Intentionality

Edited by Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder, University of Edinburgh)
About this topic
Summary Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being about something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g., Husserl 1980), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (Ryle 1949, Quine 1956). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (Dretske 1981FODOR 1990, and Millikan 1984 provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2007).
Introductions Rupert 2008Fodor 1985Adams & Aizawa 2010Crane 1998Margolis & Laurence 1999
Related categories
Subcategories:
History/traditions: Intentionality

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  1. An Analysis of the Notion of Need for the Representation of Public Services.Luca Biccheri & Roberta Ferrario - 2019 - JOWO 2019 - The Joint Ontology Workshops, Proceedings of the Joint Ontology Workshops 2019, Episode 5: The Styrian Autumn of Ontology, Graz, Austria, September 23-25, 2019.
    Many Public Administrations structure their services around the notion of users’ need. However, there is a gap between private, subjectively perceived needs (self-attributed) and needs that are attributed by PA to citizens (heteroattributed). Because of the gap, citizens’ needs are often only partially satisfied by PAs services. This gap is in part due to the fact that the meaning of the word “need” is ambiguous and full of antinomic nuances. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a definition of (...)
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  2. Intentionality and Perception: A Study of John Searle’s Philosophy.Anar Jafarov - 2019 - Dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
    My aim in this research is to study the philosophical problems of intentionality and perception by critically analyzing the relevant ideas from John Searle’s works, and also to attempt to give solutions to some of these problems. I try to elucidate Searle's theory of intentionality and his way of assimilating the problems of perception into this theory, and investigate the plausibility of his corresponding ideas in the context of ongoing debates.
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  3. Intentionality and Perception: A Study of John Searle’s Philosophy.Anar Jafarov - 2019 - Dissertation, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
    My aim in this research is to study the philosophical problems of intentionality and perception by critically analyzing the relevant ideas from John Searle’s works, and also to attempt to give solutions to some of these problems. I try to elucidate Searle's theory of intentionality and his way of assimilating the problems of perception into this theory, and investigate the plausibility of his corresponding ideas in the context of ongoing debates.
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  4. Extended Modal Realism - a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-12.
    Kriegel described the problem of intentional inexistence as one of the 'perennial problems of philosophy' (Kriegel Philosophical Perspectives 21(1), 307–340, 2007: 307). In the same paper, Kriegel alluded to a modal realist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, Kriegel does not state by name who defends the kind of modal realist solution he has in mind. Kriegel also points out that even what he believes to be the strongest version of modal realism does not pass the 'principle of (...)
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  5. Towards a Theory of Singular Thought About Abstract Mathematical Objects.James E. Davies - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4113-4136.
    This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue (...)
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  6. Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
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  7. A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality.Peter Clutton & Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Phenomenal intentionality theories have recently enjoyed significant attention. According to these theories, the intentionality of a mental representation (what it is about) crucially depends on its phenomenal features. We present a new puzzle for these theories, involving a phenomenon called ‘intentional identity’, or ‘co-intentionality’. Co-intentionality is a ubiquitous intentional phenomenon that involves tracking things even when there is no concrete thing being tracked. We suggest that phenomenal intentionality theories need to either develop new uniquely phenomenal resources for handling the puzzle, (...)
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  8. Structure, Intentionality and the Given.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 95-118.
    The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology—one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception—requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se (...)
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  9. Donald Davidson: Looking Back, Looking Forward.Claudine Verheggen - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2).
    The papers collected in this issue were solicited to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Donald Davidson’s birth. Four of them discuss the implications of Davidson’s views—in particular, his later views on triangulation—for questions that are still very much at the centre of current debates. These are, first, the question whether Saul Kripke’s doubts about meaning and rule-following can be answered without making concessions to the sceptic or to the quietist; second, the question whether a way can be found to answer (...)
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  10. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]J. N. Mohanty - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 37 (4):872-872.
    Searle develops a theory of intentionality which is intended to provide a foundation for his earlier and influential theory of speech acts. His basic assumption, which according to this reviewer, is well-founded, is that philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. Speech acts have a derived form of intentionality. In its original form, some mental states and events, only some of which again are conscious states, are intentional. For Searle, intentionality = directedness towards an object, but (...)
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  11. Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.
    According to Hutto and Satne, 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their explanation of the emergence and constitution of intentional mental contents is circular. After identifying the problem, they also propose a solution: what neo-Pragmatists need to do, to overcome circularity, is to appeal to a primitive content-free variety of intentionality, different from the full-blown intentionality of propositional attitudes. In this paper, I will argue that, in addition to the problem of circularity, there is (...)
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  12. Erratum To: Hard Problems of Intentionality.Mark Rowlands - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):279-279.
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  13. Critical Notice of Origins of Objectivity, Oxford, by Tyler Burge.Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (33):515-530.
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  14. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018.Michael Starks - 2016 - Las Vegas, USA: Reality Press.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2019). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it (...)
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  15. Teleology and World From Different Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind and Transcendental Phenomenology.Rodolfo Giorgi & Danilo Manca - 2018 - Humana Mente 11 (34).
    During the last century, most philosophers of science have tried to expunge teleological explanations from the fields of epistemology. They took for granted that the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and evolution effectively dispense us with any presence of goal-directedness in nature: based on an anti-metaphysical attitude, they hold purposes and goals to be of religious and spiritual nature, thereby obstacles to any effective comprehension of biological processes. Accordingly, teleological categories have been abandoned in many ways in favor of mechanical (...)
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  16. Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, by Sainsbury, R. M. And Michael Tye: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Pp. 208. £25.00. [REVIEW]Stephane Savanah - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):830-831.
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  17. The Real Trouble with Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):641-651.
    Cognitivists about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view (...)
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  18. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. [REVIEW]Clas Weber - 2008 - Disputatio 3 (25):59-65.
  19. Towards a Pluralist Theory of Singular Thought.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3947-3974.
    This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which (...)
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  20. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis 1.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
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  21. Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Understanding the “intentionality” of mental phenomena is widely regarded as a key problem in philosophy of mind. Franz Brentano (along with his students, especially Edmund Husserl) is widely credited with bringing intentionality to philosophers’ attention. In early treatment by the Brentano school, intentionality is at least nominally understood as executed, brought about, or achieved in mental acts. And in the early 20th century, historians of psychology regarded this “act conception” of intentionality as integral for understanding the phenomenon. Yet the secondary (...)
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  22. Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Moritz Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
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  23. Eschatology and Mark's Theologia Crucis.Charles B. Cousar - 1970 - Interpretation 24 (3):321-335.
    Mark's whole understanding of the gospel, what it does for believers, and what believers must do in response, points to an eschatology understood in mission, not in withdrawal. The Son of Man who is to come recognizes as his own those who through proclamation and suffering have identified with his redemptive activity in the world. No moment is incidental, because in view of the cross and resurrection the history and life of the people of God have become throughly eschatological.
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  24. Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.
    Annotated bibliography of works on externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind.
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  25. Intencjonalność i semantyka.Andrzej Dabrowski - 2013 - Kraków, Polska: Universitas.
    The problem of intentionality, which constitutes the basic theme of the book, has its roots in Brentano’s philosophical and psychological reflections. Intentionality refers to mental phenomena (perceptions, beliefs, desires, judgments etc.) being directed toward something. Intentionality plays a crucial role within phenomenological epistemology. Furthermore, it is one of the most important issues of analytic philosophy, particularly within analytically-oriented philosophies of mind and language. In the latter framework, intentionality constitutes, among other things, part of the pragmatic theory of language, which explains (...)
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  26. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An "Agent" Approach to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  27. Los intereses, el objeto especulativo de las redes sociales. Una cuestión ética.Jorge Montesó Ventura - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 74:137-153.
    Philosophy has always shown concern about human interests in their study of knowledge. Nowadays, with the emergence of new social customs promoted by the massive use of networks, this concern is moving towards a more practical slope analysis. Interests -guide of our attention and, therefore, knowledge too- have becoming object to commercialization of trademarks. Such maelstrom has contributed to social networks become big banks of interests dedicated to make business with our privacy, a behaviour that awakes many ethical controversies and, (...)
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  28. Distributed Cognitive Agency in Virtue Epistemology.Michael David Kirchhoff & Will Newsome - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):165-180.
    We examine some of the ramifications of extended cognition for virtue epistemology by exploring the idea within extended cognition that it is possible to decentralize cognitive agency such that cognitive agency includes socio-cultural practices. In doing so, we first explore the (seemingly unquestioned) assumption in both virtue epistemology and extended cognition that cognitive agency is an individualistic phenomenon. A distributed notion of cognitive agency alters the landscape of knowledge attribution in virtue epistemology. We conclude by offering a pragmatic notion of (...)
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  29. The Enactive Roots of STEM: Rethinking Educational Design in Mathematics.Michael David Kirchhoff, Daniel D. Hutto & Dor Abrahamson - 2015 - Educational Psychology Review 27 (3):371–389.
    New and radically reformative thinking about the enactive and embodied basis of cognition holds out the promise of moving forward age-old debates about whether we learn and how we learn. The radical enactive, embodied view of cognition (REC) poses a direct, and unmitigated, challenge to the trademark assumptions of traditional cognitivist theories of mind—those that characterize cognition as always and everywhere grounded in the manipulation of contentful representations of some kind. REC has had some success in understanding how sports skills (...)
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  30. Composition and Transactive Memory Systems.Michael David Kirchhoff - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):59-77.
    A recurrent theme in research on socially distributed cognition is to establish the claim that the cognitive phenomenon of transactive memory is grounded in a specific mode of organization: mechanistic compositional organization. My topic is the confluence of transactive remembering or transactive memory systems (TMSs) and mechanistic compositional organization. In relation to this confluence, the paper scrutinizes the claim that the kind of organization grounding TMSs and/or tokens of transactive remembering takes the specific form of mechanistic compositional organization – at (...)
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  31. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    An extended argument that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. -/- Evolving Enactivism argues that cognitive phenomena—perceiving, imagining, remembering—can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms (...)
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  32. Mirrors and Misleading Appearances.Vivian Mizrahi - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):354-367.
    ABSTRACTAlthough philosophers have often insisted that specular perception is illusory or erroneous in nature, few have stressed the reliability and indispensability of mirrors as optical instrumen...
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  33. Reply to Fine on Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1495-1512.
    A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.
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  34. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. [REVIEW]Dale Jacquette - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):439.
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  35. Precis of Belief and MeaningBelief and Meaning.Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):595.
    This essay provided a summary of my book, _Belief and Meaning, showing how I thought that it was possible to combine a view of intentional content that was externalist as well as one which keeps faith with Frege's constraint raised by his puzzle about identity and Kripke's puzzle about belief. The account criticizes current externalist accounts owing to Putnam, Burge, McDowell and Davidson. A great deal turns on meaning and intentional content being contextual in a way that the book elaborates.
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  36. Du contenu intentionnel et son contexte.Denis Fisette - 1992 - In Daniel Laurier (ed.), Essais sur l'intentionnalité et le langage. Paris-Montreal: Vrin-Bellarmin. pp. 17-35.
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  37. La Versión Débil de la Hipótesis Del Pensamiento En Lenguaje Natural.Liza Skidelsky - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 24 (1):83-104.
    Entre los filósofos que consideran que pensamos utilizando representaciones simbólicas, P. Carruthers ha defendido, versus la hipótesis del ‘lenguaje del pensamiento’ (LDP), una versión débil de la hipótesis del ‘pensamiento en lenguaje natural’ (PLN). En este trabajo, me ocuparé, en primer lugar, de mostrar las razones por las cuales Carruthers, en su defensa de la hipótesis débil del PLN, siembra cierta confusión en la polémica entre el LDP y PLN. En segundo lugar, intentaré esbozar una salida de esta confusión, ofreciendo (...)
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  38. What is the Extension of the Extended Mind?Hajo Greif - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4311-4336.
    Two aspects of cognitive coupling, as brought forward in the Extended Mind Hypothesis, are discussed in this paper: how shall the functional coupling between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? What are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? These two related questions are best answered in the light of an aetiological variety of functionalist argument that adds historical depth to the “active externalism” promoted by Clark and Chalmers and helps to (...)
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  39. What is It to Be Aware of Your Awareness of Red? A Review Essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given.Giulia Martina & Simon Wimmer - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):992-1012.
    In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A (...)
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  40. Gestalt Psychology.Barry Smith - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 51-54.
    The term ‘Gestalt’ was introduced into psychology by the Austrian philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels in an essay entitled “On ‘Gestalt-Qualities’” published in 1890. ‘Gestalt,’ in colloquial German, means roughly: ‘shape’ or ‘structure’ or ‘configuration’, and Ehrenfels demonstrates in his essay that there are certain inherently structural features of experience which need to be acknowledged in addition to simple tones, colours and other mental ‘atoms’ or ‘elements’. His essay thus initiated a reaction against the then still dominant atomism in psychology, a (...)
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  41. Teaching Art and Design: Communicating Creative Practice Through Embodied and Tacit Knowledge.Kylie Budge - 2016 - Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 15 (3-4):432-445.
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  42. Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy.Gyula Klima (ed.) - 2015 - Fordham University Press.
    It is supposed to be common knowledge about the history of ideas that one of the few medieval philosophical contributions preserved in modern philosophical thought is the idea that mental phenomena are distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality, their directedness toward some object. As is usually the case with such commonplaces about the history of ideas, this claim is not quite true. Medieval philosophers routinely described ordinary physical phenomena, such as reflections in mirrors or sounds in the air, as (...)
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  43. (Mock-)Thinking About the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.
    In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are (...)
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  44. G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
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  45. XIV—On the Cognitive Content of Morality.Jürgen Habermas - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):335-358.
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  46. Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.
    A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...)
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  47. The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation.Majid Davoody Beni - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (1):99-107.
    In this paper I am advocating a structuralist theory of mental representation. For a structuralist theory of mental representation to be defended satisfactorily, the naturalistic and causal constraints have to be satisfied first. The more intractable of the two, i.e., the naturalistic constraint, indicates that to account for the mental representation, we should not invoke “a full-blown interpreting mind”. So, the aim of the paper is to show how the naturalistic and causal constraints could be satisfied. It aims to offer (...)
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  48. Self-Notions and Top-Down Distortion.Daniel Morgan - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):277-294.
    John Perry offers an unusually substantive, and initially plausible, account of the conceptual role of first-person thought. This paper critiques Perry’s account, particularly in what it says about action explanation, and offers a partial alternative. It also identifies three high-level assumptions about what accounts of conceptual roles should look like that plausibly explain why Perry’s account goes off track in the ways that it does – this is the top-down distortion of the title. Identifying and arguing against the three assumptions (...)
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  49. LA INTENTIO COMO CLAVE DE LA TRANSOBJETIVIDAD DE LA INTELIGENCIA EN LA FILOSOFÍA REALISTA / The Intentio as key to the transobjectivity of intelligence in the realist Philosophy.Miguel Acosta - 2011 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Filosofía de la Inteligencia. Madrid, Spain: CEU Ediciones. pp. 79-102.
    Uno de los temas fundamentales de la filosofía realista es la intentio. Este concepto surgió en la filosofía árabe a partir de la idea aristotélica que explica la posibilidad del alma de apropiarse de las formas de las cosas. La intentio es el vínculo referencial entre la realidad y el intelecto en el acto de conocer. En la primera parte del artículo se hace una revisión conceptual del término con especial énfasis en Avicena y Averroes; y en la segunda parte (...)
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  50. LOS EFECTOS DE LA "INTENTIO" COMO ACTO VOLITIVO EN LAS PASIONES HUMANAS SEGÚN TOMÁS DE AQUINO.Miguel Acosta - 2013 - In J. L. Fuertes Herreros (ed.), La teoría filosófica de las pasiones y las virtudes. De la Filosofía Antigua al Humanismo Escolástico Ibérico. Textos e estudos de Filosofía Medieval, 6. Ribeirão (Portugal): Ediçoes Húmus. pp. 61-80.
    El estudio acerca de la influencia de las pasiones en el voluntario libre ha sido recurrente en la tradición tomista. Sin embargo, las causas de los dos efectos psicológicos de la intentio volitiva mencionados por Tomás de Aquino, la redundantia y la distractio, pasaron desapercibidas, y podrían aclarar algunos comportamientos consecuencia de la dinámica de las pasiones del hombre. La acción de la intentio volitiva originada por los afectos, al alcanzar cierto grado de intensidad, puede llegar a sobrepasar el control (...)
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