Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (Universidad de Los Andes)
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  1. Arabella Lyon, Intentions: Negotiated, Contested, and Ignored Reviewed By.Thomas Adajian - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19 (6):432-434.
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  2. Arabella Lyon, Intentions: Negotiated, Contested, and Ignored. [REVIEW]Thomas Adajian - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19:432-434.
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  3. Intention Varhaishistoria.T. Aho - 1989 - Ajatus 46:87-99.
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  4. Introduction.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 1-18.
    We do things in time. Philosophy of action can capture this phenomenon in at least two ways. On one hand, it might focus on the way that temporal preferences and long-term temporal horizons affect the rationality of decisions in the present (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Rawls 1971). Such work may focus on the way we discount the distant future, for example, or prioritize the future over the past. Approaches of this kind treat time as, in a sense, something external to (...)
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  5. Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency, a role with great significance for the study of action. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
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  6. XIV.—Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1):321-332.
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  7. Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe.G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) - 1979 - Cornell University Press.
  8. In Defense of the Intention/Foresight Distinction.Mark P. Aulisio - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):341 - 354.
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  9. Hall on Intention and Decision.Bruce Aune - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):564.
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  10. Intention and Foresight.Bruce Aune - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):652-654.
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  11. Intention.G. B. - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):142-142.
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  12. Action Theory.Annette Baier - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  13. The Complexities of Intention.Jodie A. Baird & Janet Wilde Astington - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press.
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  14. The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition.John A. Bargh - 1994 - In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  15. Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions.Mark J. Barker - 2012 - International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):199-226.
    This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light (...)
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  16. Motives and Intentions.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1980 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  17. Intending.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Philosophical Review. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 163--184.
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  18. Intentional Social Action and We-Intentions.Marvin Belzer - 1986 - Analyse & Kritik 8 (1):86-108.
    In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of "we-intention" plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela's concept of "we-intention". Tuomela's introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative (...)
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  19. What Can We Not Do at Will and Why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.
    Recently it has been argued that we cannot intend at will. Since intentions cannot be true or false, our involuntariness cannot be traced to “the characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth”, as Bernard Williams convincingly argues. The alternative explanation is that the source of involuntariness is the shared normative nature of beliefs and intentions. Three analogies may assimilate intentions to beliefs vis-à-vis our involuntariness: first, beliefs and intentions aim at something; second, beliefs and intentions are transparent to the (...)
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  20. Rhetorical Affects and Critical Intentions.Seyla Benhabib - 1987 - Theory and Society 16 (1):153-158.
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  21. Values and Intentions.T. Blakeley - 1961 - Philosophical Studies 11:271-272.
  22. The Dynamics of Intention.V. Blankenship - 1985 - In Michael Frese & John Sabini (eds.), Goal Directed Behavior: The Concept of Action in Psychology. L. Erlbaum Associates. pp. 161--170.
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  23. Intention-Based Semantics.Emma Borg - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 250--266.
    There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-) based semantics.[2] For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should (...)
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  24. The Diffusiveness of Intention Principle: A Counter-Example.Joseph M. Boyle & Thomas D. Sullivan - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (5):357 - 360.
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  25. Some Questions for Miss Anscombe About Intention.David Braybrooke - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):49 - 54.
  26. Action & Interpretation.James M. Brown - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 29:349-351.
  27. Action, Intention and Self-Determination.E. Brugger - 2005 - Vera Lex 6 (1/2):79-106.
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  28. Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
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  29. Aiming and Intending.Ann Bumpus - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):581-595.
  30. Intention, Meaning and Structure: Social Action in its Physical Context.D. Canter - 1985 - In G. P. Ginsburg, Marylin Brenner & Mario von Cranach (eds.), Discovery Strategies in the Psychology of Action. Academic Press. pp. 35--171.
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  31. The Artist's Intention.William H. Capitan - 1964 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 18 (68/69):323-34.
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  32. Main Intentions in the Use of Language.Robert Champigny - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (12):528-533.
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  33. Intention.David Charles - 1989 - In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer. pp. 33--52.
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  34. Intentional Actions and Their Side Effects.Ewing Y. Chinn - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):161-171.
  35. Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
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  36. Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. [REVIEW]Randy K. Chiu - 2003 - Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1-2):65-74.
    The growing body of whistleblowing literature includes many studies that have attempted to identify the individual level antecedents of whistleblowing behavior. However, cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the ethicality of whistleblowing affect the judgment of whistleblowing intention. This study ascertains how Chinese managers/professionals decide to blow the whistle in terms of their locus of control and subjective judgment regarding the intention of whistleblowing. Hypotheses that are derived from these speculations are tested with data on Chinese managers and professionals. Statistical analysis (...)
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  37. Aquinas on Intentions.R. W. Clark - 1976 - The Thomist 40 (2):303-310.
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  38. Intentional Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  39. Intention and Intentionality.Michael Cohen - 1982 - Philosophical Books 23 (1):30-32.
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  40. II. Praxis and Intention.John M. Connolly - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):366-378.
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  41. Towards a Convincing Account of Intention.Niel Henk Conradie - unknown
    Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
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  42. A Note on Harman on Intending.Michael Corrado - 1978 - Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):105-108.
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  43. Acting Intentionally and Minimal Abilities.Michael J. Costa - 1986 - Analysis 46 (3):144 - 147.
  44. GE ANSCOMBE, Human Life, Action and Ethics.Sergio Cremaschi - 2008 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 100 (2):431.
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  45. Gossip: An Intention-Based Account.Margaret A. Cuonzo - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):131–140.
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  46. Motive and Intention.G. D. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):139-139.
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  47. Intention and Permissibility, II.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):319–338.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  48. Intentions et signification de l'énonciation.David Davies - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (1):83-99.
    J’évalue de manière critique un certain nombre de thèses concernant la façon dont l’intention peut compléter ou supplanter la convention dans une théorie de l’interprétation. Je soutiens que la signification de l’énonciation ne peut être identifiée aux intentions du locuteur, qu’elles soient réelles ou attribuées. Ou bien l’identification de la signification de l’énonciation aux intentions réelles ne réussit pas à attribuer un rôle déterminant véritable à ces intentions, ou bien elle échoue à rendre compte de la manière dont ces intentions (...)
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  49. Intending.Lawrence H. Davis & John F. M. Hunter - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):652.
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  50. Agents and Their Actions.Maximilian de Gaynesford (ed.) - 2011 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Reflecting a recent flourishing of creative thinking in the field, _Agents and Their Actions_ presents seven newly commissioned essays by leading international philosophers that highlight the most recent debates in the philosophy of action Features seven internationally significant authors, including new work by two of philosophy's ‘super stars’, John McDowell and Joseph Raz Presents the first clear indication of how John McDowell is extending his path-breaking work on intentionality and perceptual experience towards an account of action and agency Covers all (...)
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