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Summary Inferential theories of concepts hold that they are individuated by reference to their relationships with other concepts. These may be causal, functional, computational, inferential, or associative. So a concept such as PLUS is individuated by the fact that it plays the appropriate role in inferences concerning addition, and a concept such as WATER is individuated by its reference to concepts such as CLEAR, DRINKABLE, and LIQUID. Localistic inferential theories hold that only a small number of these inferences are needed to individuate a concept; holistic inferential theories hold that a concept is individuated by many or all of the inferences that it can participate in.
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  1. added 2020-05-11
    James of Viterbo's Innatist Theory of Cognition.Jean-Luc Solere - 2018 - In A Companion to James of Viterbo. Leiden, Netherlands: pp. 168-217.
    James of Viterbio is one of the rare medieval authors to sustain a thoroughly innatist philosophy. He borrows from Simplicius the notion of idoneitas (aptitude, predisposition) so as to ground a cognition theory in which external things are not the efficient and formal causes of mental acts. A predisposition has the characteristic of being halfway between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, the subject that has predispositions does not need to be acted upon by another thing to actualize them. External things only (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-06
    Naturalism and the Metasemantic Account of Concepts.Sílvio Pinto - 2006 - Abstracta 3 (1):29-45.
    In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke’s greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke’s supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4.Sonia Roca Royes - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):405-426.
    Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon's views, endorsement of the "flexibility of origins" thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke's theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke's account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle, and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding their (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
    : This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of knowledge. (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Belief, Simulation and the First Person: Comments on A Study of Concepts by Christopher Peacocke.Jane Heal - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):413-417.
    In these comments I shall concentrate on one topic, namely Peacocke’s proposals concerning what is involved in possessing the concept of belief. The proposals are, of course, presented by him within the framework of a general theory of concepts, some parts of which are illuminating and others of which are more debatable. But differences about these issues are not germane to what follows and for our purposes I shall assume the correctness of the broad lines of his theory.
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Concepts; A Potboiler.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:1-24.
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Blueprint for a Science of Mind: A Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts.Kirk Ludwig - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):469-491.
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  8. added 2019-06-05
    Discussion of Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts. [REVIEW]David Papineau & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):425.
    Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts is a dense and rewarding work. Each chapter raises many issues for discussion. I know three different people who are writing reviews of the volume. It testifies to the depth of Peacocke’s book that each reviewer is focusing on a quite different set of topics.
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  9. added 2019-04-18
    Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Experimenting and Discoursive Committment. [REVIEW]Susanna Schellenberg - 1998 - Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (2):187-195.
  10. added 2019-03-07
    Sellars and Frege on Concepts and Laws.Danielle Macbeth - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 138-156.
  11. added 2019-01-28
    The Revisionist’s Rubric: Conceptual Engineering and the Discontinuity Objection.Michael Prinzing - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):854-880.
    ABSTRACTThis paper is about conceptual engineering. Specifically, it discusses a common objection to CE, which I call the Discontinuity Objection. According to the Discontinuity Objection, CE leads to problematic discontinuities in subject and/or inquiry – making it philosophically uninteresting or irrelevant. I argue that a conceptual engineer can dismiss the Discontinuity Objection by showing that the pre-engineering concept persists through the proposed changes. In other words, the Discontinuity Objection does not apply if the proposal involves identity-preserving changes. Two existing views (...)
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  12. added 2019-01-16
    What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-16
    Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
    Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in (...)
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  14. added 2017-12-02
    Conceptual Role Semantics and Rationality.Bradley Rives - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):271-289.
    Conceptual role semanticists argue that concepts are individuated in terms of their roles in cognition. Some prominent conceptual role semanticists argue for the further claim that concepts are individuated in terms of their rational roles in cognition. This further claim places substantive normative constraints on concept-constitutive roles. I argue that conceptual role semanticists can and should resist the claim that conceptual roles must be specified in inherently normative terms.
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  15. added 2017-05-09
    Information Specification in the Attainment of Conditional Concepts.Patrick R. Laughlin - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (2p1):370.
  16. added 2017-05-09
    Effects of Chaining Cues on the Acquisition of a Complex Conceptual Rule.Seong S. Lee & Robert M. Gagne - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 80 (3p1):468.
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  17. added 2017-05-05
    Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference.W. Hinzen - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):71-94.
    Spencer’s heritage, while almost a forgotten chapter in the history of biology, lives on in psychology and the philosophy of mind. I particularly discuss externalist views of meaning, on which meaning crucially depends on a notion of reference, and ask whether reference should be thought of as cause or effect. Is the meaning of a word explained by what it refers to, or should we say that what we use a word to refer to is explained by what concept it (...)
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  18. added 2017-05-05
    What is a Concept?Ray Jackendoff - 1992 - In E. Kittay & A. Lehrer (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization. Erlbaum. pp. 191-208.
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  19. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts and Inference.Jonathan S. T. B. T. Evans - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (1-2):29-34.
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  20. added 2017-03-09
    Pensamientos de primer orden.Mariela Aguilera - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):55-81.
    Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación (...)
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  21. added 2017-02-15
    Holistic Explanation by Christopher Peacocke. [REVIEW]Akeel Bilgrami - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):106-118.
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  22. added 2017-02-11
    Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke,'The Realm of Reason'.Brad Majors - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (2).
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  23. added 2017-02-09
    Truly Understood, by Christopher Peacocke.J. L. Bermudez - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):1276-1280.
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  24. added 2017-02-07
    The Implicit Conception of Implicit Conceptions. Reply to Christopher Peacocke.Josefa Toribio - unknown
    Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of why we need implicit conceptions; how we can discover them; what they explain; what they are; and how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which Peacocke's project ought to be (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-03
    Review of Christopher Peacocke, Truly Understood[REVIEW]D. Gene Witmer - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  26. added 2017-01-31
    Spinning Threads: Peacocke on Moderate Rationalism.Robert De Gaynesford - unknown
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  27. added 2017-01-28
    Possessed by Concepts: Christopher Peacocke's "A Study of Concepts".John Skorupski - 1995 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):143.
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  28. added 2017-01-26
    Review of [Peacocke, 2004]. [REVIEW]N. Tennant - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102:155-162.
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  29. added 2017-01-26
    Cristopher Peacocke, The Realm Of Reason.Nenad Miščević - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14:377-380.
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  30. added 2017-01-26
    A Bet with Peacocke.R. G. Millikan - 1995 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 285--292.
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  31. added 2017-01-22
    Introduction.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):1-3.
    Christopher Peacocke, in A Study of Concepts, motivates his account of possession conditions for concepts by means of an alleged parallel with the conditions under which numbers are abshacted to give the numerosity of a predicate. There are, however, logical mistakes in Peacocke's treatment of numbers, which undermine his intended analogy. Nevertheless Peacocke's account of possession conditions for concepts is not rendered inadequate simply by virtue of being deprived of the intended analogy and the motivation it was supposed to afford. (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-22
    Review: Peacocke on Modality. [REVIEW]Gideon Rosen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):641 - 648.
    We know a great deal about what is possible, so modal knowledge must be possible, not just in principle but by ordinary methods. Christopher Peacocke’s leading thought in Chapter 4 of Being Known is that this fact places significant constraints on philosophical treatments of modality. Modal realism is ruled out on the ground that it renders modal truth “radically inaccessible”, and actualism is forced upon us. It goes without saying that any account of the modal facts must eventually dovetail with (...)
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  33. added 2017-01-22
    Peacocke’s Theory of Modality. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):649 - 654.
    Chapter 4 of Being Known makes a bold and sophisticated attempt to integrate the metaphysics of modality with its epistemology. Memory sometimes enables us to know of something not happening in the present that it happened in the past; what enables us to know of something not happening in the past, present or future that it could have happened? Christopher Peacocke’s answer roots the possible in the actual, more specifically in different ways of assigning actually existing items as the semantic (...)
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  34. added 2017-01-22
    Peacocke and Kraemer on Butler's Problem.E. J. Lowe - 1980 - Analysis 40 (3):113 - 118.
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  35. added 2017-01-21
    Posséder Un Concept Selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):219-.
    ABSTRACT: Christopher Peacocke defends a sophisticated version of Conceptual Role Theory. For him, the nature of a concept is completely determined by an account of what it is to possess that concept. The possession conditions he puts forward rest on the notion of primitively compelling transitions or, more recently, on the idea of implicit conceptions. I show that his account is circular and appeals to a dubious distinction between constitutive transitions and transitions that depend on factual beliefs. I also point (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-20
    Peacocke's Thoughts.Richard E. Aquila - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (1 & 2):195 – 205.
  37. added 2017-01-19
    Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke’s Referential Turn and its Challenges.Nenad Miščević - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.
    The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke’s pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to (...)
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  38. added 2017-01-19
    Peacocke’s Theory of Modality. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):649–654.
    Chapter 4 of Being Known makes a bold and sophisticated attempt to integrate the metaphysics of modality with its epistemology. Memory sometimes enables us to know of something not happening in the present that it happened in the past; what enables us to know of something not happening in the past, present or future that it could have happened? Christopher Peacocke's answer roots the possible in the actual, more specifically in different ways of assigning actually existing items as the semantic (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-18
    Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke’s Criticisms of Constitutivism.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.
    Constitutivist accounts of self-knowledge argue that a noncontingent, conceptual relation holds between our first-order mental states and our introspective awareness of them. I explicate a constitutivist account of our knowledge of our own beliefs and defend it against criticisms recently raised by Christopher Peacocke. According to Peacocke, constitutivism says that our second-order introspective beliefs are groundless. I show that Peacocke’s arguments apply to reliabilism not to constitutivism per se, and that by adopting a functionalist account of direct accessibility a constitutivist (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-18
    Peacocke on Red and Red.Michael A. Smith - 1986 - Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
    How are we to define red? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define red in terms of looks red. But looks red is semantically complex. We must therefore define looks red in terms of red. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
    This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-24
    Dual Character Concepts in Social Cognition: Commitments and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation.Del Pinal Guillermo & Reuter Kevin - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):477–501.
    The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect (...)
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  43. added 2016-11-01
    A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...)
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  44. added 2016-10-14
    Intellect and Concept.Gurpreet Rattan - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    The connections between theories of concepts and issues of knowledge and epistemic normativity are complex and controversial. According to the general, broadly Fregean, view that stands in the background of this paper, these connections are taken not only to exist, but also to be fundamental to issues about the individuation of concepts. This kind of view fleshed out should clarify the nature and role of epistemic norms, and of different kinds of epistemic norms, in concept individuation. This paper takes up (...)
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  45. added 2016-03-09
    Two Constraints on a Theory of Concepts.Andrea Onofri - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):3-27.
    Two general principles have played a crucial role in the recent debate on concepts. On the one hand, we want to allow different subjects to have the same concepts, thus accounting for concept publicity: concepts are ‘the sort of thing that people can, and do, share’. On the other hand, a subject who finds herself in a so-called ‘Frege case’ appears to have different concepts for the same object: for instance, Lois Lane has two distinct concepts SUPERMAN and CLARK KENT (...)
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  46. added 2015-11-30
    Peacocke's Self-Knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):13–27.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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  47. added 2015-09-22
    Sprechen über die Welt. Zu Robert Brandoms "Making it explicit".Johannes Haag - 2002 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 109 (2):323-342.
  48. added 2015-03-24
    Response to Peacocke.John McDowell - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):414-99.
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  49. added 2014-04-01
    Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription.Daniel Whiting - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.
    According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.
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  50. added 2014-03-30
    Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Philosophical Issues. MIT Press. pp. 43-88.
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