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1 — 50 / 127
  1. added 2018-07-18
    Colivan Commitment, Vis-À-Vis Moore’s Paradox.Ted Parent - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-11.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for (...)
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  2. added 2018-03-25
    Incorrigibilidade nas circunstâncias adequadas: “qualquer tipo de enunciado pode oferecer evidências para qualquer outro tipo”.Eros Carvalho - 2014 - Analytica (Rio) 18 (2):41-65.
    In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-18
    Error Through Misidentification.Annalisa Coliva - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):403-425.
  4. added 2018-02-17
    Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2004 - In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 297-339.
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the (...)
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  5. added 2018-02-06
    Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.
    In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect. I begin by offering four arguments that such non-introspectible conscious experiences are possible. Next, I offer two arguments for thinking that we actually have such experiences. According to the first argument, it is unlikely that evolution would have furnished us with a faculty of introspection that worked flawlessly. According to the second argument, there (...)
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  6. added 2017-11-15
    La primera certeza de Descartes.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2014 - In Patricia King Dávalos, Juan Carlos González González & Eduardo González de Luna (eds.), Ciencias cognitivas y filosofía. Entre la cooperación y la integración. México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma de Queretaro and Miguel Ángel Porrúa. pp. 99-115.
    In the second Meditation, Descartes argues that, because he thinks, he must exist. What are his reasons for accepting the premise of this argument, namely that he thinks? Some commentators suggest that Descartes has a ‘logic’ argument for his premise: It is impossible to be deceived in thinking that one thinks, because being deceived is a species of thinking. In this paper, I argue that this ‘logic’ argument cannot contribute to the first certainty that supposedly stops the Cartesian doubt. Rather, (...)
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  7. added 2017-10-24
    Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.
    This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments, perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It is hypothesized (...)
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  8. added 2017-07-02
    What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home.Matt Duncan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81.
    Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one’s being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic (...)
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  9. added 2017-06-14
    Are Introspective Beliefs About One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to show that introspective beliefs about one’s own current visual experiences are not immediate in the sense that what justifies them does not include other beliefs that the subject in question might possess. The argument will take the following course. First, the author explains the notions of immediacy and truth-sufficiency as they are used here. Second, the author suggests a test to determine whether a given belief lacks immediacy. Third, the author applies this test (...)
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  10. added 2017-01-18
    Non-Inferential Knowledge.George S. Pappas - 1982 - Philosophia 12 (1-2):81-98.
  11. added 2017-01-18
    Response to Sapontzis.D. D. Todd - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):566-568.
  12. added 2017-01-18
    Incorrigibility, the Mental, and Materialism.Gerald Doppelt - 1977 - Philosophy Research Archives 3:504-536.
    This paper constitutes a thoroughgoing critique of Rorty's interesting attempt to characterize the mental and its elimination within materialism in terms of the incorrigibility of mental reports. I elucidate, criticize, and improve the concept of incorrigibility his position requires. Then I argue: that although mental-state reports are as corrigible as physical reports, this reflects contingent matters which do not affect the boundary of the mental and the physical; that even if the familiar paradigm mental-event reports are incorrigible, there are mental (...)
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  13. added 2017-01-16
    On Non-Infallible Pronouncements.Cardinal Newman - 1971 - New Blackfriars 52 (612):228-229.
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  14. added 2017-01-16
    On Non-Infallible Pronouncements.Karl Rahner - 1970 - New Blackfriars 51 (606):502-510.
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  15. added 2017-01-15
    Factual and Logical Incorrigibility.Lars Aagaard-Mogensen - 1972 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 9:7-14.
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  16. added 2016-12-08
    Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge.Jonathan Weisberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-197.
    Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    Access, Incorrigibility, and Identity.Alan Tormey - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (5):115.
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    Are There Any Incorrigible Empirical Statements?J. L. Mackie - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):12-28.
  19. added 2016-12-08
    Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
  20. added 2016-08-25
    Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
    You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-21
    Pain and Incorrigibility.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  22. added 2016-04-17
    Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree (...)
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  23. added 2016-04-01
    Narrative Identity and Diachronic Self-Knowledge.Kevin J. Harrelson - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):164-179.
    Our ability to tell stories about ourselves has captivated many theorists, and some have taken these developments for an opportunity to answer long-standing questions about the nature of personhood. In this essay I employ two skeptical arguments to show that this move was a mistake. The first argument rests on the observation that storytelling is revisionary. The second implies that our stories about ourselves are biased in regard to our existing self-image. These arguments undercut narrative theories of identity, but they (...)
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  24. added 2016-03-23
    Affective Ignorance.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various kinds), (...)
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  25. added 2016-01-24
    Self-Knowledge and Its Limits.John Schwenkler - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):85-95.
    This is a review essay of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and John Doris, Talking to Our Selves (Oxford, 2015). In it I question whether Cassam succeeds in his challenge to Richard Moran's account of first-personal authority, and whether Doris is right that experimental evidence for unconscious influences on behavior generates skeptical worries on accounts that regard accurate self-knowledge as a precondition of agency.
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  26. added 2015-12-21
    Illusion of Transparency.Laura Schroeter - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.
    It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.
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  27. added 2015-11-07
    Transparency of Mind: The Contributions of Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley to the Genesis of the Modern Subject.Gary Hatfield - 2011 - In Hubertus Busche (ed.), Departure for Modern Europe: A Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy (1400-1700). Felix Meiner Verlag. pp. 361–375.
    The chapter focuses on attributions of the transparency of thought to early modern figures, most notably Descartes. Many recent philosophers assume that Descartes believed the mind to be “transparent”: since all mental states are conscious, we are therefore aware of them all, and indeed incorrigibly know them all. Descartes, and Berkeley too, do make statements that seem to endorse both aspects of the transparency theses (awareness of all mental states; incorrigibility). However, they also make systematic theoretical statements that directly countenance (...)
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  28. added 2015-07-25
    Ich bin jetzt hier - aber wo ist das?Geert Keil - 2011 - In Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.), Kant: Here, Now, and How. Mentis. pp. 15-34.
    Menschen verfügen über ein komplexes Vermögen der Selbstlokalisierung in Raum und Zeit. Seine eigene Position festzustellen kann in verschiedenen Kontexten Verschiedenes bedeuten. Nicht jedes unsere raumzeitliche Lokalisierung und Orientierung betreffende Problem ist philosophischer Natur. Fragen wie »Wo ist Norden?«, »Wie weit ist es nach Hause?« oder »In welcher Richtung liegt das Ziel?« sind lebensweltliche und gegebenenfalls navigatorische Fragen. Die kognitiven Mechanismen und Fähigkeiten zu untersuchen, die unseren Lokalisierungs- und Orientierungsleistungen zugrunde liegen, ist eine Aufgabe für die Kognitionswissenschaften. Die Untersuchung der (...)
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  29. added 2015-06-08
    Selbstreferenz und Selbstbewusstsein (Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge).Christoph Jäger - 1999 - mentis.
  30. added 2015-04-05
    Pain, Incorrigibility, and Self-Intimation.David Charles Bryant - 1974 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  31. added 2015-04-05
    Incorrigibility and the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.Stanley Jack Odell - 1967 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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  32. added 2015-04-05
    Criteria, Incorrigibility, and Feelings.Osborne Harvey Green - 1966 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  33. added 2015-04-05
    Infallible Logic.Thomas De Riemer Hawley - 1896
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  34. added 2015-04-04
    Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation.Sean Allen‐Hermanson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  35. added 2015-04-04
    Incorrigibility: A Critical Examination of Three Contemporary Doctrines.David Alvin Peters - 1976 - Dissertation, Michigan State University
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  36. added 2015-03-24
    Knowledge, Certainty and Incorrigibility.Nikola Z. Grahek - 1992 - Theoria 35 (3):45-52.
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  37. added 2015-03-22
    The Infallible State.G. K. Chesterton - 1991 - The Chesterton Review 17 (2):157-159.
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  38. added 2015-03-20
    Coffee, Certification, and the Incorrigibility of Capitalism.Christopher London - 2012 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 79 (4):1045-1069.
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  39. added 2015-03-18
    Incorrigibility and the Mental.Gerald Doppelt - 1978 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):3-20.
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  40. added 2015-03-18
    Richard Robinson on Incorrigibility.James Ford - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):199 - 200.
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  41. added 2015-03-17
    Incorrigibility, Behaviourism and Predictionism.George W. Roberts - 1974 - In Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.
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  42. added 2015-03-17
    Functionalism, Machines and Incorrigibility.Richard Rorty - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (April):203-20.
  43. added 2015-03-17
    Immediate Awareness.Robert A. Imlay - 1969 - Dialogue 8 (2):228-42.
  44. added 2015-03-17
    Gasking on Arithmetical Incorrigibility.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1962 - Mind 71 (283):372-376.
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  45. added 2015-02-15
    A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter develops a simple theory of introspection on which a mental state is introspectively accessible just by virtue of the fact that one is in that mental state. This theory raises two questions: first, a generalization question: which mental states are introspectively accessible; and second, an explanatory question: why are some mental states introspectively accessible, rather than others, or none at all? In response to the generalization question, I argue that a mental state is introspectively accessible if and only (...)
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  46. added 2015-02-08
    Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy.T. Parent - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...)
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  47. added 2014-06-26
    Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):470-492.
    McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-03
    Certainty and Phenomenal States.Steven D. Hales - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):57-72.
    If we agree, along with Arnauld, Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, and others that our occurrent phenomenal states serve as sources of epistemic certainty for us, we need some explanation of this fact. Many contemporary writers, most notably Roderick Chisholm, maintain that there is something special about the phenomenal states themselves that allows our certain knowledge of them. I argue that Chisholm's view is both wrong and irreparable, and that the capacity of humans to know these states with certainty has to (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-02
    Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions.Glen Hoffmann - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
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  50. added 2014-03-30
    On Believing That I Am Thinking.Tom Stoneham - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
    It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person (...)
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