About this topic
Summary Historically, philosophers tended to view imagination as tightly bound up with the notion of mental imagery.  Although this tradition came under attack amidst the verificationism and behaviorism of the early to mid 20th century, most philosophers today continue to see an important connection between imagery and imagination.  Exactly what that connection is, however, has been much disputed.  Important questions include the following:  Must imagination involve imagery, or can there be non-imagistic imagining?  How can we account for the difference between imagination and other mental activities (such as memory) that involve imagery?  What is the role of imagery in imagination?
Key works Ryle 1960 famously argues against the existence of mental imagery and, relatedly, that there is no such thing as a faculty of imagination.  Kind 2001 and Casey 1971 explicitly take up the connection between mental imagery and imagination.  Byrne 2010 and Noordhof 2002 each take up the connection between imagining and related activities like perceiving.  Block 1981 is a useful collection of articles about mental imagery; Tye 1991 discusses the nature of imagistic representation.  
Introductions Kind 2005
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  1. added 2019-01-11
    Imagery and Possibility.Dominic Gregory - forthcoming - Noûs.
    We often ascribe possibility to the scenes that are displayed by mental or nonmental sensory images. The paper presents a novel argument for thinking that we are prima facie justified in ascribing metaphysical possibility to what is displayed by suitable visual images, and it argues that many of our imagery‐based ascriptions of metaphysical possibility are therefore prima facie justified. Some potential objections to the arguments are discussed, and some potential extensions of them, to cover nonvisual forms of imagery and nonmetaphysical (...)
  2. added 2018-12-10
    Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Avant: Special Issue-Thinking with Images.
    One distinct interest in self-knowledge concerns whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on (...)
  3. added 2018-11-24
    Inner Speech as the Internalization of Outer Speech.Christopher Gauker - 2018 - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 53-77.
    This paper aims to clear a path for the thesis that inner speech, in the very languages we speak, is the sole medium of all conceptual thought. First, it is argued that inner speech should not be identified with the auditory imagery of speech. Since they are distinct, there may be many more episodes of inner speech than those that are accompanied by auditory imagery. Second, it is argued that it is not necessary to conceive of linguistic communication as a (...)
  4. added 2018-06-27
    Visual Expectations and Visual Imagination.Dominic Gregory - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):187-206.
    (Open Access article, freely available to download from publisher's site.) Our visual experiences of objects as located in external space, and as having definite three-dimensional shapes, are closely linked to our implicit expectations about what things will look like from alternative viewpoints. What sorts of contents do these expectations involve? One standard answer is that they relate to what things will look like to us upon changing our positions. And what sorts of mental representations do the expectations call upon? A (...)
  5. added 2018-06-23
    Metaphor and Metamorphosis: Paul Ricoeur and Gilles Deleuze on the Emergence of Novelty.Martijn Boven - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Groningen
    This dissertation focuses on the problem of novelty as seen from the perspective of two French philosophers: Paul Ricoeur and Gilles Deleuze. As such, a new interpretation of the works of these two philosophers is developed. I argue that two models can be derived from their works: a model that strives to make tensions productive (based on Ricoeur) and a model that aims to organize encounters between bodies (taken from Deleuze). These models are developed on their own terms without superimposing (...)
  6. added 2018-01-27
    Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section I identifies relevant philosophical background. II offers a working definition of imagery. III identifies empirical work on visual imagery. IV and V criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to "put the image back into the imagination." The weakened conclusion is (...)
  7. added 2018-01-06
    On the Relation Between Visualized Space and Perceived Space.Bartek Chomanski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):567-583.
    In this paper, I will examine the question of the space of visual imagery. I will ask whether in visually imagining an object or a scene, we also thereby imagine that object or scene as being in a space unrelated to the space we’re simultaneously perceiving or whether it is the case that the space of visual imagination is experienced as connected to the space of perceptual experience. I will argue that the there is no distinction between the spatial content (...)
  8. added 2017-10-27
    THE IMAGINATIVE REHEARSAL MODEL – DEWEY, EMBODIED SIMULATION, AND THE NARRATIVE HYPOTHESIS.Italo Testa - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):105-112.
    In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct (...)
  9. added 2017-05-03
    Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):319-334.
    Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
  10. added 2017-03-12
    Imaginative Vividness.Kind Amy - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):32-50.
    How are we to understand the phenomenology of imagining? Attempts to answer this question often invoke descriptors concerning the “vivacity” or “vividness” of our imaginative states. Not only are particular imaginings often phenomenologically compared and contrasted with other imaginings on grounds of how vivid they are, but such imaginings are also often compared and contrasted with perceptions and memories on similar grounds. Yet however natural it may be to use “vividness” and cognate terms in discussions of imagination, it does not (...)
  11. added 2017-02-11
    Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:95-127.
    Traditionally ‘imagination’ primarily denotes the faculty of mental imagery, other usages being derivative. However, contemporary philosophers commonly hold it to be a polysemous term, with several unrelated senses. This effectively eliminates this culturally important concept as an appropriate explanandum for science, and paves the way for a thoroughgoing eliminative materialism. White challenges both these views of imagination, arguing that ‘imagine’ never means ‘suppose,’ ‘believe,’ ‘pretend’ or ‘visualize,’ that imagery may occur without imagination, and that the true sense of ‘imagine’ is (...)
  12. added 2016-12-08
    Imagining Experiences.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):561-586.
    It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for (...)
  13. added 2016-12-08
    Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
  14. added 2016-08-29
    " At What Price Freedom?" The Phenomenological Rudiments of Sartre's Cost-Benefit Analysis.Basil Vassilicos - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (1):36-44.
    In this paper, the Sartrean perspective on freedom is situated with respect to the fact that the price of freedom is at issue nowadays like never before. Of particular note is the way recourse is taken to what one might call a ‘commodification’ of freedom. We are not only asked to consider the value of freedom, but to do so in relative terms. In the process, therefore, the questions concerning freedom take on a different guise. On the one hand, what (...)
  15. added 2016-08-29
    The Time of Images and Images of Time: Lévinas and Sartre.Basil Vassilicos - 2003 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 34 (2):168-183.
    In this paper, Lévinas’s criticisms and reformulations of Sartre’s phenomenology of imagination, in the early text “Reality and its Shadow,” are explored in detail. Levinas's own views on imagination and art are shown to be intimately linked to his critique of Sartrean temporality, insofar as they rely on a renewed phenomenological examination of sensation. As a result, understanding Lévinas’s discussion of the image provides benefits for grasping his notion of the instant and its importance for some of his own positions (...)
  16. added 2016-06-15
    Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Marcus Willaschek (ed.), Disjunctivism – Disjunctive Accounts in Epistemology and in the Philosophy of Perception. Routledge. pp. 5-32.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
  17. added 2016-05-14
    Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
    This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...)
  18. added 2016-05-14
    Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College London
    The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...)
  19. added 2016-05-02
    Against the Additive View of Imagination.Nick Wiltsher - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.
    According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra- sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The (...)
  20. added 2016-03-16
    Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry.Robert Hopkins - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    How do pictures represent? In this book Robert Hopkins casts new light on an ancient question by connecting it to issues in the philosophies of mind and perception. He starts by describing several striking features of picturing that demand explanation. These features strongly suggest that our experience of pictures is central to the way they represent, and Hopkins characterizes that experience as one of resemblance in a particular respect. He deals convincingly with the objections traditionally assumed to be fatal to (...)
  21. added 2015-12-11
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination.Amy Kind (ed.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding _Handbook_ contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sections examining the most important aspects of the philosophy (...)
  22. added 2015-09-21
    Iconic Turn: A Plea for Three Turns of the Screw.Emmanuel Alloa - 2015 - Culture, Theory, and Critique 56 (3).
    In the early 1990s, W.J.T. Mitchell and Gottfried Boehm independently proclaimed that the humanities were witnessing a ‘pictorial’ or ‘iconic turn’. Twenty years later, we may wonder whether this announcement was describing an event that had already taken place or whether it was rather calling forth for it to happen. The contemporary world is, more than ever, determined by visual artefacts. Still, our conceptual arsenal, forged during centuries of logocentrism, still falls behind the complexity of pictorial meaning. The essay has (...)
  23. added 2015-09-18
    Phantasia. Aristoteles' Theorie der Sichtbarmachung.Emmanuel Alloa - 2014 - In Gottfried Boehm, Emmanuel Alloa, Orlando Budelacci & Gerald Wildgruber (eds.), Imagination. Suchen und Finden. W. Fink. pp. 91--111.
  24. added 2015-08-26
    Ein Bild, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache? Zur Geschichte der Bildhermeneutik.Tobias Keiling & Toni Hildebrandt - 2012 - In Dominic Delarue, Johann Schulz & Laura Sobez (eds.), Das Bild als Ereignis. Zur Lesbarkeit spätmittelalterlicher Kunst. Winter. pp. 127-160.
  25. added 2015-08-14
    Verlust der Welt Im Bild. Ursprung Und Entwicklung des Bildbegriffes Bei Hermann von Helmholtz Und Heinrich Hertz.Gregor Schiemann - 2008 - In G. Wolfschmidt (ed.), Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) and the Development of Communication (Nuncius Hamburgensis. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Band 10). Norderstedt.
    Helmholtz initially ascribes more to theoretical knowledge than merely that it is a picture of the world: it penetrates even to the unobservable causes of the phenomena which he conceived throughout his career as matter set mechanically in motion. The introduction of the picture-concept in the 1860s to characterize scientific theories marks the beginning of the loss of a direct connection with the world. Theories now constitute only a representation of a law-like structure of the world but no longer shed (...)
  26. added 2015-07-27
    Imagination and Reason.Joseph Agassi - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):453-453.
    Byrne's book is intended to explain why people imagine the things they do when they create alternatives to reality. Two fruitful areas of further research are: (1) How can her approach explain dreams and daydreams? (2) What is the developmental time course of the child's understanding of reality and imagination?
  27. added 2015-04-13
    Sartre.Robert Hopkins - forthcoming - In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 82-93.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
  28. added 2015-02-05
    Self-Knowledge and Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
    How do we know when we have imagined something? How do we distinguish our imaginings from other kinds of mental states we might have? These questions present serious, if often overlooked, challenges for theories of introspection and self-knowledge. This paper looks specifically at the difficulties imagination creates for Neo-Expressivist, outward-looking, and inner sense theories of self-knowledge. A path forward is then charted, by considering the connection between the kinds of situations in which we can reliably say that another person is (...)
  29. added 2015-01-27
    Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
  30. added 2015-01-08
    Icons without turn: Über Bilder und Worte.Andreas Dorschel - 2014 - In Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (ed.), Quo vadis Design? 4 Thesen. pp. 17-37.
    Images, or icons, have been made the subject of a ‘turn’. But no new epoch under its sign is looming. The image is just one medium among others. The best we can do is to face what it may and what it may not achieve. Its main competitor is the word – though there is a field of transition between both. Words and numbers surpass the image when one needs to refer to something that cannot be seen – this holds (...)
  31. added 2015-01-06
    Literary Narrative and Mental Imagery: A View From Embodied Cognition.Anezka Kuzmicova - 2014 - Style 48 (3):275-293.
    The objective of this article is twofold. In the first part, I discuss two issues central to any theoretical inquiry into mental imagery: embodiment and consciousness. I do so against the backdrop of second-generation cognitive science, more specifically the increasingly popular research framework of embodied cognition, and I consider two caveats attached to its current exploitation in narrative theory. In the second part, I attempt to cast new light on readerly mental imagery by offering a typology of what I propose (...)
  32. added 2014-08-28
    Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):698-715.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
  33. added 2014-06-03
    Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
  34. added 2014-04-02
    Inadequacies in Current Theories of Imagination.Mostyn W. Jones - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):313-333.
    Interest in imagination dates back to Plato and Aristotle, but full-length works have been devoted to it only relatively recently by Sartre, McKellar, Furlong, Casey, Johnson, Warnock, Brann, and others. Despite their length and variety, however, these current theories take overly narrow views of this complex phenomenon. Their definitions of “imagination” neglect the multiplicity of its meanings and tend to focus narrowly on the power of imaging alone. But imagination in the fullest, most encompassing sense centers instead on creativity, which (...)
  35. added 2014-03-27
    Imagination and Affective Response.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge. pp. 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
  36. added 2014-03-27
    Imagination in Non-Representational Painting.Andreas Elpidorou - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
  37. added 2014-03-26
    Putting the Image Back in Imagination.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
  38. added 2014-03-25
    Internal and External Pictures.Catharine Abell & Gregory Currie - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.
    What do pictures and mental images have in common? The contemporary tendency to reject mental picture theories of imagery suggests that the answer is: not much. We show that pictures and visual imagery have something important in common. They both contribute to mental simulations: pictures as inputs and mental images as outputs. But we reject the idea that mental images involve mental pictures, and we use simulation theory to strengthen the anti-pictorialist's case. Along the way we try to account for (...)
  39. added 2014-03-23
    False Pleasures, Appearance and Imagination in the Philebus.Sylvain Delcomminette - 2003 - Phronesis 48 (3):215-237.
    This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the "Philebus" (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object (...)
  40. added 2014-03-23
    Imagining Experiences Correctly.P. Joyce - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
    According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this (...)
  41. added 2014-03-23
    Reply to Recker's “Imagination and Images in Descartes' Science”.Don Sievert - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):61-64.
  42. added 2014-03-22
    Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
  43. added 2014-03-22
    Pictorial Representation or Subjective Scenario? Sartre on Imagination.Beata Stawarska - 2001 - Sartre Studies International 7 (2):87-111.
    The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of belief (...)
  44. added 2014-03-21
    Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
  45. added 2014-03-19
    With Sight Too Much in Mind, Mind Too Little in Sight?Robert Hopkins - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (4):293-305.
  46. added 2014-03-19
    Imaginative Contagion.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
  47. added 2014-03-19
    McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. [REVIEW]Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones - unknown
  48. added 2014-03-18
    The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance.Dustin R. Stokes - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
    A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses instead (...)
  49. added 2014-03-16
    Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination.Timothy M. Costelloe - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):31-45.
    This paper examines the role of the imagination in Hume's epistemology. Three specific powers of the imagination are identified – the imagistic, conceptual and productive – as well as three corresponding kinds of fictions based on the degree of belief contained in each class of ideas the imagination creates. These are generic fictions, real and mere fictions, and necessary fictions, respectively. Through these manifestations, it is emphasized, Hume presents the imagination both as the positive force behind human creativity and a (...)
  50. added 2014-03-13
    The Roots of Imagination.Mostyn W. Jones - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    This work presents a new theory of imagination which tries to overcome the overly narrow perpectives that current theories take upon this enigmatic, multi-faceted phenomenon. Current theories are narrowly preoccupied with images and imagery. This creates problems in explaining (1) what imagination is, (2) how it works, and (3) what its strengths and limitations are. (1) Ordinary language identifies imagination with both imaging (image-making) and creativity, but most current theories identify imagination narrowly with imaging while neglecting creativity. Yet imaging is (...)
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