Indian Ethics

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account (...) does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat. (shrink)

: Gandhi can serve as a valuable catalyst allowing us to rethink our philosophical positions on violence, nonviolence, and education. Especially insightful are Gandhi's formulations of the multidimensionality of violence, including educational violence, and the violence of the status quo. His peace education offers many possibilities for dealing with short-term violence, but its greatest strength is its long-term preventative education and socialization. Key to Gandhi's peace education are his ethical and ontological formulations of means-ends relations; the need to uncover root (...) causes and causal determinants and to free oneself from entrapment in escalating cycles of violence; and the dynamic complex relation between relative and absolute truth that includes analysis of situated embodied consciousness, tolerant diversity and inclusiveness, and an approach to unavoidable violence. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to explore early Buddhist ethics in comparison with classical Confucianist ethics and to show similarities. The study suggests that the popular belief that the two ethical systems are radically different from each other needs to be reconsidered. When a focus is given to the development, transformation, and realization of the self, a similar framework is revealed in the two ethical systems. Furthermore, this study intends to reject the popular thesis: early Buddhism is only self-liberation-concerned (...) soteriology and classical Confucianism is only society-concerned thought requiring self-effacement. ;My understanding of the core virtue of self-transformation is as compassion in early Buddhism and benevolence in classical Confucianism. So this study is focused on the analysis of compassion and benevolence by examining their metaphysical grounds, their functional mechanisms, their applications, and their meta-ethical nature. ;The metaphysical groundworks of morals are explained in terms of the rebirth and kamma theory, and the theory of Mandate of Heaven. For a person to develop and achieve these core virtues, this study shows the significant role of self-restraining or self-overcoming, the principle of extension from near to far, self-oriented motivation for the core virtue, both-regarding position , and the important role of both sympathetic feeling and reason. In the domain of social interaction, compassion and benevolence appear in the area of education and politics as tools for achieving happiness for both oneself and others. In politics, the paradigmatic model is adopted: a ruler as an embodiment of the virtue rules a country by being a moral example to the people. ;The analysis of the core virtues in terms of moral objective shows the inseparability of factual knowledge from moral practice, the universal acceptability of the virtue, and the possibility of maintaining objectivity by taking both-regarding action. (shrink)

When discussing Eastern philosophy there is often a difficulty since characteristically Eastern ways of thinking do not map well onto Western philosophic categories. Yet, P. J. Ivanhoe suggests that a careful reading of Confucianism can illuminate and expand Western approaches to ethics. Ivanhoe maintains that the best way to understand Confucian ethics is as a hybrid of virtue ethics and consequentialism, a view he calls character consequentialism (CC). The paper will progress in the following way. First, I present Ivanhoe’s conception (...) of character consequentialism. Second, I discuss how CC, particularly as it is developed by Charles Goodman as a way to interpret Mahayana Buddhist ethics, relates to aspects of Mill’s utilitarianism. This suggests that there is nothing especially new about CC. However, the similarities actually underscore the ways that Eastern and Western ethical theories can illuminate each other. Finally, I respond to Damien Keown’s concern that CC is hopeless confused. (shrink)

This article examines closely an important passage at the conclusion of the Mahābhārata wherein the final state of the epic heroes after death is defined. The Critical Edition’s phrasing of what precisely became of the characters once they arrived in heaven is unclear, and manuscript variants offer two apparently contradictory readings. In this article I present evidence in support of one of these readings, and respond to the Mahābhārata ’s seventeenth century commentator Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, who champions the other. Underlying and (...) prompting this debate is a much broader issue of the epic narrative: the complex nature of the Mahābhārata heroes as both agents in a universe governed by karma , and their identities as “portions” of divine figures acting within a broader dramatic structure of eschatological myth. (shrink)

The 423 verses in the collection known a The Dhammapada are attributed to the Buddha himself and form the essence of the ethics of Buddhist philosophy.

My project here is to argue for situating moral judgments about Indian surrogacy in the context of Reproductive Justice. I begin by crafting the best picture of Indian surrogacy available to me while marking some worries I have about discursive colonialism and epistemic honesty. Western feminists' responses to contract pregnancy fall loosely into two interrelated moments: post-Baby M discussions that focus on the morality of surrogacy work in Western contexts, and feminist biomedical ethnographies that focus on the lived dimensions of (...) reproductive technologies and how they are embodied and negotiated in specific cultural contexts. Both approaches have their shortcomings. Uncritically extending Western moral frameworks (for example, liberal feminist political values) to Indian surrogacy work raises the specter of discursive colonialism; with it, worries arise about how Western normative traditions can distort, erase, or misread non-Western subjects' lived experiences. Feminist biomedical ethnographic approaches correct this, but raise the specter of a weak moral absenteeism; with it, concerns arise about under-theorizing the structural harms and injustices shaping surrogacy worker's lives. I suggest that we might reduce these shortcomings by framing normative and ethnographic engagement with global surrogacy as questions of reproductive justice. (shrink)

Comparisons, and by that I mean the hunt for essential similarities or at least serious family resemblances, between the ethical views of Western and non-Western thinkers have been a staple of comparative philosophy for quite some time now. Some of these comparisons, such as between the views of Aristotle and Confucius, seem especially apt and revealing. However, I’ve often wondered whether Western “ethical theory”—virtue ethics, deontology, or consequentialism—is always the best lens through which to approach non-Western ethical thought. Particularly when (...) the discussion has turned to Buddhism and Buddhist ethics, theories of this sort at best seem to have an uncertain application. This is not to say that .. (shrink)

The canonical texts of Early Buddhism describe and explain a way to achieve a goal. What the goal is is not immediately clear; many different descriptions are given of it, and these descriptions can be variously interpreted. It is to some extent easier to find out what is the way to achieve the goal; the texts contain frequently repeated lists of stages on this Way. The best way of starting a consideration of the nature of the goal and its moral (...) status is to examine the most important of these lists. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that Gandhi can prefer violence in cases, but still morally object to all forms of violence. Even though this can seem to be a contradiction, nonetheless, one can prefer an action without thinking that action is morally justified. Next, I explore the objection that preferring a violent act, such as violent self-defense, over a act that is not violent, such as running away, seems to prefer an action that is more violent to one that is (...) less violent. I argue that because Gandhian nonviolence is a much broader concept than simple "no violence," violent self-defense is actually closer to a nonviolent act than running away. This is done by making a distinction between nonviolence (positive state of love and virtue) and un-violence (simple lack of physical violence). (shrink)

Schopenhauer, perhaps more than any other Western philosopher, has been associated with Asian, and specifically Indian philosophy. The problem in the last hundred years of commentarial literature has been assessing what his relationship to pre-systematic Indian philosophical thought was. Both European and Indian scholars have vacillated over the years from great confidence that Schopenhauer's system was inspired by and even representative of classical Indian thought to a concurrence that Schopenhauer's knowledge of pre-systematic Hinduism and Buddhism was superficial and his invoking (...) of their ideas was meant to reflect ideas that were strictly his own. This dissertation will establish that, while Schopenhauer did treat some aspects of pre-systematic Hindu and Buddhist thought superficially, he did appropriate the Upanis&dotbelow;dic notion of maya into his epistemology as a thesis of falsification, and this had great effects on his metaphysics of will and ethics of identification and compassion in the argumentation of his system. ;To this end, this dissertation will first examine the criteria of influence which have been used by the last hundred years of scholars in assessing Schopenhauer's relationship to pre-systematic Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, suggest that the criteria are inadequate as measures of influence, and formulate minimum and more reliable criteria. Next, Schopenhauer's first acquaintance with Anquetil Duperron's translations of the Upanis&dotbelow;ads during the formulation of his system in his notebooks from 1814 to 1818 will be investigated, in order to show how his developing systematic epistemology, metaphysics and ethics were effected by this encounter. The bulk of the dissertation will then be devoted to a detailed analysis of how crucial Schopenhauer's thesis of falsification, the result of his appropriation of the idea of maya, was for his representation theory, metaphysics of will and ethics of identification. The theory of falsification was indeed a necessary linking concept between the epistemology, metaphysics and ethics which helped give Schopenhauer's system cohesion. Finally, two enduring legacies of Schopenhauer's appropriation of ideas from pre-systematic Indian philosophical thought will be explicated, namely his stigmatizations of the Indian philosophical tradition with the stereotypes of pessimism and irrationalism, and the implications of his philosophical appropriation for cross-cultural philosophy. (shrink)

This volume examines various aspects of the Indian Constitution from the perspective of political theory. The essays view the Constitution as a political or ethical document, thereby reflecting configurations of power and interests or articulating a moral vision.

In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...) that by reading Śāntideva's argument as practical advice rather than as a philosophical claim about rational coherence, his argument can still have important insights even for those who reject his philosophical reasoning. (shrink)

The doctrine of reincarnation is endorsed by various philosophers in both the Western and Eastern traditions. This paper will explore the relationship between reincarnation and legal punishment. Three competing views of reincarnation will be analyzed on this issue: Plato's work on Socrates, the Bhagavad Gita, and Mahayana Buddhism. Each view presents interesting, but different perspectives on how our view of the person might affect how we punish. The paper will claim that there are practical implications on the administration of justice (...) linked witli each view of reincarnation. Rather than an area we should neglect, perhaps we miglit improve our understanding of punishment in our societj' when we better account for the beliefs held by members of the society. Key words: Buddhism, death, Hinduism, Mahayana, Plato, punishment, reincarnation, Socrates Then the Lord said, 'Now that the man has become as we are, knowing good from bad, what i f he eats the fruit of the Tree of Life and lives forever?' Genesis 4:22. (shrink)

Global justice as a field must confront a central problem: how global is global justice? A defining feature about the burgeoning literature in global justice is its operation within a bounded, philosophical tradition. Global justice research is too often a product of one tradition in self-isolation from others that nonetheless claims to speak for what is best for all. This criticism applies to various philosophical traditions whether so-called “analytic,” “Continental” or others. The problem is that each tradition too often works (...) independently from others to construct new ideas about the promotion of global justice: these ideas are designed by some for application to all. “Global” justice may have an international reach, but it too often lacks a more global character. The development of a more global approach to global justice raises several vexing questions. What does it mean to have a “global” approach to global justice? How “global” should any such approach be? And how can a coherent and compelling model for it be constructed? This chapter develops a new approach for a more distinctly global view of global justice: the idea of global philosophy. Most approaches to global justice are developed within bounded philosophical traditions. One problem is that each offers contributions to global justice that is constricted by the narrow bounds of their particular tradition. The issue is not only that global justice may be overly culturally-specific, but rather that bounded traditions close off important resources for addressing philosophical problems that can be accessed through closer engagement with other philosophical traditions. A global philosophy is then a more “unbound philosophy” better suited for a globalized world. Our world is ever-changing with ideas and people travelling as never before. It is time for philosophy to catch up with these developments and this chapter will explain why and how. (shrink)

To many Western students of India, svarāj and mokṣa have often seemed to represent two very different ideals of freedom, the former social, political, and modern; the latter individual, spiritual, and traditional. It is not surprising that the Hindu ideal of spiritual freedom is most commonly known by the term mokṣa , for it is this word that is usually listed as the fourth and supreme goal in the famous four ends of man . The first three ends, desire , (...) success , and morality , find their fulfillment within society, while mokṣa , it is generally said, takes one beyond society. It is pertinent to note, as Ingalls and others have pointed out, that mokṣa is a relatively late term, which came to be added to the older, first three goals of man. As a noun, mokṣa does not appear until the latest of the Upanisads, and then only three times, in Śvetāśvatara 6.16 and Maitrī 6.20 and 30. In addition, some orthodox schools did not accept the ideal of mokṣa for several more centuries, the Mīmāṁsā denying it until the eighth century A.D. (shrink)

India has promoted its power through intervention in neighboring countries under the cloak of morality. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia have nonetheless tacitly endorsed India's role as the policing force in the region. Does this recognition justify India's actions toward its weaker and smaller neighbors?

Organised in broadly chronological terms, this book presents the philosophical arguments of the great Indian Buddhist philosophers of the fifth century BCE to the eighth century CE. Each chapter examines their core ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views as well as the distinctive area of Buddhist ethics that we call today moral psychology. Throughout, the book follows three key themes that both tie the tradition together and are the focus for most critical dialogue: the idea of an?tman or no-self, the appearance/reality (...) distinction and the moral aim, or ideal. Indian Buddhist philosophy is shown to be a remarkably rich tradition that deserves much wider engagement from European philosophy. Carpenter shows that while we should recognise the differences and distances between Indian and European philosophy, its driving questions and key conceptions, we must resist the temptation to find in Indian Buddhist philosophy, some Other, something foreign, self-contained and quite detached from anything familiar. Indian Buddhism is shown to be a way of looking at the world that shares many of the features of European philosophy and considers themes central to philosophy understood in the European tradition. (shrink)

The _Mahabharata _is at once an archive and a living text, a sourcebook complete by itself and an open text perennially under construction. Driving home this striking contemporary relevance of the famous Indian epic, _Mahabharata Now _focuses on the issues of narration, aesthetics and ethics, as also their interlinkages. The cross-disciplinary essays in the volume imaginatively re-interpret the ‘timeless’ classic in the light of the pre-modern Indian narrative styles, poetics, aesthetic codes, and moral puzzles; the Western theories on modern ethics, (...) aesthetics, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and philosophy of science; and the contemporary social, ethical and political concerns. The essays are all united in their effort to situate the _Mahabharata_ in the context of _here _and _now _without violating the sanctity of the ‘written text’ as we have it today. The book will be of interest to scholars and students of Indian and comparative philosophy, Indian and comparative literature, cultural studies, and history. (shrink)

The recent revival of interest in the importance of virtues marks a shift of substance and method in thinking about it. The shift is away from discussion of rules and principles and focused on a discussion of traits, character and conditions of their excellence. This article attempts at unfolding the exact nature of an Indian ethics of virtue, which is yet to be explored in a systematic way. This enquiry into the exciting terrain of Indian philosophy inevitably leads to the (...) interesting debate regarding the very possibility of an Indian ethics of virtue. (shrink)

Corruption is the greatest pitfall of Indian democracy; it gradually erodes the faith of the Indian citizens in parliamentary democracy. Another disconcerting trend is the criminalization of politics which has emerged as a natural corollary to political corruption. The failure to deal with political corruption and criminalization has led to the depravation of political morality in India. It is against this backdrop that the article would examine the issues of political corruption and criminalization of politics in India. The article would (...) end by providing the “Gandhian” solution to this problem. (shrink)

Many teacher candidates get their first taste of life as a full-time teacher in their practicums, during which they confront a host of challenges, pedagogical and ethical. Because ethics is fundamental to the connection between teachers and students, teacher candidates are often required to negotiate dilemmas in ways that keep with the ethical ideals espoused both by the professional body and the community at large. Presenting the case of a teacher candidate who finds herself emotionally depleted in her devotion to (...) students, we look to the ethics of care and virtue for clarifying insights. Care ethics extols intersubjectivity and reciprocity, while virtue ethics enjoins commitment to a noble ideal for its own sake; both perspectives offer useful insights for our case. We argue that the perspectives and practices of contemplative traditions can facilitate the integration of care and virtue ethics, mitigating the risk of disruption in caring relations while minimizing the possibility of a personal p... (shrink)

Mahāyāna ethics has a threefold emphasis: avoiding all evil, cultivating good, and saving all beings. Most Western studies of Buddhist ethics have used Pali and Sanskrit sources to examine the first two components, which are based on monastic codes for avoiding wrong doing and attain- ing virtue. Among the few studies of the third category, which includes Buddhist social ethics, East Asian Mahāyāna materials have been sadly lacking despite the Mahāyāna rhetoric about saving all beings. To correct this deficiency, this (...) paper analyzes an early lay Mahayana text, the Updsaka Precept Sūtra. The Upāsaka differs from earlier Buddhism and from many other Mahāyāna texts in two ways: it gives supremacy to com- passionate action in society rather than monastic spiritual attainment, and it asserts that helping others out of compassion is the highest practice and best way to attain enlightenment. (shrink)

Culture creates the context within which individuals experience life and comprehend moral meaning of illness, suffering and death. The ways the patient, family and the physician communicate and make decisions in the end-of-life care are profoundly influenced by culture. What is considered as right or wrong in the healthcare setting may depend on the socio-cultural context. The present article is intended to delve into the cross-cultural perspectives in ethical decision making in the end-of-life scenario. We attempt to address the dynamics (...) of the roles of patient, family and physician therein across two countries from East and West, namely, India and Germany. In India, where illness is more a shared family affair than an individual incident, a physician is likely to respect the family’s wishes and may withhold the ‹naked truth’ about the diagnosis of a fatal disease to the patient. In Germany, a physician is legally required to inform the patient about the disease. In India, advance directive being virtually non-existent, the family acts as the locus of the decision-making process, taking into account the economic cost of available medical care. In Germany, advance directive is regarded as mandatory and healthcare is covered by insurance. Family and the physician appear to play larger roles in ethical decision making for patients in India than for those in Germany, who place greater emphasis on autonomy of the individual patient. Our study explicates how culture matters in ethical decision-making and why the bioethical discourse is necessary in the concrete realities of the socio-cultural context. To explore the possibility of finding a common ground of morality across different cultures while acknowledging and respecting cultural diversity, thus remains a formidable challenge for the bioethicists. (shrink)