This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

732 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 732
  1. The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511-531.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Action and Purpose. [REVIEW]Raziel Abelson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):178-192.
  3. The Theoretical and the Practical.E. M. Adams - 1959 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):642 - 662.
  4. Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic.F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):268-276.
  5. Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  6. Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   57 citations  
  7. Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra.Frederick Adams - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View.Frederick Adams - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   41 citations  
  9. The Role of Intention in Intentional Action.Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  10. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  11. Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) - 2010 - Bradford.
    The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases.Mark Alfano, James Beebe & Brian Robinson - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  14. André Malraux: The Commitment to Action in 'La Condition Humaine'.Derek Allan - 1988 - In Harold Bloom (ed.), André Malraux's Man's Fate. Chelsea House.
    Discusses the function of action in Malraux's third and most famous novel.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. An Action-Plan Interpretation of Purposive Explanations of Actions.William P. Alston - 1986 - Theory and Decision 20 (3):275-299.
  16. Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):293-305.
    This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  17. Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  18. Agents, Actions and Reasons.Maria Alvarez - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (1):45-58.
  19. Figuring Out How to Proceed with Evaluation After Figuring Out What Matters.Chrisoula Andreou - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (4):621-637.
    I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Agency and Awareness.Chrisoula Andreou - 2013 - Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. The Causation of Action.G. E. M. Anscombe - 2011 - In Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.), Human life, action and ethics: essays by GEM Anscombe. Andrews UK. pp. 89-108.
  22. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe Volume Two.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1981 - Blackwell.
  23. Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   321 citations  
  24. Attributions of Intentional Action.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Taylor, Richard: "Action and Purpose".D. M. Armstrong - 1966 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44:231.
  26. Praise, Blame and the Whole Self.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  27. Human Action and Intentional Action: A Non Mentalist View.Valérie Aucouturier - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Action, Intention, and Reason.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cornell University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Audi develops a general theory of action ranging from the nature of action and action-explanation to free and rational action.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  29. Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention.Bruce Aune - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
  30. The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action.Matthew Babb - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):439-457.
    Cappelen and Dever challenge the widely accepted idea that some key aspect of intentional action is essentially indexical. They argue that the classical arguments for this coming from Perry are in fact arguments for a different phenomenon: the opacity of explanatory contexts. I agree with Cappelen and Dever that what Perry says about the ineliminability of indexical terms from explanations of intentional action fails to amount to an argument for this indexicality being essential. But this should not lead us to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. Under the Guise of the Good: Kant and a Tenet of Moral Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - forthcoming - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. de Gruyter.
  32. “Responsibility for Action”.Carla Bagnoli - 2010 - Paradigmi 27 (1):75-86.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Action Theory.Annette Baier - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  34. The Search for Basic Actions.Annette Baier - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):161 - 170.
  35. Making Sense of Human Behavior: Action Parsing and Intentional Inference.Jodie A. Baird & Dare A. Baldwin - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 193--206.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  36. Deliberators Must Be Imperfect.Derek Clayton Baker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):321-347.
    This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do. Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.M. Balaguer - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):447-452.
  38. Foresight and Responsibility.Thomas Baldwin - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (209):347 - 360.
    Where a man foresaw that through its consequences his action would violate a law, is he for that reason to be judged responsible for the violation of the law? The principle that such a man is responsible, and thus that foresight is sufficient for responsibility, has long been accepted in both legal and moral theory. But in recent years anxieties about this principle have been expressed by both philosophers and lawyers. What one commonly finds in older books, both legal and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Driving a Vehicle as a Course of Practical Action.Mike Ball - 2005 - Communication and Cognition. Monographies 38 (3-4):249-280.
  40. Ibn Sina and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality.Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino - 2004 - Philosophy East and West 54 (1):71-82.
    : The concepts of intention and intentionality were particularly significant notions within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic medieval philosophical traditions, and they regained philosophical importance in the twentieth century. The theories of intention and intentionality of the medieval Islamic philosopher and physician Ibn Sina and the phenomenological philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl are examined, compared, and contrasted here, showing that Ibn Sina's conception of intention is naturalistic and, in its naturalism, is influenced by the medical professional culture to which Ibn (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Thought and Action.S. F. Barker & Stuart Hampshire - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (3):392.
  42. George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action. [REVIEW]Gerald Barnes - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10:212-216.
  43. George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action Reviewed By.Gerald W. Barnes - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (5):212-216.
  44. Action.Winston H. F. Barnes - 1941 - Mind 50 (199):243-257.
  45. Intention, Motive and Responsibility.Winston Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones - 1945 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:230-288.
  46. Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will: A Semantic Approach.Tomas Barrero - 2010 - Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
    This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.Peter Brian Barry - manuscript
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Intentional Action, Causation, and Deviance.Peter Brian Barry - manuscript
    It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
    Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   53 citations  
  50. Intentional Action.David Paul Behan - 1967 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 732