates the view that history can serve to mediate between the sciences of explanation and the sciences of interpretation, that is, between the natural sciences and the human sciences. Among other things, Seebohm analyzes history from a phenomenological perspective to reveal the material foundations of the historical human sciences in the lifeworld. As a preliminary to his analyses, Seebohm examines the formal and material presuppositions of (...) phenomenological epistemology, as well as the emergence of the human sciences and the traditional distinctions and divisions that are made between the natural and the human sciences. -/- As part of this examination, Seebohm devotes a section to discussing Husserl’s formal mereology because he understands that a reflective analysis of the foundations of the historical sciences requires a reflective analysis of the objects of the historical sciences, that is, of concrete organic wholes (i.e., social groups) and of their parts. Seebohm concludes that Husserl’s mereological ontology needs to be altered with regard to the historical sciences because the relations between organic wholes and their parts are not summative relations. Seebohm’s conclusion is relevant for the issue of the reducibility of organic wholes such as social groups to their parts and for the issue of the reducibility of the historical sciences to the lower-order sciences, that is, to the sciences concerned with lower-order ontologies. -/- In this paper, I propose to extend Seebohm’s conclusion to the ontology of chemical wholes as object of quantum chemistry and to argue that Husserl’s formal mereology is descriptively inadequate for this regional ontology as well. This may seem surprising at first, since the objects studied by quantum chemists are not organic wholes. However, my discussion of atoms and molecules as they are understood in quantum chemistry will show that Husserl’s classical summative and extensional mereology does not accurately capture the relations between chemical wholes and their parts. This conclusion is relevant for the question of the reducibility of chemical wholes to their parts and of the reducibility of chemistry to physics, issues that have been of central importance within the philosophy of chemistry for the past several decades. (shrink)

In his award-winning book _The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development_, J. N. Mohanty charted Husserl's philosophical development from the young man's earliest studies—informed by his work as a mathematician—to the publication of his _Ideas_ in 1913. In this welcome new volume, the author takes up the final decades of Husserl's life, addressing the work of his Freiburg period, from 1916 until his death in 1938. As in his earlier work, Mohanty here offers close readings of Husserl's main texts (...) accompanied by accurate summaries, informative commentaries, and original analyses. This book, along with its companion volume, completes the most up-to-date, well-informed, and comprehensive account ever written on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and its development. (shrink)

Central to Levinas’ “phenomenological” approach to ethics is his identification of an “infinite signification” in the human face. This insistence on the appearance of an infinitely signifying phenomenon has led many, notably Dominique Janicaud, to decry Levinas’ work as anti-phenomenological: little more than a novel approach to metaphysics. A significant element of the phenomenological revolution, Janicaud insists, referencing Husserl and the early Heidegger for support, is grounded in the recognition that phenomena arise in and are circumscribed by finitude. Any reference (...) to an infinite phenomenon which breaks with apperception, he therefore concludes, necessarily breaks as well with the phenomenological tradition, signaling a reversion to idealism, metaphysics, and ultimately theology. As this paper will argue however, a close reading of Husserl reveals not only the recognition of infinite phenomena; but, more significantly, the possibility that all phenomena are potentially infinite. This means that in many ways Levinas is not only more faithful to Husserl’s project than is often admitted; but moreover, that Levinas’ work serves as a lens through which a hitherto under-emphasized element of Husserl’s work can be examined – an element which challenges the traditional critique of Levinas. What’s more, the possibility of infinite phenomena opened up in Husserl’s work, when read through Levinas’ analysis of the ethical significance of the infinite, creates the possibility of recognizing the potential ethical value of all objects, and not merely one object in particular: the human face. This possibility, as I will show, contributes to further blurring the already ambiguous distinction within Levinas between “good” and “bad” infinities – a blurring which, as I will argue, serves as a powerful heuristic in interpreting certain human pathologies, from obsessive compulsive disorder and certain forms of schizophrenia, to the temptation of evil. In this way, an analysis of the status of the infinite in Husserl and Levinas provides a purely phenomenological ground for exploring issues traditionally seen as the exclusive domain of metaphysics and theology. (shrink)

In this text, the reader will find a well focused, clearly written, and concise review of major themes in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. This work could well serve the beginning student to focus on the major problems in Husserlian thought. Fuchs argues that Husserl’s phenomenology is in conformity with and an outgrowth of the traditional orientation of Western philosophy called the metaphysics of presence. In separate discussions of evidence, temporality, and intersubjectivity, the author attempts to demonstrate both that Husserl (...) is tied to this traditional metaphysical doctrine which grants primacy to presence over absence, and that he nonetheless laid the foundation for the overcoming of this metaphysic. Throughout, Husserl is portrayed as wrestling with the juxtaposition of presence and absence; and yet on each point, presence is said to remain of primary constitutive status: evidence is seen as "absolute presence," the presence of impression plays a stronger constitutive role than the absences of past and future, and knowledge of other human beings is secured on the ground of presence. In short, the author claims that Husserl provided the foundation for the overcoming of the prejudice of the metaphysics of presence, and yet did not succeed in fully extricating himself from the confusions of this tradition. (shrink)

"Understanding Phenomenology" provides a guide to one of the most important schools of thought in modern philosophy. The book traces phenomenology's historical development, beginning with its founder, Edmund Husserl and his "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology, and continuing with the later, "existential" phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The book also assesses later, critical responses to phenomenology - from Derrida to Dennett - as well as the continued significance of phenomenology for philosophy today. Written for anyone coming to (...) phenomenology for the first time, the book guides the reader through the often bewildering array of technical concepts and jargon associated with phenomenology and provides clear explanations and helpful examples to encourage and enhance engagement with the primary texts. (shrink)

If there is any one man who is at the source of the current in contemporary philosophy which is the opposite of logical analysis, it is certainly Edmund Husserl. There is little doubt that his formative influence is far more important than, say, that of Kierkegaard, in the problematic of existentialism. And the frequency of the term “phenomenology” in writings on esthetics, ethics, social philosophy and a host of other disciplines is an indication of the more or less vague sense (...) of the original contribution which he made to modern thought. Yet there is an underlying paradox here: for it is logical analysis which appears to bear the banner of rationality and precision thinking, while many philosophers who derive more directly from Husserl seem to be grappling in a twilight region with the elusive meaning of human existence. But it was Husserl pre-eminently in our age who attempted to establish philosophy on a scientific basis through a rigorous analysis of logical categories and a theory of knowledge. Anyone who attempts to understand this tension in modern thought would do well to examine Husserl closely. (shrink)

"Understanding Phenomenology" provides a guide to one of the most important schools of thought in modern philosophy. The book traces phenomenology's historical development, beginning with its founder, Edmund Husserl and his "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology, and continuing with the later, "existential" phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The book also assesses later, critical responses to phenomenology - from Derrida to Dennett - as well as the continued significance of phenomenology for philosophy today. Written for anyone coming to (...) phenomenology for the first time, the book guides the reader through the often bewildering array of technical concepts and jargon associated with phenomenology and provides clear explanations and helpful examples to encourage and enhance engagement with the primary texts. (shrink)

Professor Grossman’s introduction to the revolutionary work of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre studies the ideas of their predecessors too, explaining in detail Descartes’s conception of the mind, Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and Kierkegaard’s emphasis on dread, while tracing the debate over existence and essence as far back as Aquinas and Aristotle. For a full understanding of the existentialists and phenomenologists, we must also understand the problems that they were trying to solve. This book, originally published in 1984, presents clearly how (...) the main concerns of phenomenology and existentialism grew out of tradition. (shrink)

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called _de re_ acts is attempted. (shrink)

Macann guides the student through the major texts of the four great thinkers of the phenomenological movement.

This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)

The recent first-time publication of works from Edmund Husserl’s later years, especially his Freiburg period, combined with new studies of his method and theories, has stimulated a remarkable shift in perceptions of the scope and significance of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Informed by a deep reading of not just the works published during Husserl’s lifetime but also the countless lectures and manuscripts he wrote in his later years, the essays in The New Husserl provide an alternative approach to Husserl by examining (...) his work and his method as a whole and by probing issues, old and new, that occupied him during this exceptionally productive period. The noted Husserl specialist Klaus Held opens the book with two essays, published here in English for the first time, that provide an insightful and lucid introduction to Husserl’s central texts. Other prominent Husserl scholars treat his most important and lasting contributions to philosophy, such as the concept of intentionality, the theory of types, time-consciousness, consciousness and subjectivity, the phenomenological method, and the problem of generativity. By inviting readers to discover this "new Husserl," the present collection is likely to shape scholarly discussions of Husserl’s thought for some time to come. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl, known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. A prolific scholar, he explored an enormous landscape of philosophical subjects, including philosophy of math, logic, theory of meaning, theory of consciousness and intentionality, and ontology in addition to phenomenology. This deeply insightful book traces the development of Husserl’s thought from his earliest investigations in philosophy—informed by his work as a mathematician—to his publication of _Ideas_ in 1913. Jitendra N. (...) Mohanty, an internationally renowned Husserl scholar, presents a masterful study that illuminates Husserl’s central concerns and provides a definitive assessment of the first phases of the philosopher’s career. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

Husserl's basic phenomenological method and techniques, his notion of the intentionality of consciousness, and his reformulation of the meaning of "Subject" and "Object" are elucidated in this admirably clear, well-documented study. The contributions of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre to the development of phenomenology are also indicated.--R. D. G.

This little volume is a critical introduction to the phenomenological scene through discussion of the ideas of some of its more prominent exponents and an extensive analysis of the thought of its founder. About two thirds of the book is devoted to Husserl. It traces the evolution of Husserl's philosophy from an early interest in the psychological presuppositions of number, to the phenomenological analysis of acts of meaning, and finally to his unsuccessful attempt to construct a comprehensive system embracing the (...) presuppositions of knowledge in general. Previous acquaintance with Husserl's work is not necessary as Pivcevic gives critical expositions of the main theses of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Phenomenological Philosophy. He is careful to establish particular philosophic problems through reference to the views of other philosophers, and on different issues the position of Husserl is compared and contrasted to those of Frege, Brentano, Russell, Descartes, the positivists, the classical Empiricists and Kant. The presentation of Sartre's views includes brief discussions of European romanticism, Hegel, and Marx. Besides Sartre, Scheler and Heidegger are discussed to illustrate differing applications of the phenomenological method. The final chapter is a brief critique of the limitations of this method: the problem of "other egos," the marked tendency to anti-rationalism, and the failure to achieve its aim of a presupposition-less philosophy. Pivcevic is not totally sympathetic with the phenomenologists, which is perhaps what makes possible this critical exposition of their views. But at times one wishes his clear prose would follow a philosopher's thought further into its more obscure dimensions. His criticisms are often the standard, uninspired objections to what are generally accepted as unjustified excesses of existentialist thought. Nevertheless, this is an excellent introduction to phenomenology and especially valuable for its exposition of the thought of Edmund Husserl.--M. S. H. (shrink)

Taking into account the recent publications of many hitherto unknown works of Husserl, this short introduction aims to present Husserl's philosophizing as an organic system, which the author dubs, not inappropriately, Transcendental Positivism, since he stresses Husserl's attempt to provide a strict foundation for the sciences. The book is systematic and carefully written. It was designed to meet the needs of university students and may be recommended to them as a generally reliable guide, although necessarily not as definitive interpretation.--D. D. (...) O. (shrink)

This book presents an exposition and criticism of Husserl's essential ideas, explaining what is defective and what meritorious in them and offering a philosophical program based on the merit. The author's aim is to provide a point of entry for the study of phenomenology. In the opening section he states the key concepts of The Idea, following Husserl's summary. These are: the contrasting notions of natural thinking and philosophical thinking; intentional immanence; the "pure seeing" of reflective cognition; and eidetic abstraction. (...) He proceeds to a developmental reconstruction showing how these concepts grow out of one another. Intentionality, the active relatedness of consciousness to its object, is the foundation concept. By being aware of one's own intentionality and abandoning the natural standpoint, phenomenological reduction can be achieved and the universal experienced in eidetic abstraction. According to Pettit, the merit of Husserl's method is that it recalls philosophy to the self and to the evidence, i.e., to man as a conscious subject and to the obvious, incontestable data of consciousness. Phenomenology's defect is that, since every experience implicitly contains a description, the supposed eidetic experience is absurd. Philosophy should aim at explanation, i.e., at a non-reductive account of conscious experience, which makes the experience intelligible. Pettit concludes with a phenomenological program, listing the dimensions and types of human behavior and showing how the traditional divisions of philosophy fit into the classification. There is a bibliography but no index.--L. G. (shrink)

The second edition of The Theory and Practice of Husserl's Phenomenology is a clear and concise introduction to the theoretical background and the rigorous method of Edmund Husserl , perhaps the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century and the founder of the phenomenological movement. According to Husserl phenomenology is not a body of knowledge but a scientific practice based in a rigorous and difficult method, a method that takes long effort and practice to enter into and in which to (...) develop some significant results. Since many scholars and students do not read many of Husserl's published works, this text is meant to show the core unity of focus and method throughout decades of his phenomenological practice and refinement. The present work covers the historical origin of phenomenology and some main thematic results that appear in Husserl's works, and provides an introduction to the "how to" of producing phenomenological description. (shrink)

As the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl has been hugely influential in the development of contemporary continental philosophy. In _The Philosophy of Husserl_, Burt Hopkins shows that the unity of Husserl’s philosophical enterprise is found in the investigation of the origins of cognition, being, meaning, and ultimately philosophy itself. Hopkins challenges the prevailing view that Husserl’s late turn to history is inconsistent with his earlier attempts to establish phenomenology as a pure science and also the view of Heidegger and Derrida, (...) that the limits of transcendental phenomenology are historically driven by ancient Greek philosophy. Part 1 presents Plato’s written and unwritten theories of _eidê_ and Aristotle’s criticism of both. Part 2 traces Husserl’s early investigations into the formation of mathematical and logical concepts and charts the critical necessity that leads from descriptive psychology to transcendentally pure phenomenology. Part 3 investigates the movement of Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness to that of monadological intersubjectivity. Part 4 presents the final stage of the development of Husserl’s thought, which situates monadological intersubjectivity within the context of the historical _a priori_ constitutive of all meaning. Part 5 exposes the unwarranted historical presuppositions that guide Heidegger’s fundamental ontological and Derrida’s deconstructive criticisms of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. _The Philosophy of Husserl_ will be required reading for all students of phenomenology. (shrink)

All of the major themes of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, from the Logical Investigations to The Crisis of the European Sciences, are investigated from a critical point of view by James M. Edie. The philosophy of logic is considered insofar as it relates to the phenomenological and transcendental foundation of logic itself. Transcendental logic is studied with reference to both the formal logic of Aristotle and Leibniz and the dialectical logic of Hegel. Edie considers Husserl's theories of meaning and reference, intentionality, (...) the distinction between perceptual and eidetic intuition, the notion of the ideality of meaning, the laws of objectivity in general, and formal and material ontology, as well as Husserl's reinterpretation of the apriori. (shrink)