This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

72 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 72
  1. added 2019-07-30
    Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation.Harjit Bhogal - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I give an account of what makes an event a coincidence. -/- I start by critically discussing a couple of other approaches to the notion of coincidence -- particularly that of Lando (2017) -- before developing my own view. The central idea of my view is that the correct understanding of coincidences is closely related to our understanding of the correct 'level' or 'grain' of explanation. Coincidences have a kind of explanatory deficiency — if they did not have this deficiency (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. added 2019-06-06
    On Margitay’s Notion of Reduction by Definition.Gergely Kertész - 2012 - Tradition and Discovery 39 (2):16-21.
    In a recent article “From Epistemology to Ontology,” Tihamer Margitay argues, in addition to other things, that the ontological arguments Polanyi provided for his ontological realism with respect to the levels of reality are insufficient. Although Margitay shows this correctly in the case of arguments from boundary conditions, his arguments are not that convincing against the unidentifyability thesis, the thesis that entity kinds on higher levels cannot be identified with descriptions given on lower levels. I argue that here Polányi relies (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-06-06
    Neuroscience and the Mind.Ian Ravenscroft - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):132-137.
    Francis Crick has identified a doctrine‐the neuron doctrine‐which he apparently regards as both true and astonishing. I begin by carefully articulating Crick’s doctrine, arguing that whilst plausible it is certainly not astonishing. I then consider a related doctrine, the biological neuroscience thesis. According to BNT, mental science is biological neuroscience, where biological neuroscience is pretty much exhausted by neuroanatomy, neurophysiology and neurochemistry. Stoljar and Gold argue that BNT is unsupported by current scientific developments. I argue that well‐established results in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-05-10
    On Cognitive and Biological Neuroscience.Daniel Stoljar & Ian Gold - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):110-131.
  5. added 2019-04-23
    Our World Isn't Organized Into Levels.Angela Potochnik - manuscript
    Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-09-06
    Can Physics Ever Be Complete If There is No Fundamental Level in Nature?Markus Schrenk - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):205-208.
    In their recent book Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross claim: (i) Physics is analytically complete since it is the only science that cannot be left incomplete. (ii) There might not be an ontologically fundamental level. (iii) We should not admit anything into our ontology unless it has explanatory and predictive utility. In this discussion note I aim to show that the ontological commitment in implies that the completeness of no science can be achieved where no fundamental level exists. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. added 2018-05-13
    Specialisation, Interdisciplinarity, and Incommensurability.Vincenzo Politi - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):301-317.
    Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2018-02-17
    Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1992 - In Y. Christen & P. S. Churchland (eds.), Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer's Disease. Cambridge: Springer Verlag. pp. 18--29.
  9. added 2018-02-16
    On Correspondence.Stephan Hartmann - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (1):79-94.
    This paper is an essay review of Steven French and Harmke Kamminga (eds.), Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Essays in Honour of Heinz Post (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). I distinguish a varity of correspondence relations between scientific theories (exemplified by cases from the book under review) and examine how one can make sense of the the prevailing continuity in scientific theorizing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  10. added 2018-02-05
    Levels of Organization in Biology.Markus Eronen & Daniel Stephen Brooks - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Levels of organization are structures in nature, usually defined by part-whole relationships, with things at higher levels being composed of things at the next lower level. Typical levels of organization that one finds in the literature include the atomic, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, organismal, group, population, community, ecosystem, landscape, and biosphere levels. References to levels of organization and related hierarchical depictions of nature are prominent in the life sciences and their philosophical study, and appear not only in introductory textbooks and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2017-07-04
    Can We Distinguish Between Science and Metaphysics?Alberto Cordero - 1988 - Epistemologia 11:65.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-03-03
    Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity. What? Why? How?Uskali Mäki - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (3):327-342.
    Compared to the massive literature from other disciplinary perspectives on interdisciplinarity, philosophy of science is only slowly beginning to pay systematic attention to this powerful trend in contemporary science. The paper provides some metaphilosophical reflections on the emerging “Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity”. What? I propose a conception of PhID that has the qualities of being broad and neutral as well as stemming from within the agenda of philosophy of science. It will investigate features of science that reveal themselves when scientific disciplines (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  13. added 2016-12-08
    Theory and Method in the Neurosciences.Peter McLaughlin, Peter Machamer & Rick Grush (eds.) - 2001 - Pittsburgh University Press.
  14. added 2016-12-08
    A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience.Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):809-830.
    It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views--one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  15. added 2016-11-23
    Looking Forward, Not Back: Supporting Structuralism in the Present.Kerry McKenzie - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:87-95.
    The view that the fundamental kind properties are intrinsic properties enjoys reflexive endorsement by most metaphysicians of science. But ontic structural realists deny that there are any fundamental intrinsic properties at all. Given that structuralists distrust intuition as a guide to truth, and given that we currently lack a fundamental physical theory that we could consult instead to order settle the issue, it might seem as if there is simply nowhere for this debate to go at present. However, I will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. added 2016-02-15
    Essentialism.Matthew J. Barker - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
  17. added 2015-08-26
    Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions.David Hommen - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-89.
    In this paper, I discuss Michael Moore’s and Jonathan Schaffer’s views on the ontology of omissions in context of their stances on the problem of omissive causation. First, I consider, from a general point of view, the question of the ontology of omissions, and how it relates to the problem of omissive causation. Then I describe Moore’s and Schaffer’s particular views on omissions and how they combine with their stances on the problem of omissive causation. I charge Moore and Schaffer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2015-08-26
    Negative Kausalität.Dieter Birnbacher & David Hommen - 2012 - de Gruyter.
    „Negative Kausalität“ bezeichnet ein hochkontroverses metaphysisches Problem. Können negative Entitäten wie Abwesenheiten oder das Nicht-Eintreten bestimmter Ereignisse Ursachen oder Ursachenfaktoren sein? Diese Frage steht im Schnittpunkt einer Reihe disziplinübergreifender Grundfragen: der Frage nach dem Wesen von Kausalität, der Frage nach der Natur von Handlungen und Ereignissen und der Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Kausalität und normativer - moralischer und rechtlicher - Verantwortlichkeit. Die vorliegende Studie entwickelt im ersten Schritt eine Konzeption von negativer Kausalität ausgehend vom Sonderfall der handlungsförmigen negativen Kausalität, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2014-07-26
    The Mechanics of Individuality in Nature.Stanford Goldman - 1971 - Foundations of Physics 1 (4):395-408.
    Evidence is presented to support the hypothesis that there is a set of basically similar phenomena or characteristics of physics, biology, and sociology. Six of these are identified. Five of them are usually associated with quantum mechanics. They are the existence of eigenstates, transform domains, bosons and fermions, particles and antiparticles, and complementarity. The sixth, namely alternation of generation, is usually associated with biology. The hypothesis leads to some new points of view and interpretations in biology, sociology, and physics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. added 2014-04-30
    Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  21. added 2014-04-02
    Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings for Models of Reduction.R. van Riel - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):747-761.
    Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so water is identical to H2O. At the same time, if water reduces to H2O then H2O does not reduce to water–the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle–if water just is H2O it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The paper proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts and that in order to account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. added 2014-04-02
    A Metaphysics for Explanatory Ecumenism.Tamás Demeter - 2003 - Philosophica 71:99-115.
  23. added 2014-04-01
    Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function.Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.
    The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. added 2014-03-31
    Psychoneural Isomorphism: Historical Background and Current Relevance.Eckart Scheerer - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):183-210.
    The relevance of Wolfgang K hler's psychoneural isomorphism principle to contemporary cognitive neuroscience is explored. K hler's approach to the mind—body problem is interpreted as a response to the foundational crisis of psychology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Some aspects of his isomorphism doctrine are discussed, with a view to reaching an interpretation that is both historically accurate and pertinent to issues currently debated in the philosophy of psychology. The principle was meant to be empirically verifiable. Accordingly, some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25. added 2014-03-31
    Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.
    In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" would work (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. added 2014-03-30
    How is Scientific Analysis Possible?Richard Corry - 2009 - In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    One of the most powerful tools in science is the analytic method, whereby we seek to understand complex systems by studying simpler sub-systems from which the complex is composed. If this method is to be successful, something about the sub-systems must remain invariant as we move from the relatively isolated conditions in which we study them, to the complex conditions in which we want to put our knowledge to use. This paper asks what this invariant could be. The paper shows (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. added 2014-03-29
    Claves actuales de pensamiento.María G. Navarro, Betty Estévez & Antolín Sánchez Cuervo (eds.) - 2010 - CSIC/Plaza y Valdés.
    Constituye la primera publicación del Seminario Internacional de Jóvenes Investigadores, foro creado en el Instituto de Filosofía, perteneciente al Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2014-03-26
    The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction.Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.) - 2007 - Blackwell.
    The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward systems, consciousness, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  29. added 2014-03-26
    Understanding Neural Complexity: A Role for Reduction. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (4):467-481.
    Psychoneural reduction is under attack again, only this time from a former ally: cognitive neuroscience. It has become popular to think of the brain as a complex system whose theoretically important properties emerge from dynamic, non-linear interactions between its component parts. ``Emergence'' is supposed to replace reduction: the latter is thought to be incapable of explaining the brain qua complex system. Rather than engage this issue at the level of theories of reduction versus theories of emergence, I here emphasize a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. added 2014-03-21
    The Brain's 'New' Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint.Gary Hatfield - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):388-404.
    There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31. added 2014-03-21
    Two Radical Neuron Doctrines.Alex Byrne - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):833-833.
    G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful theory' must (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2014-03-20
    Coherence Between Theories.Mohamed Elsamahi - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):331-352.
    This paper argues that conceptual factors are as important as empirical factors in theory acceptance. Coherence between a new theory that is assessed for acceptance and the existing (established) theories in the same domain is among such conceptual factors. For example, a new theory about spectroscopy that does not cohere with established theories of spectroscopy is unlikely to be accepted, even if it was supported by empirical considerations. It is argued that a new theory coheres with a group of established (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2014-03-20
    Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle.Tim Bayne & Jordi FernÁndez - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2014-03-18
    Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory.Carl F. Craver - 2002 - Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69 (3):S83-S97.
    The dominant neuroscientific theory of spatial memory is, like many theories in neuroscience, a multilevel description of a mechanism. The theory links the activities of molecules, cells, brain regions, and whole organisms into an integrated sketch of an explanation for the ability of organisms to navigate novel environments. Here I develop a taxonomy of interlevel experimental strategies for integrating the levels in such multilevel mechanisms. These experimental strategies include activation strategies, interference strategies, and additive strategies. These strategies are mutually reinforcing, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  35. added 2014-03-14
    Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten.John Bickle - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
    In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. added 2014-03-12
    The Duality Principle: Irreducibility of Sub-Threshold Psychophysical Computation to Neuronal Brain Activation.Jonathan Bentwich - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):451-455.
    A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is ‘materialistic reductionism’, i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber’s psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. added 2014-03-12
    Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track - Reply to Bickle.Huib L. de Jong - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):435-443.
    It is argued that John Bickle’s Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, linking anatomy, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2014-03-12
    Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  39. added 2014-03-09
    The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: A Model System for the Philosophy of Mind.Kenneth Aizawa - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):65-98.
    This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  40. added 2014-03-09
    Why Neuroscience Matters to Cognitive Neuropsychology.Victoria McGeer - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):347 - 371.
    The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. added 2014-03-06
    Non‐Committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
    Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at least another variety of NCC explanations, causal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2013-09-18
    Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets.Carl Hempel - 1969 - In White Morgenbesser (ed.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. St Martin's Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  43. added 2013-03-24
    La simulation conçue comme expérience concrète.Franck Varenne - 2003 - In Jean-Pierre Müller (ed.), Le statut épistémologique de la simulation. Editions de l'ENST.
    Par un procédé d'objections/réponses, nous passons d'abord en revue certains des arguments en faveur ou en défaveur du caractère empirique de la simulation informatique. A l'issue de ce chemin clarificateur, nous proposons des arguments en faveur du caractère concret des objets simulés en science, ce qui légitime le fait que l'on parle à leur sujet d'une expérience, plus spécifiquement d'une expérience concrète du second genre.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. added 2012-03-27
    The Limitations of Hierarchical Organization.Angela Potochnik & Brian McGill - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (1):120-140.
    The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  45. added 2011-04-27
    Penser la science et la foi par la passion de la recherche. À propos de 'Chercheurs en science, chercheurs de sens'.Philippe Gagnon - 2011 - Laval Théologique et Philosophique 67 (1):149-154.
    This critical notice was occasioned by the reading of a recent monograph, published at the end of 2009, which features a dialogue and a mutual critical assessment of the work of a microbiologist, also a priest from the Mission de France, and an astrophysicist who was agnostic. The book inquires into the motivations of scientific research, looks at the quest for a Creator behind the said work when done by a believer, and tries to retrieve the spiritual presuppositions that would (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2011-01-28
    A Neurathian Conception of the Unity of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):305-319.
    An historically important conception of the unity of science is explanatory reductionism, according to which the unity of science is achieved by explaining all laws of science in terms of their connection to microphysical law. There is, however, a separate tradition that advocates the unity of science. According to that tradition, the unity of science consists of the coordination of diverse fields of science, none of which is taken to have privileged epistemic status. This alternate conception has roots in Otto (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  47. added 2011-01-28
    Levels of Explanation Reconceived.Angela Potochnik - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):59-72.
    A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher‐level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher‐level explanations are more general than their lower‐level alternatives or that higher‐level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  48. added 2011-01-24
    Über die heuristische Funktion des Korrespondenzprinzips.Stephan Hartmann - 1995 - In Jürgen Mittelstrass (ed.), Die Zunkunft des Wissens. Universitätsverlag Konstanz.
    Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis aufeinanderfolgender Theorien rückte spätestens mit der Publikation von T. S. Kuhns einflußreicher Schrift Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen im Jahre 1961 in den Brennpunkt wissenschaftsphilosophischer Untersuchungen. Dabei gibt es im wesentlichen zwei große Lager. Auf der einen Seite stehen Philosophen wie P. Feyerabend und T. S. Kuhn selbst, die den Aspekt der Diskontinuität...
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. added 2010-07-06
    Deterministic Chance.Luke Glynn - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
    I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  50. added 2010-03-27
    Explanatory Depth.Brad Weslake - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):273-294.
    I defend an account of explanatory depth according to which explanations in the non-fundamental sciences can be deeper than explanations in fundamental physics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
1 — 50 / 72