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  1. added 2020-04-14
    From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts.W. Schwarz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):217-227.
    Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.
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  2. added 2020-04-14
    Imaginary Foundations.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    Our senses provide us with information about the world, but what exactly do they tell us? I argue that in order to optimally respond to sensory stimulations, an agent’s doxastic space may have an extra, “imaginary” dimension of possibility; perceptual experiences confer certainty on propositions in this dimension. To some extent, the resulting picture vindicates the old-fashioned empiricist idea that all empirical knowledge is based on a solid foundation of sense-datum propositions, but it avoids most of the problems traditionally associated (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-13
    Debunking Arguments for Illusionism about Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):258-281.
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  4. added 2020-03-11
    Interpretation-Neutral Integrated Information Theory.Kelvin J. McQueen - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):76-106.
    Integrated information theory is a theory of consciousness that was originally formulated, and is standardly still expressed, in terms of controversial interpretations of its own ontological and epistemological basis. These form the orthodox interpretation of IIT. The orthodox epistemological interpretation is the axiomatic method, whereby IIT is ultimately derived from, justified by, and beholden to a set of phenomenological axioms. The orthodox ontological interpretation is panpsychism, according to which consciousness is fundamental, intrinsic, and pervasive. In this paper it is argued (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-17
    How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?François Kammerer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true – whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion – the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation – or a “sparse” illusion – the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-06
    Conscience et matière. Une solution matérialiste au problème de l'expérience consciente.François Kammerer - 2019 - Paris, France: Editions Matériologiques.
    Voir une tache rouge, éprouver une douleur soudaine à l’épaule, sentir l’odeur du café, entendre le son d’une trompette : voilà des exemples typiques de ce qu’on appelle des «expériences conscientes». Ces expériences conscientes intéressent les philosophes de l’esprit depuis longtemps, notamment car elles semblent poser un problème fondamental à la conception matérialiste du monde. Il semble en effet extrêmement difficile de comprendre comment une expérience consciente – un vécu subjectif, qualitatif, éprouvé en première personne – peut provenir du fonctionnement (...)
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  7. added 2019-08-19
    The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach.François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135.
    I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
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  8. added 2019-06-17
    Undermining Belief in Consciousness.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):34-47.
    Does consciousness exist? In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness” (MPC) David Chalmers sketches an argument for illusionism, i.e., the view that it does not. The key premise is that it would be a coincidence if our beliefs about consciousness were true, given that the explanation of those beliefs is independent of their truth. In this article, I clarify and assess this argument. I argue that our beliefs about consciousness are peculiarly invulnerable to undermining, whether or not their contents are indubitable or (...)
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  9. added 2019-04-24
    Meta-Illusionism and Qualia Quietism.Pete Mandik - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):140-148.
    Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as Frankish, in holding their view, are (...)
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  10. added 2019-03-31
    The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.Francois Kammerer - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is a link between (...)
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  11. added 2018-07-24
    Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Místo vědomí v materiálním světě.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-12
    The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
  13. added 2018-01-15
    Illusionism and the Epistemological Problems Facing Phenomenal Realism.Amber Ross - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):215-223.
    Illusionism about phenomenal properties has the potential to leave us with all the benefit of taking consciousness seriously and far fewer problems than those accompanying phenomenal realism. The particular problem I explore here is an epistemological puzzle that leaves the phenomenal realist with a dilemma but causes no trouble for the illusionist: how can we account for false beliefs about our own phenomenal properties? If realism is true, facts about our phenomenal properties must hold independent of our beliefs about those (...)
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  14. added 2017-11-26
    A Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness.Michael S. A. Graziano & Taylor W. Webb - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):163-176.
    Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model o...
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  15. added 2017-11-26
    Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes From Physics to Ethics.Gary L. Drescher - 2006 - Bradford.
    In Good and Real, Gary Drescher examines a series of provocative paradoxes about consciousness, choice, ethics, quantum mechanics, and other topics, in an effort to reconcile a purely mechanical view of the universe with key aspects of our ...
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  16. added 2017-11-26
    A Case Where Access Implies Qualia?Andy Clark - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):30-37.
    Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of.
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  17. added 2017-11-25
    Can You Believe It? Illusionism and the Illusion Meta-Problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  18. added 2017-11-25
    The Hardest Aspect of the Illusion Problem - and How to Solve It.François Kammerer - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):124-139.
    In 'Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness', Frankish argues for illusionism: the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Illusionism, he says, 'replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem -- the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful'. The illusion of phenomenality is indeed quite powerful. In fact, it is much more powerful than any other illusion, in the sense that we face a very special and (...)
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  19. added 2017-11-25
    Illusionism's Discontent.Balog Katalin - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):40-51.
    Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because (...)
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  20. added 2017-11-25
    Quining Diet Qualia.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):667-676.
    This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The ‘classic’ conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down ‘diet’ conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. (...)
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  21. added 2017-11-25
    Is the Mystery an Illusion? Papineau on the Problem of Consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...)
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  22. added 2017-11-25
    Partial Awareness and the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness.Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Emmanuel Dupoux & Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):510-510.
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness.
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  23. added 2017-11-25
    Metaphysical Illusions.J. J. C. Smart - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):167 – 175.
    The paper begins by considering David Armstrong's beautiful paper 'The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism', which conjectures how we get the illusion that there are non-physical qualia. There are discussions of other metaphysical illusions, that there is a passage of time, that we have libertarian free will, and that consciousness is ineffable (which last also relates to Armstrong), and of their possible explanations. Moral: avoid appeal to so called intuition or phenomenology.
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  24. added 2017-11-25
    Dennett as Illusionist.Edmond Wright - 2003 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):157-167.
    Mark Crooks's article correctly draws attention to the ambiguous use of the notion of 'illusion' by Daniel Dennett in its arguments against theories that postulate the existence of qualia. The present comment extends that criticism by showing how Dennett's strictures reveal a failure to perceive an illusion in Dennett's own arguments. First, the inadequacy of his dismissal of inner registration is shown to be based in a prejudicial interpretation of the case for qualia. Second, his resistance to the idea of (...)
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  25. added 2017-11-25
    The Grand Illusion: Why Consciousness Exists Only When You Look for It.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - New Scientist 174 (2348):26-29.
    Like most people, I used to think of my conscious life as like a stream of experiences, passing through my mind, one after another. But now I’m starting to wonder, is consciousness really like this? Could this apparently innocent assumption be the reason we find consciousness so baffling?
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  26. added 2017-11-25
    Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  27. added 2017-11-25
    The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size.T. Norretranders - 1991 - Viking Penguin.
  28. added 2017-11-25
    The Headless Woman.Keith Ward - 1969 - Analysis 29 (6):196 -.
  29. added 2017-11-25
    The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism.David Malet Armstrong - 1968 - Analysis 29 (2):48--9.
    The paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...)
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  30. added 2017-11-25
    On the Illusion of Consciousness.Alf Ross - 1941 - Theoria 7 (3):171-202.