||Inductive skepticism is the view that the use of inductive inference in forming predictions and generalizations is unable to be justified. Widely associated with David Hume, the basic problem arises from asking how inductive inference is to be justified. Can it be justified by appeal to previous success in the use of induction? That would be to employ induction to justifiy itself, which would be circular. Can induction be justified on the basis of an appeal to logic? Inductive inferences are non-deductive inferences in which the conclusions transcend the content of the premises. So logic does not justify induction. Can induction be justified by appeal to the uniformity of nature? The uniformity of nature cannot itself be established without an inductive inference from past observation of uniformity. Moreover, the uniformity of nature is not a matter of deductive logic. Given the failures of these attempts to justify induction, the conclusion inevitably appears to be that induction is unable to be justified. Hence we find ourselves in the position of inductive skepticism.