Edited by Christopher Woodard (Nottingham University)
|Summary||Hybrid theories answer the explanatory question about well-being: what makes something a constituent of a subject's well-being? The most common hybrids combine elements of subjective and objective answers to this question. These subjective-objective hybrids claim that what makes something good for a subject is that (a) she has some positive attitude towards it, and (b) it is objectively good. However, other kinds of hybrid are possible. For example, subjective-subjective hybrids point to two or more kinds of pro-attitude. Moreover, hybrid theories need not claim that each different explanatory factor is a necessary condition of well-being. Thus a hybrid theory could claim that pleasure in worthless things counts for something, but pleasure in valuable things counts for more.|
|Key works||Two influential early discussions are Appendix I in Parfit 1984 and Raz 1986. Adams 1999 Chapter 3 offers a fuller version of a subjective-objective hybrid, developing the idea that well-being consists in enjoyment of the excellent. Kagan 2009 identifies and discusses many issues involved in developing this sort of view, including difficulties specifying exactly what is involved in 'enjoyment'. Kraut 1994 proposes that well-being consists in loving things worth loving. Wolf 1997 argues that one aspect of a good life, its meaningfulness, consists in engagement in worthwhile projects. For an example of a subjective-subjective hybrid, see Hawkins 2010. For criticism of joint necessity hybrids, see Hooker 2015. Lauinger 2013 responds to one form of this criticism. For exploration of other forms of hybrid, see Sarch 2012.|
|Introductions||An introductory survey of hybrid theories is provided in Woodard 2015.|
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Learn more about PhilPapers