Husserl: Phenomenology and Psychology

Der Triestiner Vittorio Benussi , Mitglied der Grazer gegenstandstheoretischen und psychologischen Schule um Alexius Meinong, war einer der bedeutendsten Experimentalpsychologen seiner Zeit. Seine Pionierleistungen auf dem Gebiet der experimentellen Gestaltpsychologie gerieten jedoch bald durch die fortschreitende Durchsetzung der Berliner Schule der Gestalttheorie in Vergessenheit, so daß sein Werk bis heute weitgehend unbekannt geblieben ist.Benussis wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit, die sich durch eine streng experimentelle Vorgangsweise auszeichnet, erweist sich rückblickend als fruchtbarer Anknüpfungspunkt für die zeitgenössische Kognitionswissenschaft. Dies ermöglicht eine Neubewertung seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit (...) und jener "aktpsychologischen" Tradition, der er angehörte. Benussis Untersuchungen nehmen ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Voraussetzung der Intentionalität des Psychischen. Seine Arbeiten thematisieren das Problem des subjektiven Eingriffs in die Konstitution der Erfahrungsgegebenheiten, indem sie die Vorherrschaft des Subjektes über die elementaren Sinnesbedingungen betonen. In Benussis Gesamtwerk läßt sich ein einheitliches Programm erkennen: Ausgehend von der Gegenstands- und Produktionstheorie der Grazer Schule, entwickelt Benussi seinen eigenen theoretischen Standpunkt, der ihn - bewußt - der Phänomenologie Husserls nähebringt. Benussi verlagert schrittweise den Schwerpunkt seiner Forschungen von der gegenstandstheoretischen Perspektive zur Hervorhebung der latenten Subjektivität, die im Konstitutionsprozeß des Gegebenen wirksam ist.Leben und Werk Vittorio Benussis rückblickend zu betrachten, heißt sich mit einem Klassiker der Psychologie zu beschäftigen, dessen Modernität erst in der heutigen Zeit erkannt werden kann. (shrink)

“La filosofia è per me, nella sua idea, una scienza universale e ‘rigorosa’ nel senso più radicale. Come tale essa è una scienza che posa su una fondazione ultima o, che è lo stesso, su un’ultima responsabilità e garanzia di se stessa, una scienza, dunque in cui nessuna ovvietà predicativa o ante-predicativa può fungere da inindagato terreno conoscitivo. Si tratta, insisto, di realizzare nello stile dell’instaurazione di una serie di validità relative e temporanee, attraverso un infinito processo storico un’Idea – (...) ma di realizzarla effettivamente” .Il precedente paragrafo sopra riportato illustra una serie di temi correlati che saranno familiari agli studiosi di Husserl. Egli si è dedicato alla scienza fondazionalista e pone una forte enfasi sulla responsabilità del ricercatore: sostiene che la conoscenza prodotta dalla pratica scientifica è prospettica e contestuale, un’intuizione legata alla sua visione di scienza come compito aperto, infinito. Se un metodo di ricerca psicologica deve essere genuinamente definito fenomenologico e husserliano, allora ognuno di questi temi, che rappresentano l’impegno da parte del ricercatore, devono essere presenti, in maniera implicita o esplicita.“For me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense, ‘rigorous’ science. As such, it is science built in on ultimate foundation, or, what comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be obvious, either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, which, as the further meditative interpretation will show, is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process—but in this way it is, in fact, realizable.” The preceding passage illustrates a number of interrelated themes which will be familiar to students of Husserl. He is dedicated to foundational science and places strong emphasis on the researcher’s self-responsibility. He asserts that the knowledge yielded by scientific praxis is perspectival and contextual, an insight linked to his vision of science as an open-ended, infinite task. If a psychological research method is to be genuinely termed phenomenological and Husserlian, then each of these themes, which also represent commitments on the part of the practitioner, must be present, implicitly or explicitly. (shrink)

Within the Husserlian phenomenological philosophical tradition, description and interpretation co-exist. However, teaching the practice of phenomenological psychological research requires careful articulation of the differences between a descriptive and an interpretive relationship to what is provided by qualitative data. If as researchers we neglect the epistemological foundations of our work or avoid working through difficult methodological issues, then our work invites dismissal as inadequate science, undermining the effort to strongly establish psychology along qualitative lines. The first article in this two-part discussion (...) provides a Husserlian investigation of the meaning of ‘method’ for psychology as a human science. This investigation is undertaken in the light of some researchers’ appropriations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in the service of non-methodical praxes. The second article will address some implications of the attempt to structure qualitative psychological research along ‘Gadamerian’ lines, taking seriously the references to Gadamer’s work made by researchers such as Van Manen and Smith. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 11, Edition 1 May 2011, 69-85. (shrink)

Published in 1891, Edmund Husserl's first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik, aimed to ‘prepare the scientific foundations for a future construction of that discipline’. His goals should seem reasonable to contemporary philosophers of mathematics: "…through patient investigation of details, to seek foundations, and to test noteworthy theories through painstaking criticism, separating the correct from the erroneous, in order, thus informed, to set in their place new ones which are, if possible, more adequately secured. 1"But the ensuing strategy for grounding mathematical knowledge (...) sounds strange to the modern ear. For Husserl cast his work as a sequence of ‘psychological and logical investigations’, providing a psychological analysis "…of the concepts multiplicity, unity, and number, insofar as they are given to use authentically and not through indirect symbolizations. "This emphasis on psychology is a reflection of Husserl's training. As a teenager studying in Leipzig, he attended the lectures of Wilhelm Wundt, a seminal figure in the field of experimental psychology. Wundt held that, via introspection, we can study and classify our inner experiences, in much the same way that scientists study the natural world. 2 People working in his laboratory were therefore trained in procedures for observing and reporting on their own thought processes, as a means of gathering scientific data regarding our cognitive faculties. Bridging the gap between psychology and epistemology, Wundt felt that the results of such inquiry could have normative consequences, since the principles of reasoning employed in the sciences not only have their origins in psychological processes, but, moreover, are justified by the fundamental role they play in thought. His two-volume work, Logik , thus combined empirical considerations with a Kantian emphasis on the way that knowledge depends on our cognitive faculties. 3In The Philosophy of …. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the phenomenological significance of schizophrenics' auditory hallucinations and begins with the face-to-face relationship in order to describe the schizophrenic experience. Following European psychiatrists like Blackenburg and Tatossian, the authors compare the bracketing of reality in the Husserlian phenomenological reduction with that of the hallucinatory experience. "Hallucinatory epoché" is used to refer to the schizophrenic way to experiencing auditory hallucinations. The problem of intentionality is then discussed, in addition to that of dialogue, internal time, living body, and (...) intersubjectivity. In this way, "voices" appear as a modification of the own inner voice of the hallucinating person. The "other, " at the origin of the "voices, " is described in terms of transparence, the quality of being univocal, and the quality of being a priori in the perfect tense. This other is not an alter ego, "it" is an alius. Descriptions of hallucinatory voices at several levels of experience, that is, at the transcendental and empirical levels along with descriptions at the level of the life-world, may be at the basis of certain modern empirical theories of "voices. " Results obtained from the European phenomenological point of view and Hoffman's findings in the cognitive field are then compared. The authors finally discuss a case of "speech therapy" and argue that a possible avenue for phenomenological research on schizophrenia is to explore narrativity on the basis of single case studies. One of the goals of phenomenological psychiatry is to assist empirical research in finding new relationships between the stories told by the hallucinator-relationships that are presupposed in clinical experience. (shrink)

Il semble que la philosophie doive abandonner ses prétentions fondationnalistes par rapport à la psychologie. Mais est-elle, quant à elle, indépendante de la psychologie ? Le naturalisme contemporain est animé de la conviction inverse. L'auteur essaie de montrer ici, sur les exemples de Bolzano et de Husserl, ce que peut signifier l'adoption d'une attitude anti-psychologiste en philosophie. Il suggère que cette attitude est compatible avec une sorte de naturalisme problématique et spécifiquement philosophique. Philosophy must apparently give up its claims to (...) a foundation of psychology. But is it itself free of any dependence on psychology ? Contemporary naturalism says it is not. The author attempts here to show, referring to Bolzano and Husserl, what to adopt an anti-psychologistic attitude in philosophy means. His proposal is that such an attitude is compatible with a kind of problematic and properly philosophical naturalism. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the validity of phenomenology in the psychiatric setting. The phenomenological method - as a mode of research, a method of engagement between self and other, and a framework for approaching what it means to know - has found a legitimate home in therapeutic practice. Over the last century, phenomenology, as a philosophical endeavour and research method, has influenced a wide range of disciplines, including psychiatry. Phenomenology has enabled an enrichment of such practice through deepening the (...) way in which we can come to know the experiences of the other. This knowing-of-the-other is explored here within the context of psychiatric and clinica assessment. The question asked is: How best can we come to know those we work with? What method of engagement can be used to most completely come to understand and narrate the experiences of the individual, and how can this be applied in the context of an assessment aimed at psychiatric or psychological intervention? Elements of phenomenological praxis are presented as definitive of the most integral way of approaching the human subject. Husserlian and Heideggerian notions are explicated and related to phenomenological conceptions of intersubjectivity, in an effort to describe a phenomenology that can be used effectively within the psychiatric setting. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 1 May 2007. (shrink)

Paradigmatically led by existential phenomenological premises, as formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre and Edmund Husserl specifically, this paper aims at a deconstruction of the value of psychiatric labelling in terms of the implications of such labelling for the labelled individual’s experience of freedom as a conscious imperative. This work has as its intention the destabilisation of labelling as a stubborn and inexorable mechanism for social propriety and regularity, which in its unyielding classificatory brandings is Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 2, (...) Edition 1, April 2002. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any (...) theory whose data is confined to the results of particular and limited methodologies is by that fact unable to investigate those methodologies, and is thus at best only able to function in a severely restricted realm. (shrink)

Nine short manuscript fragments by Dorion Cairns, one of Husserl’s closest followers, are edited and presented here from Cairns’ Nachlass , which are held at the Center for Advanced Research on Phenomenology, Inc. at the University of Memphis. The fragments address aspects of method for phenomenological psychology, namely: the natural theoretical attitude, reflection, psychological epochē and reduction, eidetic and factual description, understanding, and intersubjective verification.

Undoubtedly, Edmund Husserl's work is one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of the Twentieth Century to the field of culture, specifically influence on the formation of a new psychiatric - psychological paradigm embodied in the phenomenological psychology and psychiatry - existential. Thispaper aims to draw a brief introduction to the issues concerning the constitution originating from the life of the subject as the psychological level of objectivity and intersubjectivity, with emphasis on aspects related to the synthetic processes (...) taking place in the Genesis passive. Highlight how interesting from the notion ofintentionality of consciousness phenomenological analysis husserliano realizes the formation of the conscience of the time, the embodiment of the spatiality and intersubjectivity whose origin lies in the synthetic processes taking place since preyoica instinctive affection in intrauterine life. (shrink)

This special issue reconsiders the contributions that phenomenology can make to the development and practice of a clinicat science of psychology. In it, we suggest that earlier attempts to apply phenomenological principles were influenced heavily by psychoanalysis, with few, if any, alternative versions of a "depth" psychology available on which to draw in reframing the nature of psychopathology and its treatment. We suggest that this lingering presence of psychoanalysis runs counter to the founding principles of phenomenological method and offer a (...) few examples of a constructive alternative grounded in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Borrowing from Mohanty, we offer this approach as a respectful-as opposed to suspicious-phenomenology, and begin to outline ways in which a transcendental ly-grounded psychology reconceptualizes both clinical research and practice, from the initial intake interview and interpretation of interview data to the aims and strategies of psychological interventions. (shrink)

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology in Husserl's writings has remained a controversial and unsettled issue. This work tracks the evolution of Husserl's understanding of this relation through the historical unfolding of his work, giving primary importance to the role of psychologism in both the determination of the nature of philosophical phenomenology and the requirements for an application of phenomenology to psychological understanding and practice. It is the conclusion of this historical exegesis and analysis of Husserl's work that psychology must (...) take its place within the transcendental framework provided by philosophical phenomenology if both philosophy and psychology are not to be rendered psychologistic. ;As a result, it is suggested that psychology operate through a return to the natural from the transcendental attitude, situating the psychic in the context of transcendental constitution. The context of Nature provided by naturalism is thus replaced by the "world of mind" in its historical and intersubjective constitution, and the concrete practice and understanding of psychology becomes informed by and infused with the social, cultural and historical aspects of the life-world which had been excluded by naturalism. Phenomenologically-informed psychology becomes in this way a "socio-cultural science." ;This work concludes with a discussion of examples of areas of psychological interest in which the contributions of a phenomenologically-informed psychology are elucidated. The significance of a phenomenological approach to psychology which is not psychologistic is demonstrated in the clarification of the distinction between psychological aspects of phenomena and the phenomena themselves which, while of psychological interest, are not themselves psychic in nature. As the life-world is rich and varied in its meanings, psychology must limit itself to a well circumscribed domain of the much larger whole which is our everyday lives, while at the same time remaining cognizant of the overall context of which it is only one part. ;This work thus argues for a more humble yet generous psychology; aware both of its limits and of what it has to offer in the way of exploration of one among several aspects of human existence. (shrink)

resumo O objetivo deste artigo é discutir o modo como Husserl desenha a originalidade da subjetividade transcendental, frente à sua homônima psicológica. Se é certo que a noção de “imanência autêntica” pode apontar para as diferentes fronteiras entre o transcendental e o psicológico, resta que por si só ela não permite decidir nada quanto ao “modo de ser” transcendental, em sua diferença face ao “mundano”. Sendo assim, procura-se reconstituir alguns dos momentos centrais do esforço husserliano para construir um conceito de (...) “subjetivo” e de “subjetividade” que não se confunda mais com o “psíquico” da psicologia tradicional. palavras-chave subjetividade – psique – fenômeno – noema – transcendental. (shrink)

J?aborderai ici le problème de la passivité de l?esprit dans le cadre d?une analyse de la perception sensible 1 . La question qui m?occupera sera la sui­vante : quel est le rôle des matériaux sensoriels ou des phénomènes sensibles dans la perception ? Plus exactement : quel sens faut-il donner ? s?il faut en donner un ? à la notion de « champs sensoriels » ( Sinnesfelder ) dans l?ana­lyse intentionnelle de la perception ? Je commencerai par rappeler que l?ap­proche (...) intentionnelle, telle qu?elle est développée par Edmund Husserl ? mais aussi, notamment, par August Messer ?, implique une critique très vive du sensualisme, aussi bien dans sa version atomiste que dans sa version gestaltiste. J?examinerai ensuite une certaine difficulté de la conception intentionaliste exposée dans les Ideen I (1913). Cette difficulté a été mise en évidence, dans le champ de la psychologie expérimentale d?inspiration wundtienne, par Edward Titchener ( Systematic Psychology , 1929) et surtout, dans l?école brentanienne, par Carl Stumpf ( Er­kenntnislehre , 1939). Elle concerne le rôle des données sensibles ou de la « hylè sensuelle » au sein des prestations intentionnelles du sujet percevant . Le point que fait valoir Stumpf se résume à ceci : si l?étude des états mentaux perceptuels ne doit pas devenir une « phénoménologie sans phénomènes », alors il semble que l?on doive renoncer au concept éthéré. (shrink)

In defining his phenomenology as descriptive psychology in the introduction to the first edition of his Logical Investigations 1, Husserl suggests that the field study of his phenomenology as his methodology are very close to that of Brentano’s psychology, and that the research in the book somehow contributes to Brentano’s philosophical program, one of whose main axes is psychology or philosophy of mind.

Historically, when psychology broke away from a philosophical mode of scholarship it strove to become a natural science. This meant that it largely imitated the concepts and practices of the natural sciences which included the use of abstract terms to designate many of its phenomena with the consequence that psychology is often more abstract and generic than it ought to be. Husserl has emphasized the role of the life-world as the ultimate basis of all knowledge and a serious consideration of (...) its role implies that psychology’s manner of labeling its phenomena should be less abstract and closer to the way the phenomena are experienced in the lifeworld. If so, this means that psychology’s primary data should be physiognomies or the expressive characteristics intrinsic to objects and situations. However, the complexities involved in the perception of physiognomies create difficulties for the practice of science. It is suggested that certain Husserlian phenomenological contributions concerning categorial modes of experiencing could be helpful in meeting scientific criteria. (shrink)

L’autore presenta lo sviluppo del proprio metodo a partire dal background psicologico sperimentale da cui proviene e dal quale ha preso le distanze, a partire dal desiderio di studiare l’essere umano con un approccio globale, un metodo scientifico non frammentario. L’incontro con la filosofia di Edmund Husserl ha connotato questo suo percorso, in essa egli ha scoperto un approccio che rendesse possibile la ricerca sui fenomeni umani proprio con i criteri che andava inseguendo. Il metodo di ricerca che ha quindi (...) elaborato si basa sul lavoro di Husserl e di Merleau-Ponty. L’articolo descrive brevemente questo metodo.The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

Na prvi pogled se psihoanaliza in fenomenologija precej razlikujeta, kolikor zadnja nima nikakršnega koncepta nezavednega, četudi je v svojem opisovanju zavesti analogno strukturirana. Pri tem področje transcendentalne zavesti v fenomenološkem opisovanju korelira s področjem nezavednega, že zato, ker sta obe področji predmet »radikalnega« gibanja razsvetljenstva. Področje uporabe se sicer razlikuje , faktično pa, če se ozremo nazaj, sta služili obe vsakič drugemu cilju: s strukturalizmom vstopa psihoanaliza v neko novo paradigmo konstrukcije racionalnosti, fenomenološka metoda pa je v eksistencialni analizi postala (...) individualni instrument analize.At a first glance, psychoanalysis and phenomenology seem to differ largely, insofar as the latter possesses no concept of the unconscious, although it is analogously structured in its description of the unconscious. The sphere transcendental consciousness in phenomenological description correlates to the sphere of the unconscious primarily because both spheres are those of a “radical” movement of the Enlightenment. The fields of application do indeed differ ; factically, however, and retrospectively, they serve two different purposes: with structuralism, psychoanalysis enters a new paradigm of the construction of reality, whereas the phenomenological method with its existential analysis became an individual instrument of analysis. (shrink)

The dissertation offers an interpretation and development of Edmund Husserl's 1925 Phenomenological Psychology Lectures. The Lectures show how and why we should develop a phenomenological psychology. ;First, the dissertation provides a historical context for Husserl's argument. It considers the prominent psychophysical psychology from 1850 through 1920, as well as Wilhelm Dilthey's and Franz Brentano's suggestions for psychology. ;Then the dissertation poses and discusses Husserl's argument per se. That is, psychology has not attained a unanimously accepted method. To do so, it (...) must be clear about its field of investigation. To gain clarity about descriptive natural sciences' provinces, we must return to our initial extra-scientific experiences of the world, and from here pose abstractions whereby we gain these provinces. ;Concretely, within the world we see animate versus inanimate realities, as well as cultural objects. With animate realities we recognize the animating mental, as contrasted with a physical embodying substrate. To gain the province of descriptive physics, we exclude the mental "side" of animate and cultural objects. To gain externally directed psychology's province, we exclude interest in the physical substrate of animate beings . Further, external reality is perceived through appearances. If physics and external psychology are to study objective external reality, these appearances must be excluded. Still, these appearances are mental in belonging to the perceiving scientist's consciousness. Therefore, psychology, an internally directed psychology, must treat them. To do so, it suspends interest in the appearing external reality. Thereby, internal perception of these appearances is possible. ;Husserl's argument presupposes a theory of perception. The dissertation offers supplemental analysis of this and rival theories. Further, it develops Husserl's notions of internal perception's adequacy and external perception's inadequacy, and the consequent evidence supplied for internal and external perceptual judgments. (shrink)

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and a phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion was published in the previous volume of this journal as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion is published here as Part II. Part I first clarified the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification it showed that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concluded with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II shows how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, i. e., the so-called "collective unconscious," can be phenomenologically accounted for if: (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and; (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative approaches to the unconscious is attended to and such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative approaches to the unconscious is attended to and such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)