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  1. Equidynamics and Reliable Reasoning About Frequencies.Marshall Abrams, Frederick Eberhardt & Michael Strevens - 2015 - Metascience 24 (2):173-188.
    A symposium on Michael Strevens' book "Tychomancy", concerning the psychological roots and historical significance of physical intuition about probability in physics, biology, and elsewhere.
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  2. The Doomsday Simulation Argument. Or Why Isn't the End Nigh, and You're Not Living in a Simulation.Mr István A. Aranyosi - manuscript
    According to the Carter-Leslie Doomsday Argument, we should assign a high probability to the hypothesis that the human species will go extinct very soon. The argument is based on the application of Bayes’s theo-rem and a certain indifference principle with respect to the temporal location of our observed birth rank within the totality of birth ranks of all humans who will ever have lived. According to Bostrom’s Simulation Argument, which appeals to a weaker indifference principle than the Doomsday Argument, at (...)
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  3. Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures.Frank Arntzenius & Cian Dorr - 2017 - In Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders & Joe Silk (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 396-428.
    We develop a Bayesian framework for thinking about the way evidence about the here and now can bear on hypotheses about the qualitative character of the world as a whole, including hypotheses according to which the total population of the world is infinite. We show how this framework makes sense of the practice cosmologists have recently adopted in their reasoning about such hypotheses.
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  4. Entropy and the Unity of Knowledge. [REVIEW]J. H. B. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (4):676-677.
  5. On Bertrand's Paradox.Sorin Bangu - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):30-35.
    The Principle of Indifference is a central element of the ‘classical’ conception of probability, but, for all its strong intuitive appeal, it is widely believed that it faces a devastating objection: the so-called (by Poincare´) ‘Bertrand paradoxes’ (in essence, cases in which the same probability question receives different answers). The puzzle has fascinated many since its discovery, and a series of clever solutions (followed promptly by equally clever rebuttals) have been proposed. However, despite the long-standing interest in this problem, an (...)
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  6. Maximum Entropy Inference with Quantified Knowledge.Owen Barnett & Jeff Paris - 2008 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 16 (1):85-98.
    We investigate uncertain reasoning with quantified sentences of the predicate calculus treated as the limiting case of maximum entropy inference applied to finite domains.
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  7. Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery.Paul Bartha - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
    De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on subjective probability. It does, however, seem mandated by Dutch Book arguments similar to those that support the other axioms of the probability calculus as compulsory for subjective interpretations. These two lines of reasoning can be (...)
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  8. Probability and Symmetry.Paul Bartha & Richard Johns - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S109-S122.
    The Principle of Indifference, which dictates that we ought to assign two outcomes equal probability in the absence of known reasons to do otherwise, is vulnerable to well-known objections. Nevertheless, the appeal of the principle, and of symmetry-based assignments of equal probability, persists. We show that, relative to a given class of symmetries satisfying certain properties, we are justified in calling certain outcomes equally probable, and more generally, in defining what we call relative probabilities. Relative probabilities are useful in providing (...)
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  9. Probabilistic Reasoning in Cosmology.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario
    Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...)
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  10. The Bayesian Who Knew Too Much.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1527-1542.
    In several papers, John Norton has argued that Bayesianism cannot handle ignorance adequately due to its inability to distinguish between neutral and disconfirming evidence. He argued that this inability sows confusion in, e.g., anthropic reasoning in cosmology or the Doomsday argument, by allowing one to draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge. Norton has suggested criteria for a candidate for representation of neutral support. Imprecise credences (families of credal probability functions) constitute a Bayesian-friendly framework that allows us to avoid (...)
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  11. Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):879–891.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of (...)
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  12. The Doomsday Argument.Nick Bostrom - 2008 - Think 6 (17-18):23-28.
    A recent paper by Korb and Oliver in this journal attempts to refute the Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument. I organize their remarks into five objections and show that they all fail. Further efforts are thus called upon to find out what, if anything, is wrong with Carter and Leslie’s disturbing reasoning. While ultimately unsuccessful, Korb and Oliver’s objections do however in some instances force us to become clearer about what the Doomsday argument does and doesn’t imply.
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  13. Chapter VI. The “Principle of Insufficient Reason” and the Right to Nonsense.Jacques Bouveresse - 2013 - In Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious. Princeton University Press. pp. 97-108.
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  14. Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
    Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...)
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  15. Indifference, Sample Space, and the Wine/Water Paradox.Marc Burock - unknown
    Von Mises’ wine/water paradox has served as a foundation for detractors of the Principle of Indifference and logical probability. Mikkelson recently proposed a first solution, and here several additional solutions to the paradox are explained. Learning from the wine/water paradox, I will argue that it is meaningless to consider a particular probability apart from the sample space containing the probabilistic event in question.
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  16. An Outcome of the de Finetti Infinite Lottery is Not Finite.Marc Burock - unknown
    A randomly selected number from the infinite set of positive integers—the so-called de Finetti lottery—will not be a finite number. I argue that it is still possible to conceive of an infinite lottery, but that an individual lottery outcome is knowledge about set-membership and not element identification. Unexpectedly, it appears that a uniform distribution over a countably infinite set has much in common with a continuous probability density over an uncountably infinite set.
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  17. Indifference Pricing: Theory and Applications.René Carmona (ed.) - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
    This is the first book about the emerging field of utility indifference pricing for valuing derivatives in incomplete markets.
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  18. The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - University of Chicago Press.
  19. A Consistent Restriction of the Principle of Indifference.Paul Castell - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):387-395.
    I argue that a particular restricted version of the Principle of Indiference is a consistent, indispensible tool for guiding our probabilistic judgements.
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  20. Insufficient Reason and Entropy in Quantum Theory.Ariel Caticha - 2000 - Foundations of Physics 30 (2):227-251.
    The objective of the consistent-amplitude approach to quantum theory has been to justify the mathematical formalism on the basis of three main assumptions: the first defines the subject matter, the second introduces amplitudes as the tools for quantitative reasoning, and the third is an interpretative rule that provides the link to the prediction of experimental outcomes. In this work we introduce a natural and compelling fourth assumption: if there is no reason to prefer one region of the configuration space over (...)
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  21. Statistical Thought: A Perspective and History.Shoutir Kishore Chatterjee - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In this unique monograph, based on years of extensive work, Chatterjee presents the historical evolution of statistical thought from the perspective of various approaches to statistical induction. Developments in statistical concepts and theories are discussed alongside philosophical ideas on the ways we learn from experience.
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  22. Induction, Indifference and Guessing.F. John Clendinnen - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):340 – 344.
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  23. A New Formulation of the Principle of Indifference.Rodolfo De Cristofaro - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):329 - 339.
    The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. (...)
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  24. A Question About Marion’s ‘Principle of Insufficient Reason’.John F. Crosby - 2010 - Quaestiones Disputatae 1 (1):245-250.
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  25. Analysis of the Maximum Entropy Principle “Debate”.John F. Cyranski - 1978 - Foundations of Physics 8 (5-6):493-506.
    Jaynes's maximum entropy principle (MEP) is analyzed by considering in detail a recent controversy. Emphasis is placed on the inductive logical interpretation of “probability” and the concept of “total knowledge.” The relation of the MEP to relative frequencies is discussed, and a possible realm of its fruitful application is noted.
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  26. A New Formulation of the Principle of Indifference.Rodolfo de Cristofaro - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):329-339.
    The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. (...)
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  27. Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.
    Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...)
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  28. Probability Kinematics.Zoltan Domotor, Mario Zanotti & Henson Graves - 1980 - Synthese 44 (3):421 - 442.
    Probability kinematics is studied in detail within the framework of elementary probability theory. The merits and demerits of Jeffrey's and Field's models are discussed. In particular, the principle of maximum relative entropy and other principles are used in an epistemic justification of generalized conditionals. A representation of conditionals in terms of Bayesian conditionals is worked out in the framework of external kinematics.
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  29. The Eternal Coin: A Puzzle About Self-Locating Conditional Credence.Cian Dorr - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):189-205.
    The Eternal Coin is a fair coin has existed forever, and will exist forever, in a region causally isolated from you. It is tossed every day. How confident should you be that the Coin lands heads today, conditional on (i) the hypothesis that it has landed Heads on every past day, or (ii) the hypothesis that it will land Heads on every future day? I argue for the extremely counterintuitive claim that the correct answer to both questions is 1.
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  30. Failure and Uses of Jaynes’ Principle of Transformation Groups.Alon Drory - 2015 - Foundations of Physics 45 (4):439-460.
    Bertand’s paradox is a fundamental problem in probability that casts doubt on the applicability of the indifference principle by showing that it may yield contradictory results, depending on the meaning assigned to “randomness”. Jaynes claimed that symmetry requirements solve the paradox by selecting a unique solution to the problem. I show that this is not the case and that every variant obtained from the principle of indifference can also be obtained from Jaynes’ principle of transformation groups. This is because the (...)
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  31. The Principle of Insufficient Reason.Homer H. Dubs - 1942 - Philosophy of Science 9 (2):123-131.
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  32. Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief.Adam Elga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.
    Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that (...)
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  33. How to Exploit Parametric Uniformity for Maximum Entropy Reasoning in a Relational Probabilistic Logic.Marc Finthammer & Christoph Beierle - 2012 - In Luis Farinas del Cerro, Andreas Herzig & Jerome Mengin (eds.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 189--201.
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  34. Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.
    Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in favor of bridging (...)
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  35. Resurrecting Logical Probability.J. Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.
    The logical interpretation of probability, or ``objective Bayesianism''''– the theory that (some) probabilitiesare strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended.The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment ofprior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetryvia a ``principle of insufficient reason'''' inevitably leads to paradox.Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, sothat disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; thatit is possible to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable priorson (...)
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  36. The Doomsday Argument in Many Worlds.Austin Gerig - unknown
    You and I are highly unlikely to exist in a civilization that has produced only 70 billion people, yet we find ourselves in just such a civilization. Our circumstance, which seems difficult to explain, is easily accounted for if many other civilizations exist and if nearly all of these civilizations die out sooner than usually thought, i.e., before trillions of people are produced. Because the combination of and make our situation likely and alternatives do not, we should drastically increase our (...)
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  37. Topics in the Foundations of Statistical Inference and Statistical Mechanics.James C. Guszcza - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This essay explores the philosophical issues concerning the interpretation of probabilities in the context of equilibrium classical statistical mechanics. One reason why investigators have never settled on a single interpretation of probability is that different theories seem to demand different concepts of probability. For example, quantum physics seems to demand an ontic "propensity" concept of probability, while decision theory demands an epistemic "personalist" concept of probability. Statistical mechanics is a branch of physics which uses probabilities to enable experimenters to make (...)
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  38. Is It the Principal Principle That Implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Springer International Publishing.
    Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann and Williamson argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to be related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several Conditions proposed in the same paper.
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  39. Defusing Bertrand's Paradox.Zalán Gyenis & Rédei Miklós - unknown
    The classical interpretation of probability together with the Principle of Indifference are formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called Labeling Irrelevance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces, it is shown that Labeling Irrelevance is violated and Bertrand's Paradox is interpreted as the very proof of violation of Labeling Invariance. It is shown that Bangu's attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand's Paradox by requiring the (...)
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  40. Defusing Bertrand’s Paradox.Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):349-373.
    The classical interpretation of probability together with the principle of indifference is formulated in terms of probability measure spaces in which the probability is given by the Haar measure. A notion called labelling invariance is defined in the category of Haar probability spaces; it is shown that labelling invariance is violated, and Bertrand’s paradox is interpreted as the proof of violation of labelling invariance. It is shown that Bangu’s attempt to block the emergence of Bertrand’s paradox by requiring the re-labelling (...)
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  41. Equipossibility Theories of Probability.Ian Hacking - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):339-355.
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  42. Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities.Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):33-48.
    We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required . Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our (...)
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  43. Application of the Maximum Entropy Principle to Nonlinear Systems Far From Equilibrium.H. Haken - 1993 - In E. T. Jaynes, Walter T. Grandy & Peter W. Milonni (eds.), Physics and Probability: Essays in Honor of Edwin T. Jaynes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 239.
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  44. The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
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  45. Some Observations on Induction in Predicate Probabilistic Reasoning.M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  46. A Note on Regularity.Douglas N. Hoover - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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  47. Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
    A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to (...)
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  48. On Indeterminate Updating of Credences.Leendert Huisman - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):537-557.
    The strategy of updating credences by minimizing the relative entropy has been questioned by many authors, most strongly by means of the Judy Benjamin puzzle. I present a new analysis of Judy Benjamin–like forms of new information and defend the thesis that in general the rational posterior is indeterminate, meaning that a family of posterior credence functions rather than a single one is the rational response when that type of information becomes available. The proposed thesis extends naturally to all cases (...)
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  49. The Well-Posed Problem.Edwin T. Jaynes - 1973 - Foundations of Physics 3 (4):477-493.
    Many statistical problems, including some of the most important for physical applications, have long been regarded as underdetermined from the standpoint of a strict frequency definition of probability; yet they may appear wellposed or even overdetermined by the principles of maximum entropy and transformation groups. Furthermore, the distributions found by these methods turn out to have a definite frequency correspondence; the distribution obtained by invariance under a transformation group is by far the most likely to be observed experimentally, in the (...)
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  50. Scientific Inference.Harold Jeffreys - 1931 - Cambridge [Eng.]Cambridge University Press.
    Thats logic. LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass 1-1. The fundamental problem of this work is the question of the nature of scientific inference.
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