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  1. added 2018-07-18
    The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self From the Personal Level.Robert Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
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  2. added 2018-01-19
    Habit in Semiosis: Two Different Perspectives Based on Hierarchical Multi-Level System Modeling and Niche Construction Theory.Pedro Ata & Joao Queiroz - 2016 - In Anderson M. West D. & Donna West (eds.), Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit. Berlin: Springer. pp. 109-119.
    Habit in semiosis can be modeled both as a macro-level in a hierarchical multi-level system where it functions as boundary conditions for emergence of semiosis, and as a cognitive niche produced by an ecologically-inherited environment of cognitive artifacts. According to the first perspective, semiosis is modeled in terms of a multilayered system, with micro functional entities at the lower-level and with higher-level processes being mereologically composed of these lower-level entities. According to the second perspective, habits are embedded in ecologically-inherited environments (...)
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  3. added 2018-01-18
    Mechanisms in Cognitive Science.Carlos Zednik - 2017 - In Phyllis McKay Illari & Stuart Glennan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 389-400.
    This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain in Marr’s account, and (...)
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  4. added 2017-08-03
    HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory).Cory Wright, Matteo Colombo & Alexander Beard - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64:28–40.
    This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called ‘Heuristic Identity Theory’ (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so (...)
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  5. added 2016-06-24
    An Abductive Theory of Constitution.Michael Baumgartner & Lorenzo Casini - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):214-233.
    The first part of this paper finds Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this common-cause coupling is the existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution. Apart from adequately (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-05
    The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
    We outline a framework of multilevel neurocognitive mechanisms that incorporates representation and computation. We argue that paradigmatic explanations in cognitive neuroscience fit this framework and thus that cognitive neuroscience constitutes a revolutionary break from traditional cognitive science. Whereas traditional cognitive scientific explanations were supposed to be distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations, neurocognitive explanations aim to be mechanistic through and through. Neurocognitive explanations aim to integrate computational and representational functions and structures across multiple levels of organization in order to explain (...)
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  7. added 2016-02-16
    Function-Theoretic Explanation and the Search for Neural Mechanisms.Frances Egan - 2017 - In David M. Kaplan (ed.), Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-163.
    A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...)
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  8. added 2015-11-20
    Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):277-286.
  9. added 2015-09-08
    Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jeff Yoshimi - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
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  10. added 2015-08-15
    Representations: From Neural Systems to Cognitive Systems.William Bechtel - 2001 - In William P. Bechtel, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale & Robert S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Blackwell.
  11. added 2015-08-15
    Understanding Language: A Luddite Approach.Martin Andrew Brown - 1993 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    According to Chomsky, the ability to speak and understand a language rests in part on knowledge of complex and abstract grammatical rules. This knowledge is used, when a person speaks or understands a sentence, to generate structural descriptions, analogous to those devised by linguists, at an unconscious level of the speaker's or hearer's mind. Speaking and understanding thus involve complex, mental activity akin to translation. Chomsky holds that this activity should be thought of as processes in the brain. ;I argue (...)
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  12. added 2015-07-14
    Quantum Structure and Human Thought.Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Liane Gabora & Sandro Sozzo - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):274-276.
    We support the authors' claims, except that we point out that also quantum structure different from quantum probability abundantly plays a role in human cognition. We put forward several elements to illustrate our point, mentioning entanglement, contextuality, interference, and emergence as effects, and states, observables, complex numbers, and Fock space as specific mathematical structures.
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  13. added 2015-06-30
    Why There Isn’T Inter-Level Causation in Mechanisms.Felipe Romero - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3731-3755.
    The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. (...)
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  14. added 2015-05-07
    Social Intelligence: How to Integrate Research? A Mechanistic Perspective.Marcin Miłkowski - 2014 - Proceedings of the European Conference on Social Intelligence (ECSI-2014).
    Is there a field of social intelligence? Many various disciplines ap-proach the subject and it may only seem natural to suppose that different fields of study aim at explaining different phenomena; in other words, there is no spe-cial field of study of social intelligence. In this paper, I argue for an opposite claim. Namely, there is a way to integrate research on social intelligence, as long as one accepts the mechanistic account to explanation. Mechanistic inte-gration of different explanations, however, comes (...)
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  15. added 2015-01-08
    Pluralists About Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.
    In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings (...)
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  16. added 2013-10-23
    Enaktivismus.Miriam Kyselo - 2013 - In A. Stephan & S. Walter (eds.), Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. J.B. Metzler.
  17. added 2011-04-20
    The Cognitive Agent: Overcoming Informational Limits.Orlin Vakarelov - 2011 - Adaptive Behavior 19 (2):83-100.
    This article provides an answer to the question: What is the function of cognition? By answering this question it becomes possible to investigate what are the simplest cognitive systems. It addresses the question by treating cognition as a solution to a design problem. It defines a nested sequence of design problems: (1) How can a system persist? (2) How can a system affect its environment to improve its persistence? (3) How can a system utilize better information from the environment to (...)
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