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1 — 50 / 112
  1. added 2020-04-16
    The Myth of Occurrence-Based Semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.
    The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-07
    Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-16
    The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too.Justin DAmbrosio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-16
    An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth's Dagger.Justin D'Ambrosio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger. The puzzle of Macbeth's dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One of (...)
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  5. added 2019-07-16
    Non-Relational Intentionality.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2017 - Dissertation, Yale University
    This dissertation lays the foundation for a new theory of non-relational intentionality. The thesis is divided into an introduction and three main chapters, each of which serves as an essential part of an overarching argument. The argument yields, as its conclusion, a new account of how language and thought can exhibit intentionality intrinsically, so that representation can occur in the absence of some thing that is represented. The overarching argument has two components: first, that intentionality can be profi tably studied (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality, Intensionality, and the Psychological.Harold Morick - 1971 - Analysis 32 (2):39.
  7. added 2019-04-22
    Intensionality and Hyperintensionality.Daniel Nolan - 2019 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Routledge Encyclopedia entry on Intensionality and Hyperintensionality.
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  8. added 2019-03-09
    Dire et penser dans le principe psychologique de non-contradiction d'Aristote.Fabien Schang - 2005 - Public@Tions Electroniques de Philosophi@ Scienti@E.
    Un paralogisme semble commis dans la démonstration par Aristote du principe psychologique de non-contradiction : à partir d’un principe performatif d’assertion (dire quelque chose, c’est le croire), une approche moderne nous incline à prétendre qu’Aristote présuppose une transparence référentielle des contextes opaques de croyance afin de corréler les versions psychologique et logique. Nous tenterons de restituer la preuve du principe (I). Au moyen de la formalisation moderne, nous appliquerons cette explication à quelques paradoxes (II). Nous en conclurons la nature de (...)
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  9. added 2019-02-22
    Quine’s Poor Tom.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):5-16.
    Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.
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  10. added 2019-01-30
    A Sound Cartesian Argument From Doubt for Dualism.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):461-465.
    I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.
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  11. added 2018-08-12
    Operator Arguments Revisited.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, John Hawthorne & Peter Fritz - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2933-2959.
    Certain passages in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ are often taken to show that non-vacuous sentential operators associated with a certain parameter of sentential truth require a corresponding relativism concerning assertoric contents: namely, their truth values also must vary with that parameter. Thus, for example, the non-vacuity of a temporal sentential operator ‘always’ would require some of its operands to have contents that have different truth values at different times. While making no claims about Kaplan’s intentions, we provide several reconstructions of how such (...)
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  12. added 2018-06-01
    The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions.Ari Maunu - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):239-246.
    There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity to reach the conclusion, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI. My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that (...)
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  13. added 2018-06-01
    On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:241-248.
    There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even (...)
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  14. added 2018-04-17
    Names, Masks, and Double Vision.Michael Rieppel - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Cumming (2008) argues that his Masked Ball problem undermines Millianism, and that we must instead treat names as variables. However, although the Masked Ball does pose a problem for the Millian given a standard view about the meaning of `believes', that view faces difficulties for independent reasons. I develop a novel ``neo Kaplanian'' attitude semantics to address this problem, and go on to show that with this alternative semantics in hand, the Millian is quite capable of accounting for the Masked (...)
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  15. added 2018-04-04
    Binding Bound Variables in Epistemic Contexts.Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-31.
    Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke’s "objectual" interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries in the epistemic case. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields (...)
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  16. added 2018-03-09
    In the Mood.Kai Frederick Wehmeier - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):607-630.
    The purpose of the present paper is to challenge some received assumptions about the logical analysis of modal English, and to show that these assumptions are crucial to certain debates in current philosophy of language. Specifically, I will argue that the standard analysis in terms of quantified modal logic mistakenly fudges important grammatical distinctions, and that the validity of Kripke's modal argument against description theories of proper names crucially depends on ensuing equivocations.
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  17. added 2018-02-22
    The Arithmetization of Syntax and the New Paradoxes of Self-Reference.T. Parent - manuscript
    In this paper, I recreate a paradox from my earlier work (“Paradox with just self-reference”) albeit entirely within the language of arithmetic. The paradox might suggest that Robinson arithmetic and its extensions are unsound; however, I claim instead that the metalanguage may be to blame, owing to the lack of restrictions on the arithmetization of syntax. If so, then the moral would be to restrict arithmetization in the metalanguage somehow, rather than distrust the arithmetical theory in the object language.
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  18. added 2018-01-06
    Meaningless Beliefs and Mates's Problem.Roy A. Sorensen - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):169 - 182.
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  19. added 2018-01-06
    On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts.Robert C. Sleigh - 1967 - Noûs 1 (1):23-31.
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  20. added 2017-10-11
    Extensionality and Logicality.Gil Sagi - 2017 - Synthese:1-25.
    Tarski characterized logical notions as invariant under permutations of the domain. The outcome, according to Tarski, is that our logic, which is commonly said to be a logic of extension rather than intension, is not even a logic of extension—it is a logic of cardinality. In this paper, I make this idea precise. We look at a scale inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus of various levels of meaning: extensions, intensions and hyperintensions. On this scale, the lower the level of meaning, (...)
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  21. added 2017-10-11
    Ideology in a Desert Landscape.Alessandro Torza - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):383-406.
    On one influential view, metaphysical fundamentality can be understood in terms of joint‐carving. Ted Sider has recently argued that (i) some first order quantifier is joint‐carving, and (ii) modal notions are not joint‐carving. After vindicating the theoretical indispensability of quantification against recent criticism, I will defend a logical result due to Arnold Koslow which implies that (i) and (ii) are incompatible. I will therefore consider an alternative understanding of Sider's metaphysics to the effect that (i) some first order quantifier is (...)
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  22. added 2017-05-29
    Is Grounding a Hyperintensional Phenomenon?Michael Duncan, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):297-329.
    It is widely thought that grounding is a hyperintensional phenomenon. Unfortunately, the term ‘hyperintensionality’ has been doing double-duty, picking out two distinct phenomena. This paper clears up this conceptual confusion. We call the two resulting notions hyperintensionalityGRND and hyperintensionalityTRAD. While it is clear that grounding is hyperintensionalGRND, the interesting question is whether it is hyperintensionalTRAD. We argue that given well-accepted constraints on the logical form of grounding, to wit, that grounding is irreflexive and asymmetric, grounding is hyperintensionalTRAD only if one (...)
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  23. added 2017-04-29
    The Linguistic Description of Opaque Contexts.Janet Dean Fodor - 1970 - Garland.
  24. added 2017-02-08
    Fictional Contexts and Referential Opacity.L. A. Whitt - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):327 - 338.
    Quantified modal logic and propositional attitudes have long been regarded as sites susceptible to referential opacity — that curious affliction first diagnosed by Quine. In this paper I suggest a way of alleviating the symptoms of referential opacity as they manifest themselves in fictional contexts, contexts in which we are confronted by discourse about fiction. Indeed, a case might be made against Quine that it is fictional, rather than quotational, contexts which are the referentially opaque contexts par excellence. For whether (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-08
    Imperatives and Referential Opacity.Ernest Sosa - 1966 - Analysis 27 (2):49 - 52.
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  26. added 2017-02-01
    Truth-Functionality and Referential Opacity.Richard Sharvy - 1970 - Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):5 - 9.
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  27. added 2017-01-29
    Some Problems of Intensionality.M. G. Yoes - 1965 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
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  28. added 2017-01-23
    Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-23
    Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Alex Orenstein - 1999 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):688-689.
    This is an excellent exposition of Arthur Prior’s views on propositional attitudes and truth. It is also an interpretation and defense of these views. Prior’s work on propositional attitudes was collected by Peter Geach and Anthony Kenny and then published posthumously under the title Objects of Thought.
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  30. added 2017-01-23
    On Disquotation and Intensionality.R. M. Martin - 1974 - Kant-Studien 65 (1-4):111-121.
  31. added 2017-01-22
    A Plea for Opacity.P. J. FitzPatrick - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:211 - 222.
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  32. added 2017-01-22
    Rundle on Referential Opacity.M. T. Thornton - 1969 - Analysis 29 (4):125 - 128.
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  33. added 2017-01-22
    Opacity and Tridency.Jon Wheatley - 1968 - Analysis 28 (6):203 - 206.
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  34. added 2017-01-22
    The Opacity of Tridence.John Woods - 1967 - Analysis 28 (2):43 - 48.
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  35. added 2017-01-20
    Mates on Referential Opacity.F. Dagfinn - 1958 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (1-4):232 – 238.
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  36. added 2017-01-19
    Descriptive Opacity.B. H. Slater - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (2):167 - 181.
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  37. added 2017-01-19
    Epistemic Opacity Again.David Widerker - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):355 - 358.
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  38. added 2017-01-19
    Epistemic Opacity Again.Eddy M. Zemach - 1973 - Philosophia 3 (1):33-41.
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  39. added 2017-01-19
    Referential Opacity.Alan Reeves - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271 – 289.
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  40. added 2017-01-18
    Intensionality and Boundedness.Glyn Morrill - 1990 - Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (6):699 - 726.
  41. added 2017-01-18
    Sameness and Referential Opacity in Aristotle.Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 1979 - Noûs 13 (3):283-311.
  42. added 2017-01-16
    XII—A Plea for Opacity.P. J. FitzPatrick - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84 (1):211-222.
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  43. added 2017-01-16
    Criteria of Intensionality.J. O. Urmson & Jonathan Cohen - 1968 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 42 (1):107-142.
  44. added 2016-12-08
    Self-Knowledge and Embedded Operators.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):202-209.
    Queen Anne is dead, and it is a fallacy to substitute a definite description for another designator of the same object in stating the content of someone’s propositional attitudes. The fallacy can take subtle forms, as when Godel’s incompleteness theorems are used to argue against mechanistic views of mind. Some instances of the fallacy exemplify a more general logical phenomenon: the set of principles satisfied by one sentential operator can differ from, and even contradict, the set of principles satisfied by (...)
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  45. added 2016-08-02
    Referential Opacity.Fabrizio Mondadori - 1995 - In Paolo Leonardi & Marco Santambrogio (eds.), On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229--251.
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  46. added 2016-05-12
    Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse (232):527-534.
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...)
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  47. added 2016-05-11
    The Iconicity of Metarepresentations.François Recanati - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Meta-Representations: a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press. pp. 311-360.
  48. added 2016-05-11
    Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation.Francois Recanati - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." -/- In this book François Recanati discusses the structure of metarepresentation from a variety of perspectives. According to him, metarepresentations have a dual structure: their content includes the content of the object-representation (people reading books) as well as the (...)
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  49. added 2016-05-03
    The Pragmatics of Attraction: Explaining Unquotation in Direct and Free Indirect Discourse.Emar Maier - forthcoming - In Paul Saka & Michael Johnson (eds.), The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
    The quotational theory of free indirect discourse postulates that pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted. But where does this unquotation come from? Based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children), I suggest a general pragmatic answer: unquotation is essentially a way to resolve a conflict that arises between two opposing constraints. On the one hand, the reporter wants to use indexicals that refer directly to the most salient speech (...)
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  50. added 2016-03-15
    Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing.Jaakko Hintikka - 1969 - Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):4 - 8.
1 — 50 / 112