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  1. Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism.Quentin Ruyant - 2021 - Springer International Publishing.
    This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account (...)
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  2. A Validation of Knowledge: A New, Objective Theory of Axioms, Causality, Meaning, Propositions, Mathematics, and Induction.Ronald Pisaturo - 2020 - Norwalk, Connecticut: Prime Mover Press.
    This book seeks to offer original answers to all the major open questions in epistemology—as indicated by the book’s title. These questions and answers arise organically in the course of a validation of the entire corpus of human knowledge. The book explains how we know what we know, and how well we know it. The author presents a positive theory, motivated and directed at every step not by a need to reply to skeptics or subjectivists, but by the need of (...)
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  3. Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge From Falsehood.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162.
    A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.
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  4. Causal Inferences in Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Research: Challenges and Perspectives.Justyna Hobot, Michał Klincewicz, Kristian Sandberg & Michał Wierzchoń - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14:574.
    Transcranial magnetic stimulation is used to make inferences about relationships between brain areas and their functions because, in contrast to neuroimaging tools, it modulates neuronal activity. The central aim of this article is to critically evaluate to what extent it is possible to draw causal inferences from repetitive TMS data. To that end, we describe the logical limitations of inferences based on rTMS experiments. The presented analysis suggests that rTMS alone does not provide the sort of premises that are sufficient (...)
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  5. EL FALSACIONISMO POPPERIANO: UN INTENTO INDUCTIVO DE EVADIR LA INDUCCIÓN.Maribel Barroso - 2015 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 36 (1):29-39.
    En el presente trabajo expongo la propuesta falsacionista de Karl Popper como resultado de su solución al problema de la inducción. En este sentido, la analizo bajo sus dos aspectos, el lógico y el metodológico. La idea detrás de ello es mostrar, en primer lugar, que su solución lógica al problema de la inducción es totalmente independiente de los criterios metodológicos que propone para la elección entre teorías rivales, y en segundo lugar, que estos últimos constituyen una transgresión a su (...)
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  6. The Problem of the Empirical Basis in the Popperian Tradition: Popper, Bartley, and Feyerabend.Jamie Shaw - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (2):524-561.
  7. Optimization of Scientific Reasoning: A Data-Driven Approach.Vlasta Sikimić - 2019 - Dissertation,
    Scientific reasoning represents complex argumentation patterns that eventually lead to scientific discoveries. Social epistemology of science provides a perspective on the scientific community as a whole and on its collective knowledge acquisition. Different techniques have been employed with the goal of maximization of scientific knowledge on the group level. These techniques include formal models and computer simulations of scientific reasoning and interaction. Still, these models have tested mainly abstract hypothetical scenarios. The present thesis instead presents data-driven approaches in social epistemology (...)
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  8. Snowflakes and Wastebaskets.Nelson Goodman - 1972 - In Problems and Projects. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. pp. 416-419.
    Talk given at a memorial meeting for C. I. Lewis at Harvard University, April 23, 1964.
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  9. Reviving Material Theories of Induction.John P. McCaskey - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83:1–7.
    John Norton says that philosophers have been led astray for thousands of years by their attempt to treat induction formally. He is correct that such an attempt has caused no end of trouble, but he is wrong about the history. There is a rich tradition of non-formal induction. In fact, material theories of induction prevailed all through antiquity and from the Renaissance to the mid-1800s. Recovering these past systems would not only fill lacunae in Norton’s own theory but would highlight (...)
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  10. Induction, Philosophical Conceptions Of.John P. McCaskey - 2020 - In Marco Sgarbi (ed.), Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy. Springer.
    How induction was understood took a substantial turn during the Renaissance. At the beginning, induction was understood as it had been throughout the medieval period, as a kind of propositional inference that is stronger the more it approximates deduction. During the Renaissance, an older understanding, one prevalent in antiquity, was rediscovered and adopted. By this understanding, induction identifies defining characteristics using a process of comparing and contrasting. Important participants in the change were Jean Buridan, humanists such as Lorenzo Valla and (...)
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  11. The Material Theory of Induction at the Frontiers of Science.William Peden - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all reasonable inductive inferences are justified in virtue of background knowledge about local uniformities in nature. These local uniformities indicate that our samples are likely to be representative of our target population in our inductions. However, a variety of critics have noted that there are many circumstances in which induction seems to be reasonable, yet such background knowledge is apparently absent. I call such an absence of circumstances ‘the frontiers of science', (...)
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  12. Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper presents and defends an argument that the continuum hypothesis is false, based on considerations about objective chance and an old theorem due to Banach and Kuratowski. More specifically, I argue that the probabilistic inductive methods standardly used in science presuppose that every proposition about the outcome of a chancy process has a certain chance between 0 and 1. I also argue in favour of the standard view that chances are countably additive. Since it is possible to randomly pick (...)
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  13. Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.
    Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...
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  14. The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - In Ion Tanasescu, Alexandru Bejinariu, Susan Krantz Gabriel & Constantin Stoenescu (eds.), Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill. Berlin, Allemagne: De Gruyter.
    This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the last, conclusive section, Whewell’s (...)
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  15. The Future of Human-Artificial Intelligence Nexus and its Environmental Costs.Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - 2020 - Futures 117.
    The environmental costs and energy constraints have become emerging issues for the future development of Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). So far, the discussion on environmental impacts of ML/AI lacks a perspective reaching beyond quantitative measurements of the energy-related research costs. Building on the foundations laid down by Schwartz et al., 2019 in the GreenAI initiative, our argument considers two interlinked phenomena, the gratuitous generalisation capability and the future where ML/AI performs the majority of quantifiable inductive inferences. The (...)
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  16. Has Science Established That the Universe is Physically Comprehensible?Nicholas Maxwell - 2013 - In A. Travena & B. Soen (eds.), Recent Advances in Cosmology. New York, USA: Nova Science. pp. 1-56.
    Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...)
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  17. Induction and Hypothesis: A Study of the Logic of Confirmation.Stephen F. Barker - 1957 - Cornell University Press.
    Doubting that any version of induction could be satisfactory as the basic principle of nondemonstrative inference the author analyzes elaborately and rejects eliminative and enumerative induction in the search for a satisfactory criterion of confirmation. The basic difficulty is that induction fails to provide a means of confirming hypotheses about unobserved things. He inclines toward a method of hypothesis but rejects previous formulations in favor of one that involves systems of confirmable hypotheses that are competetively chosen as the simplest available.
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  18. A Demonstration of the Incompleteness of Calculi of Inductive Inference.John D. Norton - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1119-1144.
    A complete calculus of inductive inference captures the totality of facts about inductive support within some domain of propositions as relations or theorems within the calculus. It is demonstrated that there can be no complete, non-trivial calculus of inductive inference. 1Introduction 2The Deductive Structure 2.1Finite Boolean algebras of propositions 2.2Symmetries of the Boolean algebra 3Deductively Definable Logics of Induction: The Formal Expression of Completeness 3.1Strength of inductive support 3.2Explicit definition 3.3Implicit definition 4The Symmetry Theorem 4.1An illustration 4.2The general case 5Asymptotic (...)
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  19. What Do We Mean by “True” in Scientific Realism?Robert W. P. Luk - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (3):845-856.
    A crucial aspect of scientific realism is what do we mean by true. In Luk’s theory and model of scientific study, a theory can be believed to be “true” but a model is only accurate. Therefore, what do we mean by a “true” theory in scientific realism? Here, we focus on exploring the notion of truth by some thought experiments and we come up with the idea that truth is related to what we mean by the same. This has repercussion (...)
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  20. Non-Inferential Transitions: Imagery and Association.Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - In Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York, NY, USA:
    Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and (...)
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  21. Beyond the Instinct-Inference Dichotomy: A Unified Interpretation of Peirce's Theory of Abduction.Mousa Mohammadian - 2019 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 55 (2):138-160.
    I examine and resolve an exegetical dichotomy between two main interpretations of Peirce’s theory of abduction, namely, the Generative Interpretation and the Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. According to the former, abduction is the instinctive process of generating explanatory hypotheses through a mental faculty called insight. According to the latter, abduction is a rule-governed procedure for determining the relative pursuitworthiness of available hypotheses and adopting the worthiest one for further investigation—such as empirical tests—based on economic considerations. It is shown that the Generative Interpretation (...)
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  22. Why is Bayesian Confirmation Theory Rarely Practiced?Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (1):3-20.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. Instead, they use alternative statistical tests that (...)
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  23. Menachem Fisch. Creatively Undecided: Toward a History and Philosophy of Scientific Agency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. 304. $27.92. [REVIEW]Karim Bschir - 2019 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (1):189-192.
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  24. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism.Lars-Göran Johansson - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (4):31-0.
    Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, (...)
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  25. Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory.Elay Shech - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Historical inductions, viz., the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as non-cogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic meta-induction, e.g., in the context of some medical studies.
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  26. Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction.William Peden - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):672-695.
    John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, (...)
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  27. Summa und System: Historie und Systematik vollendeter bottom-up- und top-down-Theorien.Jens Lemanski - 2013 - Münster, Deutschland: mentis.
    ›Bottom-up‹ und ›top-down‹ sind heutzutage gängige Methodenbezeichnungen in allen Bereichen der Wissenschaft. Dennoch sind beide Methoden keine Entdeckung der Moderne, sondern wurden unter Begriffen wie beispielsweise ›Auf-‹ und ›Abstieg‹, ›Induktion‹ und ›Deduktion‹ in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte häufig verwendet, um komplexe Wissensbestände vollständig aufzuarbeiten und zu strukturieren. Paradigmatisch für eine derartige Aufarbeitung stehen die mittelalterliche Summa und das neuzeitliche System. Aktuellen Studien zufolge hat aber bereits Dionysius Areopagita in der Spätantike eine derartige Summe verfasst, während in der Neuzeit erst J. G. Fichtes (...)
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  28. Newton's Regulae Philosophandi.Zvi Biener - 2018 - In Chris Smeenk & Eric Schliesser (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Isaac Newton. Oxford University Press.
    Newton’s Regulae philosophandi—the rules for reasoning in natural philosophy—are maxims of causal reasoning and induction. This essay reviews their significance for Newton’s method of inquiry, as well as their application to particular propositions within the Principia. Two main claims emerge. First, the rules are not only interrelated, they defend various facets of the same core idea: that nature is simple and orderly by divine decree, and that, consequently, human beings can be justified in inferring universal causes from limited phenomena, if (...)
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  29. William Whewell’s Semantic Account of Induction.Corey Dethier - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (1):141-156.
    William Whewell’s account of induction differs dramatically from the one familiar from twentieth-century debates. I argue that Whewell’s induction can be usefully understood by comparing the difference between his views and more standard accounts to contemporary debates between semantic and syntactic views of theories: rather than understanding inductive inference as capturing a relationship between sentences or propositions, Whewell understands it as a method for constructing a model of the world. The difference between this view and the more familiar picture of (...)
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  30. Local Induction. Radu J. Bogdan.Jonathan E. Adler - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (1):173-177.
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  31. Newton and the Ideal of Exegetical Success.Zvi Biener - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 60:82-87.
    Review Essay of ‘Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method’ by William L. Harper.
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  32. II.—On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning.Bernard Bosanquet - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1):29-40.
  33. Crucial Instances and Francis Bacon’s Quest for Certainty.Schwartz Daniel - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):130-150.
    Francis Bacon’s method of induction is often understood as a form of eliminative induction. The idea, on this interpretation, is to list the possible formal causes of a phenomenon and, by reference to a copious and reliable natural history, to falsify all of them but one. Whatever remains must be the formal cause. Bacon’s crucial instances are often seen as the crowning example of this method. In this article, I argue that this interpretation of crucial instances is mistaken, and it (...)
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  34. Corroboration Versus Induction.Joseph Agassi - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33):311.
  35. Induction and Non-Instantial Hypothesis.R. Das - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (29):317.
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  36. Whewell's Philosophy of Induction.Homer H. Dubs - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (14):385-386.
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  37. Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the History of Thought.Ernest A. Moody - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (17):538-541.
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  38. The Problem of Induction and Its Solution.Frederic Schick - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (16):473-478.
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  39. A Treatise on Induction and Probability.William H. Hay - 1953 - Journal of Philosophy 50 (25):782-788.
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  40. Induction, Probability, and Causation.Howard Smokler - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):45-49.
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  41. Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions: Including Examples on Crash Data.J. -W. Romeyn - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):333-364.
    This paper studies the use of hypotheses schemes in generating inductive predictions. After discussing Carnap-Hintikka inductive logic, hypotheses schemes are defined and illustrated with two partitions. One partition results in the Carnapian continuum of inductive methods, the other results in predictions typical for hasty generalization. Following these examples I argue that choosing a partition comes down to making inductive assumptions on patterns in the data, and that by choosing appropriately any inductive assumption can be made. Further considerations on partitions make (...)
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  42. Elementary Properties of Inductive Limits.Isidore Fleischer - 1963 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 9 (23):347-350.
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  43. Remarks on the Relevance of Induction to the Physical Sciences.George L. Farre - 1964 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 38:178.
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  44. Discussion: Katz on the Vindication of Induction.F. John Clendinnen - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):370.
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  45. Induction and the Empiricist Model of Knowledge.Franz Kutschera - unknown
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  46. Eliminative Abduction: Examples From Medicine.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):345-352.
    Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation involves the selection of a hypothesis on the basis of its loveliness. I argue that in optimal cases of IBE we may be able to eliminate all but one of the hypotheses. In such cases we have a form of eliminative induction takes place, which I call ‘Holmesian inference’. I argue that Lipton’s example in which Ignaz Semmelweis identified a cause of puerperal fever better illustrates Holmesian inference than Liptonian IBE. I (...)
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  47. Whewell’s Tidal Researches: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Methodology.Steffen Ducheyne - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):26-40.
    Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.Keywords: (...)
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  48. Demonstrative Induction.Henry E. Kyburg - 1960 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21:80.
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  49. Watkins, Eric, Ed. Kant and the Sciences. [REVIEW]Jeffrey Tlumak - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):684-687.
  50. More on Induction in the Language with a Satisfaction Class.Henryk Kotlarski & Zygmunt Ratajczyk - 1990 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 36 (5):441-454.
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