Husserl’s account of time-consciousness closely interconnects with his account of the givenness of sensuous objectivity. It centers on the idea of an extended or “living” present, which involves not only the momentary now but also retentions and protentions, extending it into the past and into the future. Retentions and protentions are not intentional acts in their own right; that distinguishes them from acts of recollection and expectation, of which they are conditions of possibility. When I sensuously experience an object, the appearance it presents now is not sufficient for me to experience an object. Instead, roughly, I must always have retained some of the previous appearances and have some tacit anticipations (or protentions) in regard to the appearances to come. Husserl discusses time consciousness at three levels. First, at the level of intentional experiences (or their non-intentional contents). Second, at the level of the experienced objects (or the intentional contents). Third, at the level of the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness, the most fundamental stratum of experience discoverable by phenomenological investigation.
Held 1966 discusses the transcendental I with a focus on its temporality: the “living present” is the original mode of subjective life. Brough 1972 traces the development of Husserl’s views of time-consciousness, distinguishing an earlier and a later phase. In the earlier phase, Husserl regards time-consciousness in terms of the schema ‘apprehension—content of apprehension’. In the later phase, this schema is dropped, and the idea of an absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness first emerges. Miller 1984 discusses Husserl’s views of time-consciousness and perception, from the viewpoint of the “West Coast interpretation” (See Husserl: Noesis and Noema). Bernet 2002 focuses on Husserl’s views of time-consciousness in the Bernau manuscripts, written in 1917 and 1918. Rinofner-Kreidl 2000, Kortooms 2002, Warren 2009, and Mensch 2010, are monographs exploring the relations between time-consciousness and a variety of other Husserlian topics, as well as discussing Husserl’s views in relation to other philosophers’. Rodemeyer 2006 argues that intersubjectivity is rightly understood through time-consciousness. We are aware of fellow subjects, not by analogical reasoning based on their bodily presence, but thanks to “protentions”, or anticipatory openness to the Others. Lohmar & Yamaguchi 2010 is a recent collection of papers, with contributions from many leading scholars.
|Introductions||Zahavi 2003, Ch. 3, Woodruff Smith 2006, Ch. 5, Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 3|
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