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1 — 50 / 774
  1. added 2020-08-04
    Verbal Slips and the Intentionality of Skills.John M. Monteleone - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    Many have thought that exercises of skill are intentional. The argument of the paper is that this thesis fails to account for important types of mistakes and errors. In what psychologists and linguists call “verbal slips with semantic bias”, a speaker mistakenly switches, reverses, or blends certain conceptual contents. Nevertheless, the speaker has successfully exercised an intellectual skill, insofar as her slip uses concepts in conformity to semantic and logical rules. To flesh out how one might successfully exercise skills without (...)
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  2. added 2020-07-13
    Alienation or Regress: On the Non-Inferential Character of Agential Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Paul (2009a) hold that it is inferential, others like O’Brien (2007) and Setiya (2007, 2009, 2008) argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only (...)
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  3. added 2020-07-02
    Intentional Action Without Knowledge.Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele & David Rose - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    In order to be doing something intentionally, must one know that one is doing it? Some philosophers have answered yes. Our aim is to test a version of this knowledge thesis, what we call the Knowledge/Awareness Thesis, or KAT. KAT states that an agent is doing something intentionally only if he knows that he is doing it or is aware that he is doing it. Here, using vignettes featuring skilled action and vignettes featuring habitual action, we provide evidence that, in (...)
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  4. added 2020-07-01
    Social Ontology. Emotional Sharing as the Foundation of Care Relationships.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - In S. Bourgault & E. Pulcini, Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peeters.
    Scheler’s theory that emotional sharing underlies social ontology, which was already presented in the first edition of Sympathiebuch in 1913, made a comeback in Formalismus. Sharing one’s feelings and emotions is the reason behind various “forms of being-with-one-another [Miteinandersein] and co-living-with-one-another [Miteinaderleben], in which the corresponding forms of social unit constitute themselves” [GW II, 515, my translation]. Scheler thus lays the foundation for a general theory of social ontology: There is a theory of all the possible social essential units [Wesenseinheiten]. (...)
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  5. added 2020-06-24
    Unintended Morally Determinative Aspects (UMDAs): Moral Absolutes, Moral Acts and Physical Features in Sexual and Reproductive Ethics.Anthony McCarthy - 2015 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 51:47-65.
    Catholic sexual ethics proposes a number of exceptionless moral norms. This distinguishes it from theories which deny the possibility of any exceptionless moral norms (e.g. the proportionalist approach proposed in the aftermath of "Humanae Vitae" and condemned in "Veritatis Splendor"). I argue that Catholic teaching on sexual ethics refers to chosen physical structures in such a way as to make ‘new natural law’ theory inherently unstable. I outline a theory of “the moral act” (Veritatis Splendor 78) which emphasises the place (...)
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  6. added 2020-06-16
    Intentional Side-Effects of Action.Jonathan Webber & Robin Scaife - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):179-203.
    Recent empirical research into the folk classification of the outcomes of actions as intentional is usually taken to show that such classification has an irreducibly normative dimension. Various interpretations of the experimental data have in common the claim that whether the side-effect of an action counts as intentional depends on some normative valence of that side-effect.1 This is the way that Joshua Knobe, for example, whose experimental research started this debate, understands the data. Some critics of this view claim the (...)
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  7. added 2020-06-01
    Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe Effect.Gustav Lymer & Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (4):673-694.
    In “Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language” (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects’ responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent’s intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-28
    Intentions, Intending and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2).
    Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls Non-Inferential Weak Cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
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  9. added 2020-04-15
    Events, Processes, and the Time of a Killing.Yair Levy - 2020 - Ratio 33 (3):138-144.
    The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of the time of a killing (ToK), which persistently besets theories of act-individuation. The solution proposed claims to expose a crucial wrong-headed assumption in the debate, according to which ToK is essentially a problem of locating some event that corresponds to the killing. The alternative proposal put forward here turns on recognizing a separate category of dynamic occurents, viz. processes. The paper does not aim to mount a comprehensive defense of process (...)
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  10. added 2020-04-13
    The Developmental Profile of Temporal Binding: From Childhood to Adulthood.Sara Lorimer, Teresa McCormack, Emma Blakey, David A. Lagnado, Christoph Hoerl, Emma Tecwyn & Marc J. Buehner - forthcoming - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
    Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6-7-, 7-8-, and 9-10- years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgments about the time interval between i) their button press and a rocket launch, and ii) a non-causal (...)
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  11. added 2020-03-31
    Can the Mind Wander Intentionally?Samuel Murray & Kristina Krasich - unknown - Mind and Language:1-22.
    Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-12
    Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.Hugh J. McCann - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):1008-1010.
  13. added 2020-02-12
    Analytical Philosophy of Action.Lawrence H. Davis - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):99-107.
  14. added 2020-02-02
    Entitlement to Reasons for Action.Abraham Roth - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility vol. 4. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 75-92.
    The reasons for which I act are normally my reasons; I represent goal states and the means to attaining them, and these guide me in action. Can your reason ever be the reason why I act? If I haven’t yet taken up your reason and made it mine by representing it for myself, then it may seem mysterious how this could be possible. Nevertheless, the paper argues that sometimes one is entitled to another’s reason and that what one does is (...)
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  15. added 2020-01-19
    Unconscious Goals: Specific or Unspecific? The Potential Harm of the Goal/Gene Analogy.Bence Nanay - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):152-153.
    Huang and Bargh’s definition of goals is ambiguous between ‘specific goals’ – the end-state of a token action I am about to perform – and ‘unspecific goals’ – the end-state of an action-type (without specifying how this would be achieved). The analogy with selfish genes pushes the authors towards the former interpretation, but the latter would provide a more robust theoretical framework.
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  16. added 2019-12-19
    Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. Routledge.
    This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude intellectualism—offers an attractive set of (...)
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  17. added 2019-12-02
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
  18. added 2019-11-20
    Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg.Kirk Ludwig - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):125-146.
    Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole (...)
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  19. added 2019-11-17
    Double Effect & Ectopic Pregnancy – Some Problems.Michal Pruski - 2019 - Catholic Medical Quarterly 69 (2):17-20.
    This paper looks at the Catholic justification of medical interventions in ectopic pregnancies. The paper first shows that the way how Double Effect Reasoning is often applied to ectopic pregnancies is not consistent with the way Aquinas introduces this mode of reasoning. The paper then shows certain problems in common defences of the use of salpingectomies. The paper then re-evaluates the medical interventions used in the management of ectopic pregnancies, with both a focus on the aim of the treatment and (...)
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  20. added 2019-10-25
    The Myth of Mere Movement.Chauncey Maher - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1177-1193.
    Since Wilfrid Sellars’s “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” the myth of the Given has been central to philosophical discussions of perceptual experience and knowledge. In its most prominent form, the idea of the Given is the idea that perceptual experience can rationally support one’s thoughts but has no conceptual content. Now, intentional action is widely thought to be the structural complement of perceptual experience; via perceptual experience, the world impresses itself on the mind; via intentional action, the mind impresses (...)
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  21. added 2019-10-18
    The Problem of Action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):157-162.
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  22. added 2019-10-10
    Disjunctivism About Intending.Yair Levy - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    The overwhelmingly predominant view in philosophy sees intending as a mental state, specifically a plan-like state. This paper rejects the predominant view in favour of a starkly opposed novel alternative. After criticizing both the predominant Bratman-esque view of intention, and an alternative view inspired by Michael Thompson, the paper proceeds to set out and defend the idea that acting with an intention to V should be understood disjunctively, as (roughy) either one’s V-ing intentionally or one’s performing some kind of failed (...)
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  23. added 2019-10-06
    Agents in Action.Ralf Stoecker - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):21-42.
    I offer a justification for the received view that the characteristic feature of agents is to be found in the particular way their behaviour is explainable. Agents are people who have acquired three skills: (i) to act in accordance with inner or public deliberation; (ii) to do many things almost as if they had deliberated; and (iii) to recognize situations where it is worthwhile to switch from the second to the first skill. We can therefore assume that agents behave as (...)
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  24. added 2019-10-02
    Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - forthcoming - Mind:fzz056.
    Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Davidson , several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on general (...)
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  25. added 2019-09-15
    The No Act Objection: Act‐Consequentialism and Coordination Games.Simon Rosenqvist - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):179-189.
    Coordination games show that all individuals can do what is right according to act‐consequentialism, even if they do not bring about the best outcome as a group. This creates two problems for act‐consequentialism. First, it cannot accommodate the intuition that there is some moral failure in these cases. Second, its formulation as a criterion of rightness conflicts with the underlying act‐consequentialist concern that the best outcome is brought about. The collectivist view solves these problems by holding that any group of (...)
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  26. added 2019-09-13
    On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
    This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my action that (...)
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  27. added 2019-09-09
    Joint Know-How.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.
    When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an “active mutual enablement” account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such (...)
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  28. added 2019-09-02
    Anscombe and The Difference Rationality Makes.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Adrian Haddock & Rachael Wiseman (eds.), Anscombean Minds. Routledge.
    Anscombe famously argues that to act intentionally is to act under a description, and that “it is the agent's knowledge of what he is doing that gives the descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention.” Further, she takes ‘knows’ to mean that the agent can give these descriptions herself. It would seem to follow that animals cannot act intentionally. However, she denies this, insisting that although animals cannot express intentions, they can have them. But (...)
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  29. added 2019-09-02
    Second Nature and Basic Action.Ben Wolfson - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 52-66.
  30. added 2019-08-27
    Bridging the Gap Between Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions.Frédéric Minner - 2019 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 20 (1):79-98.
    Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, rationality, (...)
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  31. added 2019-08-20
    Between Heteronomy and Authonomy. The Presage of Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 19 (Special Issue, Moral Heteronomy.).
  32. added 2019-08-20
    Purpose in Action.Jay Alan Smith & Ont Toronto - 1977 - [S.N.].
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  33. added 2019-08-13
    G.E.M. Anscombe: guida alla lettura di Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2018 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    L’opera più importante per la filosofia dell’azione dopo l’Etica di Aristotele: così Donald Davidson ha definito il libro di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Intention, che Elisa Grimi ci presenta oggi attraverso questa preziosa guida alla lettura, il primo testo di questo genere in lingua italiana. dalla Prefazione di Cyrille Michon. Che cosa sia un’intenzione, quale sia il ruolo che essa svolge all'interno di un’azione, se vi si possa trovare traccia della vera intenzione del soggetto guardando l’azione che compie: questi e (...)
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  34. added 2019-07-29
    Agents in Movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.
    The paper discusses the category of one of the most fundamental expressions of agency, those movements of agents that are actions. There have been three dominant views of action since the 1960s: 1. the Causal Theory of Action, 2. the Tryings/Willings view, and 3. Agent Causation. These views claim that actions are: 1. events of bodily movements which have the right causes; 2. specific types of mental events causing events of bodily movements; 3. instances of the causal relationship between agents (...)
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  35. added 2019-07-29
    Kieran Setiya: Practical Knowledge: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Hardcover £56/74$. 308 pages.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):1019-1020.
    Review of Setiya's collection of essays titled Practical Knowledge.
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  36. added 2019-06-09
    Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.
    Harry Frankfurt Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–39 famously attacked what he called the principle of alternate possibilities. PAP states that being able to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. He gave counterexamples to PAP known since then as “Frankfurt cases.” This paper sidesteps the enormous literature on Frankfurt cases while preserving some of our salient pretheoretical intuitions about the relation between alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. In particular, I introduce, explain, and defend a principle that has so far been (...)
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  37. added 2019-06-07
    The Power of Excuses.Paulina Sliwa - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (1):37-71.
    Excuses are commonplace. Making and accepting excuses is part of our practice of holding each other morally responsible. But excuses are also curious. They have normative force. Whether someone has an excuse for something they have done matters for how we should respond to their action. An excuse can make it appropriate to forgo blame, to revise judgments of blameworthiness, to feel compassion and pity instead of anger and resentment. The considerations we appeal to when making excuses are a motley (...)
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  38. added 2019-06-06
    Halfhearted Action and Control.Shepherd Joshua - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...)
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  39. added 2019-06-06
    Reasons for Action. Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. , £21.99 .).Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):413-415.
  40. added 2019-06-06
    The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases: A Unified Account of the Data.Mark Alfano, James R. Beebe & Brian Robinson - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
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  41. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and Intentional Action.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.
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  42. added 2019-06-06
    Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. [REVIEW]Terrance McConnell - 1997 - Ethics 107 (2):346-349.
  43. added 2019-06-06
    Diskussion/Discussion. Corporate Action: A Reply to Coleman.Raimo Tuomela - 1993 - Analyse & Kritik 15 (2):216-218.
    This short note argues that the basic points Coleman makes against my critical paper are incorrect. These points concern the possibility of a single agent holding a corporate goal, the doxastic conditions concerning group action, and 'jointness-effects'.
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  44. added 2019-06-06
    Review of Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. [REVIEW]Michael J. Zimmerman - 1993 - Ethics 103 (4):839-841.
  45. added 2019-06-06
    Hegel’s Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]Willem de Vries - 1985 - The Owl of Minerva 16 (2):212-215.
    Hegel’s Philosophy of Action contains the papers from a joint meeting of the Hegel Societies of America and Great Britain held at Oxford in 1981. But it presents an even broader spectrum of Hegel studies, for six different countries are represented.
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  46. added 2019-06-06
    Reason and Action. [REVIEW]M. J. - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (1):125-126.
    What is the correct logical analysis of "S did A with the intention I"? The answer and central thesis of Aune’s Reason and Action, begins: "We do A with the intention i just when we do A and the fact that we do A is psychologically explainable by the fact that we have the intention i." The book can be seen as an elaboration of and commentary on this notion of psychological explanation. Briefly, psychological explanation is causal explanation; the intention (...)
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  47. added 2019-06-06
    The Appropiate Causation of Intentional Basic Actions.David Pears - 1975 - Critica 7 (20):39-72.
  48. added 2019-06-06
    Analytical Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]H. M. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (4):792-792.
    This book is a development of ideas originally set out in the author’s well known articles "Basic Actions" and "What We can Do." The announced aim of the book is to isolate a class of actions that are basic in the sense that we do not do them by doing some other action. As Danto expresses it in the preface, he wants to "wash away the contextual features which convert movements into gestures and vest the disposition of limbs with high (...)
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  49. added 2019-06-06
    God’s Action and Nature’s Ways.John Lachs - 1973 - Idealistic Studies 3 (3):223-228.
    I should like to offer three criticisms of Professor Cobb’s challenging paper. The first is that he has failed to explain how divine efficient causation in the world is possible. The second is that he did not succeed in showing that such divine causality is actual. Finally, he fell short of demonstrating that it is necessary to introduce the idea of God in a philosophy that is to give an adequate description of the world.
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  50. added 2019-06-06
    Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
1 — 50 / 774