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  1. A Wittgenstein Symposium.Josep-Maria Terricabras (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    The centenary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein provided an opportunity for recovering some of the great Wittgensteinian subjects, for re-examining them and for discussing their implications and relevance. This volume is the result of the interchange that took place in Girona among well-known scholars of Wittgenstein's work in different countries. The eleven contributions are organized into three main subjects: on Wittgenstein's method, on knowledge and meaning, on language and use. This volume is not only the result of the different (...)
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  2. Thoughts Without Objects.Frederick R. Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
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  3. Descartes' Quartum Quid.Pedro Amaral - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:379-409.
    My goal is to illustrate Descartes’ reliance on two quite different and competing interpretations of objective reality by explaining how each is used in defending his causal axioms. The initial criticism comes from Caterus (and is later taken up by Gassendi) who charges that Descartes makes it appear as if the thought in its objective aspect (the intentional entity) is really distinct from the thought qua modification of the mind (i.e., the thought in its formal aspect). This implies that the (...)
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  4. The Status of Intentional Objects.Richard E. Aquila - 1971 - New Scholasticism 45 (3):427-456.
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  5. Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  6. On the Origin of Objects.John Black - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (3):720-721.
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  7. Images, Intentionality and Inexistence.Ben Blumson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):522-538.
    The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
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  8. Is Thought a Symbolic Process?Laurence BonJour - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  9. The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane.Ilaria Canavotto - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories of intentionality (...)
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  10. The Intentional Approach to Ontology.Roderick Chisholm - 1984 - In Kah Kyung Cho (ed.), Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--8.
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  11. Intentional Objects and Causal Semantics.A. Chrudzimski - 2008 - Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 36 (2):25-35.
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  12. Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2013 - Semiotica 194 (194):189–206.
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the (...)
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  13. Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.
    I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the name of intentional objects. (...)
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  14. Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2004 - Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.
    Ontology is doubtless the most important part of Roman Ingarden’s (1893-1970) philosophy. Contrary to Husserl, Ingarden always believed that any serious philosophical investigation must involve an ontological basis and he tried to formulate a solid ontological framework for his philosophy. There are several reasons why this ontology deserves our attention. For those who are interested in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Ingarden’s ontology could be treated as an ingenious attempt to analyse the conceptual structure and hidden ontological assumptions of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (...)
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  15. Intentional Objects.Michael Clark - 1965 - Analysis 25 (January):123-128.
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  16. BOOK REVIEW The Objects of Thought. Tim Crane. [REVIEW]Niall Connolly - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):517-520.
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  17. The Objects of Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Tim Crane addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. He argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that to understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') we need to understand the representation of the non-existent.
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  18. Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
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  19. Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle.
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  20. 2 The Intentional Encounter.Christine Daigle - 2013 - In Christine Daigle & Élodie Boublil (eds.), Nietzsche and Phenomenology: Power, Life, Subjectivity. Indiana University Press. pp. 28.
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  21. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion.Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
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  22. Intentional Objects, Old and New.Eric Dowling - 1970 - Ratio 12 (December):95-107.
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  23. Intersubjective Intentional Identity.Walter Edelberg - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):481-502.
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  24. Independent Intentional Objects.Katalin Farkas - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  25. The Intentionality of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...)
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  26. Thinking of Something.Gregory Fitch - 1990 - Noûs 24 (December):675-696.
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  27. Salmon on Hob and Nob.David Friedell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):213-220.
    Nathan Salmon appeals to his theory of mythical objects as part of an attempt to solve Geach’s Hob–Nob puzzle. In this paper I argue that, even if Salmon’s theory of mythical objects is correct, his attempt to solve the puzzle is unsuccessful. I also refute an original variant of his proposal. The discussion indicates that it is difficult (if not impossible) to devise a genuine solution to the puzzle that relies on mythical objects.
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  28. A Modal Approach to Intentional Identity.Ephraim Glick - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):386-399.
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  29. Intentional Identity and Reporting the Beliefs of Others.Geoffrey Currier Goddu - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    This work analyzes Peter Geach's problem of intentional identity, viz. adequately formalizing the sentence "Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow" and other sentences like it. First, Geach's problem is presented, and then Geach's original formalization proposals, and his own reasons for rejecting them, are presented and discussed. Next, the solutions proposed by various philosophers and linguists are presented and analyzed in detail. All are shown to be either inadequate or incomplete. (...)
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  30. Equivocidad del ser y objeto intencional.Ma González Porta & Transzendentaler Objektivismus - 2002 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 105:97-118.
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  31. Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
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  32. HOT: Keeping Up Appearances?David Miguel Gray - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states . Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an (...)
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  33. Limits of Propositionalism.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):819-838.
    Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. A number of philosophers have recently called the propositionalist thesis into question. It has been argued, successfully I believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a propositional content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-propositional attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. In light of this, Sinhababu’s recent attack on anti-propositionalists is noteworthy. The present paper aims to sharpen (...)
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  34. Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
    This paper offers a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states, non-propositional attitudes such as loving one’s department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. In broadest terms, the view reached is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. The proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. The proposal also allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional (...)
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  35. Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...)
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  36. Back to Intentional Entities and Essences.David F. Haight - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (2):178-190.
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  37. Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15:1-19.
    Meinong's theory of defective objects in On Emotional Presentation is ambiguous in ways which give rise to a dilemma. It is not clear whether or not defective objects are supposed to be a special kind of intentional object. If they are intentional objects, then a strengthened version of Mally's paradox about self-referential thought can be given which contradicts the intentionality thesis. But if they are not intentional objects, then thoughts with defective objects themselves constitute immediate counter-examples to the intentionality thesis. (...)
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  38. Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  39. Thought and its Objects.T. M. Knox - 1969 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (76):193-203.
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  40. The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  41. Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing (...)
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  42. The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness From Brentano to Husserl. By Ryan Hickerson. [REVIEW]Patrick Madigan - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (3):555-556.
  43. The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane.Raamy Majeed - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):182-184.
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  44. The Mystery of Thought.Norman Malcolm - 1993 - In Josep-Maria Terricabras (ed.), A Wittgenstein Symposium. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  45. Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence].Olivier Massin - 2011 - Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  46. Biological Functions and Perceptual Content.Mohan P. Matthen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the presence of objects that are (...)
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  47. Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System.Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.
    The authors attempt to show that certain forms of behavior of the human immune system are illuminatingly regarded as errors in that system's operation. Since error-ascription can occur only within the context of an intentional/teleological characterization of the system, it follows that such a characterization is illuminating. It is argued that error-ascription is objective, non-anthropomorphic, irreducible to any purely causal form of explanation of the same behavior, and further that it is wrong to regard all errors of the immune system (...)
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  48. D.W. Smith & R. McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. [REVIEW]Wolfe Mays - 1984 - Philosophical Books 25 (1):25-27.
  49. The Objects of Intentionality.Colin McGinn - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    A sketch is given of the view that there are non-existent intentional objects: such things as Pegasus and Zeus, which do not exist but which can be the subject of thought, which can be referred to, and to which true predicates can be applied. It is claimed that non-existent objects are the foundation of all intentionality: whenever there is intentionality towards an existent object, there is concurrent intentionality towards a non-existent one. The consequences of this view for perception and reference (...)
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  50. Thought and its Objects.Abraham I. Melden - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (October):434-441.
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