Husserl: Works, Misc

In this paper I discuss some significant aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology which could not be adequately known without studying the manuscripts, unpublished during his lifetime and then published gradually since 1950 by Husserl Archives in Leuven founded by Father van Breda in 1939. The aspects I discuss here are listed under 6 subjects: Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the constituting corporeal subjectivity, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the conditions of possibility of representifications, concept of I-consciousness, conception of transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity, the (...) development of Husserl’s conception of phenomenological philosophy, and Husserl’s metaphysics. This paper is drawn from, and an extension of, a lecture given at the Catholic University of Louvain in the occasion of 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Husserl Archives. (shrink)

Il soggetto empirico indagato dagli psicologi trattiene forti legami con il soggetto puro indagato dai fenomenologi. Ne deriva il paradosso di una differenza che è insieme identità. L’analisi fenomenologica allora potrebbe assumere presupposti naturalistici, esito che Husserl ha decisamente escluso, affermando invece la necessità dell’epoché, della ricerca eidetica e il primato della coscienza intenzionale. Le ricerche che vertono sulla coscienza vedono oggi consumarsi un contrasto tra i sostenitori dell’embodiment, secondo cui le neuroscienze sono in grado di spiegare a sufficienza i (...) fenomeni psichici, e i fenomenologi, i quali, basandosi sul concetto husserliano di hyle, configurano una soggettività sensoriale, ovvero una coscienza legata strettamente all’esperienza sensibile. La ricerca di scientificità nel primo caso giunge attraverso le scienze della complessità alla matematizzazione della psiche, mentre nel secondo caso i fenomenologi si appoggiano ai progressi delle neuroscienze. (shrink)

With the publication of these lectures, given in the summer semester of 1907 at the University of Göttingen, all of Husserl’s course on the “Main Parts of the Phenomenology and Critique of Reason” is now available. They were preceded by the publication in 1964 of a translation of the first five lectures of the course under the title The Idea of Phenomenology, which was first published in German in 1950. As Husserl wrote in a private notebook, the themes of the (...) course were to be the “problems of a phenomenology of perception, of phantasy, of time, of the thing”. As worked out in the course, the lectures describe the conditions of possibility of the presentation of a thing in visual perception, the role of kinaesthetic experience in the unification of the series of images of the thing presented, and the temporal background of the presentation. (shrink)

This collection is the third of three planned volumes collecting Husserl's shorter essays, reviews, and lectures. Slightly more than one-third of the volume is devoted to five essays on the theme of renewal. All were written in the years from 1922 to 1924; the first three were published in the Japanese journal Kaizo in 1923 and 1924, but the fourth and fifth were not published. These essays arise out of Husserl's own experience of and reflection upon the First World War. (...) Husserl sees a crisis in which our loss of a proper sense of the human has consequences which are not merely theoretical but, much more broadly, ethical and cultural. His response to this crisis is to call for a philosophical renewal of the sort which can underwrite a cultural renewal. (shrink)

The two works on logic that Husserl published during his lifetime were Logical Investigations, which appeared in 1900–01 at the beginning of his career, and Formal and Transcendental Logic, which appeared in 1929 and was written just after he retired from teaching in 1928. The present volume contains lectures Husserl gave on logic and the theory of science during the years between these two publications. The main text of the book, comprising 330 pages, is a course he gave in Freiburg (...) in 1917–18 during the winter semester. The course was originally given in 1910–11 when Husserl was at Göttingen, where it was repeated twice in 1912–13 and 1914–15. The volume also contains some fifty pages of supplementary texts, taken from materials that Husserl composed or used during the first presentation of the course in 1910–11. The critical apparatus is very extensive because it has to cover all the variations in the texts that arose as the courses were repeated. It should also be mentioned that the original version of this course drew on material that Husserl had discussed in earlier courses. Thus, the present volume gives a comprehensive picture of how Husserl’s thoughts on logic developed during his last years at Göttingen and his first years at Freiburg. The largest part of the book deals with the formal analysis of meaning and judgment. (shrink)

Paul Janssen, of the University of Cologne, has provided a new edition of the book Husserl published in 1929. The edition required no changes in the text of the work itself; the few additions or annotations that Husserl made later are placed in the critical notes. The volume follows the standard format of the Husserliana series. There is an introduction of some thirty pages, followed by the main text, and then supplementary texts and the critical notes and adjustments to the (...) texts. Janssen’s introduction gives the circumstances surrounding the composition of the book, many excerpts from letters of Husserl which reveal his attitude towards it, and an analysis of the work itself. The ten supplementary texts were written between 1920 and 1929 and explore in greater detail themes found in the main text. Among many interesting remarks are the examination of Sinn, noema, immanent and external perception, occasional expressions, and the study of vagueness, distinctness, and identity of judgment. (shrink)

Ulrich Claesges, author of an important book on Husserl’s theory of the constitution of space, has edited the famous lectures of 1907 in which Husserl examines the phenomena of "thing" and "space." The introduction to this course has already been published as Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Claesges includes supplementary texts dating from 1906-1917, with one from 1926. It is in the introduction to this course that Husserl uses the transcendental reduction for the first time, and quite appropriately; for the reduction (...) is motivated by the peculiarities inherent in our experience of things. Husserl is persuaded by his analysis of this experience that he must turn to another kind of experience as the basis for philosophy. The reduction is mentioned only a few times in this volume, however. (shrink)

This book is a good example of Husserl’s phenomenology at work. It contains three parts, each filled with interesting analyses. Part One examines prepredicative experience and describes how certain aspects come to prominence against others, how similarities arise, how a prepredicative sense of attribution occurs. It discusses the difference between the ego’s being affected and his act of attention, explores prepredicative modalities, and the elementary state of relations in experience. In Part Two Husserl moves to explicit predication as his theme, (...) shows how it differs from the passivity that underlies it, explores relations, predicates and sets, and several dimensions to be found in categorial objectivities: states of affairs, propositions, core-forms, modalities, and affair-complexes. The theme of temporality is often mentioned in Parts One and Two. In Part Three the problem of different kinds of generalities is examined. Husserl distinguishes associative similarities, empirical essences, and pure essences. He describes the different kinds of subsumptions or relations to individuals that such generalities permit. In this book Husserl fills out some of the terse analyses of Formal and Transcendental Logic. It was edited for style by Ludwig Landgrebe, and so is more relaxed in expression than Husserl’s other works. The translation is easy to read and proved accurate in places where I compared it to the German. However on page 208, line 13, "this synthesis" should, I think, be "this unity," and on line 16, "they" should be "it." The emendation made on page 325 seems incorrect. Evidenz is translated by "self-evidence," but perhaps "evidence" would be better if it is understood that Husserl gives a special meaning to the term. In his Afterword, Eley uses themes from Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Lorenzen to criticize Husserl’s attempt to get beyond language in the description of experience.—R.S. (shrink)

This pair of lectures was given by Husserl in 1929 at the Sorbonne, and was later revised and expanded, resulting in the Cartesiansche Meditationen. By far the largest portion of the present volume consists of an introduction by the translator, the intention of which is to acquaint the Anglo-American philosopher with the fundamentals of Husserl's phenomenology. Biographical information on Husserl is also presented. The lectures themselves are less technical than the Cartesian Meditations, and are well suited as an introduction to (...) Husserl's thought.—A. W. W. (shrink)

This latest volume of the Husserliana continues the process of making available to a wider philosophical public the treasure of Husserl's unpublished writings at Louvain, formerly accessible only to a limited circle. Much of the work of later phenomenological psychologists is foreshadowed in this volume. After acknowledging the contributions of Dilthey and Brentano, Husserl proceeds to apply the analytical method of transcendental phenomenology as formulated in the Ideen to the concrete constitution of the living subject in the world. The priority (...) of the subject's world of spontaneous experience over the "objective world" of science is stressed. From an investigation of this direct experience the activity of the ego and the structure of the world as a realm of possible knowledge and action are systematically developed. There are appended the sketches and original text for the Encyclopaedia Britannica article "Phenomenology," and many brief essays amplifying the discussion. An essential book for anyone concerned with a most vital and productive current in continental thought.--S. A. N. (shrink)

This book is the edition of a course given by Husserl in the Winter Semester of 1906-07 at Goettingen. The volume contains a long and informative introduction by the editor, the course itself, which extends for 355 pages, two sets of supplementary texts, which extend for almost 100 pages, and textual-critical remarks and tables of contents. The materials are not dramatically new, but they do shed light on Husserl's development and on the meaning of his teachings in Ideas I and (...) in his well-known lectures on thing-perception in the Summer Semester of 1907; the latter were published by Ulrich Claesges as volume XVI of Husserliana, and five introductory lectures to them were published by Walter Biemel as Die Idee der Phaenomenologie, volume II of the series. The lectures in Melle's volume are divided into three sections. The first discusses pure logic as a formal theory of science, the second examines epistemology and phenomenology, the third talks about the lower and higher forms of objectivity. (shrink)

The two pieces translated here, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" and "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" represent one of the earliest and one of the latest presentations by Husserl of the discipline of phenomenology. The first essay sets up his phenomenological method over against naturalism, psychologism, historicism, and Weltanschauung philosophy as the only way to secure a rigorous scientific basis for philosophy. The second essay was a lecture which introduced the major ideas of his last work, Die Krisis (...) der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. In it he identifies the telos of European civilization as the infinity contained in the ideas of reason. Modern European man's current spiritual crisis stems from his having naturalized the spirit making it a function of or an extension from the physical world. Only by returning to a spirit-centered science with the infinite task of exploring the ideal world of spirit of which nature is but a part can European man harmonize himself with his telos and resolve his spiritual crisis. Lauer's introduction to the whole of Husserl's philosophy is helpful.—P. M. (shrink)

The initial collaboration and subsequent parting of the ways of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and the closely related course of the early development of the phenomenological movement, are chronicled in part in the history of a text Husserl wrote for the fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The article, “Phenomenology,” which, until 1956, remained an important source of many a general reader’s information about phenomenology, was both one of Husserl’s few attempts to present in a concise way an account (...) of the new fundamental science that he originated and “a programmatic outline for his future endeavors” from 1928 on. The five versions of the article and a set of lectures on phenomenological psychology that Husserl gave in Amsterdam in 1928 are brought together in the present volume. The fifth version of Husserl’s article was finally “done into English” by one of Husserl’s doctoral students, Christopher V. Salmon, whose version was eventually further truncated by the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The actual Britannica text is not reproduced here. The transmogrifications of this ill-fated text are meticulously illuminated by Thomas Sheehan, who has also prepared a complete edition of the marginalia to Husserl’s copy of Sein und Zeit. Richard E. Palmer has edited and translated the Amsterdam Lectures and Husserl’s marginal remarks in his copy of Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Both sets of marginalia occupy about two-hundred pages of the volume. Also included are several other documents relevant to the history of the philosophical and personal relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, whom Husserl had chosen to be his academic successor and philosophical heir: remarks made by Heidegger in April 1929 on the occasion of Husserl’s seventieth birthday; Husserl’s letter to Alexander Pfänder from January 1931, in which he reveals his disappointment with Heidegger; and a lecture on “Phenomenology and Anthropology,” given by Husserl in June 1931, in which he publicly rejects Heidegger’s philosophy. The editors have worked with and, at times, updated Walter Biemel’s critical edition of Husserl’s texts on phenomenological psychology, as well as other materials available in the Husserl archives, at Louvain. (shrink)

This is an intelligent and useful collection of works by Husserl. The editors have assembled twenty-one short works; some appeared first as essays, some are manuscripts, some are letters, some are extracts from larger works. Most important, they cover a wide range of topics and thus make up a rather colorful collection. Five are brief "introductions" to phenomenology: Husserl's inaugural lecture at Freiburg ; his introduction to the English edition of Ideas ; his Encyclopedia Britannica article ; his summary of (...) his London lectures ; and his summary of the Paris lectures. Another group is made up of papers concerning logic and mathematics: an early essay on the concept of number ; the very important essay "Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic" which contains some of the central ideas later found in Logical Investigations; a critique of psychologism entitled "On the Psychological Grounding of Logic" ; and a book review in which Husserl responds to a critic of the Logical Investigations. The issue of phenomenology as a science is developed in two works, the essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", in which Husserl criticized Dilthey; and an ensuing exchange of three letters between Dilthey and Husserl. Perhaps the most interesting part of the volume is made up of a series of studies of space and time. Two are manuscript essays ; one is "The Origin of Geometry" ; one is a selection from the lectures on internal time consciousness ; and one is a selection from Experience and Judgment which deals with inner time, perception, imagination, and association. The last section contains three general "humanistic" papers by Husserl, "Phenomenology and Anthropology" ; a paper on cultural and moral renewal ; and one on universal teleology which deals with sexuality. There is also a recollection Husserl wrote of Franz Brentano, letters to Munsterberg and Metzger, and short pieces on Eucken, Reinach, and George Bernard Shaw. (shrink)

The texts collected in this volume deal with a topic that is especially important in phenomenology. The subtitle of the book is, "Towards a Phenomenology of Intuitive Representations." Perhaps the most decisive philosophical move Husserl made was his restoration to philosophical legitimacy of the intuition or the direct presentation of an object; this he did through his treatment of intentionality. Husserl overcame the long tradition of both British Empiricism and continental Cartesianism, the tradition in which the perceiver is said never (...) to deal directly with an object but only with a mental representation of it. But if Husserl restores presentation, then he must give a new account of representation as well. He claims that in many forms of representation we enjoy again the same object we once perceived, but now in ways that must be distinguished from perception. In such forms of awareness we do not have something that only suggests or only resembles the object, we have the object itself, but not immediately perceived. Hence we deal with "intuitive representation," a term that would be contradictory in the philosophical tradition Husserl works against. The texts included in this volume are thus important for the definition of phenomenology, crucial in the criticism Husserl makes of other philosophical traditions, and interesting simply as analyses of the forms in which things are presented and represented to us. The texts are carefully edited and splendidly introduced by Eduard Marbach, whose book, Das Problem des Ich in der Phaenomenologie Husserls develops the themes found in the present volume, and whose current research in developmental psychology shows the impact Husserl's thought can have in related fields. (shrink)

This book presents an exposition and criticism of Husserl's essential ideas, explaining what is defective and what meritorious in them and offering a philosophical program based on the merit. The author's aim is to provide a point of entry for the study of phenomenology. In the opening section he states the key concepts of The Idea, following Husserl's summary. These are: the contrasting notions of natural thinking and philosophical thinking; intentional immanence; the "pure seeing" of reflective cognition; and eidetic abstraction. (...) He proceeds to a developmental reconstruction showing how these concepts grow out of one another. Intentionality, the active relatedness of consciousness to its object, is the foundation concept. By being aware of one's own intentionality and abandoning the natural standpoint, phenomenological reduction can be achieved and the universal experienced in eidetic abstraction. According to Pettit, the merit of Husserl's method is that it recalls philosophy to the self and to the evidence, i.e., to man as a conscious subject and to the obvious, incontestable data of consciousness. Phenomenology's defect is that, since every experience implicitly contains a description, the supposed eidetic experience is absurd. Philosophy should aim at explanation, i.e., at a non-reductive account of conscious experience, which makes the experience intelligible. Pettit concludes with a phenomenological program, listing the dimensions and types of human behavior and showing how the traditional divisions of philosophy fit into the classification. There is a bibliography but no index.--L. G. (shrink)

The present volume completes the publication of the most important and most representative Husserl texts from the twenties. The second half of the book contains important variants selected from the earlier versions of the lectures, a large number of independent short essays and notes, and finally a huge number of editorial notes on the texts and their reconstruction. The lectures deal with perception, expectation, and their implied phenomena, centered around the underlying major theme of the in-itself, hence of the passivity (...) of the flux of consciousness. By sacrificing deliberately an in extenso publication of the three versions of the lectures in favor of concentrating the theme into one volume, the editor chose to satisfy the most pressing needs of the Husserl scholar. Yet, one cannot but wonder whether an author of Husserl's stature might not deserve a more complete presentation.--M. J. V. (shrink)

In 2000 and 2001 many conferences were held to commemorate the centenary of Logical Investigations. In addition to these festive observances, a number of new publications of Husserl’s work related to the Investigations are appearing. The two volumes under review belong to that category. They are the texts of two courses Husserl gave concurrently in the winter semester of 1902–03 at Göttingen, where he had begun to teach in 1901–02. In his first year he gave a course on logic and (...) the theory of knowledge, in which he went through the ideas found in Logical Investigations, which, of course, had been published in 1900–01. In his second year at Göttingen, he split this material into two separate courses, one on logic and one on the general theory of knowledge, but both courses continued to rework the material of the Investigations. These two courses have now been published in the two volumes we are examining. What they offer, therefore, is Husserl’s own paraphrase of and commentary on the Investigations themselves. They are valuable as such, because they are more relaxed and more amplified: they contain more examples, more helpful repetition, some second-person address, and a more conversational tone. These lectures illuminate Husserl’s writings in the way that Heidegger’s published course material sheds light on his works. Furthermore, these books show how the material of the Investigations looked to Husserl when it was still fresh in his mind but when an interval of a few years had given him some critical distance to it. Husserl continued to review and use the material from these courses for other courses he gave at Göttingen in subsequent years. (shrink)

Brough's translation of Husserl's writings on time-consciousness found in volume 10 of the critical edition of Husserl's works is a welcome addition to the growing catalogue of translations of Husserl. The texts collected in Husserliana 10 are of central importance to understanding Husserl's phenomenology. They are indispensable first to understanding the "wonder" of time-consciousness, whose analysis is "an ancient burden", and the "most difficult" and "perhaps the most important" problem in phenomenology. But they are also indispensable to understanding the most (...) fundamental structures of all experience and of the ego. The irreducible and unitary form of time grounds the possibility of experiencing the duration, concreteness, and individuality of all objects, whether immanent or transcendent, whether processional or enduring; indeed, even ideal objects are experienced as timeless only against the backdrop of the temporal. The analysis of time-consciousness therefore discloses intentionalities essential to the experience of every possible object. (shrink)

Article en hommage à Jacques English dans lequel je propose une réflexion générale sur le thème des objets intentionnels en examinant un aspect de la solution proposée par Husserl dans son manuscrit de 1894 sur les objets intentionnels qui concerne le statut ontologique des objets de pensée et leur temporalité. J’aborde cette question par le biais de l’individuation des contenus intentionnels et leur temporalité dans les manuscrits de Bernau publiés dans le volume XXXIII des Husserliana . Je m’intéresse en particulier (...) au sens que prend le principium individuationis dans la cinquième partie de ces manuscrits de Husserl qui s'intitule «De la phénoménologie de l’individuation : la temporalité des objets d’expérience, des objets imaginaires et des objets idéaux». (shrink)

Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian meaning of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo-Kantian background.

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

Betrachtet man die Geschichte des Begriffs ‚Phänomenologie‘, ist nicht auf den ersten Blick klar, was darunter zu verstehen ist. Wie Schuhmann (1984 ) herausgearbeitet hat, tritt dieser Begriff in der Philosophiegeschichte auf, noch lange bevor Edmund Husserl sich ihn zu Eigen machte, um sein eigenes philosophisches Projekt zu beschreiben. Auch hinderte Husserls Versuch, diesen Begriff für die Beschreibung seines eigenen einmaligen Projekts zu beanspruchen, seine Zeitgenossen (z.B. Pfänder, Reinach, Stein) keineswegs daran, denselben Begriff ebenfalls zur Beschreibung ihrer jeweiligen Projekte und (...) Methoden zu verwenden. Es versteht sich also, dass Husserl selbst beträchtlichen Aufwand betrieb, um zu definieren, was der Begriff ‚Phänomenologie‘ in seinen Augen zu bedeuten hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Publikation des ersten Buches seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie im Jahre 1913 charakterisiert Husserl Phänomenologie als eine neue Wissenschaft, die sich von jeder anderen, bereits geschichtlich verankerten Wissenschaft wie Physik, Psychologie oder Kulturwissenschaft unterscheidet (Hua III/1, 1). Diese Darstellung von Phänomenologie lässt auf Anhieb eine wichtige Abweichung von seiner einstigen Gleichsetzung von Phänomenologie und deskriptiver Psychologie in den Logischen Untersuchungen (1901) erkennen. In der breiteren philosophischen Landschaft wären angesichts Husserls positiver Bestimmung dessen, was diese phänomenologische Wissenschaft ist, möglicherweise auch heute noch viele genauso irritiert wie einige der damaligen Teilnehmer des VI. Kongresses für experimentelle Psychologie, denen Husserl 1914 erklärte: „Analog wie die reine Geometrie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Raumes bzw. Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Raumgestalten ist, ist die reine Phänomenologie Wesenslehre des ‚reinen‘ Bewusstseins, Wissenschaft von den ideal möglichen Bewusstseinsgestalten (mit ihren ‚immanenten Korrelaten‘)“ (Schumann 1914, 144-5). Was heute wie damals für ein Verständnis dieser Darstellung von Phänomenologie der Klärung bedarf, ist Husserls Beschreibung der Phänomenologie als einer Wesenslehre, d.h. einer reinen oder eidetischen Wissenschaft, ebenso wie seine Aussage, deren Untersuchungsgegenstand sei das von ihm sogenannte reine Bewusstsein. Nur indem man die beiden Bedeutungen von ‚rein‘ erhellt, die hiermit angesprochen sind, wird auch deutlich, inwiefern Husserl behaupten kann, Phänomenologie unterscheide sich von anderen Wissenschaften: sowohl von empirischen wie Physik oder experimenteller Psychologie als auch von anderen eidetischen Wissenschaften wie Geometrie und deskriptiver Psychologie. Diese Erläuterung zeigt nicht nur, inwiefern Phänomenologie von all diesen Disziplinen verschieden ist, sondern auch, inwiefern sie mit ihnen zusammenhängt – und damit ist gerade die Idee der Phänomenologie begründet. (shrink)

A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.

A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.

The question that arises in this article is whether we can find elements of phenomenology in Bernard Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology.With help of other Lonergan scholars, I have discovered that modern thinking plays an important role in the theology and philosophy ofthis Jesuit author. Moreover, the terminology of modern philosophy coexists with the terminology of classical and especially Tomisticthought. This article is interested in the elements that Lonergan takes from the modern philosophy and emphasizes the centrality ofHusserlian phenomenology among the other (...) modern authors used by Lonergan. Following the research of the Jesuit thinker, I speakabout two parallel realities coexisting in his Trinitarian theology. Lonergan tries to realize their synthesis, but at the same time healso recognizes their distinctiveness. The most relevant result of this coexistence is obtained through the replacement of the metaphysical differentiation between the level of substance and the level of the three Persons, so that, instead of having the elements of classical theology, Lonergan predicates at the same time that God subsists as well as the Trinitarian Persons subsist. Through this assertion he emphasizes the identity between God’s existence and the existence of the three divine Persons, and eliminates the classical differentiation that might be closer to the danger of subordinating the three Persons to the one God. (shrink)

The following pages contain a partial edition of Husserl’s manuscript A I 35, pages 1a-28b. The first few pages are dated on May 1927 and are included mostly for completeness’ sake. The bulk of the manuscript convolute, however, is from 1912. Four pages of the convolute, 31a-34b, have been published as Beilage XII (210, 2–216, 2) in Hua XXXII. The manuscript was excluded from the text selection of Husserliana XXI3 based on its much later date of composition. A I 35/24a (...) is mentioned in Husserliana XXII (p. xxi, n. 4) as confirmation for Zermelo’s 1902 “oral report” to Husserl of his own independent discovery of the paradox. The text presented here for the first time has already been the target of at least three extensive commentaries, while still unpublished, by Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock. These present a good survey in english of the central issues on the text and contain many translated quotations. (shrink)

In these lectures, given at Göttingen in 1904-1910, Husserl describes the phenomenological content of lived experiences of time, Zeiterlebnisse, and defines the differences between acts of consciousness. He carefully shows how inner time is constituted as a continuum through the retentional modifications of consciousness. Consciousness is not merely temporal; it is temporality and the basis for the constitution of objective time. The translation is crystal-clear, though this makes the doctrine no less difficult. This early work shows that Husserl practiced phenomenology (...) before he formulated its methodological principles in the Ideen.—A. B. D. (shrink)

The following text, which is now published for the first time, comes from Husserl’s manuscript A III 1 and was probably written in 1914. The text belongs to a bundle of pages which Husserl wrote down during the presentation and examination of the “Staatsexamensarbeit” of his student Jean Hering. The work “Die Lehre vom Apriori bei Lotze” was done by Hering in the summer semester 1914 in order to receive a degree that would qualify him as a secondary school teacher. (...) Although this “Staatsexamensarbeit” was never published, Hering used parts of it for his article which appeared in the Jahrbuch, “Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. Edmund Husserl zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet”. Husserl characterized pages 5 to 8 of the manuscript A III 1 as his “own reflections” on Hering’s work. These pages are published as “Text Nr. 5” in Husserliana XLI. What follows here are pages 9 to 16 of this manuscript, which Husserl called “free excerpts”. (shrink)

Husserl’s legacy of research manuscripts has been revered as a resource containing the deepest insights of his later work and criticized because such manuscripts present work in progress rather than completed “results.” I suggest that these materials are far more than fragments calling for careful interpretation; instead, they belong to a different genre and should be taken up in an attitude of research directed toward working out unsolved problems rather than in an attitude focused on interpreting pregiven texts. After sketching (...) some elements of the research practice this entails, I review some of the ways in which Husserl’s research results have been appropriated and emphasize the need for further phenomenological investigation in the spirit of the “rigorous science” Husserl envisioned. (shrink)

The Essential Husserl, the first anthology in English of Edmund Husserl's major writings, provides access to the scope of his philosophical studies, including selections from his key works: Logical Investigations, Ideas I and II, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Experience and Judgment, Cartesian Meditations, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, and On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. The collection is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in twentieth-century philosophy.