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1 — 50 / 164
  1. added 2018-11-26
    Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Cognitive Psychology 108:42-71.
    In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...)
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  2. added 2018-11-06
    Adams Thesis and the Local Interpretation of Conditionals.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Adams' Thesis states that the probability of a conditional is the probability of the consequent conditional on the antecedent. S. Kaufmann introduced a rival method, the so-called ``local interpretation'', for calculating the probability of a conditional that, according to a purported majority, squares better with intuition in some circumstances. He also gives an example purporting to show that this new method sometimes corresponds to rational action. We challenge the intuitions and expose a mathematical error in the example. We also offer (...)
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  3. added 2018-11-04
    Credence for Epistemic Discourse.Paolo Santorio - manuscript
    Many recent theories of epistemic discourse exploit an informational notion of consequence, i.e. a notion that defines entailment as preservation of support by an information state. This paper investigates how informational consequence fits with probabilistic reasoning. I raise two problems. First, all informational inferences that are not also classical inferences are, intuitively, probabilistically invalid. Second, all these inferences can be exploited, in a systematic way, to generate triviality results. The informational theorist is left with two options, both of them radical: (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Mind:fzy067.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations have recently emerged in its favor. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form, ‘If I don’t know it, p.’ Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
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  5. added 2018-07-22
    Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Analysis:any051.
    Richard Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between cre- dences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
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  6. added 2018-07-09
    Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating.Borut Trpin - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Ljubljana
    This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies that learning a conditional can (...)
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  7. added 2018-02-17
    Ramsey’s Test, Adams’ Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals.Richard Dietz & Igor Douven - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
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  9. added 2017-09-21
    Embedding "If and Only If".Adam Sennet & Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):449-460.
    Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while others seem fine. Some proponents of the view that indicative conditionals have No Truth Values (NTV) use their view to explain why some left-nestings are hard to interpret: the embedded conditional does not express the truth conditions needed by the embedding conditional. Left-nestings that seem fine are then explained away as cases of ad hoc, pragmatic interpretation. We challenge this explanation. The standard reasons for NTV about indicative conditionals (triviality results, Gibbardian (...)
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  10. added 2017-04-21
    General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
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  11. added 2017-02-14
    Of Conditional Reasoning.Josef Perner & Eva Rafetseder - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 90.
  12. added 2017-02-13
    The Adams Family.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2010 - Cognition 117 (3):302-318.
  13. added 2017-02-13
    Probability Theory as an Alternative to Complexity.David G. Lowe - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (3):451-452.
  14. added 2017-02-13
    The Nature of Denied Propositions in the Conditional Reasoning Task: Interpretation and Learning.Herman Staudenmayer & L. E. Bourne - 1978 - In Russell Revlin & Richard E. Mayer (eds.), Human Reasoning. Distributed Solely by Halsted Press. pp. 83--99.
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  15. added 2017-02-12
    Probability and Conditionals. Belief Revision and Rational Decision.David Miller - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37 (3):212-214.
  16. added 2017-02-07
    Conditionals and Conditional Thinking.Andrea Manfrinati, Pierdaniele Giaretta & Paolo Cherubini - 2008 - Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34.
    In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground (...)
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  17. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms; Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice Jordan Howard Sobel; The Dynamics of Norms Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffery, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]Roy Gardner - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):553-.
  18. added 2017-02-02
    Nonmonotonic Conditionals That Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold.James Hawthorne - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):625-637.
    I’ll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I’ll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and (...)
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  19. added 2017-02-02
    Everyday Reasoning with Inducements and Advice.Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (3):241 – 272.
    In two experiments, we investigated how people interpret and reason with realistic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). We found that inducements and advice differed with respect to the degree to which the speaker was perceived to have (a) control over the consequent, (b) a stake in the outcome, and (c) an obligation to ensure that the outcome occurs. Inducements and advice also differed with respect to perceived sufficiency and necessity, (...)
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  20. added 2017-02-01
    Semantics of Probability.John C. Bigelow - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  21. added 2017-01-25
    Surprises: Low Probabilities or High Contrasts?Karl Halvor Teigen & Gideon Keren - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):55-71.
  22. added 2017-01-25
    Decisions with Indeterminate Probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259.
  23. added 2017-01-25
    Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
  24. added 2017-01-24
    Low Probability of Paternity or… Something Else?Patricia Adair Gowaty - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):675-675.
  25. added 2017-01-24
    Unphilosophical Probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.
  26. added 2017-01-23
    Conditionals, Predicates and Probability.Brian Weatherson - manuscript
    Ernest Adams has claimed that a probabilistic account of validity gives the best account of our intuitive judgements about the validity of arguments. In particular, he claims, it has the best hope of accounting for our judgements about many arguments involving conditionals. Most of the examples in the literature on this topic have been arguments framed in the language of propositional logic. I show that once we consider arguments involving predicates and involving identity, Adams’s strategy is less successful.
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  27. added 2017-01-22
    Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book shows how these developments have led researchers to view people's conditional reasoning behaviour more as succesful probabilistic reasoning rather ...
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  28. added 2017-01-22
    Probability, Practical Reasoning, & Conditional Statements of Intent.Dale Jacquette - 2003 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1):101-113.
  29. added 2017-01-21
    ``Some Questions About Adams' Conditionals&Quot.Patrick Suppes - 1994 - In Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 5-11.
  30. added 2017-01-20
    What Makes Us Believe a Conditional? The Roles of Covariation and Causality.Klaus Oberauer, Andrea Weidenfeld & Katrin Fischer - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):340 – 369.
    Two experiments were conducted to investigate the roles of covariation and of causality in people's readiness to believe a conditional. The experiments used a probabilistic truth-table task (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003) in which people estimated the probability of a conditional given information about the frequency distribution of truth-table cases. For one group of people, belief in the conditional was determined by the conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, whereas for another group it depended on the probability of the (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-20
    The Underinformative Formulation of Conditional Probability.Laura Macchi & Maria Bagassi - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):274-275.
    The formulation of the conditional probability in classical tasks does not guarantee the effective transmission of the independence of the hit rate from the base rate. In these kinds of tasks, data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language only if these are adequately transmitted. From this perspective, the partitive formulation should not be considered a facilitation, but rather, a way of effectively transmitting the conditional probability.Consider the following (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-19
    Unknown Probabilities.Richard Jeffrey - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):327 - 335.
    From a point of view like de Finetti's, what is the judgmental reality underlying the objectivistic claim that a physical magnitude X determines the objective probability that a hypothesis H is true? When you have definite conditional judgmental probabilities for H given the various unknown values of X, a plausible answer is sufficiency, i.e., invariance of those conditional probabilities as your probability distribution over the values of X varies. A different answer, in terms of conditional exchangeability, is offered for use (...)
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  33. added 2017-01-19
    Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition.Paul Weirich - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):82-95.
    The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.
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  34. added 2017-01-18
    Operating on Functions with Variable Domains.Philip G. Calabrese - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):1-18.
    The sum, difference, product and quotient of two functions with different domains are usually defined only on their common domain. This paper extends these definitions so that the sum and other operations are essentially defined anywhere that at least one of the components is defined. This idea is applied to propositions and events, expressed as indicator functions, to define conditional propositions and conditional events as three-valued indicator functions that are undefined when their condition is false. Extended operations of "and", "or", (...)
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  35. added 2017-01-17
    Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.
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  36. added 2017-01-17
    Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297.
  37. added 2017-01-16
    Partition-Edit-Count: Naive Extensional Reasoning in Judgment of Conditional Probability.Craig R. Fox & Jonathan Levav - 2004 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 133 (4):626-642.
  38. added 2017-01-16
    Conditional Probability and Defeat.Trenton Merricks - 2002 - In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press. pp. 165-175.
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  39. added 2017-01-16
    A Sampling Approach to Biases in Conditional Probability Judgments: Beyond Base Rate Neglect and Statistical Format.Klaus Fiedler, Babette Brinkmann, Tilmann Betsch & Beate Wild - 2000 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 129 (3):399-418.
  40. added 2017-01-15
    Probabilities of Conditionals in Context - A Comment on Khoo (2016).Theodore Korzukhin - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):45-49.
  41. added 2017-01-15
    What is ‘Conditional Probability’?E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):218-223.
  42. added 2017-01-15
    Quick Triviality Proofs for Probabilities of Conditionals.P. Milne - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):75-80.
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  43. added 2017-01-11
    A Puzzle About Knowing Conditionals.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):473-478.
    We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-12
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions extend his ideas in (...)
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  45. added 2016-12-08
    How People Interpret an Uncertain If.Andrew Jb Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, Bastian Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. pp. 80-91.
    Conditionals are central to inference. Before people can draw inferences about a natural language conditional, they must interpret its meaning. We investigated interpretation of uncertain conditionals using a probabilistic truth table task, focussing on (i) conditional event, (ii) material conditional, and (iii) conjunction interpretations. The order of object (shape) and feature (color) in each conditional's antecedent and consequent was varied between participants. The conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and took longer to process than conjunction (mean di (...)
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):259-266.
    Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at (...)
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  47. added 2016-12-08
    Coherence and Nonmonotonicity in Human Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2005 - Synthese 146 (1-2):93-109.
    Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. We report four experiments which investigate three rules of SYSTEMP, namely the AND, the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE, and the OR rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of SYSTEM P. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic (...)
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  48. added 2016-12-05
    Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals.M. Kolbel - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):97 - 108.
  49. added 2016-08-16
    Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  50. added 2016-04-29
    Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All?Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    This paper motivates and develops a novel semantic framework for deontic modals. The framework is designed to shed light on two things: the relationship between deontic modals and substantive theories of practical rationality and the interaction of deontic modals with conditionals, epistemic modals and probability operators. I argue that, in order to model inferential connections between deontic modals and probability operators, we need more structure than is provided by classical intensional theories. In particular, we need probabilistic structure that interacts directly (...)
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