Husserl: Phenomenology and Psychology

Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...) mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 391 - 409 The author outlines a provisional phenomenology of problem solving. He begins by reviewing the history of problem-solving psychology, focusing on the Gestalt approach, which emphasizes the influence of prior knowledge and the occurrence of sudden insights. He then describes problem solving as a process unfolding in a field of consciousness against a background of unconscious knowledge, which encodes action patterns, schemata, and affordances. A global feeling of wrongness or tension is (...) resolved by a series of field transitions, which are guided by peripheral experiences of coherence or “rightness.” The author treats the distinction between reproductive thought and productive thought as a difference in field structure. With reproductive thoughts and actions we perform operations to solve a problem in a semi-automatic sequence. In productive thought, by contrast, a kind of parallel search occurs. This may explain the otherwise obscure phenomenology of struggling to break an impasse. (shrink)

Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen’s revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl’s work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I and II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception (...) of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine acts in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that “mental act” is a merely technical term or misnomer. (shrink)

Husserl focused perhaps more than any other philosopher on the relationship between philosophy and psychology. This problem was important to him because the European project of universal science must include sciences of consciousness that address questions of meaning, value and purpose so crucial for humanity. This paper provides a sketch of the later Husserl’s thinking on this issue in order to clarify the relationships among transcendental philosophy as the mother of the sciences, psychology as the foundational mental science, and the (...) various regional sciences of persons. Radicalizing and extending the transcendental tradition to free philosophy from naturalism, Husserl developed methods and fundamental concepts for understanding consciousness in its distinctive world constituting function. In parallel fashion, Husserl traced the historical failures of psychology to its naturalistic philosophy, from which he liberated the discipline by means of phenomenological reflections on the intentional property of its subject matter. This pure focus on mental processes resulted in the clarification of the transcendental phenomenological foundation of psychology as well as a recognition of the paradoxical manner in which psychological processes are both world constituting and mundanely present in the lives of persons. The apperceptive synthesis of transcendental consciousness and mundane embodiment in the identification of the person is proposed as essential for a non-naturalistic, intentional psychology, which provides appropriate concepts and the method of intentional analysis for such sciences of persons as sociology, history, literary studies, and religious studies. The problems, means, and inevitable inadequacies of communicating transcendental insights in language are discussed. Analysis of the complexity of living persons discloses their transcendental dimension in the manifolds their mundane activities and in their products, including use, cultural, and art objects as well as social institutions. Attention is drawn to resources in phenomenology beyond Husserl and in the genuine psychological intuitions of non-phenomenologists for generating non-naturalistic, phenomenologically grounded person sciences. (shrink)

This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...) approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative approaches to the unconscious is attended to and such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious. (shrink)

Aron Gurwitsch wants to introduce a theory of organization developed by Gestalt psychology into Husserlian phenomenology. The problem is to show how it is possible to introduce a theory developed within a positive science into philosophical phenomenology. His solution is to show that aspects of this theory already are or can be phenomenological through what he calls an incipient phenomenological reduction. Specifically, it is the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in which he identifies the possibility moving from an explanatory science (...) to a descriptive one. If the temptation can be resisted of returning to an explanatory approach and description can be radicalized, Gurwitsch believes that this reduction can become phenomenological and even attain transcendental levels. This possibility of reduction makes it possible for scientists, especially psychologists, to have a firsthand understanding of phenomenology, perhaps to convince them of this approach and realize the continuity of philosophy and the sciences and the need to maintain cooperation via phenomenology. (shrink)

Husserl's phenomenology provides theory for empirical science and other practices in the form of transcendental philosophy after Kant. This phenomenology is a reflection on mental objects in relation to mental processes, some of which are shared in culture: a theoretical framework that grounds and co-ordinates theory-production for empirical practice. The importance of the original work of Edmund Husserl for contemporary empirical psychology is that it provides the conceptual justification for the methods employed and the interpretative stances taken. Informed theoretically by (...) Husserl's phenomenology, empirical psychology is thus a discipline grounded and co-ordinated by essences. Essences are about the being of consciousness connected with other consciousness and mental senses, expressed as various forms of intentionality in connection with sense and meaning. The aim of this paper is to clarify some key features of Ideas I rather than to comment on the quality of the translation by Dahlstrom or the closeness of the readings of leading phenomenological psychologists to the original. (shrink)

En este trabajo hablamos de la posibilidad de una psicología fenomenológica,no como oportunidad de refundición del proyecto husserliano, sino comoplan de revisión de los fundamentos de una psicología de confección naturalista a partir de un tratamiento estrictamente fenomenológico. Esta revisión crítica, operada por Husserl, dialogará muy de cerca con las tesis que W. Dilthey desenvuelve en 1894, bajo el signo de una psicología descriptiva. Es nuestra intención mostrar, una vez ponderadas las insuficiencias evidenciadas por la perspectiva diltheyniana, la utilidad incuestionable (...) de la psicología fenomenológica como plataforma y vía de acceso indirecto para una auténtica filosofía fenomenológica.In this paper, we address the possibility of a phenomenological psychology,not having in mind a re-establishment of the husserlian project, but as plan torevise, from a strictly phenomenological approach, the basis of a naturalistic psychology. Such a critical revise, operated by Husserl, will dialogue closely with the thesis developed by W. Dilthey in 1894, under the title of a descriptive psychology. It´s our purpose to explain, given the insufficiency shown by Dilthey’s own perspective, the unquestionable utility of this phenomenological psychology as groundwork and indirect access way to a genuine phenomenological philosophy. (shrink)

The magical number three has provided the template for this comparative study of Freudian psycho-analysis and Husserlian phenomenology. "Three" should be considered the number of dialectics; the method in the study to let three distinct thematisations succeed each other should find its legitimation in dialectics. The relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology as that between two dialectic theories might well call for a dialectic interpretation. It should be difficult from a straightforward and unambiguous interpretation to give full credit to the rich (...) and equivocal meaning of psycho-analysis and phenomenology. I hope to have shown in the presentation above, that it is possible by accentuating different sides of the two scientific disciplines to reach different conclusions regarding their relationship. For a full account of this relationship these different conclusions should be placed together and viewed in their internal coherence as a dialectical unity. Thus none of the three sections of the text should be considered apart from the others. In the first section of the paper, the first thematisation, I tried to spell out the discrepancies between Freud and Husserl as clearly as possible. The point of departure here was the Freudian notion of the "psychical apparatus," and Husserl's doctrine of "intentional consciousness." The models built around these central notions can be shown to have a paradigmatic meaning for the development of Freud's and Husserl's psychological projects. Conceiving the subject as psychical apparatus, Freud thought it possible to make psychology a natural science. The subject could be treated like a mechanical apparatus, that is a machine admitting the general laws of motion. - In contrast, Husserl thought psychology should depart from natural science in its scientific selfunderstanding, and join the humanities instead. Psychology's departure from natural science, Husserl found legitimized in the subject's essential character of intentional consciousness. According to Husserl, man as a conscious being could not be reduced to a thing in the natural world. On the contrary, the aprioric basis for the world should be found in intentional consciousness, which constitutes the "world" as a meaningful coherence related to the subject. Freud's and Husserl's conceptions of psychology were traced to historical roots in respectively positivism, naturalism and mechanical materialism on the one hand, and rationalism, humanism and idealism on the other. In this first interpretation the relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology seemed to be antithetical, the two theoretical projects representing opposite poles with regard to cartesian dualism. Although in some ways caricaturing the theories in this one-sided interpretation, I tried to show, that such interpretation is possible with bases in the texts of Freud and Husserl. The decided one-sidedness of the first thematisation should, however, be balanced by the competing interpretation in the second section of the paper. In the second thematisation, I tried to show, that both psycho-analysis and phenomenology in their concrete psychological projects went beyond their points of departure. Although Freud as a scientist of the 19th century naturally found his theoretical language in the successful natural sciences, from which his scientific career started, he decisively broke with this frame of reference in his descriptions of the pathological problems from his clinical praxis. In contrast to the abstract metapsychology of the psychical apparatus, Freud in his clinical psychology departed from mechanism in his attempts to interpret the meaning of the patient's neurotic symptom. The clinical attitude of Freud might resemble phenomenologists' openness towards the meaning of the phenomena, and the case-histories of Freud often read like clinical analyses stemming from existential- phenomenological psychiatrists. - Correspondingly, although Husserl started from the tradition of German philosophy of consciousness, also he can be seen to go beyond the premises of his wellsprings. Starting with a notion of intentionality as consciousness's active positing meaningful objects, Husserl later was led to consider a deeper level of intentionality, a "functioning intentionality," that would situate the subject in a "world" prior to any thematic perceptual act. With the notion of functional intentionality and its further development in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the "body-subject," phenomenology seems to have come close to the Freudian doctrine of the unconscious. From this second interpretation it seemed to follow, that a meeting between psycho-analysis and phenomenology should be possible, by cutting off the mechanistic parts from psychoanalysis and the idealistic parts from phenomenology. The hindrance for such meeting should apparently be found in the divergent theoretical prejudices stemming from the ideological climates in which the theories were hatched. None of these two apparently contradictory interpretations, that of the first and second thematisation, should, however, rule out the other. To the question which interpretation is the right one, we should answer "both... and," or perhaps better "Neither... nor." Freud and Husserl in fact held contradictory views in their explicit scientific self-understanding. On the other hand, much of the controversy was caused by theoretical prejudices not essential to the central enterprise of psycho-analysis and phenomenology. And yet, the theoretical work of Freud and Husserl should be considered in its entirety, not omitting parts that do not fit the interpretative context. Freud's mechanistic theories must be read in connection with his clinical/phenomenological psychology, Husserl's doctrine of transcendental consciousness together with his concrete analyses of the world and the body. Freud sticked to his mechanistic metaphors throughout his life, not just because mechanic materialism was his scientific point of departure, but also because he found the models of the psychical apparatus useful to picture the subject-matter of psycho-analysis, the unconscious as it is discovered by the analytic method. Correspondingly, Husserl found in transcendental idealism a metaphysical horizon apparently suited for his main theoretical project, to un-cover by phenomenological reflexion man in his free and conscious being. In this way Freud's materialism and Husserl's idealism might find their limited justification, not in the absolutistic sense set forth in the first section, but in relation to their weighting different aspects of the subject/object dialectic of man. This point of view I tried to explicate in the third section of this paper. In the subject/object dialectic Freud seems to underline man's existence as object, his being ruled by the mechanic, the irrational, the infantile, the unconscious. In contrast, Husserl underlines man's existence as subject, his free and conscious openness towards the world and the future. This difference I characterized with the notions of Ricoeur as respectively an "archeology" and a "teleology" of the subject. And yet the difference between Freud and Husserl is that of a weighting different sides of the subject/object dialectic, not of an exclusive thematisation of man as either subject or object. Freudian archaeology is supplemented by an implicit teleology, Husserlian teleology by an implicit archeology. On the background of such interpretation the relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology should be seen neither as the polarity of the first thematisation, nor as the synthesis of the second. Psycho-analysis and phenomenology both contradict and imply each other in a relationship that should be termed dialectical. With this third interpretation the paper ended. At last I noted that the problems raised by the controversy on the subject/object dialectic of man should not easily be solved. Instead, the question "what is man" should have to be answered continuously in a concrete historical reflextion or dialogue. Yet I think it safe to conclude, that any psychological consideration has to take into consideration, both man's archeological and his teleological features, thus not allowing the one perspective completely to rule out the other. (shrink)

In this review essay, the author commends Matthew Ratcliffe for his masterful and highly valuable account of the emotional phenomenology of existential change—of shifts in our experience of belonging to a shared world of possibilities—but criticizes him for his commitments to two frameworks that are actually extraneous and inimical to his project and that perpetuate remnants of Cartesian isolated-mind thinking—Husserlian ‘‘pure phenomenology’’ and traditional diagnostic psychiatry. The author contends that Ratcliffe’s devotion to a decontextualizing psychiatric language in particular conceals the (...) contexts of severe emotional trauma in which the existential feelings that he so beautifully elucidates take form. (shrink)

In the paragraphs immediately following the introduction of the method of phenomenological epoché (§§34-46) in Ideas, rather than applying this new method, Husserl provides a series of psychological descriptions on the basis of psychological reflection. This is surprising for at least two reasons. First, since Husserl has already distinguished phenomenology from psychology (both empirical and eidetic), it is not clear why he would engage in psychological reflection and description at this point in the book. Further, the psychological descriptions that Husserl (...) provides in these paragraphs are of consciousness — specifically, of our consciousness of something. But, as Husserl indicates at several points in the first book of Ideas, and as he more fully develops in the 1912 pencil manuscript of the second book of Ideas, the object of psychology is, strictly speaking, not consciousness but the soul (Seele) considered as reality (Realität). In this chapter, I first develop how these two interpretative difficulties can be overcome if we consider the overall aim of the second chapter — namely, to establish that consciousness has its own kind of being and hence essence. Then, I elucidate how exactly Husserl establishes this in this chapter and show how it entails a radical rethinking of the distinction between and relation of consciousness and world. (shrink)

If mind is a creature of adaptation, then our standard theories of intentionality and of mental representation are in need of considerable revision. For such theories, deriving under Cartesian inspiration from the work of Brentano, Husserl and their followers, are context-free. They conceive the subject of mental experience in isolation from any surrounding physico-biological environment. Husserl sought in his later writings to find room for the surrounding world of human practical experience, and a similar expansion of concerns can be detected (...) also in the writings of other later phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. But in none of these authors do we find sustained attempts to grapple with the intervolvements of the world of human thought, feeling and action with the environment of human behavior as this is described by physics and biology. Their work can, however, be seen in a new light when conjoined with the ideas on perception and action of J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker, both of whom (independently) conceived their work under the banner of 'ecological psychology.' It is against this background that the term 'Husserlian ecology' is to be understood in this essay. (shrink)

Na prvi pogled se psihoanaliza in fenomenologija precej razlikujeta, kolikor zadnja nima nikakršnega koncepta nezavednega, četudi je v svojem opisovanju zavesti analogno strukturirana. Pri tem področje transcendentalne zavesti v fenomenološkem opisovanju korelira s področjem nezavednega, že zato, ker sta obe področji predmet »radikalnega« gibanja razsvetljenstva. Področje uporabe se sicer razlikuje , faktično pa, če se ozremo nazaj, sta služili obe vsakič drugemu cilju: s strukturalizmom vstopa psihoanaliza v neko novo paradigmo konstrukcije racionalnosti, fenomenološka metoda pa je v eksistencialni analizi postala (...) individualni instrument analize.At a first glance, psychoanalysis and phenomenology seem to differ largely, insofar as the latter possesses no concept of the unconscious, although it is analogously structured in its description of the unconscious. The sphere transcendental consciousness in phenomenological description correlates to the sphere of the unconscious primarily because both spheres are those of a “radical” movement of the Enlightenment. The fields of application do indeed differ ; factically, however, and retrospectively, they serve two different purposes: with structuralism, psychoanalysis enters a new paradigm of the construction of reality, whereas the phenomenological method with its existential analysis became an individual instrument of analysis. (shrink)

“La filosofia è per me, nella sua idea, una scienza universale e ‘rigorosa’ nel senso più radicale. Come tale essa è una scienza che posa su una fondazione ultima o, che è lo stesso, su un’ultima responsabilità e garanzia di se stessa, una scienza, dunque in cui nessuna ovvietà predicativa o ante-predicativa può fungere da inindagato terreno conoscitivo. Si tratta, insisto, di realizzare nello stile dell’instaurazione di una serie di validità relative e temporanee, attraverso un infinito processo storico un’Idea – (...) ma di realizzarla effettivamente” .Il precedente paragrafo sopra riportato illustra una serie di temi correlati che saranno familiari agli studiosi di Husserl. Egli si è dedicato alla scienza fondazionalista e pone una forte enfasi sulla responsabilità del ricercatore: sostiene che la conoscenza prodotta dalla pratica scientifica è prospettica e contestuale, un’intuizione legata alla sua visione di scienza come compito aperto, infinito. Se un metodo di ricerca psicologica deve essere genuinamente definito fenomenologico e husserliano, allora ognuno di questi temi, che rappresentano l’impegno da parte del ricercatore, devono essere presenti, in maniera implicita o esplicita.“For me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense, ‘rigorous’ science. As such, it is science built in on ultimate foundation, or, what comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be obvious, either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, which, as the further meditative interpretation will show, is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process—but in this way it is, in fact, realizable.” The preceding passage illustrates a number of interrelated themes which will be familiar to students of Husserl. He is dedicated to foundational science and places strong emphasis on the researcher’s self-responsibility. He asserts that the knowledge yielded by scientific praxis is perspectival and contextual, an insight linked to his vision of science as an open-ended, infinite task. If a psychological research method is to be genuinely termed phenomenological and Husserlian, then each of these themes, which also represent commitments on the part of the practitioner, must be present, implicitly or explicitly. (shrink)

L’autore presenta lo sviluppo del proprio metodo a partire dal background psicologico sperimentale da cui proviene e dal quale ha preso le distanze, a partire dal desiderio di studiare l’essere umano con un approccio globale, un metodo scientifico non frammentario. L’incontro con la filosofia di Edmund Husserl ha connotato questo suo percorso, in essa egli ha scoperto un approccio che rendesse possibile la ricerca sui fenomeni umani proprio con i criteri che andava inseguendo. Il metodo di ricerca che ha quindi (...) elaborato si basa sul lavoro di Husserl e di Merleau-Ponty. L’articolo descrive brevemente questo metodo.The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

This study describes the fundamental nature of the client-therapist relationship. Current research has found this relationship to be more predictive of psychotherapeutic progress than any specific technique or general theoretical approach. Relationship researchers, however, have yet to develop a compelling description or definition of the therapy relationship. They have focused instead on establishing and perfecting psychometric instruments. This study demonstrates that the field's neglect of definitional efforts is the probable result of methodological procedures that derive, broadly speaking, from the empiricism (...) of David Hume. These procedures assume ontological and epistemological positions that lead to overlooking foundational descriptive analysis. The study explicates an alternative methodology-the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl---and demonstrates how this method, unlike Hume's empiricism, provides an objective procedure for describing the essential nature of the therapy relationship. Using this methodology, the study articulates, analyzes, and describes the elemental aspects of the therapy relationship. The study delineates the "bonding" or "conjunctive" ontology that underlies personal relations . It then explores complex subjective states that are inherent in all personal relations. Finally, it offers a look at the ramifications of the study's metaphysical and descriptive findings upon the counseling process, relationship research, counselor training, and philosophical and therapeutic theory. (shrink)

Persons currently making contact with the field of psychology have become increasingly aware of the pressing need for a model of human experiencing that appropriately reflects the presence, or as the phenomenologist expresses it, the lebendige Gegenwart, of psychological life. This dissertation attempts to arrive at an understanding of a basis for this need, felt by psychologist and philosopher alike, through a focus upon behavioral and cognitive psychological models. ;Our findings suggest that the behavioral model, historically rooted in laboratory studies (...) of the rat, regards the individual as largely passive to the activity of the external world. In restricting its approach to public methods of observation and focusing exclusively upon behavior, the depth and subtlety of human experience remains undisclosed. ;The cognitive model of information processing, on the other hand, derived from the way computer scientists describe what their machines do, perceives the external world as passive to the formal apparatus of so-called structures of thought. In restricting its approach to the data of discrete "inputs" and independent formalized rules, the situatedness of experiences remains unaccounted for. ;Claiming that behavioral and cognitive psychology are grounded in a "prejudice of the world" wherein the person is regarded as not being different for any other object of investigation, a phenomenological model is offered as a basis for both behaviorism and cognitivism. Based upon the philosophical work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, this third model seeks to overcome the bifurcated reality of the models of empiricism and rationalism through the ontological primacy of phenomena and the lived body. ;Conclusions reached regarding the application of the phenomenological model to the psychological study of language, sensation, and perception suggest that these domains of human activity are realized initially on a pre-reflective level with meaning as their central basis. In disagreement with both cognitivism and behaviorism, evidence was provided to indicate that language and perception are fundamentally inseparable. (shrink)

The relationship between phenomenology and psychology in Husserl's writings has remained a controversial and unsettled issue. This work tracks the evolution of Husserl's understanding of this relation through the historical unfolding of his work, giving primary importance to the role of psychologism in both the determination of the nature of philosophical phenomenology and the requirements for an application of phenomenology to psychological understanding and practice. It is the conclusion of this historical exegesis and analysis of Husserl's work that psychology must (...) take its place within the transcendental framework provided by philosophical phenomenology if both philosophy and psychology are not to be rendered psychologistic. ;As a result, it is suggested that psychology operate through a return to the natural from the transcendental attitude, situating the psychic in the context of transcendental constitution. The context of Nature provided by naturalism is thus replaced by the "world of mind" in its historical and intersubjective constitution, and the concrete practice and understanding of psychology becomes informed by and infused with the social, cultural and historical aspects of the life-world which had been excluded by naturalism. Phenomenologically-informed psychology becomes in this way a "socio-cultural science." ;This work concludes with a discussion of examples of areas of psychological interest in which the contributions of a phenomenologically-informed psychology are elucidated. The significance of a phenomenological approach to psychology which is not psychologistic is demonstrated in the clarification of the distinction between psychological aspects of phenomena and the phenomena themselves which, while of psychological interest, are not themselves psychic in nature. As the life-world is rich and varied in its meanings, psychology must limit itself to a well circumscribed domain of the much larger whole which is our everyday lives, while at the same time remaining cognizant of the overall context of which it is only one part. ;This work thus argues for a more humble yet generous psychology; aware both of its limits and of what it has to offer in the way of exploration of one among several aspects of human existence. (shrink)

The dissertation offers an interpretation and development of Edmund Husserl's 1925 Phenomenological Psychology Lectures. The Lectures show how and why we should develop a phenomenological psychology. ;First, the dissertation provides a historical context for Husserl's argument. It considers the prominent psychophysical psychology from 1850 through 1920, as well as Wilhelm Dilthey's and Franz Brentano's suggestions for psychology. ;Then the dissertation poses and discusses Husserl's argument per se. That is, psychology has not attained a unanimously accepted method. To do so, it (...) must be clear about its field of investigation. To gain clarity about descriptive natural sciences' provinces, we must return to our initial extra-scientific experiences of the world, and from here pose abstractions whereby we gain these provinces. ;Concretely, within the world we see animate versus inanimate realities, as well as cultural objects. With animate realities we recognize the animating mental, as contrasted with a physical embodying substrate. To gain the province of descriptive physics, we exclude the mental "side" of animate and cultural objects. To gain externally directed psychology's province, we exclude interest in the physical substrate of animate beings . Further, external reality is perceived through appearances. If physics and external psychology are to study objective external reality, these appearances must be excluded. Still, these appearances are mental in belonging to the perceiving scientist's consciousness. Therefore, psychology, an internally directed psychology, must treat them. To do so, it suspends interest in the appearing external reality. Thereby, internal perception of these appearances is possible. ;Husserl's argument presupposes a theory of perception. The dissertation offers supplemental analysis of this and rival theories. Further, it develops Husserl's notions of internal perception's adequacy and external perception's inadequacy, and the consequent evidence supplied for internal and external perceptual judgments. (shrink)

Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's response to this paper for the understanding of intentionality and the theory of orientation by the departure of the limited depth of Husserl's phenomenological method 'overhang' of meaning, the transcendental self is not to demonstrate for a "No interest of spectators." As for the general said: convert from the natural attitude on the attitude of transcendental object is the "what" questions that translate into on the "how", the paper further stressed that "how" question does not replace, (...) "What "The problem, simply by the phenomenological" how "a series of reflection, given the infinite wealth of meaning to the essence of things as" what "up. We see this new "what" is like a work of art, the phenomenological method is like an art activity. This view is from Kant's' Critique of Judgement "in the United States objects to the conditions attributed to" reflect judgments "be inspired. We really see this in Heidegger, "phenomenological psychology" as an art scholar who, as Husserl's late for the life of the world by the transcendental subject and its infinite reflection "how" to the final show as a pure phenomenological psychology, the main theme of the transcendent nature of the "what" the rich meaning, it is Husserl's "phenomenological psychology" We also considered an art. This article starts from a reaction on Heidegger's critiques of Husserl's conception of the intentionality and his theoretical position, then investigates with greater depth Husserl's phenomenological method "epoché", and highlights that the transcendental ego originally is not "an uninterested observer". For viewing that from the natural to the transcendental attitude the question of "what" is transformed into the question of "how" regarding the object in general, we point out the question of "how" by no means replaces the question of "what". Phenomenology basically aims to endow the essence of matter as "what" through a series of reflections on its "how" with boundless meanings. We estimate this new form of "what" as a work of art, and the phenomenological method as an activity of art. This insight is illuminated by Kant when he in "Critique of Judgment" discusses the possibility of a beautiful object to be obtained through a Reflective Judgment. We see some scholar thinks Heidegger's authentic phenomenological psychology like an art. The later Husserl shows his mature phenomenological psychology , as he acquires the rich meanings of the essence of the transcendental subjectivity as the topics of the pure phenomenological psychology through a series of reflections on the "how" of the Life-world and the transcendental subjectivity. So Husserl's phenomenological psychology can be understood as a form of art. (shrink)

Phenomenological psychology and the relationship was beyond Husserl's phenomenology as a parallel and overlapping. This view is very clear, in the development of phenomenology has been unable to solve properly, but in the realm of applied sciences to be justification. This is how it happened? What does it mean? Through this meta-ethics and normative ethics of the situation between the ethical, the ethics of difference with the description, that the phenomenological psychology as a qualitative research solution. This means that, due (...) to situational ethics of phenomenological psychology show of its own, owing phenomenological psychology situational ethics restore its ontological significance. The relationship between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology is regarded by Husserl as parallel and overlapping. It is neither a clear thought, nor has been solved properly by the development of phenomenology, but justified in the practical field of apply sciences. How does it happen? What is it meant? In this paper, we point out the solution by considering the phenomenological psychology as a qualitative research through the distinction between descriptive ethics and situation ethics, which is in between meta-ethics and normative ethics. That is to say, phenomenological psychology shows itself to us due to situation ethics, while situation ethics regains its ontological sense due to phenomenological psychology. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is based on discussion of Husserl's phenomenological psychology to explore and experience the world of how inter-related. According to Husserl, the former theory of the world has its structural system, and this structure is a priori necessary, namely, "the world" and the "experience of the world" is one of the two sides can not be separated. To this end, we focus placed in the "experience of the world" and "experienced world" correspondence between the two on. (...) Husserl pointed out that in the past has always been the lack of a scientific "popular science" to study the correspondence. This door can be "as pure experience of the universality of the world to describe the world of science" is the "phenomenological psychology" Husserl claims, if not the world of experience or present life in the pre-given, then we will not be possible on the theory of the world's work, because the theoretical foundation of the idea will be no activities at all. Experience is closely linked with the world, as long as the experience continued, showing the world will not stand still. This is exactly the attitude that we were standing in a natural situation. Natural life in this pattern, the world has been identified as continuing to exist. The world is our "around the world" . Whether we are engaged in active practice or theory, we are facing the issues raised around the world away. The theme of the paper is an inquiry into how world and experience are closely related on the basis of the phenomenological psychology in Husserl. According to Husserl, the pre-theoretical world is structuralized apriori, which means, the world and the experience of the world are inseparably correlated. We focus on a study of this correlation. In the eyes of Husserl no traditional science was ever qualified to study such a correlation except his own phenomenology, particularly the phenomenological psychology. Husserl claims that, supposed that the world were not pre -given in the pre-theoretical experience, we would never be able to make any research about the world scientifically, because the theoretical thinking would be unfounded. The experience and the world are closely related, as long as the experience goes on, the would sustains. This is exactly what happens when we are in the natural attitude. In the natural life-style the world is supposed to sustain as such. This world is the environing world . No matter what we do or what we think, all the questions we pose are oriented towards this primordial world. (shrink)

resumo O objetivo deste artigo é discutir o modo como Husserl desenha a originalidade da subjetividade transcendental, frente à sua homônima psicológica. Se é certo que a noção de “imanência autêntica” pode apontar para as diferentes fronteiras entre o transcendental e o psicológico, resta que por si só ela não permite decidir nada quanto ao “modo de ser” transcendental, em sua diferença face ao “mundano”. Sendo assim, procura-se reconstituir alguns dos momentos centrais do esforço husserliano para construir um conceito de (...) “subjetivo” e de “subjetividade” que não se confunda mais com o “psíquico” da psicologia tradicional. palavras-chave subjetividade – psique – fenômeno – noema – transcendental. (shrink)