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  1. Paradox with Just Self-Reference.T. Parent - manuscript
    If a semantically open language has no constraints on self-reference, one can prove an absurdity. The argument utilizes co-referring names 'a0' and 'a1', and the definition of a functional expression 'The reflection of x = y'. The definition enables a type of self-reference without deploying any semantic terminology--yet given that a0= a1, the definition implies the that 'a0' = 'a1', which is absurd. In truth, however, 'the reflection of x = y' expresses an ill-defined function. And since there is a (...)
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  2. Tense and Intensionality in Specificational Copular Sentences.Maribel Romero - manuscript
    Specificational sentences show Connectivity Effects (Akmajian 1970, Higgins 1979, Halvorsen 1978, Jacobson 1994, among others). For example, an NP like no man embedded in a relative clause in general cannot bind a pronoun outside the relative clause, as illustrated in (3a); but in specificational copular sentences this binding is possible, as in (3b). This effect is called Variable Binding Connectivity. Similarly, the NP a unicorn cannot be interpreted de dicto with respect to the embedded verb look for in (4a); but (...)
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  3. An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger.Justin D’Ambrosio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-38.
    In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger. The puzzle of Macbeth's dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One of (...)
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  4. The Myth of Occurrence-Based Semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-25.
    The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims (...)
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  5. Binding Bound Variables in Epistemic Contexts.Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-31.
    Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke’s "objectual" interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries in the epistemic case. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields (...)
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  6. Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of hyperintensionality is provided. Hyperintensional languages have expressions with meanings that are more fine-grained than necessary equivalence. That is, the expressions may necessarily co-apply and yet be distinct in meaning. Adequately accounting for theories cast in hyperintensional languages is important in the philosophy of language; the philosophy of mind; metaphysics; and elsewhere. This entry presents a number of areas in which hyperintensionality is important; a range of approaches to theorising about hyperintensional matters; and a range of debates that (...)
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  7. The many-property problem is your problem, too.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832.
    The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the (...)
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  8. Quine’s Poor Tom.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):5-16.
    Section 31 of Quine's Word and Object contains an eyebrow-raising argument, purporting to show that if an agent, Tom, believes one truth and one falsity and has some basic logical acumen, and if belief contexts are always transparent, then Tom believes everything. Over the decades this argument has been debated inconclusively. In this paper I clarify the situation and show that the trouble stems from bad presentation on Quine’s part.
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  9. The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions.Ari Maunu - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):239-246.
    There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity to reach the conclusion, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI. My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that (...)
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  10. Intensionality and Hyperintensionality.Daniel Nolan - 2019 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Routledge Encyclopedia entry on Intensionality and Hyperintensionality.
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  11. Operator Arguments Revisited.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri, John Hawthorne & Peter Fritz - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2933-2959.
    Certain passages in Kaplan’s ‘Demonstratives’ are often taken to show that non-vacuous sentential operators associated with a certain parameter of sentential truth require a corresponding relativism concerning assertoric contents: namely, their truth values also must vary with that parameter. Thus, for example, the non-vacuity of a temporal sentential operator ‘always’ would require some of its operands to have contents that have different truth values at different times. While making no claims about Kaplan’s intentions, we provide several reconstructions of how such (...)
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  12. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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  13. On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:241-248.
    There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even (...)
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  14. A Sound Cartesian Argument From Doubt for Dualism.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):461-465.
    I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.
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  15. Knowing the Facts: A Contrastivist Account of the Referential Opacity of Knowledge Attributions.Giorgio Volpe - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Cham: Palgrave. pp. 401-420.
    The view that propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts is prima facie rather appealing, especially for realistically minded philosophers, but it is difficult to square with the referential opacity of knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows that p’. For how could Lois Lane know that Superman can fly and ignore that Clark Kent can fly if knowledge is a two-place relation between an agent and a fact and the fact that Superman can fly just is the fact that Clark (...)
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  16. Non-Relational Intentionality.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2017 - Dissertation, Yale University
    This dissertation lays the foundation for a new theory of non-relational intentionality. The thesis is divided into an introduction and three main chapters, each of which serves as an essential part of an overarching argument. The argument yields, as its conclusion, a new account of how language and thought can exhibit intentionality intrinsically, so that representation can occur in the absence of some thing that is represented. The overarching argument has two components: first, that intentionality can be profi tably studied (...)
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  17. Is Grounding a Hyperintensional Phenomenon?Michael Duncan, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):297-329.
    It is widely thought that grounding is a hyperintensional phenomenon. Unfortunately, the term ‘hyperintensionality’ has been doing double-duty, picking out two distinct phenomena. This paper clears up this conceptual confusion. We call the two resulting notions hyperintensionalityGRND and hyperintensionalityTRAD. While it is clear that grounding is hyperintensionalGRND, the interesting question is whether it is hyperintensionalTRAD. We argue that given well-accepted constraints on the logical form of grounding, to wit, that grounding is irreflexive and asymmetric, grounding is hyperintensionalTRAD only if one (...)
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  18. Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory Part 2: Indexicals and Vagueness.Anna Mahtani - 2017 - Lse Philosophy Blog.
    In her second post in this series, Anna Mahtani explores the parallels between philosophy of language and decision theory’s treatment of indexicals and vagueness.
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  19. The Pragmatics of Attraction: Explaining Unquotation in Direct and Free Indirect Discourse.Emar Maier - 2017 - In Paul Saka & Michael Johnson (eds.), The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
    The quotational theory of free indirect discourse postulates that pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted. But where does this unquotation come from? Based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children), I suggest a general pragmatic answer: unquotation is essentially a way to resolve a conflict that arises between two opposing constraints. On the one hand, the reporter wants to use indexicals that refer directly to the most salient speech (...)
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  20. Names, Masks, and Double Vision.Michael Rieppel - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Cumming (2008) argues that his Masked Ball problem undermines Millianism, and that we must instead treat names as variables. However, although the Masked Ball does pose a problem for the Millian given a standard view about the meaning of `believes', that view faces difficulties for independent reasons. I develop a novel ``neo Kaplanian'' attitude semantics to address this problem, and go on to show that with this alternative semantics in hand, the Millian is quite capable of accounting for the Masked (...)
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  21. Extensionality and Logicality.Gil Sagi - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 5):1-25.
    Tarski characterized logical notions as invariant under permutations of the domain. The outcome, according to Tarski, is that our logic, which is commonly said to be a logic of extension rather than intension, is not even a logic of extension—it is a logic of cardinality. In this paper, I make this idea precise. We look at a scale inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus of various levels of meaning: extensions, intensions and hyperintensions. On this scale, the lower the level of meaning, (...)
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  22. Ideology in a Desert Landscape.Alessandro Torza - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):383-406.
    On one influential view, metaphysical fundamentality can be understood in terms of joint‐carving. Ted Sider has recently argued that (i) some first order quantifier is joint‐carving, and (ii) modal notions are not joint‐carving. After vindicating the theoretical indispensability of quantification against recent criticism, I will defend a logical result due to Arnold Koslow which implies that (i) and (ii) are incompatible. I will therefore consider an alternative understanding of Sider's metaphysics to the effect that (i) some first order quantifier is (...)
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  23. Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer.
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come (...)
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  24. A Problem for a Logic of 'Because'.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (1):46-49.
    A problem is raised for the introduction rules proposed in Benjamin Schnieder’s ‘A logic for “because”’, arising in connection with (a) inferences that the rules should not, but do, validate and (b) inferences that the rules should, but do not, validate.
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  25. Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse (232):527-534.
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic theory he (...)
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  26. Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  27. Intensional Contexts.Michael Nelson - 2012 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International. pp. 125.
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  28. De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge.Erich Rast - 2012 - Analysis and Metaphysics 11:106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...)
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  29. Representing Unicorns: How to Think About Intensionality.Mark Sainsbury - 2012 - In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications.
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation (...)
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  30. Coreference and Meaning.N. Ángel Pinillos - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):301 - 324.
    Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, 'he' and 'John' in 'John went to the store and he bought some milk'. Let us call this 'de jure' coreference. Other times, coreference is 'de facto' as with 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' in a sincere use of 'Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens'. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that (...)
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  31. Paradoxes of Intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
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  32. Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth.Paul Saka - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):125-135.
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want (...)
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  33. Indirect Discourse: Parataxis, the Propositional Function Modification, and “That”.Michael Alan Johnson - 2009 - Aporia 19 (1):9-24.
    The purpose of this paper is to assess the general viability of Donald Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse, as well as the specific plausibility of a reincarnated form of the Davidsonian paratactic theory, Gary Kemp's propositional paratactic theory. To this end I will provide an introduction to the Davidsonian paratactic theory and the theory's putative strengths, thereafter noting that an argument from ambiguity seems to effectively undermine Davidson's proposal. Subsequently, I will argue that Kemp's modification of Davidson's theory – (...)
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  34. The Puzzle of Free Indirect Discourse.Yael Sharvit - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):353-395.
    The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the familiar puzzle of free indirect discourse (FID). FID shares some properties with standard indirect discourse and with direct discourse, but there is currently no known theory that can accommodate such a hybrid. Based on the observation that FID has ‘de se’ pronouns, I argue that it is a kind of an attitude report.
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  35. Searle's Derivation of Promissory Obligation.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2007 - In Intentional Acts and Insitutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology. Springer.
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  36. The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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  37. Concepts, Intension, and Identity in Tibetan Philosophy of Language.Jonathan Stoltz - 2006 - Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29 (2):383-400.
    This article examines one highly localized set of developments to the Buddhist doctrine of word meaning that was made by twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists primarily schooled at gSaṅ phu Monastery in central Tibet. I will show how these thinkers developed the notion of a concept (don spyi) in order to explain how it is that words are capable of applying to real objects, and how concepts can be used to capture elements of word meaning extending beyond reference (...)
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  38. Possible Intensionality of the Verb Phrase Position.Richard Zuber - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):255–256.
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  39. Dire et penser dans le principe psychologique de non-contradiction d'Aristote.Fabien Schang - 2005 - Public@Tions Electroniques de Philosophi@ Scienti@E.
    Un paralogisme semble commis dans la démonstration par Aristote du principe psychologique de non-contradiction : à partir d’un principe performatif d’assertion (dire quelque chose, c’est le croire), une approche moderne nous incline à prétendre qu’Aristote présuppose une transparence référentielle des contextes opaques de croyance afin de corréler les versions psychologique et logique. Nous tenterons de restituer la preuve du principe (I). Au moyen de la formalisation moderne, nous appliquerons cette explication à quelques paradoxes (II). Nous en conclurons la nature de (...)
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  40. How to Get Intentionality by Language.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - In G. Forrai & G. Kampis (eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi. pp. 127-141.
    One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality—the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess—contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I (...)
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  41. Précis of *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation.François Recanati - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):237-247.
    A summary of my book *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta*, published by MIT Press in 2000 ('Representation and Mind' series).
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  42. In the Mood.Kai Frederick Wehmeier - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):607-630.
    The purpose of the present paper is to challenge some received assumptions about the logical analysis of modal English, and to show that these assumptions are crucial to certain debates in current philosophy of language. Specifically, I will argue that the standard analysis in terms of quantified modal logic mistakenly fudges important grammatical distinctions, and that the validity of Kripke's modal argument against description theories of proper names crucially depends on ensuing equivocations.
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  43. No Belief Is Contingently True.Ari Maunu - 2003 - Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  44. Belief Ascription, Simulation, and Opacity.François Recanati - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (2):223-237.
  45. Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2002 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  46. Intelligibility and Intensionality.David S. Oderberg - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):171-178.
    A common argumentative strategy employed by anti-reductionists involves claiming that one kind of entity cannot be identified with or reduced to a second because what can intelligibly be predicated of one cannot be predicated intelligibly of the other. For instance, it might be argued that mind and brain are not identical because it makes sense to say that minds are rational but it does not make sense to say that brains are rational. The scope and power of this kind of (...)
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  47. Opacity and Self-Consciousness.Michael Pendlebury - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):243-251.
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  48. A Plea for Monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
    Kaplan claims in Demonstratives that no operator may manipulate the context of evaluation of natural language indexicals. We show that this is not so. In fact, attitude reports always manipulate a context parameter (or, rather, a context variable). This is shown by (i) the existence of De Se readings of attitude reports in English (which Kaplan has no account for), and (ii) the existence of a variety of indexicals across languages whose point of evaluation can be shifted, but only in (...)
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  49. Meaningless Beliefs and Mates's Problem.Roy A. Sorensen - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):169 - 182.
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  50. Believing in Words.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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