Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (University of the Andes)
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  1. Non-Symmetric Awe: Why It Matters Even If We Don't.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel.
    The universe is enormous, perhaps unimaginably so. In comparison, we are very small. Does this suggest that humanity has little if any cosmic significance? And if we don’t matter, should that matter to us? Blaise Pascal, Frank Ramsey, Bertrand Russell, Susan Wolf, Harry Frankfurt, Stephen Hawking, and others have offered insightful answers to those questions. For example, Pascal and Ramsey emphasize that whereas the stars (in all their enormity) cannot think, human beings can. Through an exploration of some features of (...)
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  2. L'Explication de l'action. Analyses contemporaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2014 - Paris, France: Vrin.
    En quoi consiste l’explication des actions humaines? Au sein de la philosophie analytique, la réponse standard à cette question, que les travaux de Davidson ont largement contribué à façonner, est la conception causaliste : expliquer une action consiste à mentionner la raison pour laquelle l’agent l’a accomplie, conçue comme la combinaison particulière d’états mentaux (désir et croyance) dont l’occurrence est la cause des mouvements corporels constituant l’action. En identifiant les raisons à des causes, cette conception a fait ressurgir les questions (...)
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  3. L'Explication ordinaire des actions humaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2015 - 93100 Montreuil, France: Ithaque.
    En quoi consiste l’explication d’une action ? La question, fondamentale pour toute réflexion méthodologique sur les sciences de l’homme, renvoie d’abord à une pratique commune. Dans nos rapports à autrui, il arrive que la compréhension fasse défaut. C’est alors que surgit le besoin d’explication, afin de comprendre la conduite d’autrui ou encore éclairer les autres sur ce que nous faisons… Qu’est-ce qu’une action intentionnelle ? Les pensées d’un agent causent-elles son comportement ? Comment caractériser le savoir qu’un agent possède de (...)
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  4. Does What We Want Influence What We See?Bence Nanay - 2006 - In Ron Sun & Naomi Miyake (eds.), Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. CPC Press.
    I aim to show that the content of our perceptual states depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Most philosophical and psychological theories of perception claim or at least assume the opposite: they conceive of perception as allpurpose: what we want to do does not influence what we see. I will argue that the content of one's perceptual state does vary as the action one is inclined to perform varies. To put it very simply, what we see does (...)
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  5. Revaluing the Behaviorist Ghost In Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.Nikolai Alksnis & Jack Alan Reynolds - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...)
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  6. On Self-Governance Over Time.Sergio Tenenbaum - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-12.
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  7. Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief.Carlos Núñez - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to (...)
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  8. The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. -/- The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such (...)
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  9. Anscombe on How St. Peter Intentionally Did What He Intended Not to Do.Graham Hubbs - 2019 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):129-45.
    G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, meticulous in its detail and its structure, ends on a puzzling note. At its conclusion, Anscombe claims that when he denied Jesus, St. Peter intentionally did what he intended not to do. This essay will examine why Anscombe construes the case as she does and what it might teach us about the nature of practical rationality.
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  10. Ethics Without Intention, by Di Nucci, Ezio: London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014, Pp. V + 264, £18.99.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-837.
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  11. G.E.M. Anscombe – „Intention“.David Hommen - 2016 - Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL-Online).
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  12. Was There a Scientific ’68? Its Repercussion on Action Research and Mixing Methods.José Andrés-Gallego - 2018 - Arbor 194 (787):436: 1-10.
    The author asks whether there was a “scientific ‘68”, and focuses on aspects of two specific methodological proposals defined in the 1940s and 50s by the terms “action research” and “mixing methods”, applied particularly to social sciences. In the first, the climate surrounding the events of 1968 contributed to heightening the participative element to be found –by definition– in “action research”; that is: the importance of making the research subjects themselves participants in the design, execution and application of the study (...)
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  13. Propositionalism About Intention: Shifting the Burden of Proof.Lucy Campbell - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252.
    ABSTRACTA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism (...)
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  14. Effort and the Standard Story of Action.Michael Brent - 2012 - Philosophical Writings 40:19 - 27.
    In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally mediated by their motivational factors. On the (...)
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  15. Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.
    The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on (...)
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  16. Review Essay: Intention, Plans, and Practical ReasonIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Zimmerman & Michael E. Bratman - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):189.
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  17. Actions, Rationality & Decision.Denis Fisette and Daniel Vanderveken (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford: , College Publications.
    Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo et Raimo Tuomela (...)
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  18. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (30):35-62.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  19. Can Affordances Explain Behavior?Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):295-315.
    In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...)
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  20. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Alfred Mele tackles some central problems in the philosophy of action. His purpose is to construct an explanatory model for intentional behaviour, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons and intentions in the etiology of intentional action.
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  21. Brand on Intending and Acting1.Haig Khatchadourian - 1986 - Metaphilosophy 17 (4):371-378.
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  22. Reasons for Action. Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. , £21.99 .).Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):413-415.
  23. The Intentional and the Socio-Cultural in Language Use.Jan Nuyts - 1994 - Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (2):237-268.
    This paper is a contribution to the recent debate between a number of anthropologists and philosophers concerning the role of intentions in a theory of verbal behavior. It reviews a number of arguments put forward by ethno- and anthro-polinguists against the intention-centered view of human behavior common in current cognitively oriented language research, and typically represented in John Searle's theory of intentionality and of speech acts. It is argued that these arguments do not affect the assumption that intentions are always (...)
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  24. Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory. By Myles Brand.James E. Tomberlin - 1987 - Noûs 21 (1):45-55.
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  25. Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions: Nature and Classification.Mark J. Barker - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):199-226.
    This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light (...)
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  26. Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.
    What is the relation between the intention to A and doing A intentionally? It is natural to suppose that the latter entails the former. That is, it is natural to accept what Michael Bratman has called the ‘Simple View’ of the relation between acting intentionally and having an intention. Bratman is one noteworthy writer who has denied that the Simple View is true. In the present paper I do not defend this view. I contend that one well-known argument that Bratman (...)
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  27. Author’s Intention. [REVIEW]Darryl J. Murphy - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):787-789.
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  28. Evidence and Agency Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Berislav Marusic - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Berislav Marusic explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
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  29. Sometimes It is Not so Bad to Decide in a Hurry: Influence of Different Levels of Temporal Opportunity on the Elaboration of Purchasing Intention.Grzegorz Pochwatko & Jean-Christophe Giger - 2008 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 39 (4):209-216.
    Sometimes it is not so bad to decide in a hurry: Influence of different levels of temporal opportunity on the elaboration of purchasing intention The present study examines the impact of different levels of time pressure on the elaboration of purchase intention. Participants formed attitudes towards two stores and then indicate in which stores they would go shopping. Descriptions of the stores were experimentally constructed in order to indicate whether participants rely on an attribute-based or an attitude-based strategy when forming (...)
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  30. Legislative Intention and the CISG.Olaf Meyer & André Janssen - 2009 - In Olaf Meyer & André Janssen (eds.), Cisg Methodology. Sellier de Gruyter.
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  31. The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention.Catherine D. Rau - 1973 - NTU Philosophical Review 3:25-34.
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  32. The Author’s Intention. [REVIEW]Darryl J. Murphy - 2005 - Symposium 9 (1):129-132.
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  33. Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions?Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):54-69.
    Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions (...)
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  34. Making Sense of Intention.Henry Schiller - unknown
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  35. Action, Intention, and Reason.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):308.
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  36. Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe.Irving Thalberg, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (4):624.
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  37. Intending.Lawrence H. Davis & John F. M. Hunter - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):652.
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  38. Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
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  39. Lying by Promising. A Study on Insincere Illocutionary Acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
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  40. The Anthropology of Intentions: Language in a World of Others.Alessandro Duranti - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    How and to what extent do people take into account the intentions of others? Alessandro Duranti sets out to answer this question, showing that the role of intentions in human interaction is variable across cultures and contexts. Through careful analysis of data collected over three decades in US and Pacific societies, Duranti demonstrates that, in some communities, social actors avoid intentional discourse, focusing on the consequences of actions rather than on their alleged original goals. In other cases, he argues, people (...)
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  41. Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
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  42. Causal Constraints on Intention.Steven J. Jensen - 2014 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14 (2):273-293.
    Christopher Tollefsen, relying on the new natural law theory, has suggested that in the Phoenix abortion case, the action might be characterized simply as removing the baby rather than killing the baby. Tollefsen and other proponents of the new natural law theory fail to give proper weight to the observable facts of the world around us, and thereby tend to ignore the importance of observable causes in shaping the character of our intentions and our actions. An appreciation of the role (...)
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  43. Les Intentions D’Écriture de MontaigneMontaigne's Intentions of Writing. The Example of the Chapter Of Cannibals.Jean-François Dupeyron - 2016 - Methodos 16.
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  44. Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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  45. The Gulf War and Just War Theory: Right Intention.Rosemary Hollis - 1992 - New Blackfriars 73 (859):210-217.
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  46. XIV.—Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1):321-332.
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  47. VIII—The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art.Anthony Savile - 1968 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (1):101-124.
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  48. What Can We Not Do at Will and Why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.
    Recently it has been argued that we cannot intend at will. Since intentions cannot be true or false, our involuntariness cannot be traced to “the characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth”, as Bernard Williams convincingly argues. The alternative explanation is that the source of involuntariness is the shared normative nature of beliefs and intentions. Three analogies may assimilate intentions to beliefs vis-à-vis our involuntariness: first, beliefs and intentions aim at something; second, beliefs and intentions are transparent to the (...)
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  49. The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.N. Sinhababu - unknown
  50. Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by GEM Anscombe.Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.) - 2005 - Andrews UK.
    Presents a collection of essays by the celebrated philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. This collection includes papers on human nature and practical philosophy, together with the classic 'Modern Moral Philosophy'.
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