Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (University of the Andes)
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  1. Cooperation and Shared Inquiry.Daniel C. Friedman - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    We inquire together all the time, yet the norms of such inquiring are poorly understood. Parallels from norms of individual inquiry fall short in accurately characterizing our inquiring together. The need then for an account of inquiring together which provides normative guidance is pressing. This paper unpacks and defends a version of a crucial norm of such inquiry, inspired by Harman (1986), which codifies the kind of evidence necessary for a shared inquirer to permissibly settle her shared question. It is (...)
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  2. The Unity of Motive.Levin Güver - 2024 - Argumenta 18:231-245.
    The role of intention in criminal law stands in stark contrast to that of motive. While intention’s significance for criminal liability is hardly ever contested, motive’s relevance is most frequently relegated to the peripheries. This is, I believe, a mistake, and I hope to amend it by providing a novel argument in favour of motive’s relevance to criminal liability: an argument premised not on normative considerations, but on the very nature of motive itself. An agent’s motives, I will argue, are (...)
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  3. (1 other version)Knowing Your Commitments in Action.Merve Rumeysa Tapınç - forthcoming - Episteme.
    An interesting class of intentions is commitments: diachronic intentions that are especially representative of human agency. I argue that the justification conditions for knowing our commitments differ from those for knowing ordinary intentions, and I propose an externalist view according to which knowing one’s own commitments is much like knowing those of others. I discuss Sarah Paul’s transparency view, according to which, we know our intentions by making a conscious decision, even when we do not follow through on them. This (...)
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  4. (1 other version)Communicating Testimonial Commitment.Alejandro Vesga - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    I argue for the Cooperative Warrant Thesis (CWT), according to which the determinants of testimonial contents in communication are given by the practical requirements of cooperative action. This thesis distances itself from conventionalist views, according to which testimony must be strictly bounded by conventions of speech. CWT proves explanatorily better than conventionalism on several accounts. It offers a principled and accurate criterion to distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial communication. In being goal-sensitive, this criterion captures the role of weak and robust (...)
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  5. Understanding mental causation.Andrea White - 2024 - York: White Rose University Press.
    Understanding Mental Causation proposes a new, non-relational theory of mental causation. Andrea White believes that contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. This volume explains where the leading theories go astray, and how the new theory proposed solves critical problems for philosophers of mind and action. Ordinary experience suggests that what we do with our bodies causally depends, somehow, on what is going on in our minds. However, the problem of how (...)
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  6. The Do-able Solution to the Interface Problem.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has seemed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of (...)
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  7. Interpreting Action with Norms: Responsibility and the Twofold Nature of the Ought‐Implies‐Can Principle.Sebastián Figueroa Rubio - 2024 - Ratio Juris.
    This article examines the application of the ought‐implies‐can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show (...)
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  8. The Induction-of-Intrinsic-Desires Theory.Christoph Lumer - 2012 - In Alessandro Innocenti & Angela Sirigu, Neuroscience and the Economics of Decision Making. Abingdon; New York: Routledge. pp. 109-124.
    (1) Emotions influence decisions in various ways. In particular, they can induce new intrinsic desires. This mechanism is the topic of this paper. (2) After briefly discussing some rival approaches a new theory of such emotional decisions is presented. (3) The general framework into which this theory is integrated is an expectancy-valence or decision-theoretic model of decision, however with a strict distinction between intrinsic and other desires. (4) The specific part of the theory then explains emotional decisions by non-hedonic emotion-induced (...)
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  9. Attention and Practical Knowledge.Hao Tang - 2023 - Journal of Human Cognition 7 (2):19-29.
    Practical knowledge, in the sense made famous by G. E. M. Anscombe, is “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions”. This knowledge is very ordinary, but philosophically it is not easy to understand. One illuminating approach is to see practical knowledge as a kind of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. I offer an enrichment of this approach, by (1) exploiting Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of heeding (that is, paying attention), in particular paying attention to one’s own intentional action, and (2) (...)
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  10. Objections to Davidson’s Theory of Agency and Actions.Yu Zhang - 2023 - Open Journal of Social Sciences 11:355-362.
    Davidson’s theory of agency aims to solve the dilemma that the same action can be both intentional and not intentional. He explains primitive actions using primarily bodily movements and argues that event-causality can be described through the “accordion effect”, but not agent-causality. And Davidson uses reasons as causes to explain the actions and responds to five objections. In this paper, I critique Davidson’s argument, pointing out that he ignores certain factors in the belief-desire model, such as emotions. And his sentence (...)
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  11. Predictive Minds Can Be Humean Minds.Frederik T. Junker, Jelle Bruineberg & Thor Grünbaum - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The predictive processing literature contains at least two different versions of the framework with different theoretical resources at their disposal. One version appeals to so-called optimistic priors to explain agents’ motivation to act (call this optimistic predictive processing). A more recent version appeals to expected free energy minimization to explain how agents can decide between different action policies (call this preference predictive processing). The difference between the two versions has not been properly appreciated, and they are not sufficiently separated in (...)
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  12. Gappy Action and Murder.Noam Melamed - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper explores the form of persistence distinctive of intentional actions. Unlike entities whose progression through time is typically continuous, our actions often have parts separated in time by a gap in our own activity. The way in which their coherence is understood thus affects their attribution to us. I present a theory of agency at the gaps that accounts for such phenomena and passes two touchstones. It solves the puzzle of the time of a killing in a new way (...)
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  13. De re belief and methodological solipsism.Kent Bach - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield, Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  14. Intentions and Inquiry.Daniel C. Friedman - 2025 - Mind 134 (533):85-106.
    This paper defends the Intention Account of Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial (...)
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  15. Folk psychology and proximal intentions.Alfred Mele, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Maria Khoudary - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (6):761-783.
    There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present (...)
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  16. How to do things with sunk costs.Michael Zhao - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):596-615.
    It is a commonplace in economics that we should disregard sunk costs. The sunk cost effect might be widespread, goes the conventional wisdom, but we would be better off if we could rid ourselves of it. In this paper, I argue against the orthodoxy by showing that the sunk cost effect is often beneficial. Drawing on discussions of related topics in dynamic choice theory, I show that, in a range of cases, being disposed to honor sunk costs allows an agent (...)
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  17. Life and meaning.Edward Hinchman - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (3):333-350.
    [Warning: Google's "AI Overview" -- the first thing you see when you google this publication -- is thoroughly misleading: it presents the paper's thesis and argument as nearly the opposite of what I actually wrote. I've long assumed that AI will transform everything we've written into nonsense after we die, but the nonsensification in this case was almost immediate. Here's the abstract that Google garbled:] What sense could it make to describe your life as ‘unlivable’? What is it not only (...)
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  18. Geist und Handlung. Wilfrid Sellars' Theorie des Handelns im manifesten und wissenschaftlichen Weltbild.Jürgen H. Franz - 2010 - Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
    Dieses Buch widmet sich der ebenso alten wie aktuellen Frage, wie das Handeln des Menschen plausibel und nachvollziehbar erklärt werden kann. Es wird das Ziel verfolgt, dieses brisante und immer noch kontrovers diskutierte Problem der Handlungserklärung philosophisch zu bedenken und adäquate Losungen zu entwickeln. Dabei wird zunächst ein Umweg eingeschlagen, der sich jedoch als besonders lohnenswert erweist, nämlich den über die philosophische Handlungstheorie von Wilfrid Sellars, die untrennbar mit seiner weitbekannten Philosophie des Geistes verknüpft ist und, obgleich bereits zur traditionellen (...)
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  19. Inclinazioni naturali: natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica.Giulia Codognato - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Trieste and University of Udine
    The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (...)
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  20. Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.
    Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non‐indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our (...)
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  21. (1 other version)The Primacy of the Practical.John Brunero - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between ψ-ing and ϕ-ing), we can derive reasons to (...)
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  22. ‘I knew all along’: making sense of post-self-deception judgments.Martina Orlandi - 2024 - Synthese 203 (136):1-15.
    Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, (...)
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  23. Four Objections to a Broad Scope Theory of Intention.Harrison Lee - 2021 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 95:225-239.
    Proponents of “broad scope” theories of intention argue that agents cannot intend to achieve given ends without intending certain inevitable or probable consequences. I shall argue that some Thomistic variants of these theories collapse into the Expectation View (EV), i.e., that we intend to produce all of the consequences that we expect to result from our actions. I shall then raise four objections to EV. First, EV falsely implies that we intend to produce all of the expected beneficial consequences of (...)
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  24. Proximal intentions intentionalism.Victor Tamburini - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):879-891.
    According to a family of metasemantics for demonstratives called intentionalism, the intentions of speakers determine the reference of demonstratives. And according to a sub-family I call proximal intentions (PI) intentionalism, the intention that determines reference is one that occupies a certain place—the proximal one—in a structure of intentions. PI intentionalism is thought to make correct predictions about reference where less sophisticated forms of intentionalism make the wrong predictions. In this article I argue that this is an illusion: PI intentionalism also (...)
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  25. Is the wandering mind a planning mind?Frederik Tollerup Junker & Thor Grünbaum - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (5):706–725.
    Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...)
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  26. Virtues, Rights, or Consequences? Mapping the Way for Conceptual Ethics.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Studia Philosophica.
    Are there virtues that constitutively involve using certain concepts? Does it make sense to speak of rights or duties to use certain concepts? And do consequentialist approaches to concepts necessarily have to reproduce the difficulties that plague utilitarianism? These are fundamental orientating questions for the emerging field of conceptual ethics, which invites us to reflect critically about which concepts to use. In this article, I map out and explore the ways in which conceptual ethics might take its cue from virtue-ethical, (...)
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  27. (1 other version)Inquiry in Action: A Problem-Oriented Account of Agency.Nathan Dyck - 2024 - The Philosophical Quarterly 74.
    In this paper, I argue that it is not a necessary condition of intentional agency that agents act on intentions with antecedently clear content. That is, some actions proceed on the basis of intentions which do not initially provide necessary conditions for performing those actions, and instead involve discovering at least some of these conditions in the course of performing them. To do this, I develop an account of problem-oriented agency, according to which agents may act in relation to problems (...)
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  28. (2 other versions)Hope: A Solution to the Puzzle of Difficult Action.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Pursuing difficult long-term goals typically involves encountering substantial evidence of possible future failure. If decisions to pursue such goals are serious only if one believes that one will act as one has decided, then some of our lives’ most important decisions seem to require belief against the evidence. This is the puzzle of difficult action, to which I offer a solution. I argue that serious decisions to φ do not have to give rise to a belief that one will φ, (...)
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  29. Échelles et raisons d’agir dans la conception architecturale.Dominique Raynaud - 2017 - Sciences du Design 5:131-144.
    Cet article compare les modèles explicatifs en architecturologie et en philosophie analytique de l’action, l’une et l’autre postulant l’existence d’actions finalisées. Cette similitude pose la question de l’identité des échelles de référence et des raisons d’agir. On montre que les échelles sont un sous-ensemble des raisons d’agir. Ce résultat a deux conséquences : 1. Le pouvoir explicatif des raisons d’agir est supérieur à celui des échelles de référence. 2. Raisons d’agir et échelles de référence ont un intérêt pour l’explication ex (...)
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  30. Meaning and responsibility.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):809-827.
    In performing an act of assertion we are sometimes responsible for more than the content of the literal meaning of the words we have used, sometimes less. A recently popular research program seeks to explain certain of the commitments we make in speech in terms of responsiveness to the conversational subject matter. We raise some issues for this view with the aim of providing a more general account of linguistic commitment: one that is grounded in a more general action‐theoretic notion (...)
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  31. Review of Shared and Institutional Agency, by Michael E. Bratman.Abraham Roth - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  32. Instrumental Rationality in the Social Sciences.Katharina Nieswandt - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1):46-68.
    This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz. by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using (...)
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  33. Begrebet handling og adfærd.Justus Hartnack - 1966 - Århus,:
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  34. Semantic conventions and referential intentions.Jakub Rudnicki - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-16.
    According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of the uses of demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by the speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of the existence of a semantic convention of this sort. My argument is placed in the Lewisian framework of signaling games and consists of several steps that correspond to four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present in the literature, that have proven inconclusive when employed separately and without being set in the mentioned framework.
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  35. Impermissible Targeting of Human Shields.Beba Cibralic - 2023 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 109 (2):171-194.
    An assumption underpinning the literature on human shields is that it is possible to distinguish between a voluntary shield and an involuntary shield. This is a claim I challenge with the purpose of demonstrating that the conventional basis on which we currently determine which human shields are liable to targeting is morally unjustifiable. Given the difficulty in tracking intentions, any presumption on the part of the targeting agent to know ex ante whether a civilian is volunteering to be a shield (...)
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  36. (2 other versions)The structure of content.Colin McGinn - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield, Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  37. (2 other versions)On the ascription of content.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield, Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  38. (1 other version)Other bodies.Tyler Burge - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield, Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  39. (1 other version)Beyond belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield, Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  40. Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason).Jay Jian - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):360-374.
    Given the success of the formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension to the challenge of understanding intention. According to them, (1) intentions can also admit of degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these degreed states are all governed by the norms of the probability calculus, such that the rational norms for belief and for intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises some worries about (2). It considers two schemes (...)
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  41. Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions.Jakub Rudnicki & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-21.
    The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that _prima facie_ look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the (...)
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  42. On the immediate mental antecedent of action.Michael Omoge - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):276-292.
    What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal (...)
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  43. Intention und Zeichen: Untersuchungen zu Franz Brentano und zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk.Dieter Münch - 1993 - Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
  44. Nothing Added.Candace Vogler - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):229-247.
    Although most work in contemporary Anglophone philosophical action theory understands Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph on Intention as the work that inaugurates the field, action theory often operates by setting out to understand intentional action by investigating the psychological antecedents of intention action. Now, Anscombe has no quarrel with moral psychology. Intention is a work of moral psychology, but it is a kind of moral psychology in which we attend to the act of deliberately making something the case in order to understand (...)
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  45. Action.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  46. Acts and Embodiment.Kit Fine - 2022 - Metaphysics 5 (1):14–28.
    The theory of embodiment is used in providing an account of the identity of acts and in providing solutions to various puzzles concerning acts.
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  47. Agency and Time.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli, Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. New York: Routledge. pp. 133-148.
    Is there something special about one’s attitude toward a prospective action when deciding or intending to do it? Philosophers often appeal to the idea of settling to distinguish intention from other attitudes toward some prospective action, such as expecting it, or desiring it. But 'settle' has become a term of art invoked in divergent ways. The first use of the term concerns the more immediate upshot of a decision on the psychology of the agent. Once a decision has been made (...)
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  48. Pragmatic Particularism.Ray Buchanan & Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):62-78.
    For the Intentionalist, utterance content is wholly determined by a speaker’s meaning-intentions; the sentence uttered serves merely to facilitate the audience’s recovering these intentions. We argue that Intentionalists ought to be Particularists, holding that the only “principles” of meaning recovery needed are those governing inferences to the best explanation; “principles” that are both defeasible and, in a sense to be elaborated, variable. We discuss some ways in which some theorists have erred in trying to tame the “wild west” of pragmatics (...)
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  49. Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me.Francesca Bonalumi, John Michael & Christophe Heintz - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (4):502-524.
    Can commitments be generated without promises, commissive speech acts or gestures that are conventionally interpreted as such? While we remain neutral with respect to the normative answer to this question, we propose a psychological answer. Specifically, we hypothesize that people at least believe that commitments are in place if one agent (the sender) has led a second agent (the recipient) to rely on her to do something, and if this is mutually known by the two agents. Crucially, this situation can (...)
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  50. Indecision and Buridan’s Principle.Daniel Coren - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far (...)
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1 — 50 / 1972