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  1. Intensional Expressions.Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - 1967 - Studia Logica 20 (1):63 - 86.
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  2. Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  3. Intensional Logic.George Bealer - 1996 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan. pp. 262-264.
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  4. Toward a New Theory of Content.George Bealer - 1994 - In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
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  5. What is Referential Opacity?J. M. Bell - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):155 - 180.
  6. The Pragmatics of Substitutivity.Jonathan Berg - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):355 - 370.
  7. Believing in Words.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  8. Opacity and Indefinite Terms.Spencer Carr - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (1):39 - 49.
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  9. Intentional Inexistence.Roderick Chisholm - 1976 - In L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Brentano. Duckworth.
  10. Structured Meanings.M. J. Cresswell - 1985 - MIT Press.
    Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.
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  11. Mates on Referential Opacity.F. Dagfinn - 1958 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (1-4):232 – 238.
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  12. “The Story Says That” Operator in Story Semantics.Charles B. Daniels - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (1):73-86.
    In [2] a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories — sets of sentences assembled under various constraints. Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories. A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s. A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world, whenever A is true, B is true. In this article the first-order language of [2] is extended by the addition (...)
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  13. Is Grounding a Hyperintensional Phenomenon.Michael J. Duncan, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    It is widely thought that grounding is a hyperintensional phenomenon. Unfortunately, the term ‘hyperintensionality’ has been doing double-duty, picking out two distinct phenomena. This paper clears up this conceptual confusion. We call the two resulting notions hyperintensionalityGRND and hyperintensionalityTRAD. While it is clear that grounding is hyperintensionalGRND, the interesting question is whether it is hyperintensionalTRAD. We argue that given well-accepted constraints on the logical form of grounding, to wit, that grounding is irreflexive and asymmetric, grounding is hyperintensionalTRAD only if one (...)
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  14. XII—A Plea for Opacity.P. J. FitzPatrick - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84 (1):211-222.
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  15. A Plea for Opacity.P. J. FitzPatrick - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:211 - 222.
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  16. The Linguistic Description of Opaque Contexts.Janet Dean Fodor - 1979 - Garland.
  17. Solving the Iteration Problem.Graeme Forbes - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (3):311 - 330.
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  18. The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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  19. Opacity, Inexistence and Intentionality.Anthony C. Genova - 1975 - Ratio 17 (December):237-246.
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  20. Opacity and the Ought-to-Be.Lou Goble - 1973 - Noûs 7 (4):407-412.
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  21. Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing.Jaakko Hintikka - 1969 - Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):4 - 8.
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  22. Identity, Intensionality, and Moore's Paradox.Dale Jacquette - 2000 - Synthese 123 (2):279 - 292.
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  23. Indirect Discourse: Parataxis, the Propositional Function Modification, and “That”.Michael Alan Johnson - 2009 - Aporia 19 (1):9-24.
    The purpose of this paper is to assess the general viability of Donald Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse, as well as the specific plausibility of a reincarnated form of the Davidsonian paratactic theory, Gary Kemp's propositional paratactic theory. To this end I will provide an introduction to the Davidsonian paratactic theory and the theory's putative strengths, thereafter noting that an argument from ambiguity seems to effectively undermine Davidson's proposal. Subsequently, I will argue that Kemp's modification of Davidson's theory – (...)
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  24. Opacity.David Kaplan - 1986 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court. pp. 229-289.
  25. Quantifying In.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
  26. Quantification and Opacity.Ali Akhtar Kazmi - 1987 - Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1):77 - 100.
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  27. Intentionality and Intensionality, Part I.William C. Kneale - 1968 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-90.
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  28. Oblique Contexts.Leonard Linsky - 1983 - University of Chicago Press.
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  29. Referential Opacity.Leonard Linsky - 1972 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 26 (99/100):130.
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  30. Semantics for Opaque Contexts.Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141-66.
    In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (...)
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  31. The Pragmatics of Attraction: Explaining Unquotation in Direct and Free Indirect Discourse.Emar Maier - forthcoming - In Paul Saka & Michael Johnson (eds.), The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
    The quotational theory of free indirect discourse postulates that pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted. But where does this unquotation come from? Based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children), I suggest a general pragmatic answer: unquotation is essentially a way to resolve a conflict that arises between two opposing constraints. On the one hand, the reporter wants to use indexicals that refer directly to the most salient speech (...)
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  32. Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa.Norman Malcolm - 1965 - Dialogue 3 (4):424-425.
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  33. The Source of Intensionality.Genoveva Marti - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:197-206.
    There are obvious differences between (1) Mary is talking to the Dean and (2) Mary is looking for the Dean. In (1) we can replace "the Dean" by any other coextensional term and preserve truth value; also, from (1) we can infer that there is someone Mary is talking to. Such behavior breaks down in (2): neither intersubstitution of coextensional terms nor existential generalization guarantee preservation of truth value in a sentence like (2). (1) is purely extensional; (2) is intensional.
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  34. On Disquotation and Intensionality.R. M. Martin - 1974 - Kant-Studien 65 (1-4):111-121.
  35. Intensionality and Perception: A Reply to Rosenberg.Mohan P. Matthen - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (December):727-733.
  36. No Belief Is Contingently True.Ari Maunu - 2003 - Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  37. Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2002 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  38. Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer.
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come (...)
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  39. Referential Opacity.Fabrizio Mondadori - 1995 - In Paolo Leonardi & Marco Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229--251.
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  40. That.Richard Montague & Donald Kalish - 1959 - Philosophical Studies 10 (4):54 - 61.
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  41. Intentionality, Intensionality, and the Psychological.Harold Morick - 1971 - Analysis 32 (December):39-44.
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  42. Intensionality and Boundedness.Glyn Morrill - 1990 - Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (6):699 - 726.
  43. Intensional Contexts.Michael Nelson - 2012 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International. pp. 125.
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  44. Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) - 2000 - Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
    The essays in this collection are by some of the leading figures in their fields and they touch on the most recent turnings in Quine's work.
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  45. Intensionality and Truth.Alex Orenstein - 1999 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):688-689.
  46. Paradox with Just Self-Reference.T. Parent - manuscript
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires diagonalization on substitution instances of a definition-scheme for the predicate "x is Lagadonian." (The term 'Lagadonian' is adapted from David Lewis). Briefly, a self-referring term is counted as “Lagadonian” if the initial variable in the schema is replaced with the term itself. But the same term is not counted as Lagadonian if this variable (...)
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  47. Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  48. Sameness and Referential Opacity in Aristotle.Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 1979 - Noûs 13 (3):283-311.
  49. Opacity and Self-Consciousness.Michael J. Pendlebury - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):243-251.
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  50. Constructions and Concepts.Jaroslav Peregrin - manuscript
    Some twenty years ago, semanticists of natural language came to be overwhelmed by the problem of semantic analysis of belief sentences (and sentences reporting other kinds of propositional attitudes): the trouble was that sentences of the shapes X believes that A and X believes that B appeared to be able to have different truth values even in cases when A and B shared the same intension, i.e. were, from the viewpoint of intensional semantics, synonymous 1 . Thus, taking intensional semantics (...)
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