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1 — 50 / 122
  1. added 2019-02-19
    The Indifference Principle, its Paradoxes and Kolmogorov's Probability Space.Dan D. November - unknown
    In this paper I show that the validity of the Indifference Principle in light of its related paradoxes, is still an open question. I do so by offering an analysis of IP and its related paradoxes in the way they are manifested within the framework of Kolmogorov's probability theory. I describe the conditions that any mathematical formalization of IP must satisfy. Consequently, I show that IP's mathematical formalization has to be a set of constrains on probability spaces which mathematically describe (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-17
    The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv029.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer ([2009]) offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-18
    What Are the Odds That Everyone is Depraved?Scott Hill - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    [EMAIL ME IF YOU'D LIKE A COPY: hillscottandrew@gmail.com] Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God prizes the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some authors claim that we should assign a low probability to the hypothesis because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-30
    Is It the Principal Principle That Implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Springer International Publishing.
    Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann and Williamson argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to be related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several Conditions proposed in the same paper.
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  5. added 2018-06-15
    The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):253-272.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the opposite (...)
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  6. added 2018-06-06
    Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem.Anubav Vasudevan - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy013.
    One well-known objection to the principle of maximum entropy is the so-called Judy Benjamin problem, first introduced by van Fraassen. The problem turns on the apparently puzzling fact that, on the basis of information relating an event’s conditional probability, the maximum entropy distribution will almost always assign to the event conditionalized on a probability strictly less than that assigned to it by the uniform distribution. In this paper, I present an analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem that can help to (...)
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  7. added 2018-06-06
    Chapter VI. The “Principle of Insufficient Reason” and the Right to Nonsense.Jacques Bouveresse - 2013 - In Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious. Princeton University Press. pp. 97-108.
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  8. added 2018-06-06
    The Corroboration Paradox.Carl G. Wagner - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1455-1469.
    Evidentiary propositions E 1 and E 2, each p-positively relevant to some hypothesis H, are mutually corroborating if p > p, i = 1, 2. Failures of such mutual corroboration are instances of what may be called the corroboration paradox. This paper assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of the corroboration paradox are of negligible (...)
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  9. added 2018-06-06
    Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.
    Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...)
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  10. added 2018-06-06
    A Question About Marion’s ‘Principle of Insufficient Reason’.John F. Crosby - 2010 - Quaestiones Disputatae 1 (1):245-250.
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  11. added 2018-06-06
    Transformative Decision Rules.Peterson Martin - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):71-85.
    A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.
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  12. added 2018-06-06
    Entropy and Uncertainty.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (4):467-491.
    This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result 1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an "a priori" probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0-1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result 2 established a sensitivity of (...)
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  13. added 2018-06-06
    The Principle of Insufficient Reason.Homer H. Dubs - 1942 - Philosophy of Science 9 (2):123-131.
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  14. added 2018-05-30
    Tychomancy: Inferring Probability From Causal Structure.Michael Strevens - 2013 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Maxwell's deduction of the probability distribution over the velocity of gas molecules—one of the most important passages in physics (Truesdell)—presents a riddle: a physical discovery of the first importance was made in a single inferential leap without any apparent recourse to empirical evidence. -/- Tychomancy proposes that Maxwell's derivation was not made a priori; rather, he inferred his distribution from non-probabilistic facts about the dynamics of intermolecular collisions. Further, the inference is of the same sort as everyday reasoning about the (...)
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  15. added 2018-03-16
    Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - unknown
    The principle of indifference is supposed to suffice for the rational assignation of probabilities to possibilities. Bertrand advances a probability problem, now known as his paradox, to which the principle is supposed to apply; yet, just because the problem is ill-posed in a technical sense, applying it leads to a contradiction. Examining an ambiguity in the notion of an ill-posed problem shows that there are precisely two strategies for resolving the paradox: the distinction strategy and thewell-posing strategy. The main contenders (...)
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  16. added 2018-02-20
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy011.
    In his, Roger White argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals which, while widely shared, is incorrect. In their, Hawthorne, Landes,Wallmann, and Williamson argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference.
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  17. added 2018-02-17
    An Empirical Approach to Symmetry and Probability.Jill North - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):27-40.
    We often use symmetries to infer outcomes’ probabilities, as when we infer that each side of a fair coin is equally likely to come up on a given toss. Why are these inferences successful? I argue against answering this with an a priori indifference principle. Reasons to reject that principle are familiar, yet instructive. They point to a new, empirical explanation for the success of our probabilistic predictions. This has implications for indifference reasoning in general. I argue that a priori (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-17
    Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support.Isaac Levi - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):97-118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  19. added 2017-12-06
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  20. added 2017-05-30
    Direct Inference From Imprecise Frequencies.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - In Michela Massimi, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), EPSA15 Selected Papers - The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 347-358.
    It is well known that there are, at least, two sorts of cases where one should not prefer a direct inference based on a narrower reference class, in particular: cases where the narrower reference class is gerrymandered, and cases where one lacks an evidential basis for forming a precise-valued frequency judgment for the narrower reference class. I here propose (1) that the preceding exceptions exhaust the circumstances where one should not prefer direct inference based on a narrower reference class, and (...)
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  21. added 2017-03-27
    Error Estimate and Convergence Analysis of Moment-Preserving Discrete Approximations of Continuous Distributions.K. Tanaka & A. A. Toda - unknown
    The maximum entropy principle is a powerful tool for solving underdetermined inverse problems. This paper considers the problem of discretizing a continuous distribution, which arises in various applied fields. We obtain the approximating distribution by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler information of the unknown discrete distribution relative to an initial discretization based on a quadrature formula subject to some moment constraints. We study the theoretical error bound and the convergence of this approximation method as the number of discrete points increases. We prove (...)
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  22. added 2017-02-21
    Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology.Ernan Mcmullin - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (3):359-389.
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  23. added 2017-01-28
    Maximum Entropy Inference with Quantified Knowledge.Owen Barnett & Jeff Paris - 2008 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 16 (1):85-98.
    We investigate uncertain reasoning with quantified sentences of the predicate calculus treated as the limiting case of maximum entropy inference applied to finite domains.
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  24. added 2017-01-27
    Defusing Bertrand’s Paradox.Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):349-373.
    The classical interpretation of probability together with the principle of indifference is formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called labelling invariance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces; it is shown that labelling invariance is violated, and Bertrand’s paradox is interpreted as the proof of violation of labelling invariance. It is shown that Bangu’s attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand’s paradox by requiring the re-labelling (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-26
    A Fuzzy Neuron Based Upon Maximum Entropy Ordered Weighted Averaging.Michael O'Hagan - 1991 - In B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager & L. A. Zadeh (eds.), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases. Springer. pp. 598--609.
  26. added 2017-01-18
    Induction, Indifference and Guessing.F. John Clendinnen - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):340 – 344.
  27. added 2017-01-16
    Bertrand's Paradox Revisited : Why Bertrand's 'Solutions' Are All Inapplicable.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    This paper shows that Bertrand's proposed ‘solutions’ to his own question, which generates his chord paradox, are inapplicable. It uses a simple analogy with cake cutting. The problem is that none of Bertrand's solutions considers all possible cuts. This is no solace for the defenders of the principle of indifference, however, because it emerges that the paradox is harder to solve than previously anticipated.
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  28. added 2017-01-15
    Johannes von Kries’s Principien: A Brief Guide for the Perplexed.Sandy Zabell - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):131-150.
    This paper has the aim of making Johannes von Kries’s masterpiece, Die Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung of 1886, a little more accessible to the modern reader in three modest ways: first, it discusses the historical background to the book ; next, it summarizes the basic elements of von Kries’s approach ; and finally, it examines the so-called “principle of cogent reason” with which von Kries’s name is often identified in the English literature.
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  29. added 2016-12-08
    Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian Conditionalisation and Voluntarism.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):67-85.
    Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification fails (...)
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  30. added 2016-12-08
    The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.
    The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Open Court.
  33. added 2016-12-08
    Entropy and the Unity of Knowledge. [REVIEW]J. H. B. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (4):676-677.
  34. added 2016-12-05
    Probability and Symmetry.Paul Bartha & Richard Johns - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S109-S122.
    The Principle of Indifference, which dictates that we ought to assign two outcomes equal probability in the absence of known reasons to do otherwise, is vulnerable to well-known objections. Nevertheless, the appeal of the principle, and of symmetry-based assignments of equal probability, persists. We show that, relative to a given class of symmetries satisfying certain properties, we are justified in calling certain outcomes equally probable, and more generally, in defining what we call relative probabilities. Relative probabilities are useful in providing (...)
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  35. added 2016-08-15
    Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.
    I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. (...)
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  36. added 2016-04-26
    Predictive Statistical Mechanics and Macroscopic Time Evolution: Hydrodynamics and Entropy Production.Domagoj Kuić - 2016 - Foundations of Physics 46 (7):891-914.
    In the previous papers, it was demonstrated that applying the principle of maximum information entropy by maximizing the conditional information entropy, subject to the constraint given by the Liouville equation averaged over the phase space, leads to a definition of the rate of entropy change for closed Hamiltonian systems without any additional assumptions. Here, we generalize this basic model and, with the introduction of the additional constraints which are equivalent to the hydrodynamic continuity equations, show that the results obtained are (...)
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  37. added 2016-03-08
    The Constraint Rule of the Maximum Entropy Principle.Jos Uffink - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27 (1):47-79.
    The principle of maximum entropy is a method for assigning values to probability distributions on the basis of partial information. In usual formulations of this and related methods of inference one assumes that this partial information takes the form of a constraint on allowed probability distributions. In practical applications, however, the information consists of empirical data. A constraint rule is then employed to construct constraints on probability distributions out of these data. Usually one adopts the rule that equates the expectation (...)
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  38. added 2016-03-07
    Can the Maximum Entropy Principle Be Explained as a Consistency Requirement?Jos Uffink - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26 (3):223-261.
    The principle of maximum entropy is a general method to assign values to probability distributions on the basis of partial information. This principle, introduced by Jaynes in 1957, forms an extension of the classical principle of insufficient reason. It has been further generalized, both in mathematical formulation and in intended scope, into the principle of maximum relative entropy or of minimum information. It has been claimed that these principles are singled out as unique methods of statistical inference that agree with (...)
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  39. added 2016-02-10
    On the Preference for More Specific Reference Classes.Paul Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.
    In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for frequency information for (...)
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  40. added 2016-02-08
    A Defense of the Principle of Indifference.Greg Novack - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.
    The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa ), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa ). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment that generates counterexamples. Roger White ( 2008 ) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, but (...)
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  41. added 2016-02-01
    Probabilistic Reasoning in Cosmology.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario
    Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...)
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  42. added 2016-01-26
    Defusing Bertrand's Paradox.Zalán Gyenis & Rédei Miklós - unknown
    The classical interpretation of probability together with the Principle of Indifference are formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called Labeling Irrelevance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces, it is shown that Labeling Irrelevance is violated and Bertrand's Paradox is interpreted as the very proof of violation of Labeling Invariance. It is shown that Bangu's attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand's Paradox by requiring the (...)
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  43. added 2016-01-15
    Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures.Frank Arntzenius & Cian Dorr - 2017 - In Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders & Joe Silk (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 396-428.
    We develop a Bayesian framework for thinking about the way evidence about the here and now can bear on hypotheses about the qualitative character of the world as a whole, including hypotheses according to which the total population of the world is infinite. We show how this framework makes sense of the practice cosmologists have recently adopted in their reasoning about such hypotheses.
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  44. added 2015-12-07
    Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
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  45. added 2015-12-07
    On Indeterminate Updating of Credences.Leendert Huisman - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):537-557.
    The strategy of updating credences by minimizing the relative entropy has been questioned by many authors, most strongly by means of the Judy Benjamin puzzle. I present a new analysis of Judy Benjamin–like forms of new information and defend the thesis that in general the rational posterior is indeterminate, meaning that a family of posterior credence functions rather than a single one is the rational response when that type of information becomes available. The proposed thesis extends naturally to all cases (...)
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  46. added 2015-12-07
    Probability Kinematics.Zoltan Domotor, Mario Zanotti & Henson Graves - 1980 - Synthese 44 (3):421 - 442.
    Probability kinematics is studied in detail within the framework of elementary probability theory. The merits and demerits of Jeffrey's and Field's models are discussed. In particular, the principle of maximum relative entropy and other principles are used in an epistemic justification of generalized conditionals. A representation of conditionals in terms of Bayesian conditionals is worked out in the framework of external kinematics.
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  47. added 2015-09-08
    Equidynamics and Reliable Reasoning About Frequencies.Marshall Abrams, Frederick Eberhardt & Michael Strevens - 2015 - Metascience 24 (2):173-188.
    A symposium on Michael Strevens' book "Tychomancy", concerning the psychological roots and historical significance of physical intuition about probability in physics, biology, and elsewhere.
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  48. added 2015-08-26
    The Quantum Doomsday Argument.Alastair Wilson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    If the most familiar overlapping interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics is correct, then each of us is constantly splitting into multiple people. This consequence gives rise to the quantum doomsday argument, which threatens to draw crippling epistemic consequences from EQM. However, a diverging interpretation of EQM undermines the quantum doomsday argument completely. This appears to tell in favour of the diverging interpretation. But it is surprising that a metaphysical question that is apparently underdetermined by the physics should be settled by (...)
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  49. added 2015-08-07
    The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
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  50. added 2015-05-18
    Justifying Objective Bayesianism on Predicate Languages.Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson - unknown
    Objective Bayesianism says that the strengths of one’s beliefs ought to be probabilities, calibrated to physical probabilities insofar as one has evidence of them, and otherwise sufficiently equivocal. These norms of belief are often explicated using the maximum entropy principle. In this paper we investigate the extent to which one can provide a unified justification of the objective Bayesian norms in the case in which the background language is a first-order predicate language, with a view to applying the resulting formalism (...)
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1 — 50 / 122