Indian Ethics

The objective of this paper is to explore the Buddhist position particularly within the Mahāyāna sect about the use of human embryos which may be either surplus embryos thawedinthe laboratoryorembryosculturedfor researchpurposes.Buddhismdoesnot give prominence to any supreme creation whose plan might be distorted by human intervention with nature. Buddhism postulates the cyclic course of human existence as eternal. There is no starting point to the series of lives lived and obviously there is no end. In the Buddhist thought, there is a (...) belief that every individual had existence prior to the present birth. Following this, the paper made a study of the details of the conception and gestation as found in the Buddhist literature and sources. Buddhism aims to do away with pain. Intention is an intrinsic aspect in Buddhism referred to as sankalpa, which is beyond mere goals and objectives. An action is deemed as good karma because of its intentions. To Buddhism, a selfless action gains significance. (shrink)

Evil in the Vedas and the Upanishads undergoes a theoretical transformation as this literature itself moves away from its consequentialist and naturalistic roots to a radical procedural approach to moral questions. The goods of life on the early account were largely natural: evil was a moral primitive that motivated a teleological approach to morality geared towards avoiding natural evil. The gods of nature (such as fire, and rain, intimately involved in metabolism) were propitiated to gain beneficent results, and to avoid (...) hunger and illness. To please the gods of nature involves eating, which is merely the imposition of natural evil on sacrificial victims so that one avoids the evils of disease and hunger oneself. The entire system is one of resentment: the goods of life are defined by way of the bads that they displace. Authors of the latter part of the Vedas, such as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, show themselves to be concerned about the irreducibility of evil on the naturalistic account, but also more broadly with the irreducible phenomenon of moral luck that comes in tow with a teleological approach to ethics. Whether one is able to ward off evil and enjoy the goods of life is not under one’s control and is within the purview of the forces of nature. This motivates the transition to a procedural account of ethics---yoga---where evil is not a primitive but a side effect of the non-yogic life, characterized by a lack of self-governance. As Death teaches us, evil is not a moral primitive and can be reduced out of the moral equation by taking responsibility for a lack of autonomy, which transforms this external threat of a lack of autonomy into a self lack of autonomy, or self-governance. With this transformation we are delivered into the realm of preservation (Vishnu). (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine some of the key concepts of Jaina religion from an environmental perspective. The paper focuses on Jain’s parasparopagraho jīvānām or interconnectedness. The common concerns between Jainism and environmentalism constituted in a mutual sensitivity towards living beings, a recognition of the interconnectedness of life forms and a programme to augment awareness to respect and protect living systems. The paper will also investigate how ahiṃsā or non-violence is understood in the Jain community (...) and also how this concept bears a positive influence in maintaining ecological balance. The paper aims to show that the practice of non-violence is limited not only to actions but extends to words and thoughts. In this process, I attempt to show the development of “intellectual ahiṃsā” where non-violence is rooted in Jain anekāntavāda that is in the tolerance of other religions, thoughts and believes. The Jain’s radical egalitarianism does away with the charges of anthropocentricism labelled against it. In fact, the Jain virtue ethics, compassion and tolerance are instrumental in creating an environment that was conducive to peaceful and productive multi-sectarian interaction both in society and ecology. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory. Within the study of Buddhism, it also has sparked a continuous comparative discourse, which seeks to explicate Buddhist philosophical principles in light of Parfit’s conceptual framework. Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the anātman doctrine and (...) its relation to Buddhist ethics. I discuss in particular three dominant elements appropriated by Parfitian-inspired scholarship: Parfit’s theoretical categories; philosophical problems raised by his reductionist theory of persons; and Parfit’s argumentative style. I argue that the three elements used in this scholarship constitute different facets of one methodological approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which relies on Western terminology and conceptual schemes to establish a conversation with non-Western philosophy. I suggest that while this methodology is fruitful in many ways, philosophy as a cosmopolitan space may benefit significantly from approaching Buddhist philosophy using its own categories and terminology. (shrink)

It is a common view in modern scholarship on Buddhist ethics, that attachment to the self constitutes a hindrance to ethics, whereas rejecting this type of attachment is a necessary condition for acting morally. The present article argues that in Vasubandhu's theory of agency, as formulated in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary), a cognitive and psychological identification with a conventional, persisting self is a requisite for exercising moral agency. As such, this identification is essential for embracing the ethics (...) of Buddhism and its way of life. The article delineates the method that Vasubandhu employs to account for the notion of a selfless moral agent, with particular emphasis on his strategies for dealing with one central aspect of agency, self-interested concern for the future. (shrink)

Human rights, as traditionally understood in the West, are grounded in an anthropocentric theory of personhood. However, as this chapter argues, such a stance is certainly not culturally universal; historically, it is derivable from a cultural orientation that is Greek in origin. Such an orientation conflates thought with language (logos), and identifies humans as uniquely deserving of moral consideration or standing to the exclusion of non-human knowers. The linguistic theory of thought impedes insight and understanding of both Indian and Western (...) contributions to political and moral thought. It is argued that the idea that we have rights by virtue of being human is problematic. In contrast, the chapter argues for an account of personal rights derivable from Patañjali’s philosophy. On a Patañjalian account, the rights necessary for the good of persons transcend species, sex, caste, race, class, age, ability, and sexual orientation. (shrink)

The doctrine of reincarnation is endorsed by various philosophers in both the Western and Eastern traditions. This paper will explore the relationship between reincarnation and legal punishment. Three competing views of reincarnation will be analyzed on this issue: Plato's work on Socrates, the Bhagavad Gita, and Mahayana Buddhism. Each view presents interesting, but different perspectives on how our view of the person might affect how we punish. The paper will claim that there are practical implications on the administration of justice (...) linked witli each view of reincarnation. Rather than an area we should neglect, perhaps we miglit improve our understanding of punishment in our societj' when we better account for the beliefs held by members of the society. Key words: Buddhism, death, Hinduism, Mahayana, Plato, punishment, reincarnation, Socrates Then the Lord said, 'Now that the man has become as we are, knowing good from bad, what i f he eats the fruit of the Tree of Life and lives forever?' Genesis 4:22. (shrink)

Global justice as a field must confront a central problem: how global is global justice? A defining feature about the burgeoning literature in global justice is its operation within a bounded, philosophical tradition. Global justice research is too often a product of one tradition in self-isolation from others that nonetheless claims to speak for what is best for all. This criticism applies to various philosophical traditions whether so-called “analytic,” “Continental” or others. The problem is that each tradition too often works (...) independently from others to construct new ideas about the promotion of global justice: these ideas are designed by some for application to all. “Global” justice may have an international reach, but it too often lacks a more global character. The development of a more global approach to global justice raises several vexing questions. What does it mean to have a “global” approach to global justice? How “global” should any such approach be? And how can a coherent and compelling model for it be constructed? This chapter develops a new approach for a more distinctly global view of global justice: the idea of global philosophy. Most approaches to global justice are developed within bounded philosophical traditions. One problem is that each offers contributions to global justice that is constricted by the narrow bounds of their particular tradition. The issue is not only that global justice may be overly culturally-specific, but rather that bounded traditions close off important resources for addressing philosophical problems that can be accessed through closer engagement with other philosophical traditions. A global philosophy is then a more “unbound philosophy” better suited for a globalized world. Our world is ever-changing with ideas and people travelling as never before. It is time for philosophy to catch up with these developments and this chapter will explain why and how. (shrink)

Many authors claim that certain Indian (Hindu) texts and traditions deny that nature has intrinsic value. If nature has value at all, it has value only as a means to mokṡa (liberation). This view is implausible as an interpretation of any Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of ahiṁsā (non-harm) and karma. The proponent must explain the connection between ahiṁsā and merit by citing the connection between ahiṁsā and mokṡa: ahiṁsā is valuable, and therefore produces merit, because ahiṁsā is instrumentally (...) valuable as a means to mokṡa. Ahiṁsā is a means to mokṡa, however, because it produces merit. Hence the explanation is circular. Additionally, this view entails that morality is strictly arbitrary – it might just as well be that hiṁsā (harm) produces merit, and ahiṁsā produces demerit. An alternative interpretation that avoids these problems states that the value of ahiṁsā derives from the intrinsic value of the unharmed entities. (shrink)

भारतीय समाज मूल्यप्रधान समाज है. भारतीय संस्कृति में मूल्यों को मनुष्य के सामाजिक, राजनैतिक और धार्मिक जीवन में विशेष स्थान दिया गया है क्योंकि मूल्यों के वास्तवीकरण का नाम ही संस्कृति है. वर्तमान समय में विज्ञान ने जहाँ मनुष्य को भौतिक सुविधाएँ उपलब्ध करने के लिए प्रत्येक क्षेत्र में अविष्कारों के ढेर लगा दिए हैं ,वहां उसके जीवन में एक खोखलापन भी उत्त्पन्न कर दिया है. ऐसे में समाज, देश और अपने स्वयं के जीवन में उसने मानव मूल्यों को तिलांजली (...) दे दी है. मानव जीवन की सार्थकता तभी है जब वह श्रेष्ठ भावनाएं रखे. हम एक लोकतान्त्रिक समाज का हिस्सा हैं जहाँ पर हम आपसी भाई-चारे, न्याय, समान अधिकार और स्वतन्त्रता का हिमायती बनने का नाटक करते हैं. संविधान में दिए गये मूल्यों की प्राप्ति से पहले हमें व्यक्ति के जीवन और समाज का भी मुआयना करना होगा तभी हम श्रेष्ठ मूल्यों को समाज में स्थापित कर सकते हैं. मूल्य, व्यक्ति की सामाजिक विरासत का एक अंग होता है इसलिए मूल्यों की व्यवस्था मानव आस्तित्व के विभिन्न स्तरों या आयामों में व्यक्ति के अनुकूलन की प्रक्रिया का मार्गदर्शन करती है. नैतिक मूल्य व्यक्ति के जीवन के साथ साथ समाज को भी उत्कृष्टता की तरफ अग्रसर करते हैं. इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य उद्देश्य नैतिक मूल्यों के व्यक्ति के जीवन और वर्तमान भारतीय समाज में उपयोगिता का अध्ययन करना है. (shrink)

Contemporary Indian Philosophy is related to contemporary Indian thinkers and contains the proceedings of First Session of Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS) Haryana. It is neither easy nor impossible to translate into action all noble goals set forth by the eminent thinkers and scholars, but we might try to discuss and propagate their ideas. In this session all papers submitted electronically and selected abstracts have been published on a website especially develop for this session. In this volume (...) we included some papers from this session and also from open sources and contributors include teachers, research scholars and students etc. This volume is divided into two parts. First part contains papers on Swami Vivekananda and second part contains papers of B. G. Tilak, Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Saheed Bhagat Singh and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar etc. It is the general intention of the Centre to produce informative as well as positive literature to inspire and motivate the students and the general readers. (shrink)

Is it accurate to speak of ‘Hindu virtue ethics’? Or would that amount to forcing the tradition into a conceptual framework it does not fit? The answers to these questions will depend upon (1) what one means by “virtue ethics”, (2) how one restricts the scope of the term “Hindu ethics”, and (3) whether one is construing the question as about the “external” or “internal” history of Hindu ethics. We consider three accounts of what it means to be “an ethics (...) of virtue” and use them to identify senses in which it is reasonable to speak of Hindu virtue ethics and senses in which it is not. We close with a look at one Indian philosophical school whose ethical commitments appear to fit within a virtue ethical frame, namely, the Yoga school. We argue that Yoga ethics offers the resources for developing a Hindu example of agent-based virtue ethics. The paper will be of value both to those with an interest in Hindu ethics as well as to those from other traditions who wish to understand the underlying structure of virtue ethical theories, in general, or of agent-based forms of virtue ethics, in particular. (shrink)

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is one of the names who advocated to change social order of the age-old tradition of suppression and humiliation. He was an intellectual, scholar, statesman and contributed greatly in the nation building. He led a number of movements to emancipate the downtrodden masses and to secure human rights to millions of depressed classes. He has left an indelible imprint through his immense contribution in framing the modern Constitution of free India. He stands as a symbol of struggle (...) for achieving the Social Justice. We can assign several roles to this great personality due to his life full dedication towards his mission of eradicating evils from Indian society. The social evils of Indian society, also neglected this great personality even in intellectual sphere too. The so-called intellectuals of India not honestly discussed his contribution to Indian intellectual heritage, rather what they discussed, also smells their biases towards a Dalit literate and underestimated his great personality. This paper will attempt to discuss important facts about life and a short description of the literature written by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. This is followed by discussion his philosophy in the five major sections i.e. Feminism and women empowerment, philosophy of education, ideas on social justice and equality, philosophy of politics and economics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the provocative image of the bodhisattva, the saint of the Indian Mahayana Buddhist tradition, descending into the hell realms to work for the benefit of its denizens. Inspired in part by recent attempts to naturalize Buddhist ethics, I argue that taking this ‘mythological’ image seriously, as expressing philosophical insights, helps us better understand the shape of Mahayana value theory. In particular, it expresses a controversial philosophical thesis: the claim that no amount of physical pain can disrupt the (...) flourishing of a fully virtuous person. I reconstruct two related elements of early Buddhist psychology that help us understand this Mahayana position: the distinction between hedonic sensation and virtuous or nonvirtous mental states ; and the claim that humans are massively deluded as to what constitutes well-being. Doing so also lets me emphasize the continuity between early Buddhist and Mahayana traditions in their views on well-being and flourishing. (shrink)

This essay considers the eighth century Indian Buddhist monk, Śāntideva’s strategy of using the afflictive mental states for progress towards liberation in his Introduction to the Practice of Awakening. I begin by contrasting two images from the first chapter that represent the power of bodhicitta: the fires destroying the universe at the end of time, and the mercury elixir that transmutes base metals into gold. The first of these, I argue, better illustrates the text’s predominant strategy of destroying the afflictive (...) mental states directly by their antidotes. The second, in contrast, represents an alternative strategy in which afflictive mental states like anger, craving and delusion, are manipulated for liberative gain. I offer several examples of Śāntideva’s use of the kleśas in his text, and argue that they can be understood as a continuation of the logic of skillful means, in which destructive actions, and here destructive mental states, are used to lessen suffering. Finally, I suggest that one reason Śāntideva employs the kleśas in this way is because of his realization that many practitioners early on the bodhisattva path will lack the motivation necessary to successfully pursue the difficult training of the bodhisattva. (shrink)

In the previous module we examined the dialectic that Krishna initiates in the Bhagavad Gītā. Arjuna’s despondency and worry about the war he must fight is captured in his own words by teleological concerns – consequentialism and virtue theoretic considerations. In the face of a challenge, a teleological approach results in the paradox of teleology---namely, the more we are motivated by exceptional and unusual ends, the less likely we are to pursue our ends given a low expected utility. Krishna's solution (...) is to switch to a procedural ethics. To this extent, Krishna identifies three ethical theories. Two were discussed extensively in the earlier chapter on the Gītā. The first is basic deontology, called karma yoga. This states that we should choose to do our duty without appealing to the outcome as a justification. The duties in question are definable by good outcomes, but the outcomes do not constitute the reason for embracing duty. The second, spoken about at length, is bhakti yoga. According to this, the right thing to do is to worship the ideal by our actions. This practice results in us improving our skill and practice such that we come to liberate ourselves from fault and instantiate the ideal itself. The third is the Gītā’s metaethical theory—conceptual account of the right and the good. This is called “jñāna yoga.” This module focuses on the metaethical dimensions of the Gītā. (shrink)

Are Confucian and Buddhist ethical views closer to Kantian, Consequentialist, or Virtue Ethical ones? And how can such comparisons shed light on the unique aspects of Confucian and Buddhist views? This essay (i) provides a historically grounded framework for distinguishing western views, (ii) identifies a series of questions that we can ask in order to clarify the philosophic accounts of ethical motivation embedded in the Buddhist and Confucian traditions, and (iii) then critiques Lee Ming-huei’s claim that Confucianism is closer to (...) Kantianism than virtue ethics and Charles Goodman’s claim that Buddhism is closer to Consequentialism than virtue ethics. (shrink)

A number of scholars have attempted to situate the Buddha’s teachings within the primary Western ethical theories, namely consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. One challenge that each has confronted is Buddhism’s emphasis on the ultimate non-existence of the self. In his writings, Charles Goodman has put forward an account of how the realization of the ultimate non-existence of the self would lead a practitioner to consequentialism. The present comment challenges the account offered by Goodman, and argues that an ethical-particularist account (...) better squares Buddhist ethics with Buddhist metaphysics. This comment also shows how Goodman’s more recent work, while constituting a significant retreat from his.. (shrink)

In recent decades, several attempts have been made to characterize Buddhism as a systematically unified and consistent normative ethical theory. This has given rise to a growing interest in meta-ethical questions. Meta-ethics can be broadly or narrowly defined. Defined broadly, it is a domain of inquiry concerned with the nature and status of the fundamental or framing presuppositions of normative ethical theories, where this includes the cognitive and epistemic requirements of presupposed conceptions of ethical agency.1 Defined narrowly, it concerns the (...) justificatory status of fundamental moral claims or judgments, i.e., claims or judgments of the form ‘x is good, right, virtuous’ and ‘x is bad, wrong, vicious.’.. (shrink)

Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist (...) and utilitarian strands in Buddhist ethics is more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize incautious and imprecise claims that Buddhism will make practitioners happy. We can make progress by distinguishing between happiness in the sense of a Buddhist version of eudaimonia, and happiness in the sense of attitudinal pleasure. Doing so might result in an interpretation of Buddhist views about happiness that was simultaneously philosophically interesting, historically credible, and psychologically testable. (shrink)

In recent years, discussions of Buddhist ethics have increasingly drawn upon the concepts and tools of modern ethical theory, not only to compare Buddhist perspectives with Western moral theories, but also to assess the meta-ethical implications of Buddhist texts and their philosophical context. Philosophers aiming to defend the Madhyamaka framework in particular – its ethics and soteriology along with its logic and epistemology – have recently attempted to explain its combination of moral commitment and philosophical scepticism by appealing to various (...) forms of meta-ethical anti-realism. This paper argues that those attempts do not succeed, even in their own terms. Their emphasis on universal compassion, among other features of their approaches, is difficult to explain normatively so long as it is embedded within an anti-realist framework. Soteriological values – such as enlightenment and liberation – also seem to require a realist account of their normativity. Though many Buddhist philosophers disagree, there is at least one form of Buddhist philosophy, that of the Yogācāra school, that can be interpreted as articulating a meta-ethical realism of the kind that the broader Mahāyāna tradition (if not other Buddhist traditions as well) seems to require. To a greater extent than stressing common anti-realist themes would allow, the paper argues that finding common ground, where Western moral realism and Buddhist moral realism can coalesce and jointly vindicate a repertoire of shared ethical concepts, may also facilitate the efforts of those engaged in comparative ethical theory. (shrink)

Nietzsche once proclaimed himself the 'Buddha of Europe', and throughout his life Buddhism held enormous interest for him. While he followed Buddhist thinking in demolishing what he regarded as the two-headed delusion of Being and Self, he saw himself as advocating a response to the ensuing nihilist crisis that was diametrically opposed to that of his Indian counterpart. In this book Antoine Panaïoti explores the deep and complex relations between Nietzsche's views and Buddhist philosophy. He discusses the psychological models and (...) theories which underlie their supposedly opposing ethics of 'great health' and explodes the apparent dichotomy between Nietzsche's Dionysian life-affirmation and Buddhist life-negation, arguing for a novel, hybrid response to the challenge of formulating a tenable post-nihilist ethics. His book will interest students and scholars of Nietzsche's philosophy, Buddhist thought and the metaphysical, existential and ethical issues that emerge with the demise of theism. (shrink)

Several contributions in the book show how these principles apply to contemporary problems and moral issues.

_A Communion of Subjects_ is the first comparative and interdisciplinary study of the conceptualization of animals in world religions. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines, including Thomas Berry, Wendy Doniger, Elizabeth Lawrence, Marc Bekoff, Marc Hauser, Steven Wise, Peter Singer, and Jane Goodall consider how major religious traditions have incorporated animals into their belief systems, myths, rituals, and art. Their findings offer profound insights into humans' relationships with animals and a deeper understanding of the social and ecological web in (...) which we all live. Contributors examine Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Daoism, Confucianism, African religions, traditions from ancient Egypt and early China, and Native American, indigenous Tibetan, and Australian Aboriginal traditions, among others. They explore issues such as animal consciousness, suffering, sacrifice, and stewardship in innovative methodological ways. They also address contemporary challenges relating to law, biotechnology, social justice, and the environment. By grappling with the nature and ideological features of various religious views, the contributors cast religious teachings and practices in a new light. They reveal how we either intentionally or inadvertently marginalize "others," whether they are human or otherwise, reflecting on the ways in which we assign value to living beings. Though it is an ancient concern, the topic of "Religion and Animals" has yet to be systematically studied by modern scholars. This groundbreaking collection takes the first steps toward a meaningful analysis. (shrink)

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account (...) does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat. (shrink)

Management philosophy and business ethics education thought the focus of different business situations in which attention to the ethical norms, systems and rules of the establishment; the former emphasis on business ethics and cognitive guidance; of ethical analysis, judgments, ability to nurture and choice ; and practice ethical behavior habits ... etc. So, the philosophy of business ethics and moral education seriously practical reasoning ability, as well as the realization of the ideal personality. Basic spirit of Buddhism as an ideal (...) personality values ​​or outlook on life, so how to help students achieve their ideal personality? This is the duty of the contemporary Buddhist scholars, contemporary issues. So, this article trying to use the basic spirit of Buddhism, the "Four Noble Truths", "three methods and India" and other ideas as a starting point to explore its application in business ethics education, the basic spirit of this card into Buddhism as a business ethics based on the value of education may and rational, and thus infer the practice of business ethics and philosophy of education principles related to the principle. Philosophy and management concern the education of business ethics from different perspectives; while the latter focuses on the ethical norms, the establishment of institutions and rules, the former stresses the guiding of the recognition about business ethics, the analysis and judgment about ethical situations, the cultivation of the ability to make choices, the cultivation of the habit to practice morality, and so on. How Buddhism, as a framework of values ​​about the ideal character and life, is to help the students to realize their ideal character is the certainly an important topic for contemporary Buddhists scholars. The key elements of Buddhist thoughts can be traced to the original Buddhism. Accordingly, this paper is intended to explore the application of Buddhism in the education of business ethics, starting with the concepts of the "four noble truths "and the" three dharma seals, "and whereby justify the possibility and legitimacy of Buddhist thoughts as the value foundations of the education of business ethics and, furthermore, figure out the principles of the philosophical education of how to practice the business ethics. (shrink)

J. Baird Callicott claims that moral pluralism leads to relativism, skepticism, and the undermining of moral obligations. Buddhist ethics provides a counterexample to Callicott; it is a robust tradition of moral pluralism. Focusing on one of the most significant texts in Buddhist ethics, Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, I show how it draws on a multiplicity of moral principles determined by context and skillful means (upāya kauśalya). In contrast to Callicott’s description of pluralism as detrimental to moral life, I suggest that South Asian (...) Buddhist traditions provide a model of moral reasoning that is both robust and flexible, a model appropriate for the many kinds of moral obligations that arise in the context of environmental ethics. (shrink)

Many Japanese American Buddhist families in the San Jose, California area observe a series of late life celebrations in honor of their elders. The sixty-first, the seven-tieth, the seventy-seventh, and eighty-eighth birthdays are celebrated with special flourish. These celebrations mark milestones in life and underscore the respect and gratitude elders are accorded by the family and community. At these gatherings the talk among family and guests invariably turns to the life of the elder and they wonder how the elder was (...) able to survive and even flourish amid the hard- ships and setbacks during his or her long life. Indeed, long-lived elders do seem to have a presence of being that can only come from many years of living. The idea of kyogai, “one's station in life,” is especially revered in the elder. Ordinarily, kyogai refers to one's place in society. Kyogai also suggests the spiritual maturity of being able to live with equanimity and ease in a transient and interdependent world. For Shiryu Morita, a leading Japanese sho-artist or calligrapher and student of Buddhist thought and practice, kyogai is both a spiritual and an aesthetic quality. I reflect on Morita's notion of kyogai within the context of the Buddha's attitude toward aging and elders. I offer my reflections as a Buddholo- gist interested in elder ethics and as a Buddhist priest concerned with caring for and empowering elders. I begin with a description of the Buddha's attitude toward aging and elders outlined in the Sutta-Nipata, an early Buddhist document. The “Salla Sutta” in the Sutta-Nipata outlines the Buddha's attitude toward old age, elders and elder tasks. Old age is linked to the question of death and the unease of living in a transient world, in the passages cited below.1. (shrink)

I have meditated regularly, following simple Buddhist procedures, for more than ten years, and that seems just about long enough for me to start to offer some preliminary account of it, despite the limitations of my progress and experience, and the difficulty of describing the more intimate and less explored reaches of the mind. I think I have learned enough to say that through prolonged spiritual practice one arrives at the springs of action and at root attitudes, and is in (...) a position to be possessed of them in a purer, stronger form. It may seem difficult to see how the practice of philosophy can be reconciled with the practice of meditation, but I shall describe how I have tried to do so, and say how I think the one bears on the other. In fact all I can do in the present paper is to attempt a limited discussion of moral psychology, and its relation to the foundations of ethics, a discussion, I must concede now, in which I waver uncertainly in my expression of the key issues. But I think that I cannot delay indefinitely, and if I can sketch out the terrain even roughly, better work on it can come later. My references to mindfulness and to meditation will be elementary and not systematic, though adequate, I hope, to what I want to say about ethics. What I am writing in praise of is mindfulness, or awareness, which I take to be a virtue that is developed through the practice of meditation or some comparable contemplative activity. I am also concerned for the future direction of philosophy. It seems to me that our attaining to this virtue will transform its practice, so that it moves closer to traditional expectations, somewhat disappointed in recent years, though supposedly less so now. If I am not deluded, there is an interior route towards the great questions of metaphysics, and we shall be known for not having taken it. It is a task for a new generation of philosophers, and I for one still scan the horizon for their arrival. (shrink)

Characteristically religious ethical systems consist of much more than a morality: that is, much more than judgments marked by serious societal pressure and the appropriateness in offenders of a sense of moral guilt. Religious ethics characteristically demands also control and modification of thoughts and desires. This supra-moral element is prominent in Buddhism, where it flourishes primarily in the "Samgha". The ethics of Buddhism can be understood only by means of a concept of the supra-moral.

Buddhist ethics is essentially determined by a striving for liberation of suffering and for the lasting happiness of Buddhahood. As all phenomena, happiness and suffering are subject to the law of cause and effect, one therefore attains happiness through generating the causes of it and abandoning the causes of suffering. In his or her liberation, a being does not depend on external being but on his or her own mental abilities, which include responsibility and critical thinking. The Buddha Nature is (...) inherent to every being. There are various paths to liberation and various modi of ethical behaviour, according to a person’s predispositions. The path of liberation means the path of opening out the bonds of ego. Buddhist ethics is related to developing compassion as well as wisdom. Bodhicitta represents the motivation to attain Buddhahood, in order to help all beings effectively, with no limits of time and space. (shrink)

Buddhists call Buddhism the Buddha Dharma: the Dharma, a collection of methods for getting enlightened, taught by a Buddha, a Fully Enlightened One. Buddhists refer to themselves as people who have taken refuge with the Three Jewels: 1) the Buddhas or Fully Enlightened Ones, 2) the Dharma or methods taught for reaching enlightenment, 3) and the Sangha or community of Buddhist monks and nuns, called Bhikshus and Bhikshunis. In formally becoming a Buddhist one becomes a disciple of a Buddhist master, (...) a fully ordained Bhikshu, who administers the Three Refuges: "I take refuge with the Buddhas; I take refuge with the Dharma; I take refuge with the Sangha.". (shrink)

The following essay is the main chapter of a book manuscript entitled “The Virtue of Non-Violence: from Gautama to Gandhi.” The book attempts to accomplish two principal goals: (1) to conceive of nonviolence from the standpoint of virtue ethics; and (2) to give Gandhi’s philosophy a Buddhist interpretation. My intent is not to foreclose on the possibility of a Hindu or Jain reading of Gandhi’s work; rather, I argue that there are some distinct advantages in thinking of Gandhi as a (...) Buddhist. (shrink)

There are two temptations to be resisted when approaching Buddhist moral theory. The first is to assimilate Buddhist ethics to some system of Western ethics, usually either some form of Utilitarianism or some form of virtue ethics. The second is to portray Buddhist ethical thought as constituting some grand system resembling those that populate Western metaethics. The first temptation, of course, can be avoided simply by avoiding the second. In Buddhist philosophical and religious literature we find many texts that address (...) moral topics, and a great deal of attention devoted to accounts of virtuous and vicious actions, virtuous and vicious states of character and of virtuous and vicious lives. However, we find very little direct attention to the articulation of sets of principles that determine which actions, states of character or motives are virtuous or vicious, and no articulation of sets of obligations or rights. (shrink)

3rd century BCE India saw in Aśoka a legendary emperor, widely admired for his political achievements but even more so for his unprecedented humanitarian approach to governance, which was deeply shaped by the Buddhist faith he adopted. His outstanding historical example invites a closer investigation into his character and behaviour patterns in the search for a new role model of cross-cultural leadership excellence. In this work✝ I will contrast the leadership approaches of today which are strongly influenced by the Western (...) academic world with the holistic, human-centred way we can extract from Buddhist teachings. From there I will examine Aśoka’s biography and character, as far as we can reinterpret from the available historical material, to extract in what manner and how closely he embodied the Buddhist ideal of leadership. To do so, I will as far as possible make use of archeologic evidence available in the form of epigraphs issued by the emperor. In this way, I hope to inspire leaders, Buddhists or non-Buddhists, to consider and embrace a leadership style which is felt most suitable for a globalised world we live in. (shrink)

There are two main loci of contemporary debate about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics. The first investigates the general issue of whether the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness is consistent with a commitment to systematic ethical distinctions. The second queries whether the metaphysical analysis of no-self presented by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra entails the impartial benevolence of a bodhisattva. This article will critically examine these debates and demonstrate the ways in which they are shaped by competing understandings of Madhyamaka conventional truth (...) or reality and the forms of reasoning admissible for differentiating conventional truth from falsity and good from bad. (shrink)

Is there a ‘common element’ in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory? While many agree that there is such an element, there is disagreement about whether it is best reconstructed in terms that approximate consequentialism or virtue ethics. This paper will argue that two distinct evaluative relations underlie these distinct positions; an instrumental and constitutive analysis. It will raise some difficulties for linking these distinct analyses to particular normative ethical theories but will (...) give reasons to think that both analyses may be justified. It will close with some reflections on the complexity involved in trying to establish a single and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics. (shrink)

The _Vessantara Jataka_ is one of the most popular and influential Theravada Buddhist texts and the final and longest scripture in the Pali Canon. It tells the story of Prince Vessantara, who attained the Perfection of Giving by giving away his fortune, his children, and his wife. Prince Vessantara was the penultimate rebirth as a human of the future Gotama Buddha, and his extreme charity is frequently portrayed in the sermons, rituals, and art of South and Southeast Asia. This anthology (...) features sophisticated literary and anthropological analyses of the ethics of giving, understanding of attachment and nonattachment, depiction of the trickster, and unique performative qualities of the _Vessantara Jataka_. Contributors to the volume include well-respected anthropologists, textual scholars in religious and Buddhist studies, and art historians who unravel from multiple perspectives the text's morality, religion, and place in contemporary academic debates. These experts show the _Vessantara Jataka_ to be as brilliantly layered as a Homerian epic or Shakespearean play, with aspects of tragedy, comedy, melodrama, and utopian fantasy intertwined to problematize and scrutinize Buddhism's cherished virtues. Unusual for its disciplinary range, this collection helps recast Buddhism as a human tradition rich in ethical and aesthetic complexity. It also features an introduction describing the work's main themes and styles, a character glossary, and a bibliography. (shrink)

This volume brings together nineteen of Mark Siderits's most important essays on Buddhist philosophy. Together they cover a wide range of topics, from metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and ethics, to the specific discussions of the interaction between Buddhist and classical Indian philosophy. Each of the essays is followed by a postscript written by Mark Siderits specifically for this volume, which connect the essays with each other, show thematic interrelations, and bring the discussion up to date by addressing developments (...) in the field since the publication of the essays. (shrink)