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  1. Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):423-442.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
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  2. Prejudice or Propaganda.James E. Alcock - 2009 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):80-84.
    Slife and Reber accuse psychology of harboring a hidden, albeit unintentional, bias against theism in violation of the spirit of the American Psychological Association Council of Representatives resolution on religious prejudice. However, they are mistaken in categorizing a bias against theism in psychological research and theory as religious prejudice. Moreover, their discussion of religious prejudice morphs into promotion of Christian theology. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  3. IMPLICIT BIAS, STEREOTYPE THREAT, AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IN PHILOSOPHY.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (2).
    This paper offers an unorthodox appraisal of empirical research bearing on the question of the low representation of women in philosophy. It contends that fashionable views in the profession concerning implicit bias and stereotype threat are weakly supported, that philosophers often fail to report the empirical work responsibly, and that the standards for evidence are set very low—so long as you take a certain viewpoint.
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  4. Leaky Pipeline Myths: In Search of Gender Effects on the Job Market and Early Career Publishing in Philosophy (Draft).Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8 (953).
    That philosophy is an outlier in the humanities when it comes to the underrepresentation of women has been the occasion for much discussion about possible effects of subtle forms of prejudice, including implicit bias and stereotype threat. While these ideas have become familiar to the philosophical community, there has only recently been a surge of interest in acquiring field-specific data. This paper adds to quantitative findings bearing on hypotheses about the effects of unconscious prejudice on two important stages along career (...)
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  5. Review: Implicit Bias and Philosophy (Vol. 1 & 2).Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2016 - Philosophy:1-8.
  6. The Gendered Conference Campaign: A Critique.David Benatar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):13-23.
    The Gendered Conference Campaign seeks to reduce the prevalence of conferences at which the keynote speakers are all male. Such conferences, according to proponents of the campaign, stereotype philosophy as male, contribute to implicit bias against women and perpetuate stereotype threat. I argue, first, that if a more diverse list of keynote speakers were the correct way to counter harms such as implicit bias and stereotype threat, then a Gendered Conference Campaign would not be the solution. The campaign would need (...)
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  7. Fair Numbers: What Data Can and Cannot Tell Us About the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy.Yann Benétreau-Dupin & Guillaume Beaulac - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:59-81.
    The low representation (< 30%) of women in philosophy in English-speaking countries has generated much discussion, both in academic circles and the public sphere. It is sometimes suggested (Haslanger 2009) that unconscious biases, acting at every level in the field, may be grounded in gendered schemas of philosophers and in the discipline more widely, and that actions to make philosophy a more welcoming place for women should address such schemas. However, existing data are too limited to fully warrant such an (...)
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  8. Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self.Nora Berenstain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of (...)
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  9. Implicit Attitudes and Awareness.Jacob Berger - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I offer here a new hypothesis about the nature of implicit attitudes. Psy- chologists and philosophers alike often distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes by maintaining that we are aware of the latter, but not aware of the former. Recent experimental evidence, however, seems to challenge this account. It would seem, for example, that participants are frequently quite adept at predicting their own perfor- mances on measures of implicit attitudes. I propose here that most theorists in this area have nonetheless overlooked (...)
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  10. Symmetry in Cognition, and its Reflection in Society.Miro Brada - 2016 - In Ioannis Vandoulakis (ed.), Symmetry: Art and Science. Adeilaide: International Symmetry Society. pp. 34-37.
    Cognitive tests show that identity and symmetry reflect intellect. 'Guess of other guess' creates various symmetries, while only one is right: 'absolute symmetry', which can be outvoted by the majority. Prejudices result from differences between ME (my identity) and others. Unbiased judgement is symmetrical, always in the middle: neither in favor, nor against ME. Intelligence reduces prejudices, but the lack of opportunities can counterbalance it. That's why type of bias differs in various groups: people from war zones, people in therapy, (...)
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  11. Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.
    Implicit intergroup biases have been shown to impact social behavior in many unsettling ways, from disparities in decisions to “shoot” black and white men in a computer simulation to unequal gender-based evaluations of résumés and CVs. It is a difficult question whether, and in what way, agents are responsible for behaviors affected by implicit biases. I argue that in paradigmatic cases agents are responsible for these behaviors in the sense that the behavior is “attributable” to them. That is, behaviors affected (...)
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  12. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics.Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about (...)
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  13. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology.Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. This volume addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions about implicit bias, including its effect on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.
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  14. Religion and Reducing Prejudice.Joanna Burch-Brown & William Baker - 2016 - Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 19 (6):784 - 807.
    Drawing on findings from the study of prejudice and prejudice reduction, we identify a number of mechanisms through which religious communities may influence the intergroup attitudes of their members. We hypothesize that religious participation could in principle either reduce or promote prejudice with respect to any given target group. A religious community’s influence on intergroup attitudes will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices found within the community, as well as on interactions between the religious community and the larger (...)
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  15. Do Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moral Judgments?C. Daryl Cameron, Joshua Knobe & B. Keith Payne - 2010 - Social Justice Research 23:272-289.
    Recent work in social psychology suggests that people harbor “implicit race biases,” biases which can be unconscious or uncontrollable. Because awareness and control have traditionally been deemed necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility, implicit biases present a unique challenge: do we pardon discrimination based on implicit biases because of its unintentional nature, or do we punish discrimination regardless of how it comes about? The present experiments investigated the impact such theories have upon moral judgments about racial discrimination. The results (...)
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  16. Representing a Past: A Historical Analysis of How Gender Biases Influence the Interpretation of Archaeological Remains.Saliha Chattoo - 2009 - Constellations (University of Alberta Student Journal) 1 (1).
    The cultural and temporal context that any archaeologist is a part of will necessarily bias the way in which he or she interprets material remains. While interpretation is a crucial part of the archaeological process, the preconceived notions an archaeologist may hold can colour their interpretation of the society in question. Through examples such as the excavations at Knossos in Crete, the effect such biases can have on archaeological interpretation and discourse is studied.
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  17. Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition.Michael Cholbi & Alex Madva - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):517-544.
    The Black Lives Matter movement has called for the abolition of capital punishment in response to what it calls “the war against Black people” and “Black communities.” This article defends the two central contentions in the movement’s abolitionist stance: first, that US capital punishment practices represent a wrong to black communities rather than simply a wrong to particular black capital defendants or particular black victims of murder, and second, that the most defensible remedy for this wrong is the abolition of (...)
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  18. Reducing Subjectivity: Meditation and Implicit Bias.Diana M. Ciuca - unknown
    Implicit association of racial stereotypes is brought about by social conditioning. This conditioning can be explained by attractor networks. Reducing implicit bias through meditation can show the effectiveness of reducing the rigidity of attractor networks, thereby reducing subjectivity. Mindfulness meditation has shown to reduce bias from the use of one single guided session conducted before performing an Implicit Association Test. Attachment to socially conditioned racial bias should become less prevalent through practicing meditation over time. An experimental model is proposed to (...)
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  19. Implicit Bias and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the Context of the Corporatized University.Margaret A. Crouch - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):212-226.
  20. Faking of the Implicit Association Test Is Statistically Detectable and Partly Correctable.Dario Cvencek, Anthony S. Brown, Nicola S. Gray & Robert J. Snowden - unknown
    Male and female participants were instructed to produce an altered response pattern on an Implicit Association Test measure of gender identity by slowing performance in trials requiring the same response to stimuli designating own gender and self. Participants’ faking success was found to be predictable by a measure of slowing relative to unfaked performances. This combined task slowing (CTS) indicator was then applied in reanalyses of three experiments from other laboratories, two involving instructed faking and one involving possibly motivated faking. (...)
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  21. Using the Implicit Association Test Does Not Rule Out an Impact of Conscious Propositional Knowledge on Evaluative Conditioning.Jan de Houwer - 2006 - Learning and Motivation 37 (2):176-187.
  22. Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias.Guillermo Del Pinal & Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (1):95-111.
    How are biases encoded in our representations of social categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statistical associations between target features and representations of social categories. These are the sorts of associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories. (...)
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  23. Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the Evidence.Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-30.
    Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
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  24. Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story From Sydney.Tom Dougherty, Samuel Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (2):467-474.
    The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the (...)
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  25. Comments on Gendler's, “the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias”.Andy Egan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.
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  26. PsychInfo Liberal Bias.R. Eisenman - 2003 - Journal of Information Ethics 12 (2):5-9.
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  27. Perceptual Failure and a Life of Moral Endeavor.Barrett Emerick - 2015 - Social Philosophy Today 31:129-139.
    Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey argued that as agents engaged in a “life of moral endeavor,” we should understand ourselves and others to be moral works in progress, always possessing the potential to grow beyond and become more than the sum of our past wrongs. In this paper I follow Harvey and argue that in order to live a life of moral endeavor, it is not enough merely to know about injustice. Instead, we must engage in the (...)
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  28. Prejudice is Free, but Discrimination has Costs.Steven Farron - 2000 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 14 (2):179-245.
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  29. Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism.Luc Faucher & Edouard Machery - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):41-62.
    In this article, we argue that it can be fruitful for philosophers interested in the nature and moral significance of racism to pay more attention to psychology. We do this by showing that psychology provides new arguments against Garcia's views about the nature and moral significance of racism. We contend that some scientific studies of racial cognition undermine Garcia's moral and psychological monism about racism: Garcia disregards (1) the rich affective texture of racism and (2) the diversity of what makes (...)
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  30. The Bias Issue.Jeffrey Friedman - 2005 - Critical Review 17 (3-4):221-236.
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  31. Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and Machery.J. L. A. Garcia - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2):250-268.
    I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery’s vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fear or disgust, (...)
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  32. Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer.
    Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the (...)
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  33. On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias.Tamar Gendler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):33-63.
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  34. Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice.Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles - unknown
    This research examines whether spontaneous, unintentional discriminatory behavior can be moderated by an implicit (nonconscious) motivation to control prejudice. We operationalize implicit motivation to control prejudice (IMCP) in terms of an implicit negative attitude toward prejudice (NAP) and an implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced (BOP). In the present experiment, an implicit stereotypic association of Blacks (vs. Whites) with weapons was positively correlated with the tendency to "shoot" armed Black men faster than armed White men (the "Shooter Bias") in a (...)
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  35. Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.Stacey Goguen - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Though stereotype threat is most well-known for its ability to hinder performance, it actually has a wide range of effects. For instance, it can also cause stress, anxiety, and doubt. These additional effects are as important and as central to the phenomenon as its effects on performance are. As a result, stereotype threat has more far-reaching implications than many philosophers have realized. In particular, the phenomenon has a number of unexplored “epistemic effects.” These are effects on our epistemic lives—i.e., the (...)
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  36. Lost in Translation: Religion in The Public Sphere.Jérôme Gosselin-Tapp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    This paper proposes a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the prism of translation that frames the recent literature about the debate between Rawls and Habermas on the role of religious reasons in the public sphere. This debate originates with the introduction of Rawls’s proviso in his conception of the public use of reason, 765-807, 1997), which consists in the “translation” of religious reasons into secular ones, which he thinks is necessary in order for religious reasons to be legitimate in the public sphere. (...)
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  37. Gender, Race, Bias and Perspective: Or, How Otherness Colours Your Judgment.Reg Graycar - unknown
    This discussion considers assumptions about judges and judging and suggests that despite what is sometimes perceived as increasing diversity on the bench and in the legal profession, outsider decision makers' membership of the jurisprudential community is still marked by 'otherness'. The argument draws upon my ongoing interest in the law's concern with the concepts of 'objectivity', 'neutrality' and 'perspective'. I argue that the legal system is inherently suspicious of 'otherness' and most specifically so when 'others' occupy positions of 'judgement'. The (...)
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  38. A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept.Anthony Greenwald - manuscript
    This theoretical integration of social psychology’s main cognitive and affective constructs was shaped by 3 influences: (a) recent widespread interest in automatic and implicit cognition, (b) development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, & J. L. K. Schwartz, 1998), and (c) social psychology’s consistency theories of the 1950s, especially F. Heider’s (1958) balance theory. The balanced identity design is introduced as a method to test correlational predictions of the theory. Data obtained with this method (...)
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  39. Implicit Association Test: Validity Debates.Anthony Greenwald - manuscript
    Note posted 9 Jun 08 : Modifications made today include a new section on predictive validity, and addition of recently published article and in in-press article, both by Nosek & Hansen, under the "CULTURE VS. PERSON" heading, which replaces a previously listed unpublished ms. of theirs. I continue to encourage all interested to send material that they are willing to be included on this page. Please also to let me know about errors, including faulty links.
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  40. The Implicit Association Test's D Measure Can Minimize a Cognitive Skill Confound: Comment on McFarland and Crouch.Anthony Greenwald - manuscript
    McFarland and Crouch reported substantial positive correlations between the Implicit Association Test and response speed and between IATs assessing racism or self-esteem and ostensibly unrelated control IATs. Using an IAT measure in millisecond-difference score format, they concluded that the IAT was confounded with general cognitive ability. A reanalysis of these data using the D measure eliminated the speed of responding confound, although it did not eliminate the correlation between the control and racism IATs. The study was replicated and the two (...)
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  41. Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.Anthony Greenwald & L. H. Krieger - manuscript
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  42. If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
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  43. Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
    Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...)
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  44. The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd & Joseph Sweetman - forthcoming - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely (...)
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  45. Troubles with Stereotypes for Spinozan Minds.Bryce Huebner - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92.
    Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. (...)
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  46. The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.
    I offer a new argument for the elimination of ‘beliefs’ from cognitive science based on Wimsatt’s concept of robustness and a related concept of fragility. Theoretical entities are robust if multiple independent means of measurement produce invariant results in detecting them. Theoretical entities are fragile when multiple independent means of detecting them produce highly variant results. I argue that sufficiently fragile theoretical entities do not exist. Recent studies in psychology show radical variance between what self-report and non-verbal behaviour indicate about (...)
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  47. Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias.Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):522–540.
    We first describe recent empirical research on racial cognition, particularly work on implicit racial biases that suggests they are widespread, that they can coexist with explicitly avowed anti-racist and tolerant attitudes, and that they influence behavior in a variety of subtle but troubling ways. We then consider a cluster of questions that the existence and character of implicit racial biases raise for moral theory. First, is it morally condemnable to harbor an implicit racial bias? Second, ought each of us to (...)
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  48. A New Use of ‘Race’: The Evidence and Ethics of Forensic DNA Ancestry Profiling.Matthew Kopec - 2014 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (3):237-253.
    Recent advances in population genetics have made it possible to infer an individual's ancestral origin with a high degree of reliability, giving rise to the new technology called ‘DNA Ancestry Profiling’. Bioethicists have raised concerns over using this technology within a forensic context, many of which stem from issues concerning race. In this article, I offer some reasons why we ought to allow forensic scientists to use DNA Ancestry Profiling to infer the race or ethnicity of perpetrators — on a (...)
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  49. Are the States Underlying Implicit Biases Unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian Answer.Beate Krickel - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious (...)
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  50. Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
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