About this topic
Summary

Characteristically for Husserlian phenomenology, whatever we can legitimately say about the self is closely paralleled by an account of the data and workings of self-awareness. On the one hand, Husserl speaks about the self (“the monad”) as the experienced totality of one’s life. Within it, we can abstractively distinguish constitutive levels, all the way down to the pre-egological flow of time-consciousness, quite unlike our ordinary experiences of ourselves. On the other hand, Husserl’s later account of intentional acts involves the idea of an ego-pole, an aspect of intentional experiences, conceived as the opposite of an object-pole. In our intentional lives, the ego-pole is the source and center of performance and activity, including the action of predication. One way in which we can be aware of our selves is by regarding them reflectively, as in phenomenological reflection. However, for Husserl, the primary self-awareness is pre-reflective. In Husserl-scholarship, this pre-reflective self-awareness has been identified with the absolute flow of time-consciousness.

Key works A classic treatment, Held 1966 discusses the “living present” as the original mode of subjective life. Marbach 1974 explores the reasons that led Husserl, in Ideas I, to abandon his earlier view that there is only an empirical self, and to introduce the idea of a pure I. Marbach also discusses this Husserlian notion in relation to ideas in contemporary psychology, as well as Kant’s views. Zahavi 1999 engages with a variety of approaches to self-awareness, drawing attention to the promise of the phenomenological, especially the Husserlian, approach, with an emphasis on the idea of a pre-reflective self-awareness. Carr 1999 investigates subjectivity in the transcendental tradition, especially Kant and Husserl, upholding the idea and the tradition against Heideggerian and other criticisms. With a view to accounting for the possibility of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Mensch 1988 grounds intersubjectivity in a pre-individual “primal subjectivity”. Lotz 2007 studies affectivity and subjectivity, as well as Husserl’s phenomenological method, based on Husserl’s later texts, arguing that Husserl’s views are rooted in a central concern with concrete human activities and experiences. Taguchi 2006 explores the notion of an “original I” (Ur-Ich), considered as a phenomenological topic.
Introductions Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 8, Moran 2005, Ch. 7
Related categories

71 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. added 2019-02-23
    On the Border of Self-Appearance. Self-Affection and Reflection in the Remembering in Kant and Husserl.Guillermo Ferrer - 2015 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 4 (2):87-98.
  2. added 2019-02-23
    The Problem of Time and Reflexivity in Husserl.A. Krioukov - 2013 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 2 (2):50-60.
  3. added 2019-02-16
    What has Transparency to Do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - forthcoming - ProtoSociology.
    This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
  4. added 2018-02-04
    Embodiment and Self-Awareness – Evans, Cassam and Husserl.Lilian Alweiss - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (1):31-51.
  5. added 2018-02-04
    Self-Consciousness and Otherness: Hegel and Husserl.Saulius Geniušas - 2011 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 16 (3).
    Countless differences between Hegel and Husserl notwithstanding, there is a common element in both of their accounts of the genesis of otherness. According to both, only if one delves into the interiority of self-consciousness, can one account for the rudimentary appearance of the Other. Following the Hegelian and Husserlian variants of such a strategy, this paper argues that: at the primitive levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through; an irreducible distance separates the Other from the self, due to (...)
  6. added 2017-09-14
    Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness?Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2016 - In Sofia Miguens, Sofia Magueys & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...)
  7. added 2017-03-10
    The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.
    Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
  8. added 2017-03-08
    Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution Und Die Spätlehre des Ich in der Genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.
    Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
  9. added 2017-03-02
    M. Steinhoff, Zeitbewusstsein Und Selbsterfahrung. Studien Zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität Und Zeitlichkeit Im Vorkantischen Empirismus Und in den Transzendentalphilosophien Kants Und Husserls. [REVIEW]K. B. Beils - 1988 - Kant-Studien 79 (3):358.
  10. added 2017-02-28
    The Interactive Now: A Second-Person Approach to Time-Consciousness.Stephen Langfur - 2016 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.
    Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...)
  11. added 2017-02-28
    Intentionality and Normativity.Maxime Doyon - 2016 - Philosophy Today 60 (1):207-221.
    The paper is organized around two ideas that come out in Steve Crowell’s Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger and that I discuss critically in turn. The first concerns the reach of Crowell’s claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience. I make my point by considering the case of imagining experiences, which are—I argue—meaningful, intentional, but not necessarily normative in any relevant sense. The second question is about (...)
  12. added 2017-02-28
    Freedom, Responsibility and Self-Awareness in Husserl.Thomas Nenon - 2011 - Phainomena 76:161-182.
    e following essay is organized around eighteen theses concerning the relationship between freedom, responsibility and self- awareness that I believe are both correct and consistent with specic doctrines and the overall positions advanced in Husserl’s published writings. e eighteen theses are not meant to represent a deductive argument. Most of them are not unique to Husserl or phenomenological philosophy, but I’m not aware of any other thinker who has hat brought all of them together as does Husserl.
  13. added 2017-02-28
    Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers.Dermot Moran - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):265-291.
    Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein, and also consider the influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made (...)
  14. added 2017-01-01
    Harald Delius: Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Barry Smith - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46:170–173.
    The thesis of Delius's book is that statements of self-awareness such as "I am aware that I see a cat" possess what he calls 'Cartesian characteristics' of indubitability or absolute self-evidence. He argues that this is the case in virtue of the fact that such statements are not about anything independent of themselves. The book is described as a 'semantical inquiry', but it is not by any means a contribution to the philosophy of language of the predictable sort. Statements of (...)
  15. added 2016-12-08
    Problem samouchwytności ciała – Husserl i Sartre.Katarzyna Gurczyńska-Sady - 2009 - Diametros 21:14-29.
    The topic of the article is the way in which a human being can grasp its own body. The confrontation between Husserl's and Sartre's philosophy about meeting Another is my way of showing the radical change in our understanding of the problem of how we know our own body. According to Husserl both our psyche and body are given to us immediately. The body of Another is given to us by means of our own body. The psyche of Another is (...)
  16. added 2016-12-08
    La dramatique de la personne ou l'ipséité comme paradoxe.Emmanuel Housset - 2007 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 81 (2):215.
    Le terme de « personne » est devenu aujourd’hui très abstrait, y compris dans le personnalisme, et il est nécessaire de lui redonner le statut d’un vrai concept. Une telle tâche est rendue possible par la méthode de la phénoménologie qui seule peut être attentive à l’identité propre de la personne par rapport à l’identité de la chose. Contre le concept juridique de personne et contre les pensées de l’identité personnelle issues de Locke, Husserl permet de montrer en quoi l’identité (...)
  17. added 2016-10-27
    Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.
    I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
  18. added 2016-10-27
    Kant’s and Husserl’s Agentive and Proprietary Accounts of Cognitive Phenomenology.Julia Jansen - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.
    In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. These, I (...)
  19. added 2016-10-27
    Intencionalidad, pasividad y autoconciencia en la fenomenología de Husserl.Francesco De Nigris - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):215-250.
    A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...)
  20. added 2016-10-27
    Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.
  21. added 2016-10-27
    Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness From Lotze to Scheler.Guillaume Frechette - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.
    Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...)
  22. added 2016-10-22
    Brentano or Husserl? Intentionality, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness in Contemporary Phenomenology of Mind.Federico Boccaccini - 2015 - Archivio Di Filosofia (3):189-202.
  23. added 2016-03-07
    Introduction: Intersubjectivity and Empathy.Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):125-133.
  24. added 2016-03-01
    How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness.Wei Zhang - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):47-66.
    The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness (...)
  25. added 2015-09-13
    Sartre’s Case for Nonthetic Consciousness: The Ground of the Cartesian Cogito’s Certainty and the Methodological Basis for Phenomenological Ontology.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (4):405-442.
    Sartre’s phenomenological view of consciousness gives primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i.e., pre-reflectively aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre’s grounds for holding this thesis, despite his view that the thesis’s truth underwrites the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and thereby the method of Sartre’s own phenomenological ontology. I document three lines of support for the thesis, the most promising of which consists in a proof by (...)
  26. added 2015-08-16
    Can I Anticipate Myself? Self-Affection and Temporality.Natalie Depraz - 1998 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 83-97.
  27. added 2015-02-20
    Barbara Merker, Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis. Zu Heideggers Transformation der Phänomenologie Husserls. [REVIEW]Christoph Jamme - 1990 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 97 (1):203.
  28. added 2015-02-18
    Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis: Zu Heideggers Transformation der Phänomenologie Husserls.Barbara Merker - 1988 - Suhrkamp.
  29. added 2015-02-15
    The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Phenomenological and Philosophical Investigation.Kenneth Wayne Williford - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    In this dissertation, the author articulates and defends a version of the historically important view that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. In Chapter 1, the author defends a certain conception of the role of phenomenology in the theory of consciousness. The author argues that any theory of consciousness must account for the properties that phenomenology reveals consciousness to have. The most important properties in this regard are structural: temporality, synchronic unity, and self-referentiality. It is argued that these properties can be given (...)
  30. added 2015-02-15
    Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Critique of Representational Theory.Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.
    Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...)
  31. added 2015-02-15
    Intentionality, Time, and Self-Identity: Husserl's Theory of Time and the Problem of Personal Identity.Se-Gweon An - 1990 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
    In this dissertation I raise three questions: What is Husserl's theory of time?; Can we develop a particular thesis of self-identity and, if so, what would it look like?; How does the thesis work in relation to the problems that are to be solved? ;In chapter II, I give an exposition of Husserl's view on time with the purpose of establishing a framework that will play a decisive role in the formation of a thesis of self-identity. Husserl defines time as (...)
  32. added 2015-02-15
    Phenomenology and the Dialectic: A Study of Pre-Reflexive Consciousness in the Phenomenological Theories of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.Richard Timothy Murphy - 1963 - Dissertation, Fordham University
  33. added 2015-02-14
    Review of Dan Zahavi's Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW]Greg Janzen - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
    In Subjectivity and Selfhood Dan Zahavi presents the fruits of his thinking on a nexus of issues regarding the experiential structure of consciousness and its relation to selfhood. The central theme of the book is that the “notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness, and consequently it is indispensable to a variety of disciplines such as philosophy of mind, social philosophy, psychiatry, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience” . Proceeding, as in his previously published work , on (...)
  34. added 2014-09-23
    Peter R. Costello: Layers in Husserl’s Phenomenology. On Meaning and Intersubjectivity. [REVIEW]Joona Taipale - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (2):169-173.
    Around the 1920s, Husserl increasingly began to integrate temporality into his phenomenological analyses. As a consequence, many topics that he had thus far considered in terms of a static structure were re-introduced as involving inner dialectics, a multi-layered depth-dimension to be unveiled by further studies. Establishing a novel, genetic-phenomenological approach motivated certain important shifts of focus in his account of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. For one, whereas Husserl had earlier discussed the experiencing subject as a self-identical pole, introducing temporality into the (...)
  35. added 2014-05-10
    Self-Reference and Time-the Dynamic Stability of Consciousness.Georg Römpp - 1989 - Husserl Studies 6 (2):129-154.
  36. added 2014-04-02
    Husserl's Ego.John Brough - 2005 - Philosophy Today 49 (Supplement):222-231.
  37. added 2014-04-02
    The Problem of Self-Constitution For Idealism and Phenomenology.Errol E. Harris - 1977 - Idealistic Studies 7 (1):1-27.
    Following kant, idealists establish the transcendental unity of the subject as the prior condition of experience of objects. this is necessarily all-inclusive and the finite self becomes one of its phenomena, which cannot be identified with the transcendental ego, nor yet be wholly divorced from it. this is the basis of kant's paralogism of reason. t h green, f h bradley and edmund husserl are all victims of this paralogism, each in his own way. green fails to avoid it by (...)
  38. added 2014-03-30
    Die zweideutigkeit der reflexion als wahrnehmung von anonymität.Gisbert Hoffmann - 1997 - Husserl Studies 14 (2):95-123.
  39. added 2014-03-27
    Die monade in husserls phänomenologie der intersubjektivität.Klaus Erich Kaehler - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (4):692-709.
    Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not a mere egology, but gets its concrete accomplishment only as a phenomenology of 'transcendental intersubjectivity'. However, the subjective centers of any transcendentality and thus of every constitution — even of intersubjectivity itself — have to be such unities as Leibniz' 'monads', that is, individually concrete subjects producing all their representations of one another completely out of themselves, respectively. Thus the problem arises, how the genuine transcendental status of each monadic subject in all its constitutive achievements (...)
  40. added 2014-03-26
    La conception husserlienne de la temporalité entre 1905 et 1910.Valérie Kokoszka - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 58 (2):314-341.
    The phenomenological study of time, as Husserl conceives its progression, should make accessible, through reduction, the appearing time of the temporal objects and the temporality of intentional acts, but also the origin of those 'times': the flow of absolute consciousness. A number of major interpretations, such as those of J.-P. Sartre and R. Bernet, question the achievement of phenomenological reduction and the absoluity of absolute consciousness; they insist on the fact that absolute consciousness, the ultimate constitutive consciousness, seems to require (...)
  41. added 2014-03-25
    Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation. [REVIEW]Holger Maaß - 2001 - Husserl Studies 17 (3):243-253.
  42. added 2014-03-21
    Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Husserl Studies 20 (2):99-118.
    Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse” – but he also takes care to distinguish between several different regresses. One (...)
  43. added 2014-03-21
    Over de zelfconstitutie van de absolute bewustzijnsstroom: De restitutie van een leerstuk van Brentano in Husserls analyse van het tijdbewustzijn.Toine Kortooms - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (1):91-124.
    This article focuses on one of the attempts Edmund Husserl undertakes in the hitherto unpublished, so-called L-manuscripts, dating mainly from 1917 and 1918, to describe the structure of the consciousness of internal time. The focus on this attempt is motivated by the fact that in it Husserl offers a supplement to a notion that plays a fundamental role in his earlier analysis of time-consciousness, viz. the notion of the self-constitution of the absolute flow of consciousness. In his elaboration of this (...)
  44. added 2014-03-11
    Me, Myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on Elusiveness of the Self.Pierre-Jean Renaudie - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):99-113.
    In his early essay on transcendence of the ego, Sartre attempted to follow Husserl’s Logical Investigations and to draw the consequences of his phenomenological criticism of subjectivity. Both authors have emphasized the elusiveness of the self as a result of intentionality of consciousness. However, Sartre’s analysis of ego led him quite far from Husserl’s philosophical project, insofar as it was somehow already raising the question about the moral nature of the self, and was thus establishing the basis of the conception (...)
  45. added 2014-03-11
    The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness.Stephen Langfur - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
  46. added 2014-03-09
    S. Taguchi, Das Problem Des 'Ur-Ich' Bei Edmund Husserl: Die Frage Nach der Selbstverständlichen 'Nähe' Des Selbst. [REVIEW]Søren Overgaard - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):89-95.
  47. added 2014-03-04
    Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (1):13-25.
    The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.
  48. added 2014-03-04
    Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate.Neal DeRoo - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (1):1-12.
    In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi’s concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper (...)
  49. added 2014-02-26
    Self-Awareness and Affection.Dan Zahavi - 1998 - In N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (eds.), Alterity and Facticity. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 205-228.
    Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) Frank has also (...)
  50. added 2014-02-18
    Husserlian Self-Awareness and Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors.Peter Hadreas - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):43-51.
    The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...)
1 — 50 / 71