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Siblings:History/traditions: Inference

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  1. Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
    Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...)
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  2. The Essential Puzzle of Inference.James W. Allard - 1998 - Bradley Studies 4 (1):61-81.
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  3. Immediate Inference Revised.Albert E. Avey - 1923 - Journal of Philosophy 20 (22):589-596.
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  4. Reasoning as a Source of Justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  5. Relevance Logic, Classical Logic, and Disjunctive Syllogism.John A. Barker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (6):361 - 376.
  6. The Problem of Basic Deductive Inference.Gordon Barnes - manuscript
    Knowledge can be transmitted by a valid deductive inference. If I know that p, and I know that if p then q, then I can infer that q, and I can thereby come to know that q. What feature of a valid deductive inference enables it to transmit knowledge? In some cases, it is a proof of validity that grounds the transmission of knowledge. If the subject can prove that her inference follows a valid rule, then her inference transmits knowledge. (...)
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  7. Inquiry: A New Paradigm for Critical Thinking.Mark Battersby (ed.) - 2018 - Windsor, Canada: Windsor Studies in Argumentation.
    This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field is still evident (...)
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  8. Inference in Indian and Western Logic.Birendra Kumar Bhattacharya - 1976 - Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
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  9. The A Priority of Abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.
    Here we challenge the orthodoxy according to which abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference. We start by providing a case study illustrating how abduction can justify a philosophical claim not justifiable by empirical evidence alone. While many grant abduction's epistemic value, nearly all assume that abductive justification is a posteriori, on grounds that our belief in abduction's epistemic value depends on empirical evidence about how the world contingently is. Contra this assumption, we argue, first, that our belief in (...)
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  10. Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  11. How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1):1-40.
    Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...)
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  12. Inference and Insight. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):633–640.
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  13. Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.
  14. The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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  15. Comments on Boghossian.John Broome - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):19-25.
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  16. The Nature of Inference.D. G. Brown - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (3):351-369.
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  17. Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-28.
    A surge of empirical research demonstrating flexible cognition in animals and young infants has raised interest in the possibility of rational decision-making in the absence of language. A venerable position, which I here call “Classical Inferentialism”, holds that nonlinguistic agents are incapable of rational inferences. Against this position, I defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be practically rational. This model vindicates the Lockean idea that we can intuitively grasp rational connections between thoughts by developing the (...)
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  18. Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.
    This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent (...)
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  19. Many Meanings of ‘Heuristic’.Sheldon J. Chow - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):977-1016.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ‘heuristic’ in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears to be little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ‘heuristic’, and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics (...)
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  20. The Rational Roles of Intuition.Elijah Chudnoff - 2014 - In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. (...)
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  21. Extrasyllogistic Inference.Joseph T. Clark - 1952 - Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 3:14-15.
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  22. Is Imperative Inference Impossible? The Argument From Permissive Presuppositions.Hannah Clark-Younger - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    Standard definitions of validity are designed to preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. However, it seems possible to construct arguments that contain sentences in the imperative mood. Such sentences are incapable of being true or false, so the standard definitions cannot capture the validity of these imperative arguments. Bernard Williams offers an argument that imperative inference is impossible: two imperatives will always have different permissive presuppositions, so a speaker will have to change his mind before uttering a second (...)
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  23. Varieties of Practical Inference. Clarke - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):273-286.
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  24. Practical Inferences.D. S. Clarke - 1985 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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  25. Cogency and Context.Cesare Cozzo - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    The problem I address is: how are cogent inferences possible? In § 1 I distinguish three senses in which we say that one is “compelled” by an inference: automatic, seductive-rhetorical and epistemic compulsion. Cogency is epistemic compulsion: a cogent inference compels us to accept its conclusion, if we accept its premises and we aim at truth. In §§ 2–3 I argue that cogency is intelligible if we consider an inference as a compound linguistic act in which several component acts are (...)
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  26. Inference and Compulsion.Cesare Cozzo - 2014 - In E. Moriconi (ed.), Second Pisa Colloquium in Logic,Language and Epistemology. ETS. pp. 162-180.
    What is an inference? Logicians and philosophers have proposed various conceptions of inference. I shall first highlight seven features that contribute to distinguish these conceptions. I shall then compare three conceptions to see which of them best explains the special force that compels us to accept the conclusion of an inference, if we accept its premises.
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  27. Kevin McCain and Ted Poston (Eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:N/A.
  28. Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.
    True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...)
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  29. Reasoning Without Blinders: A Reply to Valaris.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):889-893.
    I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.
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  30. Intuitions for Inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.
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  31. Inferential Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):203-213.
    Consider: -/- The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)? -/- Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis: -/- E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t. -/- I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an agent (...)
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  32. How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
    In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude (...)
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  33. An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 2: Informal Reasoning Assignments.Rebeka Ferreira & Anthony Ferrucci - 2018 - Open Educational Resource: OpenStax-CNX and Canvas Commons.
    This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...)
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  34. Mental Models in Propositional Reasoning and Working Memory's Central Executive.Juan A. Garc - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):370 – 393.
    We examine the role of working memory's central executive in the mental model explanation of propositional reasoning by using two working memory measures: the classical “reading span” test by Daneman and Carpenter (1980) and a new measure. This new “reasoning span” measure requires individuals to solve very simple anaphora problems, and store and remember the word solution in a growing series of inferential problems. We present one experiment in which we check the involvement of the central executive in conditional and (...)
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  35. Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):373-394.
    I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a (...)
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  36. The Justification of Inference: A Navya Nyāya Approach.Raghunath Ghosh - 1990 - Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
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  37. A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  38. Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.Trudy Rose Govier - 2018 - Windsor: University of Windsor.
    We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues (...)
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  39. Inference and If-Then.Richard E. Grandy - 1979 - Psychological Review 86 (2):152-153.
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  40. Inference, Consequence, and Meaning: Perspectives on Inferentialism.Lilii͡a Gurova (ed.) - 2012 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
  41. Nondeductive Inference. [REVIEW]P. K. H. - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (3):546-546.
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  42. Mathematical Inference and Logical Inference.Yacin Hamami - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):665-704.
    The deviation of mathematical proof—proof in mathematical practice—from the ideal of formal proof—proof in formal logic—has led many philosophers of mathematics to reconsider the commonly accepted view according to which the notion of formal proof provides an accurate descriptive account of mathematical proof. This, in turn, has motivated a search for alternative accounts of mathematical proof purporting to be more faithful to the reality of mathematical practice. Yet, in order to develop and evaluate such alternative accounts, it appears as a (...)
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  43. Poincaré and Prawitz on Mathematical Induction.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dancak (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2014. London: College Publications. pp. 149-164.
    Poincaré and Prawitz have both developed an account of how one can acquire knowledge through reasoning by mathematical induction. Surprisingly, their two accounts are very close to each other: both consider that what underlies reasoning by mathematical induction is a certain chain of inferences by modus ponens ‘moving along’, so to speak, the well-ordered structure of the natural numbers. Yet, Poincaré’s central point is that such a chain of inferences is not sufficient to account for the knowledge acquisition of the (...)
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  44. A Dynamic Logic of Interrogative Inquiry.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - In Can Başkent (ed.), Perspectives on Interrogative Models of Inquiry: Developments in Inquiry and Questions. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 129-161.
    We propose a dynamic-epistemic analysis of the different epistemic operations constitutive of the process of interrogative inquiry, as described by Hintikka’s Interrogative Model of Inquiry (IMI). We develop a dynamic logic of questions for representing interrogative steps, based on Hintikka’s treatment of questions in the IMI, along with a dynamic logic of inferences for representing deductive steps, based on the tableau method. We then merge these two systems into a dynamic logic of interrogative inquiry which articulates a joint treatment of (...)
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  45. Mathematical Rigor, Proof Gap and the Validity of Mathematical Inference.Yacin Hamami - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiæ 18 (1):7-26.
    Mathematical rigor is commonly formulated by mathematicians and philosophers using the notion of proof gap: a mathematical proof is rig­orous when there is no gaps in the mathematical reasoning of the proof. Any philosophical approach to mathematical rigor along this line requires then an account of what a proof gap is. However, the notion of proof gap makes sense only relatively to a given conception of valid mathematical reasoning, i.e., to a given conception of the validity of mathematical inference. A (...)
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  46. Practical Inferences.R. M. Hare - 1971 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
    I Imperative Sentences It has often been taken for granted by logicians that there is a class of sentences which is the proper subject-matter of logic, ...
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  47. Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
    Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
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  48. How Belief is Based on Inference.Gilbert H. Harman - 1964 - Journal of Philosophy 61 (12):353-359.
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  49. Information, Deduction, and the A Priori.Jaakko Hintikka - 1970 - Noûs 4 (2):135-152.
  50. Goodness-Fixing Isn’T Good Enough: A Reply to McHugh and Way.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Mind:fzy035.
    According to McHugh and Way reasoning is a person-level attitude revision that is regulated by its constitutive aim of getting fitting attitudes. They claim that this account offers an explanation of what is wrong with reasoning in ways one believes to be bad and that this explanation is an alternative to an explanation that appeals to the so-called Taking Condition. I argue that their explanation is unsatisfying.
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