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  1. added 2020-03-15
    Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - In Introduction to Logic. Rebus.
  2. added 2020-02-16
    Making Conditional Speech Acts in the Material Way.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about these sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-04
    Epistemic Modal Credence.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account (...)
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  4. added 2020-01-30
    The Big Four - Their Interdependence and Limitations.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the (...)
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  5. added 2020-01-30
    The Triviality Result is Not Counter-Intuitive.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The Equation (TE) states that the probability of A → B is the probability of B given A (Jeffrey, 1964: 702–703). Lewis has shown that the acceptance of TE implies that the probability of A → B is the probability of B, which is implausible: the probability of a conditional cannot plausibly be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the probability that the match will light given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the probability (...)
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  6. added 2019-10-10
    The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms -- the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief -- are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker's semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-18
    Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or-to-if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...)
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  8. added 2019-07-22
    If P, Then P!Matthew Mandelkern - manuscript
    The Identity principle says that conditionals with the form 'If p, then p' are logical truths. Identity is overwhelmingly plausible, and has rarely been explicitly challenged. But a wide range of conditionals nonetheless invalidate it. I explain the problem, and argue that the culprit is the principle known as Import-Export, which we must thus reject. I then explore how we can reject Import-Export in a way that still makes sense of the intuitions that support it, arguing that the differences between (...)
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  9. added 2019-07-11
    Chancy Modus Ponens.Sven Neth - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):632-638.
    Chancy modus ponens is the following inference scheme: ‘probably φ’, ‘if φ, then ψ’, therefore, ‘probably ψ’. I argue that Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general. I further argue that the invalidity of Chancy modus ponens sheds new light on the alleged counterexample to modus ponens presented by McGee. I close by observing that, although Chancy modus ponens is invalid in general, we can recover a restricted sense in which this scheme of inference is valid.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis: Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Conditionals.Niki Pfeifer - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):223-240.
    Two experiments investigate two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis for the first time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated conditional, which consists of one propositional variable with a negation either in the antecedent or in the consequent. This task allows us to infer if people interpret indicative conditionals as material conditionals or as conditional events. In the first experiment I investigate between-participants the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis crossed with abstract versus concrete task material. The modal response for all four groups is (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    What is 'Conditional Probability'?E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):218-223.
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  12. added 2019-06-05
    XII—Probabilities and Conditionals: Distinctions by Example.Jeremy Butterfield - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):251-272.
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    The Logic of Conditionals. Ernest W. Adams.Ian F. Carlstrom & Christopher S. Hill - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-158.
  14. added 2019-03-18
    No Surprises.Ian Wells - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    The surprise exam paradox is an apparently sound argument to the apparently absurd conclusion that a surprise exam cannot be given within a finite exam period. A closer look at the logic of the paradox shows the argument breaking down immediately. So why do the beginning stages of the argument appear sound in the first place? This paper presents an account of the paradox on which its allure is rooted in a common probabilistic mistake: the base rate fallacy. The account (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-18
    Between a Conditional’s Antecedent and its Consequent: Discourse Coherence Vs. Probabilistic Relevance.Karolina Krzyżanowska, Peter J. Collins & Ulrike Hahn - 2017 - Cognition 164:199-205.
    Reasoning with conditionals is central to everyday life, yet there is long-standing disagreement about the meaning of the conditional. One example is the puzzle of so-called missing-link conditionals such as "if raccoons have no wings, they cannot breathe under water." Their oddity may be taken to show that conditionals require a connection between antecedent ("raccoons have no wings") and consequent ("they cannot breathe under water"), yet most accounts of conditionals attribute the oddity to natural language pragmatics. We present an experimental (...)
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  16. added 2019-02-09
    The Spectre of Triviality.Nate Charlow - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):595-605.
    A spectre haunts the semantics of natural language — the spectre of Triviality. Semanticists (in particular Rothschild 2013; Khoo and Mandelkern 2018a,b) have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre. None, I will argue, have yet succeeded.
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  17. added 2019-01-31
    Probabilities of Conditionals in Context: A Comment on Khoo.Theodore Korzukhin - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):45-49.
  18. added 2018-11-26
    Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Cognitive Psychology 108:42-71.
    In this paper, new evidence is presented for the assumption that the reason-relation reading of indicative conditionals ('if A, then C') reflects a conventional implicature. In four experiments, it is investigated whether relevance effects found for the probability assessment of indicative conditionals (Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer, 2016a) can be classified as being produced by a) a conversational implicature, b) a (probabilistic) presupposition failure, or c) a conventional implicature. After considering several alternative hypotheses and the accumulating evidence from other studies as (...)
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  19. added 2018-11-06
    Adams Thesis and the Local Interpretation of Conditionals.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Adams' Thesis states that the probability of a conditional is the probability of the consequent conditional on the antecedent. S. Kaufmann introduced a rival method, the so-called ``local interpretation'', for calculating the probability of a conditional that, according to a purported majority, squares better with intuition in some circumstances. He also gives an example purporting to show that this new method sometimes corresponds to rational action. We challenge the intuitions and expose a mathematical error in the example. We also offer (...)
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  20. added 2018-11-04
    Credence for Epistemic Discourse.Paolo Santorio - manuscript
    Many recent theories of epistemic discourse exploit an informational notion of consequence, i.e. a notion that defines entailment as preservation of support by an information state. This paper investigates how informational consequence fits with probabilistic reasoning. I raise two problems. First, all informational inferences that are not also classical inferences are, intuitively, probabilistically invalid. Second, all these inferences can be exploited, in a systematic way, to generate triviality results. The informational theorist is left with two options, both of them radical: (...)
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  21. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
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  22. added 2018-07-22
    Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):424-436.
    Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
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  23. added 2018-07-09
    Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating.Borut Trpin - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Ljubljana
    This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies that learning a conditional can (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-17
    Ramsey’s Test, Adams’ Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals.Richard Dietz & Igor Douven - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-17
    Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
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  26. added 2017-09-21
    Embedding If and Only If.Adam Sennet & Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):449-460.
    Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while others seem fine. Some proponents of the view that indicative conditionals have No Truth Values (NTV) use their view to explain why some left-nestings are hard to interpret: the embedded conditional does not express the truth conditions needed by the embedding conditional. Left-nestings that seem fine are then explained away as cases of ad hoc, pragmatic interpretation. We challenge this explanation. The standard reasons for NTV about indicative conditionals (triviality results, Gibbardian (...)
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  27. added 2017-04-21
    General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
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  28. added 2017-02-14
    Of Conditional Reasoning.Josef Perner & Eva Rafetseder - 2011 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 90.
  29. added 2017-02-13
    The Adams Family.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2010 - Cognition 117 (3):302-318.
  30. added 2017-02-13
    Probability Theory as an Alternative to Complexity.David G. Lowe - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (3):451-452.
  31. added 2017-02-13
    The Nature of Denied Propositions in the Conditional Reasoning Task: Interpretation and Learning.Herman Staudenmayer & L. E. Bourne - 1978 - In Russell Revlin & Richard E. Mayer (eds.), Human Reasoning. Distributed Solely by Halsted Press. pp. 83--99.
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  32. added 2017-02-12
    Probability and Conditionals. Belief Revision and Rational Decision.David Miller - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37 (3):212-214.
  33. added 2017-02-07
    Conditionals and Conditional Thinking.Andrea Manfrinati, Pierdaniele Giaretta & Paolo Cherubini - 2008 - Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34.
    In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms; Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice Jordan Howard Sobel; The Dynamics of Norms Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffery, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]Roy Gardner - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):553-.
  35. added 2017-02-02
    Nonmonotonic Conditionals That Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold.James Hawthorne - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):625-637.
    I’ll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I’ll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and (...)
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  36. added 2017-02-02
    Everyday Reasoning with Inducements and Advice.Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (3):241 – 272.
    In two experiments, we investigated how people interpret and reason with realistic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). We found that inducements and advice differed with respect to the degree to which the speaker was perceived to have (a) control over the consequent, (b) a stake in the outcome, and (c) an obligation to ensure that the outcome occurs. Inducements and advice also differed with respect to perceived sufficiency and necessity, (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-01
    Semantics of Probability.John C. Bigelow - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  38. added 2017-01-25
    Surprises: Low Probabilities or High Contrasts?Karl Halvor Teigen & Gideon Keren - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):55-71.
  39. added 2017-01-25
    Decisions with Indeterminate Probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.
  40. added 2017-01-25
    Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
  41. added 2017-01-24
    Low Probability of Paternity or… Something Else?Patricia Adair Gowaty - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):675-675.
  42. added 2017-01-24
    Unphilosophical Probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.
  43. added 2017-01-23
    Conditionals, Predicates and Probability.Brian Weatherson - manuscript
    Ernest Adams has claimed that a probabilistic account of validity gives the best account of our intuitive judgements about the validity of arguments. In particular, he claims, it has the best hope of accounting for our judgements about many arguments involving conditionals. Most of the examples in the literature on this topic have been arguments framed in the language of propositional logic. I show that once we consider arguments involving predicates and involving identity, Adams’s strategy is less successful.
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  44. added 2017-01-22
    Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book shows how these developments have led researchers to view people's conditional reasoning behaviour more as succesful probabilistic reasoning rather ...
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  45. added 2017-01-22
    Probability, Practical Reasoning, & Conditional Statements of Intent.Dale Jacquette - 2003 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1):101-113.
    To qualify the truth of a proposition probabilistically is to place it within the scope of a special type of alethic modality. We expect that, as in other modal contexts, the merely probabilistic truth of an assumption in a valid inference must carry over to whatever conclusions are derived from the assumption. That expectation, however, is not always fulfilled in ordinary reasoning about conditional probabilities. There are simpler ways of illustrating what I shall call the paradoxes of conditional probabilistic reasoning (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-21
    ``Some Questions About Adams' Conditionals&Quot.Patrick Suppes - 1994 - In Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 5-11.
  47. added 2017-01-20
    What Makes Us Believe a Conditional? The Roles of Covariation and Causality.Klaus Oberauer, Andrea Weidenfeld & Katrin Fischer - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):340 – 369.
    Two experiments were conducted to investigate the roles of covariation and of causality in people's readiness to believe a conditional. The experiments used a probabilistic truth-table task (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003) in which people estimated the probability of a conditional given information about the frequency distribution of truth-table cases. For one group of people, belief in the conditional was determined by the conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, whereas for another group it depended on the probability of the (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-20
    The Underinformative Formulation of Conditional Probability.Laura Macchi & Maria Bagassi - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):274-275.
    The formulation of the conditional probability in classical tasks does not guarantee the effective transmission of the independence of the hit rate from the base rate. In these kinds of tasks, data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language only if these are adequately transmitted. From this perspective, the partitive formulation should not be considered a facilitation, but rather, a way of effectively transmitting the conditional probability.Consider the following (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-19
    Unknown Probabilities.Richard Jeffrey - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):327 - 335.
    From a point of view like de Finetti's, what is the judgmental reality underlying the objectivistic claim that a physical magnitude X determines the objective probability that a hypothesis H is true? When you have definite conditional judgmental probabilities for H given the various unknown values of X, a plausible answer is sufficiency, i.e., invariance of those conditional probabilities as your probability distribution over the values of X varies. A different answer, in terms of conditional exchangeability, is offered for use (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-19
    Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition.Paul Weirich - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):82-95.
    The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.
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