Interlevel Metaphysics

Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. -/- A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is (...) it different? What sorts of properties do social groups have? Can they have beliefs or intentions? Can they perform actions? And if so, what does it take for a group to believe, intend, or act? -/- Other entities investigated in social ontology include money, corporations, institutions, property, social classes, races, genders, artifacts, artworks, language, and law. It is difficult to delineate a precise scope for the field (see section 2.1). In general, though, the entities explored in social ontology largely overlap with those that social scientists work on. A good deal of the work in social ontology takes place within the social sciences (see sections 5.1–5.8). -/- Social ontology also addresses more basic questions about the nature of the social world. One set of questions pertains to the constituents, or building blocks, of social things in general. For instance, some theories argue that social entities are built out of the psychological states of individual people, while others argue that they are built out of actions, and yet others that they are built out of practices. Still other theories deny that a distinction can even be made between the social and the non-social. -/- A different set of questions pertains to how social categories are constructed or set up. Are social categories and kinds produced by our attitudes? By our language? Are they produced by causal patterns? And is there just one way social categories are set up, or are there many varieties of social construction? -/- The term ‘social ontology’ has only come into wide currency in recent years, but the nature of the social has been a topic of inquiry since ancient Greece. As a whole, the field can be understood as a branch of metaphysics, the general inquiry into the nature of entities. (shrink)

Forgotten Truth is primarily a presentation of the traditional esoteric view that reality consists of a hierarchy of Being. Within the hierarchy there are an indefinite number of worlds, but they can be classified into four levels: the terrestrial, psychic, and celestial planes, and the Infinite. The corresponding levels within the human microcosm are body, mind, soul, and spirit. “From the multiple heavens of Judaism to the storied structure of the Hindu temple and the angelologies of innumerable traditions, the view (...) was reached convergently and independently, as if by innate tropism, by virtually all known societies…” (18). The important exception is our current society, whose fundamental flaw is its inclination to reduce all reality to the terrestrial plane alone. Modernity is “captive of an outlook presumed to be scientific but in fact scientistic” (17); it goes beyond the actual findings of science to deny that other approaches to knowledge are valid and other truths true” (16). (shrink)

One of the trademarks of Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology is his theory of levels of reality. Hartmann drew from many sources to develop his version of the theory. His essay “Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie” testifies of the fact that he drew from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. But this text was written relatively late in Hartmann’s career, which suggests that his interest in the theories of levels of the ancients may have been retrospective. In “Nicolai Hartmann und seine (...) Zeitgenossen,” Martin Morgenstern puts the emphasis on contemporaries of Hartmann: Émile Boutroux, Max Scheler, Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, and Arnold Gehlen. But there is another plausible source for Hartmann’s conception of levels that has so far remained overlooked in the literature. Hartmann studied with and was influenced by Nikolai Lossky. Lossky has a theory of levels that he adopted from Vladimir Solovyov. Solovyov presents his theory of levels, among other places, in Oпpaвдaнie дoбpa, where he says that the five principal stages of the cosmogonic process of ascension toward universal perfection, which are given in experience, are the mineral or inorganic realm, the vegetal realm, the animal realm, the realm of natural humanity, and the realm of spiritual or divine humanity. This theory appears to bear significant similarities with the theory of levels of reality that Hartmann will develop a few decades later. Solovyov was widely read in Russia and it would be unlikely that Hartmann was not at least minimally acquainted with his work. Chances are that Hartmann came into contact with it in some details. An intellectual lineage could thus likely be traced from Hartmann back to Solovyov. In this paper, I document and discuss this possible lineage. (shrink)

Inwagen, Peter van_Dispensing with Ontological Levels.

We respond to Jack Vromen’s (this issue) critique of our discussion of the missing micro-foundations of work on routines and capabilities in economics and management research. Contrary to Vromen, we argue that (1) inter-level relations can be causal, and that inter-level causal relations may also obtain between routines and actions and interactions; (2) there are no macro-level causal mechanisms; and (3) on certain readings of the notion of routines and capabilities, these may be macro causes.

Natural realism is the view that there is a real, metaphysical distinction between those properties, perhaps like being a quark, that are natural kinds and those, perhaps like being either red or round that are not. This is a fairly respectable doctrine, though by no means universally accepted. Perhaps slightly less well entrenched is the idea that there is a relation of causal relevance that sometimes holds between a property of a cause and a property of an effect. If causation (...) is a relation between tokens, causal relevance is a relation between types. Finally, there’s the idea that there are many levels. Sometimes, people will talk about the relation between the mental level and the biological or physical level without meaning too much by this. But the straight-faced suggestion that levels are mind-independent features of reality will occasionally raise a skeptical eyebrow. It may be that anyone suspicious about any of these three ideas is suspicious of them all. This is as it should be. I don’t say this because I think the three characters are maximally suspicious, but because the three form a tightly knit family that to a certain extent stand or fall together. If there are natural kinds, then there are real resemblances, or objective similarities between members of those kinds. But not just any similarity counts. There’s at least one respect in which anything three miles from a burning barn is similar to anything else three miles from a burning barn. The similarities that count as far as natural kinds are concerned are causal similarities. Being a member of a natural kind must make a difference to your causal interactions. But the idea of a feature that makes a difference to your causal interactions just is the idea of a causally relevant feature. If you put the white ball into the pocket of an ordinary pool table in a bar, it will come.. (shrink)

Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new (...) way. Then I will propose a more modest approach, and show how it does not deserve the criticism directed at a prototype by Jackson and Pettit. (shrink)

To this day, debates on ontological emergence have been almost exclusively carried out within non-humean power-based or law-based metaphysics, the main underlying stake being indeed whether or not irreducible causal powers, or irreducible governing laws, can happen to come into being under specific circumstances. It is therefore unsurprising that humeanists themselves never felt that attracted by emergence, consistently with Lewis’ own dismissal of "suchlike rubbish". In the present paper, I argue, contrary to this received wisdom, that humeanism and ontological emergence (...) can actually peacefully coexist. Such a coexistence can be established by reviving some elements of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science, in which a very idiosyncratic account of diachronic, evolutionary emergence is associated with extensions of the humean mosaic and the correlative coming into being of new best system laws, which have the peculiarity of being temporally indexed. Incidentally, this reconciliation of humeanism and emergence allows for conceiving the autonomy of the special sciences in an interesting way, consistently with the reductionist ideal of a unified, all-encompassing science. (shrink)

Alexander Bird (2001; 2002; 2007) offers a powerful argument showing that, regardless of whether necessitarianism or contingentism about laws is true, salt necessarily dissolves in water. The argument is that the same laws of nature that are necessary for the constitution of salt necessitate the solubility of salt. This paper shows that Bird’s argument faces a serious objection if the possibility of emergentism – in particular, C. D. Broad’s account – is taken into account. The idea is (roughly) that some (...) emergent laws in some possible worlds may disrupt the solubility of salt without disrupting its constitution. (shrink)

En tout généralité, le concept d’émergence capture une relation entre deux entités, un « émergent » E et sa « base d’émergence » B, de telle manière que l’on puisse affirmer que E dépend de B et que, malgré cette dépendance, E s’avère irréductible à B. Une façon classique de concrétiser cette idée est de considérer E comme un « tout » et B comme les « parties » de ce tout. Dans l’esprit de la maxime classique selon laquelle « (...) Le tout est plus que la somme de ses parties », l’émergence cristallise ainsi un double refus : celui de la simple assimilation du tout à ses parties, ainsi que celui de la radicale déconnexion entre le tout et ses parties. À cet égard, affirmer par exemple qu’une cellule vivante émerge d’une base moléculaire inerte sous-jacente revient à considérer que, d’une part, la nature de la cellule est bien dépendante de la nature des molécules qui la composent et que, d’autre part et malgré cette dépendance, certaines propriétés de la cellule ne peuvent être réduites aux propriétés de ces molécules. Ainsi posée, l’émergence se révèle un outil philosophique prometteur pour constituer et défendre une voie médiane entre le réductionnisme et le dualisme, positions selon lesquelles, respectivement, « le tout n’est que la somme de ses parties » et « le tout est hétérogène à ses parties ». Elle permet alors de faire droit à l’intuition selon laquelle les sciences comme la biologie ou la psychologie, ainsi que les objets que ces sciences étudient – par exemple les organismes ou l’« esprit » – témoignent d’une relative autonomie par rapport aux sciences étudiant les constituants élémentaires de la réalité naturelle. -/- Dans la présente entrée, après avoir introduit à l’idée générale de l’émergence et au projet philosophique initiateur de l’émergentisme, et après avoir fait recension de différents phénomènes possiblement émergents, nous tâchons d’élucider les déterminants historiques des différentes théories contemporaines de l’émergence. Dans un effort ensuite plus conceptuel, nous nous attachons à distinguer les différents sens dans lesquels une entité peut être considérée comme émergente. Nous concluons cette entrée en identifiant les apories majeures de l’émergentisme actuel dans sa version dominante. (shrink)

According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects (...) of emergentism with this distinction in the background. (shrink)

I shall explore in this article the hypothesis that structures are relations between the components of complex entities. After having introduced hylomorphism, its major advantages and the major views of the nature of structures, I shall introduce the distinctions between external and internal relations and the one between symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations. I shall also describe the theory of non-symmetrical relations that I accept, i.e., the O-Roles theory, as most structures seem to be external and non-symmetrical relations. Later on, I (...) shall develop my hypothesis and I shall deal with one objection, i.e., that relations necessarily come together with Bradley's vicious regress. Finally, I shall also hypothesize that complex entities are different from structures and from their structured components. In this respect, I shall defend a " simple view " of complex entities. Dwelling on this view, I shall also reply to some recent objections against hylomorphism. (shrink)

Among the very architects of the recent re-emergence of emergentism in the physical sciences, Robert B. Laughlin certainly occupies a prominent place. Through a series of works beginning as early as his Nobel lecture in 1998, a lecture given after having been awarded, together with Störmer and Tsui, the Nobel prize in physics for its contribution in the elucidation of the fractional quantum Hall effect, Laughlin openly and relentlessly advocated a strongly anti-reductionistic view of physics – and, more particularly, of (...) the interface between condensed matter and particles physics – which culminated in what can be considered his emergentist manifesto: A Different Universe. Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down (2005). In spite of this prominent role in the vindication of emergentism, rare are the philosophers, among whom even those sympathetic to the idea of emergence, who have paid serious attention to Laughlin’s insights. The subtleties of his view – it is true, often concealed in many technicalities – have accordingly, and somewhat unfortunately, mainly passed unnoticed. (shrink)

Der Artikel diskutiert Niklas Luhmanns Konzeption von Kommunikation als emergentem Phänomen. Erstens soll gezeigt werden, dass sich Luhmann, entgegen jüngster Einwände, in der Tat als sozialer Emergentist rekonstruieren und als solcher in die aktuelle Debatte um Reduktion und Emergenz des Sozialen einordnen lässt. Zweitens soll dadurch Licht auf die generellen Probleme und Voraussetzungen einer emergentistischen Soziologie geworfen werden. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, wird zunächst geklärt, welche Positionen sich in der Soziologie grundsätzlich gegenüber stehen und auf welcher Grundlage Luhmann als (...) Emergentist einzuordnen ist. Anschließend soll die Emergenz der Kommunikation als eigenständiges soziales Phänomen erläutert und ins Verhältnis zum Individuum gesetzt werden. Schließlich wird Luhmanns Konzeption mit Hilfe einiger Adäquatheitsbedingungen aus der allgemeinen Wissenschaftsphilosophie als unzureichend kritisiert. Ziel ist dabei auch die Klärung der Bedingungen für eine plausible Emergenztheorie innerhalb der Soziologie. Nach einer abschließenden Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Ergebnisse soll ein Ausblick auf eine aussichtsreiche soziologische Emergenzkonzeption geboten werden. (shrink)

I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact (...) accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist's ontology or ideology. (shrink)

Current day Physics and Science in general are based on a computational quantitative-reductionist approach that even though highly successful, they not only still leave consciousness out, but they don’t appear to offer any key of how consciousness is even supposed to be integrated into the current scientific establishment. This delay of integrating consciousness into Science starts to suggest that the current approaches might not be the most suitable tools of tackling consciousness. Therefore, in this paper, an approach that would be (...) in contrast to current Science, but ending by subsuming it, would be employed in analyzing consciousness. Consciousness would be shown to be an emergent phenomenon that would show a consistent structure throughout, and in this structure, suggestions for integrating current Physics would be made. (shrink)

Current day Physics and Science in general are based on a computational quantitative-reductionist approach that even though highly successful, they not only still leave consciousness out, but they don’t appear to offer any key of how consciousness is even supposed to be integrated into the current scientific establishment. This delay of integrating consciousness into Science starts to suggest that the current approaches might not be the most suitable tools of tackling consciousness. Therefore, in this paper, an approach that would be (...) in contrast to current Science, but ending by subsuming it, would be employed in analyzing consciousness. Consciousness would be shown to be an emergent phenomenon that would show a consistent structure throughout, and in this structure, suggestions for integrating current Physics would be made. (shrink)

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...) what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? (2) Are there emergent properties? (3) Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? (4) Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? Although I use the terminology of “levels”, the proposed framework can also represent “scales”, “domains”, or “subject matters”, where these are not linearly but only partially ordered by relations of supervenience or inclusion. (shrink)

Despite its recent popularity, Emergence is still a field where philosophers and physicists often talk past each other. In fact, while philosophical discussions focus mostly on ontological emergence, physical theory is inherently limited to the epistemological level and the impossibility of its conclusions to provide direct evidence for ontological claims is often underestimated. Nevertheless, the emergentist philosopher’s case against reductionist theories of how the different levels of reality are related to each other can still gain from the assessment of paradigmatic (...) examples of discontinuity between models in physics, even though their implications must be handled with care. (shrink)

Although contemporary metaphysics has recently undergone a neo-Aristotelian revival wherein dispositions, or capacities are now commonplace in empirically grounded ontologies, being routinely utilised in theories of causality and modality, a central Aristotelian concept has yet to be given serious attention – the doctrine of hylomorphism. The reason for this is clear: while the Aristotelian ontological distinction between actuality and potentiality has proven to be a fruitful conceptual framework with which to model the operation of the natural world, the distinction between (...) form and matter has yet to similarly earn its keep. In this chapter, I offer a first step toward showing that the hylomorphic framework is up to that task. To do so, I return to the birthplace of that doctrine - the biological realm. Utilising recent advances in developmental biology, I argue that the hylomorphic framework is an empirically adequate and conceptually rich explanatory schema with which to model the nature of organisms. (shrink)

Review of Carl Gillett's "Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy.".

This Letter to the Editor is a comment on a paper by Rodríguez Higuera (Biosemiotics 9, 155–167, 2016) that refers to a paper by van Hateren (Biosemiotics 8, 403–419, 2015). The comment argues that semiosis (i.e., the making of meaning) has biological roots in an internal process X occurring within all forms of life. This internal process produces, in effect, an approximation (i.e., an estimate) of the fitness of an organism. X subsequently drives a purely stochastic process of structural change (...) within the organism. This results in primordial forms of semiosos, agency, and aboutness. It is argued that the way this is produced should be regarded as a form of strong emergence, because it results in novel causal powers that are not equivalent to the combined causal powers of the composing parts of the system. -/- . (shrink)

Emergence develops a novel account of diachronic ontological emergence called transformational emergence and locates it in an established historical framework. The author shows how many problems affecting ontological emergence result from a dominant but inappropriate metaphysical tradition and provides a comprehensive assessment of current theories of emergence.

This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...) understanding of what ‘emergent’ means, the denial is indefensible: non-reductive physicalism is committed to mental properties being emergent properties. It follows that the problems for emergentism—especially the problems of mental causation—are also problems for non-reductive physicalism, and they are problems for the same reason. (shrink)

Joseph Levine is generally credited with the invention of the term ‘explanatory gap’ to describe our ignorance about the relationship between consciousness and the physical structures which sustain it.¹ Levine’s account of the problem of the FN:1 explanatory gap in his book Purple Haze (2001) may be summarized in terms of three theses, which I will describe and name as follows...