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Siblings:History/traditions: Intentionality, Misc

341 found
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1 — 50 / 341
  1. added 2018-09-20
    There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation.Craig Callender & Jonathan Cohen - 2005 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21 (1):67-85.
    We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case.
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  2. added 2018-09-17
    Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-17
    Fixing Reference By Imogen Dickie Oxford University Press, 2015, Pp.288, £37.50 ISBN 978-0-19-875561-6.Nicholas K. Jones - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (1):148-153.
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  4. added 2018-09-14
    Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-30
    Medieval Vs Contemporary Metaphysics and Logic of Intentionality.Andrzej Bułeczka - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This thesis addresses three challenges posed by intentionality - the ability of our mental states and language to be about something - to a logician: an apparent reference to non-existent objects, intentional indeterminacy and the failure of substitutivity of coextensive terms in an intentional context. Since intentionality plays an important role in our everyday reasoning, a proper formal account of it is highly desirable, yet it requires a departure from classical logic. One can modify classical logic and adapt the formal (...)
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  6. added 2018-06-26
    The Concept of ‘Body Schema’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Embodied Subjectivity.Jan Halák - 2018 - In Bernard Andrieu, Jim Parry, Alessandro Porrovecchio & Olivier Sirost (eds.), Body Ecology and Emersive Leisure. Londýn, Velká Británie: Routledge. pp. 37-50.
    In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic (...)
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  7. added 2018-06-05
    The Ubiquity of Computation.Eric Dietrich - 1993 - Think (misc) 2 (June):27-29.
    For many years now, Harnad has argued that transduction is special among cognitive capacities -- special enough to block Searle's Chinese Room Argument. His arguments (as well as Searle's) have been important and useful, but not correct, it seems to me. Their arguments have provided the modern impetus for getting clear about computationalism and the nature of computing. This task has proven to be quite difficult. Which is simply to say that dealing with Harnad's arguments (as well as Searle's) has (...)
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  8. added 2018-05-23
    Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory.Andrea Marchesi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien (3):343-367.
    _ Source: _Page Count 25 This paper examines Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it is developed in _Logical Investigations_ and other early writings. In Section 1, the author attempts to capture the core of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Section 2 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of intentional relation developed in the fifth _Investigation_. In Section 3, the author tries to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the sixth _Investigation_ that the designation ‘object’ is (...)
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  9. added 2018-05-22
    Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality.Joachim Lipski - 2018 - Organon F 25 (1):53-73.
    According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this (...)
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  10. added 2018-05-22
    Demotivating Intentional Mentalism.Joachim Lipski - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):298-318.
    Intentional Mentalism is the view that mental intentionality is primary to non-mental intentionality and that the latter is derived from the former. In this article I examine three views which have been taken to motivate Intentional Mentalism: conventionalism as invoked by Searle, Gricean pragmatism, and the language of thought hypothesis. I argue that none of these views motivates Intentional Mentalism, and that, in fact, the former two imply its rejection.
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  11. added 2018-05-16
    The Many Streams in Ralph Pred’s Onflow. [REVIEW]Anderson Weekes - 2006 - Chromatikon: Annales de la Philosophie En Procès / Yearbook of Philosophy in Process 2:227-244.
    This study of Ralph Pred’s Onflow (MIT Press, 2005) expands on Pred’s arguments and raises doubts about the viability of phenomenology. Showing that Pred’s method is indeed phenomenological, I validate his interpretations of William James as phenomenologist and his critique of John Searle in light of James, which documents the extent to which the role of habit in the constitution of experience is neglected by philosophers. In explaining habit, however, Pred himself reverts to non-phenomenological models drawn from James’ postulate of (...)
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  12. added 2018-04-23
    Non-Propositional Contents and How to Find Them.Alex Grzankowski - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    To understand what non-propositional content is and whether there are any such contents, we first need to know what propositional content is. That issue will be the focus of the first section of this essay. In the second section, with an understanding of propositional content in hand, we will consider representations that fail to have propositional content. In contrast to recent literature, it will be argued that metaphysical considerations concerning what’s represented, rather than linguistic considerations, are a more promising way (...)
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  13. added 2018-04-22
    Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent (...)
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  14. added 2018-04-13
    Review of P. Jacob What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. [REVIEW]Fiona Macpherson - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (3):184-185.
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  15. added 2018-03-25
    Meaning What I It.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):66-76.
    Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...)
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  16. added 2018-03-05
    Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...)
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  17. added 2018-03-05
    All in the Family.Willem A. Devries - 2013 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley. pp. 259--280.
    This article considers Ruth Millikan's relationship to Robert Brandom and most especially their common influence, Wilfrid Sellars.
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  18. added 2018-03-03
    Quantum Gravity, Timelessness, and the Contents of Thought.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    A number of recent theories of quantum gravity lack a one-dimensional structure of ordered temporal instants. Instead, according to many of these views, our world is either best represented as a single three-dimensional object, or as a configuration space composed of such three-dimensional objects, none of which bear temporal relations to one another. Such theories will be empirically self-refuting unless they can accommodate the existence of conscious beings capable of representation. For if representation itself is impossible in a timeless world, (...)
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  19. added 2018-02-19
    Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity.Patrice Philie - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):63-92.
    On the surface, one of the main differences between John McDowell and Wilfrid Sellars when it comes to their conceptions of intentionality has to do with their respective accounts of meaning. McDowell advocates a relational account of meaning, whereas Sellars holds, on the contrary, that a correct view of intentionality is only possible through a non-relational account of meaning. According to McDowell, Sellars does not consider the possibility of his own relational view because he suffers from a ‘blind spot’. It (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-16
    Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. [REVIEW]Eric Nelson - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (3):171-173.
  21. added 2018-01-13
    Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233.
    Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the (...)
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  22. added 2018-01-04
    Principles of Acquaintance.Jessica Pepp - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The thesis that in order to genuinely think about a particular object one must be (in some sense) acquainted with that object has been thoroughly explored since it was put forward by Bertrand Russell. Recently, the thesis has come in for mounting criticism. The aim of this paper is to point out that neither the exploration nor the criticism have been sensitive to the fact that the thesis can be interpreted in two different ways, yielding two different principles of acquaintance. (...)
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  23. added 2017-11-20
    Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, by Graham Priest.Fred Kroon - 2005 - Disputatio:295-301.
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  24. added 2017-10-24
    Reply to Gillett's Consciousness, Intentionality and Internalism.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181-182.
    This reply to Grant Gillett appeared in the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism) initially presented in "Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World" (1990) in Philosophical Psychology. The symposium begins with Velmans' summary of the main arguments in that paper, followed by critiques from two psychologists--Robert Rentoul and Norman Wetherick. Velmans replies to the critiques and the entire treatment is further critiqued by the philosopher Grant Gillett, followed by Velmans' final reply. At (...)
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  25. added 2017-07-24
    Collective Intentions.Philip Pettit - 2001 - In Intention in Law and Philosophy. Burlington, USA: Ashgate. pp. 241-254.
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  26. added 2017-07-20
    Conceptions of Original Intentionality (and Social Ontology).Pietro Salis - 2017 - In Pietro Salis & Guido Seddone (eds.), Mind, collective agency, norms. Aachen, Germany: Shaker Verlag. pp. 7-15.
    This paper highlights the fundamental difference in the criteria adopted to explain original intentionality, which is the basic stratum of intentional phenomena, between the mentalist mainstream and the minority inspired by the rejection of the Myth of the Given. Among the attempts on the latter, inferentialism has become a view of particular interest. According to inferentialism, full intentionality is a feature of cognitive subjects who participate in normative discursive practice. Therefore, the criteria to which the basic intentionality of the mind (...)
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  27. added 2017-07-15
    The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not (...)
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  28. added 2017-06-02
    Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über Phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der Erfahrung.Dirk Franken - 2014 - Dissertation, Münster
    Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, (...)
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  29. added 2017-03-13
    Attitudes and Normativity.Tadeusz Ciecierski - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):265-283.
    The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...)
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  30. added 2017-03-03
    Brentano on Intentionality.Tim Crane - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 41-48.
    Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this work in 1874, and how they were (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-14
    Intentionality and the Linguistic Analogy.Mohan Matthen - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 31 (1):77-94.
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  32. added 2017-02-12
    Intentionality.Cathal O’Madagain - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality If I think about a piano, something in my thought picks out a piano. If I talk about cigars, something in my speech refers to cigars. This feature of thoughts and words, whereby they pick out, refer to, or are about things, is intentionality. In a word, intentionality is aboutness. Many mental states exhibit […].
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  33. added 2017-02-10
    Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-10
    On Disquotation and Intensionality.R. M. Martin - 1974 - Kant-Studien 65 (1-4):111-121.
  35. added 2017-02-08
    Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence.Georges Rey - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):389-415.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what I call Strong (...)
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  36. added 2017-02-07
    Malcolm and Searle on 'Intentional Mental States'.P. M. S. Hacker - 1992 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (3):245-275.
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  37. added 2017-02-07
    Intentionality.David M. Rosenthal - 1987 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184.
    At the level of our platitudinous background knowledge about things, speech is the expression of thought. And understanding what such expressing involves is central to understanding the relation between thinking and speaking. Part of what it is for a speech act to express a mental state is that the speech act accurately captures the mental state and can convey to others what mental state it is. And for this to occur, the speech act at least must have propositional content that (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-02
    Response to Christopher Tomaszewski’s “Intentionality as Partial Identity”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):1-13.
    Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz Brentano's views (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-01
    Intentionality Without Extensionality.Robert J. Lithown & Ausonio Marras - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (6):403 - 410.
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  40. added 2017-01-31
    The Intentionality of Observation.Edwin Martin Jr - 1973 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):121-129.
  41. added 2017-01-29
    Chisholm on Intentionality.Lawrence Edward Finsen - 1982 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    Throughout his writings, Chisholm has maintained that the concept of intentionality provides a basis for an ontological distinction between the mental and the physical. This dissertation gives a comprehensive presentation and critical examination of this claim. Chisholm has often identified this 'Intentionalist Thesis' as a linguistic version of Brentano's view that intentional inexistence provides a distinction between mental and physical phenomena. The introductory chapter places Chisholm's work in this historical context, suggesting an interpretation of Brentano's view contrary to much of (...)
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  42. added 2017-01-29
    Intentionality and Mental Events.P. J. Sheehan - 1968
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  43. added 2017-01-28
    The Breakthrough to Phenomenology: Three Theories of Mental Content in the Brentano School.Ryan Hickerson - 2003 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Brentano and his students were the first to wrestle an Aristotelian perceptual concept, intentionality, into the modern metaphysics of mind. This dissertation recovers theories of Franz Brentano , Kazimierz Twardowski , and Edmund Husserl by appreciating each as an unique attempt to make a modern home for the ancient doctrine of "aboutness." The dissertation corrects a broad range of contemporary misunderstandings and criticisms of Brentano School philosophy, in particular one advanced by Martin Heidegger . ;Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-28
    Reference and Intentionality.Olav Asheim - 1992
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  45. added 2017-01-26
    Proximality as a Mark of the Mental.A. Hannay - 1977 - In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Oriel Press. pp. 132.
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  46. added 2017-01-26
    Mental States.Joseph Margolis - 1975 - Behaviorism 3 (1):23-31.
  47. added 2017-01-24
    Brain and Behavioral Functions Supporting the Intentionality of Mental States.João de F. Teixeira & Alfredo Pereira Jr - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (2):123-147.
    This paper relates intentionality, a central feature of human consciousness, with brain functions controlling adaptive action. Mental intentionality, understood as the “aboutness” of mental states, includes two modalities: semantic intentionality, the attribution of meaning to mental states, and projective intentionality, the projection of conscious content into the world. We claim that both modalities are the evolutionary product of self-organized action, and discuss examples of animal behavior that illustrate some stages of this evolution. The adaptive advantages of self-organized action impacted on (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-23
    From Intentionality to Intensionality and Back.John J. Drummond - 1998 - Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):89-126.
  49. added 2017-01-22
    Symposium: Criteria of Intensionality.J. O. Urmson & Jonathan Cohen - 1968 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 42:107 - 142.
  50. added 2017-01-21
    Causation and Intensionality: A Problem for Naturalism.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):41-64.
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