Intentionality

Edited by Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder)
About this topic
Summary Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being about something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g., Husserl 1980), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (Ryle 1949, Quine 1955). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (Dretske 1981Fodor 1990, and Millikan 1984 provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2007).
Introductions Rupert 2008Fodor 1985Adams & Aizawa 2010Crane 1998Margolis & Laurence 1999
Related
Subcategories
History/traditions: Intentionality

Contents
13558 found
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  1. Stein on Forms of Affective Intentionality.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Anna Tropia & Daniele De Santis (eds.), Rethinking Intentionality, Person, and the Essence. Aquinas, Scotus, Stein. Leiden / Boston: Brill.
    According to Brentano and his followers, there is a genuine affective mode of intentional reference which consists in presenting the targeted objects imbued with value as being good or bad, and as inviting us to adopt a pro- or contra-attitude toward them. Let us call this view “the affective intentionality thesis”. In Brentano’s version of this thesis, not only do strictly affective phenomena such as feelings and emotions exhibit a sui generis affective intentionality, but so do conative ones, such as (...)
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  2. Combinatoriality and Compositionality in Everyday Primate Skills.Nathalie Gontier - forthcoming - International Journal of Primatology.
    Human language, hominin tool production modes, and multimodal communications systems of primates and other animals are currently well-studied for how they display compositionality or combinatoriality. In all cases, the former is defined as a kind of hierarchical nesting and the latter as a lack thereof. In this article, I extend research on combinatoriality and compositionality further to investigations of everyday primate skills. Daily locomotion modes as well as behaviors associated with subsistence practices, hygiene, or body modification rely on the hierarchical (...)
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  3. Review of Hallie Liberto, Green Light Ethics[REVIEW]Jonathan Ichikawa - manuscript
  4. Defending (perceptual) attitudes.Valentina Martinis - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations (...)
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  5. Blame for Hum(e)an beings: The role of character information in judgments of blame.Samuel Murray, Kevin O'Neill, Jordan Bridges, Justin Sytsma & Zac Irving - forthcoming - Social Psychological and Personality Science.
    How does character information inform judgments of blame? Some argue that character information is indirectly relevant to blame because it enriches judgments about the mental states of a wrongdoer. Others argue that character information is directly relevant to blame, even when character traits are causally irrelevant to the wrongdoing. We propose an empirical synthesis of these views: a Two Channel Model of blame. The model predicts that character information directly affects blame when this information is relevant to the wrongdoing that (...)
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  6. Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode—what I call (...)
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  7. Three Perspectives on Perspective.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan (eds.), William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    William Lycan is a notable early proponent of representationalism, which is, roughly, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are nothing over and above its representational features (perhaps in addition to some further ingredients). Representationalism faces a challenge in accounting for perspectival experiences, which are, roughly, experiences that arise from our occupying a particular real or perceived perspective on the world. This paper presents representationalism, situating Lycan's version of representationalism within the representationalist landscape, and describes the challenge from perspectival (...)
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  8. Can We Empathize With Emotions That We Have Never Felt?Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations.
    If, as argued in some simulationist accounts, empathy aims at grasping the phenomenal richness of the other’s experience and resonating with it, it is difficult to explain our empathy with emotions that we have never experienced ourselves. According to a long philosophical tradition, imagination is constrained by experience. We have to be acquainted with the qualitative feel of the other’s experience in order to imagine it. A critical view of simulationist accounts would claim that if we cannot imagine how the (...)
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  9. The essence of the mental.Ray Buchanan & Alex Grzankowski - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):1061-1072.
    Your belief that Obama is a Democrat would not be the belief that it is if it did not represent Obama, nor would the pain in your ankle be the state that it is if, say, it felt like an itch. Accordingly, it is tempting to hold that phenomenal and representational properties are essential to the mental states that have them. But, as several theorists have forcefully argued (including Kripke (1980) and Burge (1979, 1982)) this attractive idea is seemingly in (...)
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  10. Are Phenomenal Theories of Thought Chauvinistic?Preston Lennon - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    The phenomenal view of thought holds that thinking is an experience with phenomenal character that determines what the thought is about. This paper develops and responds to the objection that the phenomenal view is chauvinistic: it withholds thoughts from creatures that in fact have them. I develop four chauvinism objections to the phenomenal view—one from introspection, one from interpersonal differences, one from thought experiments, and one from the unconscious thought paradigm in psychology—and show that the phenomenal view can resist all (...)
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  11. Phenomenology and Transcendence. On Openness and Metaphysics in Husserl and Heidegger.Bruno Cassara - 2022 - Religions 13 (11):1127.
    In this paper I examine the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics by reassessing the relationship between phenomenological and metaphysical transcendence. More specifically, I examine the notion of phenomenological transcendence in Husserl and the early Heidegger: Husserl defines transcendence primarily as the mode of givenness of phenomena that do not appear all at once, but must be given in partial profiles; Heidegger defines transcendence primarily as Dasein’s capacity to go beyond entities toward being. I argue that these divergent understandings of phenomenological (...)
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  12. Ingarden vs. Meinong on Ficta’s Generation and Properties.Hicham Jakha - forthcoming - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics:1-21.
    I explore the problems of ficta ‘generation’ and ‘properties’ in light of Meinong and Ingarden. Comparing Ingarden and the historical Meinong is not a novel project idea. By contrast, comparing Ingarden and a phenomenological Meinong, to my knowledge, has not been explored yet. Here, I rely on Alberto Voltolini’s ‘phenomenological conception of außerseiende entities’. I devise Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology to account for the problems of ascription and generation crippling Meinong’s. In short, I argue for Ingarden’s account as being the better (...)
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  13. Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias: Parallel Debates about Unconscious Content.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind. Volume 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-130.
    The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues that empirical (...)
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  14. Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - In James Stazicker (ed.), The Structure of Perceptual Experience. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 7–30.
    Is the sense‐data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been under‐explored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree. There are many different variants of representationalism, and differences between these variants that some people have taken to be inconsequential turn out to be key factors in whether the sense‐data theory is a form of representationalism. Chief among these are whether a representationalist takes the phenomenal character of (...)
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  15. Errepresentazioen egibaldintzak: zerbaitez jardun eta zerbaiti buruzkoa izan.Beñat Esnaola - 2023 - Gogoa 23.
    In this paper, I argue that some philosophers have misinterpreted John Perry’s “Thought without Representation” ([1986] 2000) in two ways. They have taken, on the one hand, his distinction between a representation being about something vs concerning something to be exclusive, and, on the other hand, that he used relativized propositions to capture the truth-conditions of representations with unarticulated constituents. I argue that Perry's distinction is not exclusive and that he argues that unarticulated constituents are part of a representation's truth-conditions, (...)
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  16. Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality. A Deweyan Reading.Pierre Steiner - 2020 - In Fausto Caruana & Italo Testa (eds.), Habits. Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience and Social Theory. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-244.
  17. Que veut dire avoir un corps et exister ? Martin Heidegger et le « problème du corps » (1959-1976).Simon Tardif - 2022 - Dissertation, Université du Québec À Montréal
    Ce mémoire est une étude à la jonction des études germaniques et de la phénoménologie, et s’efforce de reconstituer la problématique de l’interrogation et de la définition de l’homme à partir de l’oeuvre de Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Prenant une perspective à la fois historiographique et philosophique, l’ambition de cette étude consiste à reconstruire un moment du corpus de Heidegger afin d’en exposer la pertinence et l’actualité philosophiques. Cette étude est divisée en trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre reprend et analyse le (...)
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  18. Ressentiment and Self-deception in Early Phenomenology: Voigtländer, Scheler, and Reinach.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2023 - In Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality. Springer, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences. pp. 103-121.
    This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...)
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  19. The Qualia of Conscious Intentionality.Martina Fürst - 2008 - In Sven Walter & Helen Bohse (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6 (6th Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy). mentis. pp. 374-385.
  20. On Zombie Beliefs.Martina Fürst - 2012 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values and Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Druckwerker. pp. 83-85.
  21. This is Philosophy of Mind : An introduction / Pete Mandik, translation into Arabic by Salah Ismail بيت مانديك، هذه هي فلسفة العقل: مقدمة، ترجمة صلاح إسماعيل.Salah Ismail - 2023
    مقدمة للموضوعات الأساسية في فلسفة العقل. فتراه يعالج طبيعة العقل ومشكلة العقل والجسم، والذكاء الاصطناعي، والإرادة الحرة، وطبيعة الوعي، والقصدية، والهوية الشخصية والذات. وهو في معالجة هذه الموضوعات يتتبع أصولها التاريخية ويناقش النظريات المعاصرة المفسرة لها. وأخص ما يمتاز به هو الوضوح والبساطة والشمول والدقة. وهو بهذه السمات لن يكون مفيدًا لدارسي الفلسفة فحسب، وإنما سيكون ممتعًا لكثير من المثقفين أيضًا. وأرى من الخير أن يظهر القارئ العربي على عملٍ نافعٍ ورائعٍ مثل هذا. Discover fascinating and illuminating contributions to historical (...)
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  22. Imagination in Early Phenomenological Accounts of Empathy.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Thomas Petraschka & Christiana Werner (eds.), Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art. London: Routledge.
    This paper argues that early phenomenologists used the concept of empathy not only to refer to the direct perception of the other’s experiences – as underscored by contemporary proponents of the Direct Perception Theory – but also to describe – in a sense close to Lipps’s theory and contemporary Simulation Theory – how, by virtue of imagining, we “feel into” animate and inanimate objects. Focusing on this second usage of the term, two kinds of imagination-based accounts of empathy in early (...)
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  23. Hassen: Warum es so schwierig ist, damit aufzuhören.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Konrad Paul Liessmann (ed.), Der Hass. Anatomie eines elementaren Gefühls. Vienna: Zsolnay. pp. 94 - 112.
    In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage danach behandeln, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich zunächst auf die Struktur des Hasses eingehen: Ich werde für die These plädieren, dass der Hass als eine Gesinnung zu verstehen ist, die aus einem Prozess der Sedimentierung feinlicher Gefühle entsteht. Der Hass hat eine Geschichte. Diese Geschichte werde ich mich danach widmen, um die Hartnäckigkeit und Beharrung des Hasses besser zu verstehen. Denn seine Geschichte (...)
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  24. Embodied higher cognition: insights from Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of motor intentionality.Jan Halák - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (2):369-397.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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  25. Phenomenalism, Skepticism, and Sellars's Account of Intentionality.Griffin Klemick - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (5):548-558.
    I take up two questions raised by Luz Christopher Seiberth's meticulous reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars's theory of intentionality. The first is whether we should regard Sellars as a transcendental phenomenalist in the most interesting sense of the term: as denying that even an ideally adequate conceptual structure would enable us to represent worldly objects as they are in themselves. I agree with Seiberth that the answer is probably yes, but I suggest that this is due not to Sellars's rejection of (...)
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  26. First-Person Thought: Action, Identification and Experience.Maik Niemeck - 2022 - Leiden/Paderborn: Brill | mentis.
    The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic (...)
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  27. The rationality of mood.Constant Bonard - 2022 - In Julien A. Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    In this article, I argue that at least some moods are affective episodes whose main difference from emotions is that their intentional objects, qua intentional objects, are not consciously available. I defend this claim by exposing an experiment where affective responses – moods, I maintain – are elicited by subliminal pictures (§2). I then show how everyday kinds of moods can also be plausibly interpreted as emotion-like affects whose intentional object is not conscious (§3). In the final section (§4), I (...)
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  28. Le Désir: Une Anatomie Conceptuelle.Federico Lauria - 2023 - Mariac: Jacques Flament Editions.
    Les désirs sont fondamentaux. Sans eux, notre vie perdrait beaucoup de son charme et serait peut-être même dénuée de sens. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? À l’image des anatomistes étudiant en détail la structure des organismes, cet essai invite à disséquer minutieusement le désir. Le désir est-il le moteur de l’action ? Est-il l’expérience vécue du bien ? Les désirs font-ils le bonheur ? Que sont l’espoir et le désir sexuel ? Le désir est-il le nerf de la science ? Analysons (...)
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  29. What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist.Petar Nurkić & Umeljić Ivan - 2022 - Theoria: Beograd 65 (4):33-59.
    Naturalistic epistemology is usually associated with Quine’s turn from an a priori and traditional to a descriptive understanding of knowledge. In this paper, however, we will look at theories developed from Quine’s ideas - Millikan’s teleosemantics and Kornblith’s cognitive ethology. We will answer three questions: (i) Can a bee know?; (ii) What can a bee know?; and (iii) Does the bee know? First, we will answer the question of animal cognitive capacities using Kornblith’s understanding of the epistemic environment and the (...)
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  30. Emotions and Sentiments: Two Distinct Forms of Affective Intentionality.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 23:20-34.
    How to distinguish emotions such as envy, disgust, and shame from sentiments such as love, hate, and adoration? While the standard approach argues that emotions and sentiments differ in terms of their temporal structures (e.g., Ben-ze’ev, 2000; Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Frijda et al., 1991), this paper sketches an alternative approach according to which each of these states exhibits a distinctive intentional structure. More precisely, this paper argues that emotions and sentiments exhibit distinct forms of affective intentionality. The paper begins (...)
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  31. Hostile Affective States and Their Self-Deceptive Styles: Envy and Hate.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Alba Montes Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    This paper explores how individuals experiencing hostile affective states such as envy, jealousy, hate, contempt, and Ressentiment tend to deceive themselves about their own mental states. More precisely, it examines how the feeling of being diminished in worth experienced by the subject of these hostile affective states motivates a series of self-deceptive maneuvers that generate a fictitious upliftment of the subject’s sense of self. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper explores the main arguments that explain why several hostile (...)
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  32. On the Importance of a Human-Scale Breadth of View: Reading Tallis' Freedom.Jan Halák - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):439-452.
    This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis’ book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis’ main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment (...)
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  33. On a proposal of Strawson concerning context vs. 'what is said'.Varol Akman - 2008 - In Paolo Bouquet, Luciano Serafini & Richmond H. Thomason (eds.), Perspectives on Contexts, CSLI Lecture Notes No. 180. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications. pp. 79-94.
    In Strawson’s Entity and Identity, there are two essays (Chapters 11 and 12), which study the notion of context. In these essays, Strawson advances a threefold distinction regarding how context bears on the meaning of 'what is said' when a sentence is uttered. -/- In this paper, we'll (i) review the original scheme of Strawson and summarize his improvements to his own scheme, and (ii) add our own improvements to make it even more thoroughgoing. We'll also show that unless it (...)
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  34. Representing emotions in terms of object directedness.Varol Akman & Hakime G. Unsal - 1994 - Department of Computer Engineering Technical Reports, Bilkent University.
    A logical formalization of emotions is considered to be tricky because they appear to have no strict types, reasons, and consequences. On the other hand, such a formalization is crucial for commonsense reasoning. Here, the so-called "object directedness" of emotions is studied by using Helen Nissenbaum's influential ideas.
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  35. Rethinking Phenomenal Intentionality.Christopher Stratman - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    My dissertation puts forward a critique of the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT). According to standard accounts of PIT, all genuine intentionality is either identical to or partly grounded in phenomenal consciousness. I argue that it is a conceptually significant mistake to construe conscious experiences in terms of token mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties. This mistake is predicated on ignoring an important difference in the temporal character—what I call the “temporal shape”—between states and properties as opposed to conscious experiences. States (...)
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  36. Inwiefern sind philosophische Erfahrungen epistemisch transformativ?Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (5):809-822.
    Drawing on Laurie A. Paul’s notion of “transformative experience”, this paper explores transformative philosophical experiences and analyses the structure of the attitude underlying them. It is argued that these experiences have to be explained not in cognitive terms but as a change in our affective attitude. More precisely, these experiences lead us to feel values in a novel manner. However, in order to make the philosophical experience epistemically transformative and provide a new perspective from which we can acquire new philosophical (...)
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  37. The Paradox of Falsehood and Non-Being.Simone Nota - 2021 - Synthesis 1 (1):7-46.
    How can we think or say what is not? If we equate what-is-not with nothing, then a thought of nothing is no thought at all; if we don’t, we are condemned to admit that what-is-not is, seemingly incurring in self-refutation. In this paper, I address this paradox through the lenses of Parmenides, Plato, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein.
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  38. Demonstrations as actions.Piotr Tomasz Makowski & Tadeusz Ciecierski - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-25.
    This paper presents a dual intention model (DIM) of demonstrations as actions to show the agentive nature of demonstrations. According to the DIM, demonstrations are complex actions that contain as components at least three elements: an abductive intention, a deictic intention, and a basic ostensive act of indication. This paper unpacks these three components and discusses their roles from the viewpoint of the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language. It also shows how the DIM applies in selected practical (...)
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  39. Intentionality and Dualism: Does the Idea that Intentionality Is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism?Andrea Tortoreto - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (Philosophy of Mind, Intentionali):82.
    It is well known that Franz Brentano was the first to suggest intentionality, the property of being about something, as a criterion for demarcating the domain of the mental. He suggested that intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to qualify as a mental event. It is important, for the purposes of this paper, to pay attention to the fact that Brentano’s theory came from within a broader philosophical outlook that was thoroughly dualistic. He sought a total separation (...)
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  40. Emociones religiosas: fenomenología, cognición y valor.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Rubén Sánchez (ed.), Filosofía y religión. Problemas y enfoques contemporáneos. Mexiko-Stadt, Hauptstadtdistrikt, Mexiko:
    Tener miedo del más allá, sentirse amado incondicionalmente por un ser superior, avergonzarse de la condición imperfecta del ser humano, son algunos ejemplos de emociones que no dudaríamos en calificar como religiosas. Ahora bien ¿Cómo describir su estructura? ¿Por qué llamamos a estas emociones “religiosas”? ¿Cuálos son los rasgos distintivos que sirven para diferenciarlas de las emociones “no religiosas”? En este artículo se examinan los rasgos distintivos de las emociones religiosas. Para ello, se analizan tres elementos cruciales de la experiencia (...)
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  41. Love and fear as asymmetric opposites.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - In Iulian Apostolescu & Veronica Cibotaru (eds.), Phenomenologies of Love. Leiden, Niederlande:
  42. Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...)
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  43. Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of Emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - In J. Deonna, C. Tappolet & F. Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotions exhibit, we get a neat personal (...)
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  44. The estimator theory of life and mind: how agency and consciousness can emerge.J. H. Van Hateren - manuscript
    This book provides a comprehensive overview of my recent theoretical work that aims to explain some of the more puzzling properties of life and mind, in particular agency, goal-directedness and consciousness. It contains published papers as well as new material. Table of contents: Preface - PART I: GROUNDWORK - 1. Introduction - 2. The basic mechanism - 3. Inclusive and extensive fitness - 4. Components of F and X - 5. The consequences: a preview - PART II: LIFE - 6. (...)
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  45. The precision of content characterizations.Fabian Hundertmark - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (3):678-694.
    The contents of representations in non-human animals, human core cognition, and perception cannot precisely be characterized by sentences of a natural language. However, this fact does not stop us from giving imprecise characterizations of these contents through natural language. In this paper, I develop an account of the precision of content characterizations by appealing to possible-world semantics combined with set and measurement theory.
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  46. The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper (...)
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  47. Minimal Rationality: Structural or Reasons-Responsive?Jean Moritz Müller - 2022 - In Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa. Genf, Schweiz:
    According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...)
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  48. The Ineffable as Radical.Laura Silva - 2022 - In Christine Tappolet, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa. Geneva:
    Ronald de Sousa is one of the few analytic philosophers to have explored the ineffability of emotion. Ineffability arises, for de Sousa, from attempts to translate experience, which involves non-conceptual content, into language, which involves conceptual content. As de Sousa himself rightly notes, such a characterization construes all perceptual experience as ineffable and does not explain what might set emotional ineffability apart. I build on de Sousa’s insights regarding what makes emotional ineffability distinctive by highlighting that in the case of (...)
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  49. The Hyle of Imagination and Reproductive Consciousness: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Phantasy Reconsidered.Ka-yu Hui - 2022 - Husserl Studies 38 (3):273–292.
    The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema (_Auffassung/Auffassungsinhalt Schema_) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (_Phantasie_), commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the (...)
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  50. Describing the Person as Cognitive-Intentional Entity.Lucian Delescu - 2017 - Studii Franciscane 17:169-184.
    When describing the person, the general tendency is to rely upon the assumption that the quality of “person” is always constituted from “outside” to “inside” either by being determined to re-project the content of emotional experiences, or by simply transferring existent theoretical constructions. I have explored this way of thinking in a previous occasion and made more or less clear why it ultimately leads to the rejection of the inner dimension of person in the absence of which no serious discussion (...)
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