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  1. Metacognition for Dropping and Reconsidering Intentions ∗.Michael L. Anderson & Don Perlis - unknown
    In this paper, we present a meta-cognitive approach for dropping and reconsidering intentions, wherein concurrent actions and results are allowed, in the framework of the time-sensitive and contradiction-tolerant active logic.
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  2. Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning.Robert Audi - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):361-378.
    This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The (...)
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  3. Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention.Bruce Aune - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
  4. The Intentionality of Intentions.Annette C. Baier - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):389 - 414.
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  5. Act and Intent.Annette C. Baier - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):648-658.
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  6. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  7. XV*-Two Problems About Human Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309-326.
  8. The Role of Beliefs in Goal Dynamics: Prolegomena to a Constructive Theory of Intentions.Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):237-263.
    In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. (...)
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  9. Action, Intention, and Reason.Alan Dutton - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (3):191-192.
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  10. Reasons for Forming an Intention: A Reply to Pink.Stewart Goetz - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):205-213.
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  11. Towards a Theory of Intention Revision.Wiebe van Der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge - 2007 - Synthese 155 (2):265 - 290.
    Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely (...)
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  12. Intention Detecting.Richard Holton - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.
    Crispin Wright has argued that our concept of intention is extension-determining, and that this explains why we are so good at knowing our intentions: it does so by subverting the idea that we detect them. This paper has two aims. The first is to make sense of Wright's claim that intention is extension-determining; this is achieved by comparing his position to that of analytic functionalism. The second is to show that it doesn't follow from this that we do not detect (...)
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  13. Evaluating New Options in the Context of Existing Plans.J. F. Horty & M. E. Pollack - unknown
    This paper contributes to the foundations of a theory of rational choice for artificial agents in dynamic environments. Our work is developed within a theoretical framework, originally due to Bratman, that models resource-bounded agents as operating against the background of some current set of intentions, which helps to frame their subsequent reasoning. In contrast to the standard theory of rational choice, where options are evaluated in isolation, we therefore provide an analysis of situations in which the options presented to an (...)
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  14. Halfhearted Action and Control.Shepherd Joshua - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  15. Halfhearted Action and Control.Shepherd Joshua - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  16. So You Thought the Intentions Model Was Simple? Cognitive Style and the Specification of Entrepreneurial Intentions Models.Norris F. Krueger Jr & Jill Kickul - manuscript
    Intentions are central to entrepreneurial thinking and thus entrepreneurial action. We understand the critical antecedents of intentions, yet have not explored the pathways by which entrepreneurs arrive at this intent. In specific, how does a relatively stable measure of cognitive style influence nascent entrepreneurs' development of their intentionality? Not just differences in intentions but differences in the model itself. We examine the complex interaction of cognitive style with entrepreneurial intentions, finding evidence there are indeed multiple pathways to entrepreneurial intent. In (...)
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  17. A Logic of Intention and Attempt.Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):45 - 77.
    We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.
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  18. In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
    A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that (...)
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  19. Practical Intersubjectivity.Abraham Roth - 2003 - In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91. pp. 65-91.
    The intentions of others often enter into your practical reasoning, even when you’re acting on your own. Given all the agents around you, you’ll come to grief if what they’re up to is never a consideration in what you decide to do and how you do it. There are occasions, however, when the intentions of another figure in your practical reasoning in a particularly intimate and decisive fashion. I will speak of there being on such occasions a practical intersubjectivity of (...)
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  20. Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.
    Accepting a promise is normatively significant in that it helps to secure promissory obligation. But what is it for B to accept A’s promise to φ? It is in part for B to intend A’s φ-ing. Thinking of acceptance in this way allows us to appeal to the distinctive role of intentions in practical reasoning and action to better understand the agency exercised by the promisee. The proposal also accounts for rational constraints on acceptance, and the so-called directedness of promissory (...)
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  21. Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
  22. Michael Bratman.Taking Plans Seriously - 2001 - In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press.
  23. Two Problems for Accepting as Intending.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):626-641.
    It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.
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