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1 — 50 / 282
  1. added 2018-07-23
    Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-20
    Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy.Julia Nefsky & Sergio Tenenbaum - manuscript
    It seems to be a humdrum fact of human agency that we act on intentions or decisions that we have made at an earlier time. At breakfast, you look at the Taco Hut menu online and decide that later today you’ll have one of their avocado burritos for lunch. You’re at your desk and you hear the church bells ring the noon hour. You get up, walk to Taco Hut, and order the burrito as planned. As mundane as this sort (...)
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  3. added 2018-05-15
    “Yes, the Theory is Abstemious, But...”: A Critique of Yehezkel.Regan Lance Reitsma - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):59-79.
    This article is a critique of Gal Yehezkel’s attempt to refute subjectivism about normative practical reasons, a school of thought inspired by Hume. Yehezkel believes reason, far from being, as Hume puts it, “the slave of the passions,” has the normative authority to be a critic of basic desires and argues that subjectivism lacks the theoretical resources both to acknowledge this alleged truth and to analyze the distinction between wanting an outcome and intending to pursue it. I contend his refutation (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-22
    Conflicting Intentions: Rectifying the Consistency Requirements.Hein Duijf, Jan Broersen & John-Jules Ch Meyer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Many philosophers are convinced that rationality dictates that one’s overall set of intentions be consistent. The starting point and inspiration for our study is Bratman’s planning theory of intentions. According to this theory, one needs to appeal to the fulfilment of characteristic planning roles to justify norms that apply to our intentions. Our main objective is to demonstrate that one can be rational despite having mutually inconsistent intentions. Conversely, it is also shown that one can be irrational despite having a (...)
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  5. added 2018-02-16
    VII—Self-Knowledge and Intention.Roger Scruton - 1977 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):87-106.
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  6. added 2017-12-06
    The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination.Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? This edited volume integrates the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry, exploring the relationship of procrastination to agency, rationality, and ethics--topics that philosophy is well-suited to address.
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  7. added 2017-11-20
    How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions, by Berent Enç.Jing Zhu - 2005 - Disputatio:277-282.
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  8. added 2017-06-17
    Self-Deception and Selectivity: Reply to Jurjako.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-95.
    Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
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  9. added 2017-06-12
    The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    This work is an attempt to restore volition as a respectable topic for scientific studies. Volition, traditionally conceived as the act of will, has been largely neglected in contemporary science and philosophy. I first develop a volitional theory of action by elaborating a unifying conception of volition, where volitions are construed as special kinds of mental action by which an agent consciously and actively bridge the gaps between deliberation, decision and intentional action. Then I argue that the major skeptical arguments (...)
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  10. added 2017-06-12
    Omissions.Frederick Adrian Siegler - 1968 - Analysis 28 (3):98 - 106.
  11. added 2017-06-11
    Why Cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.
    Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided (...)
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  12. added 2017-06-01
    Thought and Action.Errol Harris - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 12 (3):449 - 461.
  13. added 2017-05-25
    Action, Knowledge and Will. ByHyman John . (Oxford : OUP , 2015 . Pp. Xi + 272 . Price £35.00.). [REVIEW]Evgenia Mylonaki - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267).
    In this paper I show how John Hyman takes the traditional question whether we should give a physical, ethical, psychological or intellectual account of human action and stands it on its head. For Hyman argues that the real question is how to distinguish the physical, the ethical, the psychological and the intellectual dimensions of human action, and he thereby changes the landscape in the philosophy of action. Finally, I argue that Hyman's positive proposal fails by the lights of his own (...)
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  14. added 2017-05-15
    Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  15. added 2017-05-15
    Intention, Motive and Responsibility.Winston Barnes, W. D. Falk & A. E. Duncan-Jones - 1945 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 19:230-288.
  16. added 2017-04-17
    Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.
    Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-13
    Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy.Avery Archer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  18. added 2017-04-03
    XV*-Two Problems About Human Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309-326.
  19. added 2017-04-03
    Discontenting Contented Capitalists A B&S Action Plan.Denis Collins - 1994 - Business and Society 33 (1):132-138.
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  20. added 2017-03-09
    Reconsidering Resolutions.Alida Liberman - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-27.
    In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in (...)
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  21. added 2017-02-15
    Intention in Art.Paisley Livingston - 2005 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. Oxford University Press.
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  22. added 2017-02-15
    The Nature of Intention. [REVIEW]S. C. S. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):132-133.
  23. added 2017-02-14
    The Artist's Intention.William H. Capitan - 1964 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 18 (68/69):323-34.
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  24. added 2017-02-13
    Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look.Jerrold Levinson - 1992 - In Gary Iseminger (ed.), Intention and Interpretation. Temple University Press. pp. 221--56.
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  25. added 2017-02-12
    Musorgsky: Urtext of His Intentions and Work.Marina Ritzarev - 1999 - The European Legacy 4 (4):112-116.
    Musorgsky: Eight Essays and an Epilogue. By Richard Taruskin, Foreword by Caryl Emerson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; second printing, 1997) xxxiv + 415 pp. $19.95, £15.95 paper.
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  26. added 2017-02-10
    Pathiaraj Rayappan , Intention in Action: The Philosophy of G. E. M. Anscombe . Reviewed By.Valérie Aucouturier - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (1):4-8.
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  27. added 2017-02-10
    Intention and Agency. By Donald F. Gustafson.Marjorie Price - 1990 - Modern Schoolman 68 (1):101-102.
  28. added 2017-02-09
    Intentions as Complex Entities.Marco Mazzone - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):767-783.
    In the philosophical and cognitive literature, the word ‘intention’ has been used with a variety of meanings which occasionally have been explicitly distinguished. I claim that an important cause of this polysemy is the fact that intentions are complex entities, endowed with an internal structure, and that sometimes different theories in the field are erroneously presented as if they were in conflict with each other, while they in fact just focus on different aspects of the phenomenon. The debate between Gallese’s (...)
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  29. added 2017-02-09
    Object and Intention in the Moral Act.Lottie Kendzierski - 1950 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 24:102-110.
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  30. added 2017-02-08
    An Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention.Alexander Miller - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):169 - 173.
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  31. added 2017-02-08
    Motive and Intention.James Andrew Fulton - 1973 - International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):575-581.
  32. added 2017-02-08
    Some Questions for Miss Anscombe About Intention.David Braybrooke - 1962 - Analysis 22 (3):49 - 54.
  33. added 2017-02-03
    Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe.G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) - 1979 - Cornell University Press.
  34. added 2017-02-03
    The Nature of Intention.Jack W. Meiland - 1970 - London: Methuen.
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  35. added 2017-02-01
    Another Objection to Wright's Treatment of Intention.Alexander Miller - 1989 - Analysis 67 (3):257–263.
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  36. added 2017-01-17
    A Preface Paradox for Intention.Simon David Goldstein - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.
    In this paper I argue that there is a preface paradox for intention. The preface paradox for intention shows that intentions do not obey an agglomeration norm, requiring one to intend conjunctions of whatever else one intends. But what norms do intentions obey? I will argue that intentions come in degrees. These partial intentions are governed by the norms of the probability calculus. First, I will give a dispositional theory of partial intention, on which degrees of intention are the degrees (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-16
    The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Intention.Rachael Wiseman - 2016 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):207-227.
    This paper examines the context in which Anscombe wrote Intention—focusing on the years 1956–1958. At this time Anscombe was engaged in a number of battles against her university, her colleagues, and, ultimately, “the spirit of the age,” which included her public opposition to Oxford University’s decision to award Harry Truman an honorary degree. Intention, I show, must be understood as a product of the explicitly ethical and political debates in which Anscombe was involved. Understanding the intention with which she wrote (...)
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  38. added 2016-12-12
    Utility of Ethical Frameworks in Determining Behavioral Intention: A Comparison of the U.S. And Russia.Rafik I. Beekun, Jim Westerman & Jamal Barghouti - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 61 (3):235-247.
    Using Reidenbach and Robin‘s ( Journal of Business Ethics 7, 871–879, 1988) multi-criteria ethics instrument, we carried out the first empirical test of Robertson and Crittenden‘s (Strategic Management Journal 24, 385–392, 2003) cross-cultural map of moral philosophies to examine what ethical criteria guide business people in Russia and the U.S. in their intention to behave. Competing divergence and convergence hypotheses were advanced. Our results support a convergence hypothesis, and reveal a common emphasis on relativism. Americans are also influenced by the (...)
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  39. added 2016-12-12
    Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes.
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  40. added 2016-12-08
    Can One Decide to Do Something Without Forming an Intention to Do It?John McGuire - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):269-278.
    According to the received view of practical decisions, ‘deciding to X’ is synonymous with ‘forming an intention to X’. In this article, I argue against the received view on the basis of both experimental evidence and theoretical considerations. The evidence concerns a case involving a side-effect action in which people tend to agree that an agent decided to X yet disagree that the agent had a corresponding intention to X. Additionally, I explain why one should expect decisions and intentions to (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    Logical Theories of Intention and the Database Perspective.Yoav Shoham - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (6):633-647.
    While logical theories of information attitudes, such as knowledge, certainty and belief, have flourished in the past two decades, formalization of other facets of rational behavior have lagged behind significantly. One intriguing line of research concerns the concept of intention. I will discuss one approach to tackling the notion within a logical framework, based on a database perspective.
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  43. added 2016-12-08
    A Note on Intention and the Doctrine of Double Effect.Neil Francis Delaney - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):103-110.
    The purpose of this note is to tidy up some matters concerning ascriptions of intention and the employment of the doctrine of double effect (henceforth DDE). I first argue that Jonathan Bennett’s efforts to show that DDE is a foolish doctrine are unsatisfactory. I then consider a puzzle of Mark Johnston’s that seems to pose a problem for the defender of DDE. I turn to possible solutions to the puzzle, criticize one, and then offer the one I find most appealing. (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):311-325.
    I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to (...)
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  45. added 2016-12-08
    Executions, Motivations, and Accomplishments.John Perry - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):515 - 540.
    Brutus wanted to kill Caesar. He believed that Caesar was an ordinary mortal, and that, given this, stabbing him (by which we mean plunging a knife into his heart) was a way of killing him. He thought that he could stab Caesar, for he remembered that he had a knife and saw that Caesar was standing next to him on his left, in the Forum. So Brutus was motivated to stab the man to his left. He did so, thereby killing (...)
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  46. added 2016-11-21
    After Anscombe.David K. Chan - 2008 - In Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer. pp. 141-154.
    In "After Anscombe," I argue that, although Bratman's account of intention "has provided a conceptual tool for many directions of research in philosophy and cognitive psychology," it cannot do the work in ethics that moral philosophers, especially Kantians, use it for. This can be shown by considering the problems in using intention to make a moral distinction in cases of double effect. If so, Bratman's is not the same concept of intention that Anscombe had in mind when she wrote her (...)
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  47. added 2016-11-21
    Active Voluntary Euthanasia and the Problem of Intending Death.David K. Chan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):379-389.
    In this paper, I discuss an example from Buchanan of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). I first refute objections to the intuitive permissibility of the killing described in the example. After explaining why the killing is intentional, I evaluate Buchanan's solution to the ‘problem of intending death’. According to Buchanan, what justifies a physician in intentionally bringing about a patient's death by AVE is a principle that embodies the values of patient self-determination and well-being. I argue that these two considerations are (...)
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  48. added 2016-11-18
    “Part of That Force That Always Wills the Evil and Always Produces the Good”. On a Devilish Incoherence.Peter Baumann - 2016 - S.Ph. Essays and Explorations 1 (2):25-33.
    This paper analyzes and discusses Mephisto's famous remark in Goethe's FAUST. It turns out that he is being incoherent in interesting ways.
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  49. added 2016-11-18
    Action Reconceptualized: Human Agency and its Sources.David K. Chan - 2016 - Lexington Books.
    In re-examining the concepts of desire, intention, and trying, David K. Chan brings a fresh approach toward resolving many of the problems that have occupied philosophers of action for almost a century. This book not only presents a complete theory of human agency but also, by developing the conceptual tools needed to do moral philosophy, lays the groundwork for formulating an ethics that is rooted in a clear, intuitive, and coherent moral psychology.
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  50. added 2016-10-28
    The Origin of Intentions.Richard Scheer & Professor Emeritus - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):358–368.
1 — 50 / 282