Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (University of the Andes)
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  1. Anscombe on How St. Peter Intentionally Did What He Intended Not to Do.Graham Hubbs - forthcoming - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
    G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention, meticulous in its detail and its structure, ends on a puzzling note. At its conclusion, Anscombe claims that when he denied Jesus, St. Peter intentionally did what he intended not to do. This essay will examine why Anscombe construes the case as she does and what it might teach us about the nature of practical rationality.
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  2. G.E.M. Anscombe – „Intention“.David Hommen - 2016 - Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL-Online).
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  3. Was There a Scientific ’68? Its Repercussion on Action Research and Mixing Methods.José Andrés-Gallego - 2018 - Arbor 194 (787):436: 1-10.
    The author asks whether there was a “scientific ‘68”, and focuses on aspects of two specific methodological proposals defined in the 1940s and 50s by the terms “action research” and “mixing methods”, applied particularly to social sciences. In the first, the climate surrounding the events of 1968 contributed to heightening the participative element to be found –by definition– in “action research”; that is: the importance of making the research subjects themselves participants in the design, execution and application of the study (...)
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  4. Effort and the Standard Story of Action.Michael Brent - 2012 - Philosophical Writings 40:19 - 27.
    In this paper, I present an alternative account of action that improves upon what has come to be known as the standard story. The standard story depicts actions as events that are caused by and made intelligible through the appropriate combinations of the agent’s beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions and other motivational factors. I argue that the standard story is problematic because it depicts the relation between the agent and their bodily actions as causally mediated by their motivational factors. On the (...)
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  5. Actions, Rationality & Decision.Denis Fisette and Daniel Vanderveken (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford: , College Publications.
    Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo et Raimo Tuomela (...)
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  6. Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  7. Can Affordances Explain Behavior?Alexandros Tillas, Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):295-315.
    In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...)
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  8. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Alfred Mele tackles some central problems in the philosophy of action. His purpose is to construct an explanatory model for intentional behaviour, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reasons and intentions in the etiology of intentional action.
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  9. How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
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  10. Evidence and Agency Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.Berislav Marusic - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Berislav Marusic explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
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  11. Sometimes It is Not so Bad to Decide in a Hurry: Influence of Different Levels of Temporal Opportunity on the Elaboration of Purchasing Intention.Grzegorz Pochwatko & Jean-Christophe Giger - 2008 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 39 (4):209-216.
    Sometimes it is not so bad to decide in a hurry: Influence of different levels of temporal opportunity on the elaboration of purchasing intention The present study examines the impact of different levels of time pressure on the elaboration of purchase intention. Participants formed attitudes towards two stores and then indicate in which stores they would go shopping. Descriptions of the stores were experimentally constructed in order to indicate whether participants rely on an attribute-based or an attitude-based strategy when forming (...)
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  12. Legislative Intention and the CISG.Olaf Meyer & André Janssen - 2009 - In Olaf Meyer & André Janssen (eds.), Cisg Methodology. Sellier de Gruyter.
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  13. The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention.Catherine D. Rau - 1973 - NTU Philosophical Review 3:25-34.
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  14. Flat Intentions – Crazy Dispositions?Jens Gillessen - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):54-69.
    Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions (...)
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  15. Making Sense of Intention.Henry Schiller - unknown
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  16. Ethics Without Intention, by Di Nucci, Ezio.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):837-837.
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  17. Action, Intention, and Reason.Tomis Kapitan & Robert Audi - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):308.
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  18. Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe.Irving Thalberg, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (4):624.
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  19. Intending.Lawrence H. Davis & John F. M. Hunter - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):652.
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  20. Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
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  21. Lying by Promising. A Study on Insincere Illocutionary Acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
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  22. The Anthropology of Intentions: Language in a World of Others.Alessandro Duranti - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    How and to what extent do people take into account the intentions of others? Alessandro Duranti sets out to answer this question, showing that the role of intentions in human interaction is variable across cultures and contexts. Through careful analysis of data collected over three decades in US and Pacific societies, Duranti demonstrates that, in some communities, social actors avoid intentional discourse, focusing on the consequences of actions rather than on their alleged original goals. In other cases, he argues, people (...)
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  23. Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
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  24. Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intentions.Elisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    In this paper, I offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I argue that several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different functional roles and on the different contents or types of contents they involve. I further argue that an adequate account of the distinctive nature of actions and of their various grades of intentionality depends on a large part on a proper understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different forms of intentions. (...)
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  25. Causal Constraints on Intention.Steven J. Jensen - 2014 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14 (2):273-293.
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  26. Les Intentions D’Écriture de MontaigneMontaigne's Intentions of Writing. The Example of the Chapter Of Cannibals.Jean-François Dupeyron - 2016 - Methodos 16.
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  27. Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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  28. The Gulf War and Just War Theory: Right Intention.Rosemary Hollis - 1992 - New Blackfriars 73 (859):210-217.
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  29. XIV.—Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1):321-332.
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  30. VIII—The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art.Anthony Savile - 1969 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69 (1):101-124.
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  31. What Can We Not Do at Will and Why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.
    Recently it has been argued that we cannot intend at will. Since intentions cannot be true or false, our involuntariness cannot be traced to “the characteristic of beliefs that they aim at truth”, as Bernard Williams convincingly argues. The alternative explanation is that the source of involuntariness is the shared normative nature of beliefs and intentions. Three analogies may assimilate intentions to beliefs vis-à-vis our involuntariness: first, beliefs and intentions aim at something; second, beliefs and intentions are transparent to the (...)
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  32. The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.N. Sinhababu - unknown
  33. Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by GEM Anscombe.Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.) - 2005 - Andrews UK.
    Presents a collection of essays by the celebrated philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. This collection includes papers on human nature and practical philosophy, together with the classic 'Modern Moral Philosophy'.
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  34. Nothing Added.Candace Vogler - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):229-247.
    Although most work in contemporary Anglophone philosophical action theory understands Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph on Intention as the work that inaugurates the field, action theory often operates by setting out to understand intentional action by investigating the psychological antecedents of intention action. Now, Anscombe has no quarrel with moral psychology. Intention is a work of moral psychology, but it is a kind of moral psychology in which we attend to the act of deliberately making something the case in order to understand (...)
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  35. Introduction.Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 1-18.
    We do things in time. Philosophy of action can capture this phenomenon in at least two ways. On one hand, it might focus on the way that temporal preferences and long-term temporal horizons affect the rationality of decisions in the present (see, e.g., Parfit 1984; Rawls 1971). Such work may focus on the way we discount the distant future, for example, or prioritize the future over the past. Approaches of this kind treat time as, in a sense, something external to (...)
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  36. Intentions and Intentionality.Gianfranco Pellegrino - forthcoming - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche.
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  37. There Are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  38. Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
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  39. Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  40. The Author’s Intention.Darryl J. Murphy - 2005 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 9 (1):129-132.
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  41. ‘Unwilling’ Versus ‘Unable’: Do Grey Parrots Understand Human Intentional Actions?Franck Péron, Lauriane Rat-Fischer, Laurent Nagle & Dalila Bovet - 2010 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 11 (3):428-441.
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  42. Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
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  43. What Good is a Diachronic Will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
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  44. Fazlur Rahman Et le Coran : La Recherche Méthodique de L’Intention de L’AuteurFazlur Rahman and the Koran: The Methodical Research of the Author’s Intention.Selami Varlik - 2013 - Methodos 13.
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  45. Intention.P. L. Heath & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  46. A Tale of Two Intentions: Intending What an Utterance Means and Intending What an Utterance Achieves.Robert E. Sanders - 2015 - Pragmatics and Society 6 (4):475-501.
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  47. A Companion to the Philosophy of Action.C. O'Connor, Sandis, T. (ed.) - 2010 - Blackwell.
    _A Companion to the Philosophy of Action_ offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal responsibility, Attribution Theory, and rational agency in evolutionary perspective Individual chapters also cover prominent historic figures from Plato to Ricoeur Can be approached (...)
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  48. Intentions: Negotiated, Contested, and Ignored.Arabella Lyon - 2004 - Pennsylvania State University Press.
    The relationship between an author's and an audience's intentions is complex but need not preclude mutual engagement. This philosophical investigation challenges existing literary and rhetorical perspectives on intention and offers a new framework for understanding the negotiation of meaning. It describes how an audience's intentions affect their interpretations, shows how audiences negotiate meaning when faced with a writer's undecipherable intentions, and defines the scope of understanding within rhetorical situations. Introducing a concept of intention into literary analysis that supersedes existing rhetorical (...)
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  49. Ludwig on Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):61-74.
    In this paper, I discuss Ludwig's systematic and illuminating account of conditional intentions, with particular reference to my own view (presented in "Conditional Intentions", Noûs, 2009). In contrast to Ludwig, I argue that we should prefer a formal characterization of conditional intentions rather than a more substantial one in terms of reasons for action (although the conditions that qualify an intention bear on the reasonableness and justifiability of the intention). I then defend a partially different taxonomy of the conditions that (...)
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  50. Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & MIchael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and The Philosophy of Action. Routledge. pp. 108-123.
    I investigate the structure of pro-tempore disjunctive intentions: intentions directed at two or more eventually incompatible goals that are nonetheless kept open for the time being, while the agent is waiting to acquire more information to determine which option is better. These intentions are the basic tool for balancing, in our planning agency, rigidity and flexibility, stability and responsiveness to changing circumstances. They are a pervasive feature of intentional diachronic agency and contribute to secure dynamic consistency in our plans. I (...)
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