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Siblings:History/traditions: Intentionality, Misc

347 found
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1 — 50 / 347
  1. added 2020-05-19
    The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents Vs. Direct Grasp.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano’s repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of ‘notional constituents’ – aspects which cannot come apart (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-09
    The Problem of First-Person Aboutness.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (57):521-541.
    The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems doomed to make any answer to (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-24
    Introduction to a Systemic Theory of Meaning - March 2020 Update.Christophe Menant - manuscript
    Information and meanings are present everywhere around us and within ourselves. Specific studies have been implemented in order to link information and meaning (Linguistic, Semiotic, Biosemiotic, Psychology, Psychiatry, Biology, Neurology, Cognition, Artificial Intelligence... ). No general coverage is available for the notion of meaning. We propose to complement this lack by a system approach for meaning genaration. A Meaning Generator System based on constraint satisfaction is presented. It can be used for animals, humans and artificial agents, and makes available definitions (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-24
    Theories of Aboutness.Peter Hawke - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):697-723.
    Our topic is the theory of topics. My goal is to clarify and evaluate three competing traditions: what I call the way-based approach, the atom-based approach, and the subject-predicate approach. I develop criteria for adequacy using robust linguistic intuitions that feature prominently in the literature. Then I evaluate the extent to which various existing theories satisfy these constraints. I conclude that recent theories due to Parry, Perry, Lewis, and Yablo do not meet the constraints in total. I then introduce the (...)
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  5. added 2020-01-08
    Augustine's Defence of Knowledge Against the Sceptics.Tamer Nawar - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56:215-265.
    In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views (including those of Myles Burnyeat, Gareth Matthews, and Christopher Kirwan) concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism (including his semantic response to (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-09
    Disjunction and Distality: The Hard Problem for Purely Probabilistic Causal Theories of Mental Content.William Roche - forthcoming - Synthese:1-34.
    The disjunction problem and the distality problem each presents a challenge that any theory of mental content must address. Here we consider their bearing on purely probabilistic causal (ppc) theories. In addition to considering these problems separately, we consider a third challenge – that a theory must solve both. We call this “the hard problem.” We consider 8 basic ppc theories along with 240 hybrids of them, and show that some can handle the disjunction problem and some can handle the (...)
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  7. added 2019-10-28
    Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds.Mark Johnston - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233-268.
  8. added 2019-09-23
    Content Externalism, Truth Conditions, and Truth Values.Casey Woodling - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):821-830.
    Yli-Vakkuri offers a deductive argument for Content Externalism that primarily appeals to two main principles he says should be adopted by all parties to the debate. Sawyer criticizes this argument on the grounds that there are internalist theories that are not consistent with the two principles he offers, although she takes no issue with the derivation itself. While Sawyer’s critique is insightful and largely correct, there is a more fundamental problem with the original argument. The formal proof given in the (...)
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  9. added 2019-09-13
    Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (3).
    In recent years, much has been written about situated cognition, a movement in cognitive science that appears to have important philosophical implications (Robbins and Aydede 2009). Agents of this situated turn expound a variety of positive views; thus, at least initially, the movement may be best explained in terms of what its practitioners reject. The great majority of situated theorists direct their philosophical ire at a computer-based vision of human thought that came to prominence in the 1960s.
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  10. added 2019-09-09
    Transcendental Method in Action.Patrick Daly - 2016 - Method 30 (2):1-24.
    Lonergan’s treatment of transcendental method in the first chapter of <Method in Theology> presents a bit of a puzzle. Something about heightening consciousness at the level of experience is different from the reflexive operations by which we objectify this heightened experience. Lonergan’s summary statement of transcendental method makes no explicit reference to what this difference is. In this paper, I work out an interpretation of transcendental method in which I relate the problem of being explicit about heightening consciousness at the (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Intentional Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):93-109.
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show that although the (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    IV—Sharing Thoughts About Oneself.Guy Longworth - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first‐person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first‐person pronouns. It is widely held that first‐person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    Brain and Behavioral Functions Supporting the Intentionality of Mental States.João de F. Teixeira & Alfredo Pereira Jr - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (2):123-147.
    This paper relates intentionality, a central feature of human consciousness, with brain functions controlling adaptive action. Mental intentionality, understood as the “aboutness” of mental states, includes two modalities: semantic intentionality, the attribution of meaning to mental states, and projective intentionality, the projection of conscious content into the world. We claim that both modalities are the evolutionary product of self-organized action, and discuss examples of animal behavior that illustrate some stages of this evolution. The adaptive advantages of self-organized action impacted on (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars’s Myth of Jones.Aaron Allen Schiller - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):435-454.
    Part of Sellars’s general attack on the Myth of the Given is his endorsement of psychological nominalism, a view that implies that awareness of our own mental states is not given but must be earned.Sellars provides an account of how such awareness might have been earned with the Myth of Jones. Such an account is important for Sellars, for without it the Given can look necessary after all. But aproblem with such accounts is that they can look extremely implausible. Sellars (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Lewis on Intentionality.Robert Stalnaker - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199.
    David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality of thought. I distinguish (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and the Physical: A Reply to Mumford.Ullin T. Place - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):225-231.
    Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional; the intentionality of a disposition consists in (...)
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and the Physical: A New Theory of Disposition Ascription.Stephen Mumford - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):215-225.
    This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Lecture III: Intentionality as a Relation.John McDowell - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):471-491.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and One‐Sided Relations.John J. Haldane - 1996 - Ratio 9 (2):95-114.
    Intentional states appear to relate thinkers to objects and situations even when these latter do not exist. Given the concern to allow that thought is a mode of engagement between subject and world, many writers have presented relational theories of intentionality and introduced odd relata to account for thought of the non‐existent. However there are familiar epistemological and ontological objections to such accounts which give reason to look for other ways of accommodating the appearance of relationality. A little explored possibility (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional.Ullin T. Place - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (2):91-120.
    summaryMartin and Pfeifer have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's directedness and (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Causation and Intensionality: A Problem for Naturalism1.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):41-64.
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and Intensionality: Quotation Contexts and the Modal Wedge.Dale Jacquette - 1986 - The Monist 69 (4):598-608.
    Franz Brentano upheld the medieval Aristotelian doctrine of intentionality as a mark of the mental, distinguishing physical from psychological phenomena by the intentionality of the psychological and nonintentionality of the physical. But to implement, even to fully understand and appreciate Brentano’s thesis, it is necessary to know when intentionality does or does not obtain. The task of formulating satisfactory criteria of intentionality has proved elusive. The magnitude of difficulty is indicated by the number and variety of criteria proposed and defeated (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    D.W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality. A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. [REVIEW]Claire Hill - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (1):143-144.
  25. added 2019-06-06
    Mental States.Joseph Margolis - 1975 - Behavior and Philosophy 3 (1):23.
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality, Intensionality, and the Psychological.Harold Morick - 1971 - Analysis 32 (2):39.
  27. added 2019-06-06
    On "Intentionality" and the Psychological.W. Gregory Lycan - 1969 - American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (4):305-311.
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality.W. B. Barton - 1963 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):14-19.
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  29. added 2019-06-05
    The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia.Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) - 2006 - Routledge.
    The philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that examines the profound philosophical questions that arise from scientific research and theories. A sub-discipline of philosophy that emerged in the twentieth century, the philosophy of science is largely a product of the British and Austrian schools of thought and traditions. The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia is a two-volume set that brings together an international team of (...)
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  30. added 2019-05-13
    Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.
    I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either (...)
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  31. added 2019-05-07
    A Phenomenology of Professional Failure.Ben Sheredos - manuscript
    This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don't.
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  32. added 2019-04-26
    Le Moi comme un objet intentionnel. Une sémantique de “je” sans engagement ontologique—ERRATUM.Manuel Rebuschi - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (4):699-702.
    RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re . Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un (...)
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  33. added 2019-02-13
    Théories de l’intentionnalité au Moyen Âge. [REVIEW]David Piché - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):602.
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  34. added 2018-09-20
    There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation.Craig Callender & Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21 (1):67-85.
    We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case.
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  35. added 2018-09-17
    Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  36. added 2018-09-14
    Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  37. added 2018-06-30
    Medieval Vs Contemporary Metaphysics and Logic of Intentionality.Andrzej Bułeczka - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This thesis addresses three challenges posed by intentionality - the ability of our mental states and language to be about something - to a logician: an apparent reference to non-existent objects, intentional indeterminacy and the failure of substitutivity of coextensive terms in an intentional context. Since intentionality plays an important role in our everyday reasoning, a proper formal account of it is highly desirable, yet it requires a departure from classical logic. One can modify classical logic and adapt the formal (...)
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  38. added 2018-06-26
    The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity.Jan Halák - 2018 - In Bernard Andrieu, Jim Parry, Alessandro Porrovecchio & Olivier Sirost (eds.), Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure. Londýn, Velká Británie: Routledge. pp. 37-50.
    In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic (...)
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  39. added 2018-06-05
    The Ubiquity of Computation.Eric Dietrich - 1993 - Think (misc) 2 (June):27-29.
    For many years now, Harnad has argued that transduction is special among cognitive capacities -- special enough to block Searle's Chinese Room Argument. His arguments (as well as Searle's) have been important and useful, but not correct, it seems to me. Their arguments have provided the modern impetus for getting clear about computationalism and the nature of computing. This task has proven to be quite difficult. Which is simply to say that dealing with Harnad's arguments (as well as Searle's) has (...)
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  40. added 2018-05-23
    Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory.Andrea Marchesi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien (3):343-367.
    This paper examines Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it is developed in Logical Investigations and other early writings. In Section 1, the author attempts to capture the core of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Section 2 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of intentional relation developed in the fifth Investigation. In Section 3, the author tries to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the sixth Investigation that the designation ‘object’ is a relative one. In Section (...)
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  41. added 2018-05-22
    Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73.
    According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this (...)
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  42. added 2018-05-22
    Demotivating Intentional Mentalism.Joachim Lipski - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):298-318.
    Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
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  43. added 2018-04-23
    Non-Propositional Contents and How to Find Them.Alex Grzankowski - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):233-241.
    To understand what non-propositional content is and whether there are any such contents, we first need to know what propositional content is. That issue will be the focus of the first section of this essay. In the second section, with an understanding of propositional content in hand, we will consider representations that fail to have propositional content. In contrast to recent literature, it will be argued that metaphysical considerations concerning what's represented, rather than linguistic considerations, are a more promising way (...)
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  44. added 2018-04-22
    Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent (...)
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  45. added 2018-04-13
    Review of P. Jacob What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. [REVIEW]Fiona Macpherson - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (3):184-185.
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  46. added 2018-03-25
    Meaning What I It.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):66-76.
    Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...)
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  47. added 2018-03-05
    Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...)
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  48. added 2018-03-05
    All in the Family.Willem A. Devries - 2013 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley. pp. 259--280.
    This article considers Ruth Millikan's relationship to Robert Brandom and most especially their common influence, Wilfrid Sellars.
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  49. added 2018-03-03
    Quantum Gravity, Timelessness, and the Contents of Thought.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1807-1829.
    A number of recent theories of quantum gravity lack a one-dimensional structure of ordered temporal instants. Instead, according to many of these views, our world is either best represented as a single three-dimensional object, or as a configuration space composed of such three-dimensional objects, none of which bear temporal relations to one another. Such theories will be empirically self-refuting unless they can accommodate the existence of conscious beings capable of representation. For if representation itself is impossible in a timeless world, (...)
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  50. added 2018-02-19
    Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity.Patrice Philie - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):63-92.
    On the surface, one of the main differences between John McDowell and Wilfrid Sellars when it comes to their conceptions of intentionality has to do with their respective accounts of meaning. McDowell advocates a relational account of meaning, whereas Sellars holds, on the contrary, that a correct view of intentionality is only possible through a non-relational account of meaning. According to McDowell, Sellars does not consider the possibility of his own relational view because he suffers from a ‘blind spot’. It (...)
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