Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (University of the Andes)
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  1. Quasi-Psychologism About Collective Intention.Matthew Rachar - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.
    This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective (...)
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  2. Folk Psychology and Proximal Intentions.Alfred Mele, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Maria Khoudary - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present (...)
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  3. Cooperation: With or Without Shared Intentions.Jules Salomone-Sehr - forthcoming - Ethics.
    In this paper, I refute an orthodoxy of shared agency theory, namely the view that shared intentions to φ are necessary and sufficient for φ to count as an instance of cooperation. I then take stock and articulate the everyday conception of cooperation that this refutation implies.
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  4. Intention as Belief.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What’s the relationship between (i) intending to do something, (ii) believing that you are going to do this, and (iii) its being the case that you are going to do the thing in question? I propose a position on which all three categories, correctly understood, amount in the fundamental case to the very same thing. The belief that constitutes future-directed intention, when strong, likewise constitutes one as having a real tendency to act in the intended way.
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  5. The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent‐Based Moral Judgment.Justin W. Martin, Marine Buon & Fiery Cushman - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (4):e12965.
    When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to (...)
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  6. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of (...)
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  7. Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Noncognitivism about normative judgment is the view that normative judgment is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. Noncognitivism about intention is the view that intention is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. While these theories are alike in several ways, they have rarely been discussed in concert. This paper (...)
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  8. MAKING Metaphysics.Thomas Byrne - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    We can cause windows to break and we can break windows; we can cause villages to flood and we can flood villages; and we can cause chocolate to melt and we can melt chocolate. Each time these can come apart: if, for example, A merely instructs B to break the window, then A causes the window to break without breaking it herself. Each instance of A breaking/flooding/melting/burning/killing/etc. something, is an instance of what I call MAKING. I argue that MAKING is (...)
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  9. Mark C. Murphy, God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument From Evil. [REVIEW]Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (5):587-590.
  10. Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Rational Powers in Action presents a conception of instrumental rationality as governing actions that are extended in time with indeterminate ends. Tenenbaum argues that previous philosophical theories in this area, in focusing on momentary snapshots of the mind of idealized agents, miss central aspects of human rationality.
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  11. Aristotle on Motion in Incomplete Animals.Daniel Coren - 2020 - Apeiron 53 (3):285-314.
    I explain what Aristotle means when, after puzzling about the matter of motion in incomplete animals, he suggests in De Anima III 11.433b31–434a5 that just as incomplete animals are moved indeterminately, desire and phantasia are present in those animals, but present indeterminately. I argue that self-motion and its directing faculties in incomplete animals differ in degree but not in kind from those of complete animals. I examine how an object of desire differs for an incomplete animal. Using a comparison with (...)
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  12. Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.
    Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to (...)
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  13. Is Remembering to Do a Special Kind of Memory?Thor Grünbaum & Søren Kyllingsbæk - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):385-404.
    When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We (...)
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  14. Non-Symmetric Awe: Why It Matters Even If We Don't.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel.
    The universe is enormous, perhaps unimaginably so. In comparison, we are very small. Does this suggest that humanity has little if any cosmic significance? And if we don’t matter, should that matter to us? Blaise Pascal, Frank Ramsey, Bertrand Russell, Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Stephen Hawking, and others have offered insightful answers to those questions. For example, Pascal and Ramsey emphasize that whereas the stars (in all their enormity) cannot think, human beings can. Through an exploration of some features of (...)
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  15. Intention and Mental Causation.Rémi Clot-Goudard - forthcoming - Foundations of Science.
    Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), (...)
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  16. L'Explication de l'action. Analyses contemporaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2014 - Paris, France: Vrin.
    En quoi consiste l’explication des actions humaines? Au sein de la philosophie analytique, la réponse standard à cette question, que les travaux de Davidson ont largement contribué à façonner, est la conception causaliste : expliquer une action consiste à mentionner la raison pour laquelle l’agent l’a accomplie, conçue comme la combinaison particulière d’états mentaux (désir et croyance) dont l’occurrence est la cause des mouvements corporels constituant l’action. En identifiant les raisons à des causes, cette conception a fait ressurgir les questions (...)
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  17. L'Explication ordinaire des actions humaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2015 - 93100 Montreuil, France: Ithaque.
    En quoi consiste l’explication d’une action ? La question, fondamentale pour toute réflexion méthodologique sur les sciences de l’homme, renvoie d’abord à une pratique commune. Dans nos rapports à autrui, il arrive que la compréhension fasse défaut. C’est alors que surgit le besoin d’explication, afin de comprendre la conduite d’autrui ou encore éclairer les autres sur ce que nous faisons… Qu’est-ce qu’une action intentionnelle ? Les pensées d’un agent causent-elles son comportement ? Comment caractériser le savoir qu’un agent possède de (...)
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  18. Does What We Want Influence What We See?Bence Nanay - 2006 - In Ron Sun & Naomi Miyake (eds.), Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. CPC Press.
    I aim to show that the content of our perceptual states depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Most philosophical and psychological theories of perception claim or at least assume the opposite: they conceive of perception as allpurpose: what we want to do does not influence what we see. I will argue that the content of one's perceptual state does vary as the action one is inclined to perform varies. To put it very simply, what we see does (...)
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  19. Intention at the Interface.Ellen Fridland - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    I identify and characterize the kind of personal-level control-structure that is most relevant for skilled action control, namely, what I call, “practical intention”. I differentiate between practical intentions and general intentions not in terms of their function or timing but in terms of their content. I also highlight a distinction between practical intentions and other control mechanisms that are required to explain skilled action. I’ll maintain that all intentions, general and practical, have the function specifying, sustaining, and structuring action but (...)
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  20. Revaluing the Behaviorist Ghost In Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.Nikolai Alksnis & Jack Alan Reynolds - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...)
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  21. On Self-Governance Over Time.Sergio Tenenbaum - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-12.
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  22. Interactive Time-Travel: On the Intersubjective Retro-Modulation of Intentions.E. Di Paolo - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):49-74.
    The temporality of intentions and actions in situations of social interaction can sometimes be paradoxical. I argue that in these situations it may sometimes be possible to conceive of individual acts that can, in a strong sense, be intended retroactively. This could happen when the relational patterns in social interaction literally alter the virtual structure of a participant's past corporeal intentions resulting in an odd experience of having intended something all along without knowing it. I propose that this possibility should (...)
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  23. Tensions Theoretical and Theorized: Comment on Di Paolo's 'Interative Time-Travel'.J. Z. Elias - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):75-79.
  24. Intentions and Synergies: The Cases of Control and Speed: Comment on Di Paolo's 'Interactive Time Travel'.S. Wallot - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):80-83.
    In the following, I want to add to the examples and arguments presented by Di Paolo, and argue that his description of virtual tendencies is not just a viable solution for a more coherent conception of intentions in the realmof social-embodied interactions, but that it is closely linked to the concept of motor-synergies that are necessary in order to enable movement control. Two aspects about the human body, the degrees of freedom that it has available to move, and the speed (...)
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  25. Anscombe on How St. Peter Intentionally Did What He Intended Not to Do.Graham Hubbs - 2019 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):129-45.
    G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, meticulous in its detail and its structure, ends on a puzzling note. At its conclusion, Anscombe claims that when he denied Jesus, St. Peter intentionally did what he intended not to do. This essay will examine why Anscombe construes the case as she does and what it might teach us about the nature of practical rationality.
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  26. Ethics Without Intention, by Di Nucci, Ezio: London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014, Pp. V + 264, £18.99.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-837.
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  27. G.E.M. Anscombe – „Intention“.David Hommen - 2016 - Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL-Online).
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  28. Was There a Scientific ’68? Its Repercussion on Action Research and Mixing Methods.José Andrés-Gallego - 2018 - Arbor 194 (787):436: 1-10.
    The author asks whether there was a “scientific ‘68”, and focuses on aspects of two specific methodological proposals defined in the 1940s and 50s by the terms “action research” and “mixing methods”, applied particularly to social sciences. In the first, the climate surrounding the events of 1968 contributed to heightening the participative element to be found –by definition– in “action research”; that is: the importance of making the research subjects themselves participants in the design, execution and application of the study (...)
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  29. Propositionalism About Intention: Shifting the Burden of Proof.Lucy Campbell - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252.
    ABSTRACTA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism (...)
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  30. Effort and the Standard Story of Action.Michael Brent - 2012 - Philosophical Writings 40:19 - 27.
    In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally mediated by their motivational factors. On the (...)
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  31. Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.
    The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on (...)
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  32. Review Essay: Intention, Plans, and Practical ReasonIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Zimmerman & Michael E. Bratman - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):189.
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  33. Actions, Rationality & Decision.Denis Fisette and Daniel Vanderveken (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford: , College Publications.
    Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo et Raimo Tuomela (...)
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  34. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (30):35-62.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  35. Can Affordances Explain Behavior?Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):295-315.
    In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...)
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  36. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Alfred Mele tackles some central problems in the philosophy of action. His purpose is to construct an explanatory model for intentional behaviour, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons and intentions in the etiology of intentional action.
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  37. Brand on Intending and Acting1.Haig Khatchadourian - 1986 - Metaphilosophy 17 (4):371-378.
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  38. Reasons for Action. Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. , £21.99 .).Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):413-415.
  39. The Intentional and the Socio-Cultural in Language Use.Jan Nuyts - 1994 - Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (2):237-268.
    This paper is a contribution to the recent debate between a number of anthropologists and philosophers concerning the role of intentions in a theory of verbal behavior. It reviews a number of arguments put forward by ethno- and anthro-polinguists against the intention-centered view of human behavior common in current cognitively oriented language research, and typically represented in John Searle's theory of intentionality and of speech acts. It is argued that these arguments do not affect the assumption that intentions are always (...)
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  40. Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. By Myles Brand.James E. Tomberlin - 1987 - Noûs 21 (1):45-55.
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  41. Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions: Nature and Classification.Mark J. Barker - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):199-226.
    This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light (...)
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  42. Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.
    What is the relation between the intention to A and doing A intentionally? It is natural to suppose that the latter entails the former. That is, it is natural to accept what Michael Bratman has called the ‘Simple View’ of the relation between acting intentionally and having an intention. Bratman is one noteworthy writer who has denied that the Simple View is true. In the present paper I do not defend this view. I contend that one well-known argument that Bratman (...)
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  43. Author’s Intention. [REVIEW]Darryl J. Murphy - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):787-789.
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  44. Evidence and Agency Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Berislav Marusic - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Berislav Marusic explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
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  45. Sometimes It is Not so Bad to Decide in a Hurry: Influence of Different Levels of Temporal Opportunity on the Elaboration of Purchasing Intention.Grzegorz Pochwatko & Jean-Christophe Giger - 2008 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 39 (4):209-216.
    Sometimes it is not so bad to decide in a hurry: Influence of different levels of temporal opportunity on the elaboration of purchasing intention The present study examines the impact of different levels of time pressure on the elaboration of purchase intention. Participants formed attitudes towards two stores and then indicate in which stores they would go shopping. Descriptions of the stores were experimentally constructed in order to indicate whether participants rely on an attribute-based or an attitude-based strategy when forming (...)
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  46. Legislative Intention and the CISG.Olaf Meyer & André Janssen - 2009 - In Olaf Meyer & André Janssen (eds.), Cisg Methodology. Sellier de Gruyter.
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  47. The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention.Catherine D. Rau - 1973 - NTU Philosophical Review 3:25-34.
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  48. The Author’s Intention. [REVIEW]Darryl J. Murphy - 2005 - Symposium 9 (1):129-132.
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  49. Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions?Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):54-69.
    Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions (...)
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  50. Making Sense of Intention.Henry Schiller - unknown
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