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  1. Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals.Barbara Abbott - unknown -
    We will look at several theories of indicative conditionals grouped into three categories: those that base its semantics on its logical counterpart (the material conditional); intensional analyses, which bring in alternative possible worlds; and a third subgroup which denies that indicative conditionals express propositions at all. We will also look at some problems for each kind of approach.
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  2. ``Probability and the Logic of Conditionals&Quot.Ernest Adams - 1966 - In Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pp. 165-316.
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  3. Transmissible Improbabilities and Marginal Essentialness of Premises in Inferences Involving Indicative Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):149 - 177.
  4. A Note on Comparing Probabilistic and Modal Logics of Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1977 - Theoria 43 (3):186-194.
  5. The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic.Ernest W. Adams - 1975 - D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
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  6. What's Wrong with Logic?Rani Lill Anjum - 2012 - Argumentos 4 (8).
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced to the (...)
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  7. Generalising the Probabilistic Semantics of Conditionals.Anthony Appiah - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (4):351 - 372.
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  8. Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional.Horacio Arlo-Costa - unknown -
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [27]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gardenfors showed in [13] that believing 'If A then B' cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A.
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  9. Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated.Horacio Arlo-Costa - unknown -
    Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question 'how to accept a conditional?' has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration.
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  10. Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.Horacio Arló-Costa - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):3-28.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  11. Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional Reasoning.Horacio Arlo-Costa - unknown -
  12. In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.Andrew Bacon - manuscript -
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
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  13. Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context.Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...)
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  14. Review of Skyrms & Eells (Eds.), Probabilities & Conditionals. [REVIEW]Helen Beebee - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1).
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  15. Semantics of Probability.John C. Bigelow - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  16. Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
    We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced (...)
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  17. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals.R. Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the (...)
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  18. Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
    Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation (...)
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  19. Indicative Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
    Adams Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but David Lewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presuppose that the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is argued that the exact (...)
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  20. A Preservation Condition for Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):219–222.
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  21. Conditionals and the Logic of Decision.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
    In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given (...)
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  22. More Triviality.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
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  23. The Representation of Beliefs and Desires Within Decision Theory.Richard W. Bradley - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This dissertation interprets the lack of uniqueness in probability representations of agents' degrees of belief in the decision theory of Richard Jeffrey as a formal statement of an important epistemological problem: the underdetermination of our attributions of belief and desire to agents by the evidence of their observed behaviour. A solution is pursued through investigation of agents' attitudes to information of a conditional nature. ;As a first step, Jeffrey's theory is extended to agents' conditional attitudes of belief and desire by (...)
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  24. Probabilities and Conditionals: Distinctions by Example.Jeremy Butterfield - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:251 - 272.
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  25. Operating on Functions with Variable Domains.Philip G. Calabrese - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):1-18.
    The sum, difference, product and quotient of two functions with different domains are usually defined only on their common domain. This paper extends these definitions so that the sum and other operations are essentially defined anywhere that at least one of the components is defined. This idea is applied to propositions and events, expressed as indicator functions, to define conditional propositions and conditional events as three-valued indicator functions that are undefined when their condition is false. Extended operations of "and", "or", (...)
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  26. Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All?Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deontic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. In particular, we need probabilistic structure that interacts directly (...)
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  27. Book Review:The Logic of Conditionals Ernest W. Adams. [REVIEW]Ian F. Carlstrom & Christopher S. Hill - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-.
  28. The If P, Ought P Problem.Jennifer Carr - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):555-583.
    Kratzer semantics for modals and conditionals generates the prediction that sentences of the form if p, ought p are trivially true. As Frank and Zvolenszky show, for certain flavors of modality, like deontic modality, this prediction is false. I explain some conservative solutions to the problem, and then argue that they are inadequate to account for puzzle cases involving self-frustrating oughts. These cases illustrate a general problem: there are two forms of information-sensitivity in deontic modals. Even generalizations of Kratzer semantics (...)
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  29. Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  30. On the Probabilities of Conditionals, FRANK DÖRING.Christopher Cordner - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (269).
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  31. The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.Jonathan St B. Evans David E. Over - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340-358.
    : The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe (...)
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  32. What Zif.Daniel Dohrn - manuscript -
    In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditionals. The grand aim is to reconcile the two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-conditional view (Barnett 2006, 521). While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I will give some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.
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  33. DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.Daniel Dohrn - manuscript -
    I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis (...)
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  34. Correction: On the Probabilities of Conditionals.Frank Doring - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):231.
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  35. On the Probabilities of Conditionals.Frank Doring - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):689-700.
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  36. On the Probabilities of Conditionals.Frank Döring - 1994 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):231-231.
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  37. Ramsey's Test, Adams' Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals.Igor Douven - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramseys test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen thesis for left-nested conditionals.
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  38. Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):259-266.
    Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at (...)
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  39. On Bradley's Preservation Condition for Conditionals.Igor Douven - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118.
    Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
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  40. The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
    According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by (...)
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  41. The Adams Family.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2010 - Cognition 117 (3):302-318.
  42. Introduction to the Special Issue: Ramsey Test, Conditionals and Choices.Simone Duca - 2011 - Topoi.
    Test for the rational acceptance of conditionals and it still incites much of the interest in conditional reasoning. For instance, the test has been considered as a good starting point for several formal semantics for conditionals. Furthermore, its ramifications have important implications for several disciplines, from logic and artificial intelligence to decision theory and psychology. This volume presents a small but fine sample of the state of the art of such multifarious area of research.
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  43. Lowe on Conditional Probability.Dorothy Edgington - 1996 - Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  44. On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
  45. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  46. Probabilities and Conditionals.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):412-415.
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  47. Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions extend his ideas in (...)
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  48. Marginal and Conditional Stimulus and Response Probabilities in Verbal Conditioning.Jean Engler - 1958 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (4):303.
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  49. The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals.David Etlin - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688.
    I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, (...)
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  50. A Sampling Approach to Biases in Conditional Probability Judgments: Beyond Base Rate Neglect and Statistical Format.Klaus Fiedler, Babette Brinkmann, Tilmann Betsch & Beate Wild - 2000 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 129 (3):399-418.
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