Infinitism

Edited by Kurt Sylvan (University of Southampton, University of Southampton)
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  1. added 2019-10-17
    The Reductio Argument Against Epistemic Infinitism.Tim Oakley - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3869-3887.
    Epistemic infinitism, advanced in different forms by Peter Klein, Scott Aikin, and David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that person of an infinite, non-repeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. The reductio argument is the argument to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one is justified in any proposition, because there will be an infinite chain (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-24
    Anaxagoras, the Thoroughgoing Infinitist: The Relation Between His Teachings on Multitude and on Heterogeneity.Miloš Arsenijević, Saša Popović & Miloš Vuletić - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):35-70.
    In the analysis of Anaxagoras’ physics in view of the relation between his teachings on multitude and heterogeneity, two central questions emerge: 1) How can the structure of the universe considered purely mereo-topologically help us explain that at the first cosmic stage no qualitative difference is manifest in spite of the fact that the entire qualitative heterogeneity is supposedly already present there? 2) How can heterogeneity become manifest at the second stage, resulting from the noûs intervention, if according to fragment (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    Infinitism, Completability, and Computability: Reply to Peijnenburg: Discussions.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1123-1124.
    In ‘Infinitism Regained’, Jeanne Peijnenburg argues for a version of infinitism wherein ‘beliefs may be justified by an infinite chain of reasons that can be actually completed’. I argue that Peijnenburg has not successfully argued for this claim, but rather has shown that certain infinite series can be computed.
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Prospects For Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.
    Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Don't Fear the Regress: Cognitive Values and Epistemic Infinitism: Aikin Don't Fear the Regress.Scott Aikin - 2009 - Think 8 (23):55-61.
    We are rational creatures, in that we are beings on whom demands of rationality are appropriate. But by our rationality it doesn't follow that we always live up to those demands. In those cases, we fail to be rational, but it is in a way that is different from how rocks, tadpoles, and gum fail to be rational. For them, we use the term ‘arational.’ They don't have the demands, but we do. The demands of rationality bear on us because (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-05
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  8. added 2019-05-20
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):212-215.
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. By Atkinson David, Peijnenburg Jeanne.
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  9. added 2019-03-07
    El infinito y el continuo en el sistema numérico.Eduardo Dib - 1995 - Dissertation, Universidad Nacional de Rio Cuarto
    This monography provides an overview of the conceptual developments that leads from the traditional views of infinite (and their paradoxes) to the contemporary view in which those old paradoxes are solved but new problems arise. Also a particular insight in the problem of continuity is given, followed by applications in theory of computability.
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  10. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 142-165.
    Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a (...)
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  11. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas: Reality Press. pp. 246-266.
    A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and (...)
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  12. added 2019-02-23
    Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 403p (2000)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 328-336.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W (...)
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  13. added 2019-01-30
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, Edited by Turri, John and Peter D. Klein: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. 262, £40. [REVIEW]Cei Maslen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):629-629.
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  14. added 2018-11-21
    Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
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  15. added 2018-09-22
    Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
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  16. added 2018-09-22
    Pluralism in Probabilistic Justification.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - unknown
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  17. added 2018-08-20
    Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy.Diego E. Machuca (ed.) - 2011 - Springer.
    In recent years, there has been renewed interest in Pyrrhonism among both philosophers and historians of philosophy. This skeptical tradition is complex and multifaceted, since the Pyrrhonian arguments have been put into the service of different enterprises or been approached in relation to interests which are quite distinct. The diversity of conceptions and uses of Pyrrhonism accounts for the diversity of the challenges it is deemed to pose and of the attempts to meet them. The present volume brings together twelve (...)
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  18. added 2018-08-17
    Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):505-524.
    In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and resolving the “persistent interlocutor” problem. Though I find elements of Leite’s view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of (...)
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  19. added 2018-02-17
    Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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  20. added 2018-02-17
    30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  21. added 2017-08-21
    Epistemic Infinitism and the Conditional Character of Inferential Justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2313-2334.
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-29
    On Too Common Ground: Collective Circularity, the Sextus Mill Paradox, and a Problem of Infinite Regress.Margaret A. Cuonzo - unknown
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  23. added 2017-01-23
    The Emergence of Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):546-564.
    A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges from the chain as a whole. Nowhere however is it made clear what (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-23
    The Viciousness of Infinite Regresses.Claude Gratton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:25-29.
    Henry W. Johnstone (1996) attempts to use a notion of postponement to give a general account of viciousness of infinite regresses. Though some of his examples suggest that his notion applies to only beginningless regresses (...eRdRcRbRa), I will show that it also applies to endless ones (aRbRcRdRe...). Unfortunately, despite this expanded application, it does not apply to all vicious regresses, even to some of his own examples; it is cumbersome and unnecessary, and it fails to explain how some infinite regresses (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-22
    Peter Klein Joins Editorial Board.Stephan Kinsella - unknown
    Libertarian Papers is pleased to announce that Peter Klein, Associate Professor of Applied Social Sciences and Director of the McQuinn Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership at the University of Missouri, has joined the Editorial Board.
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  26. added 2017-01-17
    Foundationalism with Infinite Regresses of Probabilistic Support.William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3899-3917.
    There is a long-standing debate in epistemology on the structure of justification. Some recent work in formal epistemology promises to shed some new light on that debate. I have in mind here some recent work by David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, hereafter “A&P”, on infinite regresses of probabilistic support. A&P show that there are probability distributions defined over an infinite set of propositions {\ such that \ is probabilistically supported by \ for all i and \ has a high probability. (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-17
    Epistemology and the Regress Problem. [REVIEW]Eugen Huzum - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (3):467-469.
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  28. added 2017-01-17
    Infinitism and Practical Conditions on Justification.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):191-209.
    This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism. Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the correct theory.
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  29. added 2017-01-17
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-16
    Naive Infinitism : The Case for an Inconsistency Approach to Infinite Collections.Toby Meadows - unknown
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism.John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old, about its account of justification, reasoning, (...)
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Epistemology and the Regress Problem.Scott Aikin - 2010 - Routledge.
    In the last decade, the familiar problem of the regress of reasons has returned to prominent consideration in epistemology. And with the return of the problem, evaluation of the options available for its solution is begun anew. Reason’s regress problem, roughly put, is that if one has good reasons to believe something, one must have good reason to hold those reasons are good. And for those reasons, one must have further reasons to hold they are good, and so a regress (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    Meta-Epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):175-185.
    I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):333-341.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Infinitism Regained.J. Peijnenburg - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):597-602.
    Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition $E_{0}$ is made probable by $E_{1}$ which in turn is made probable by $E_{2}$ , which is made probable by $E_{3}$ , and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism.
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  36. added 2016-12-08
    From Vicious Circle to Infinite Regress, and Back Again.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:6-29.
    The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to The Scientific Image, is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. (...)
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  37. added 2016-09-19
    A Note Concerning Infinite Regresses of Deferred Justification.Paul Thorn - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):349-357.
    An agent’s belief in a proposition, E0, is justified by an infinite regress of deferred justification just in case the belief that E0 is justified, and the justification for believing E0 proceeds from an infinite sequence of propositions, E0, E1, E2, etc., where, for all n ≥ 0, En+1 serves as the justification for En. In a number of recent articles, Atkinson and Peijnenburg claim to give examples where a belief is justified by an infinite regress of deferred justification. I (...)
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  38. added 2016-05-16
    Review of "Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism", Edited by John Turri and Peter Klein. [REVIEW]Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):141-145.
    This is a review of Turri and Klein's "Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism".
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  39. added 2015-11-30
    THE BECOMING OF THE ULTIMATE TRUTH.Jayarajan Kurunghat - manuscript
    A short book meant to take honest and determined seekers to the Ultimate Truth.The reality about (our) ‘presence’ is that it is the becoming of the Ultimate Truth it self. -/- .
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  40. added 2015-11-18
    Scepticism and the Diversity of Epistemic Justification.I. T. Oakley - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):263-279.
    Sceptics have been accused of achieving their sceptical conclusions by an arbitrary (though usually implicit) redefinition of terms like “justified”, so that, while it may be true that no belief is justified in the sceptic’s new sense of the word, all the beliefs we have taken as justified remain so in the ordinary, standard meaning of the term. This paper defends scepticism against this charge. It is pointed out that there are several sorts of case where someone’s belief may be (...)
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  41. added 2015-08-26
    Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. [REVIEW]Brandon Beasley - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (1):194-196.
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  42. added 2015-08-26
    Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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  43. added 2015-03-24
    On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does (...)
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  44. added 2015-03-24
    The Need for Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):201-210.
    Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present (...)
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  45. added 2015-03-24
    Finite Reasons Without Foundations.Ted Poston - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):182-191.
    This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false (...)
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  46. added 2015-03-24
    Prospects for Moral Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):172-181.
    This article poses two regresses for justification of moral knowledge and discusses three models for moral epistemic infinitism that arise. There are moral infinitisms dependent on empirical infinitism, what are called “piggyback” moral infinitisms. There are substantive empiricist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of descriptive facts to justify normative rules. These empiricist infinitisms are developed either as infinitist egoisms or as infinitist sentimentalisms. And, finally, there are substantive rationalist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of normative reasons to justify moral rules. (...)
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  47. added 2015-03-24
    Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism.René Woudenberg & Ronald Meester - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):221-231.
    This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article (...)
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  48. added 2015-03-23
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  49. added 2015-03-23
    Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 140--149.
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  50. added 2015-03-21
    Infinitism and Probabilistic Justification.Benjamin Bewersdorf - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):691-699.
    According to infinitism, beliefs can be justified by an infinite chain of reasons. So far, infinitism has rarely been taken seriously and often even dismissed as inconsistent. However, Peijnenburg and Atkinson have recently argued that beliefs can indeed be justified by an infinite chain of reasons, if justification is understood probabilistically. In the following, I will discuss the formal result that has led to this conclusion. I will then introduce three probabilistic explications of justification and examine to which extent they (...)
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1 — 50 / 100