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  1. The Sufficiency of Objective Representation.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
  2. Spatial Experience, Spatial Reality, and Two Paths to Primitivism.Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    I explore two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality: spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. Roughly, spatial functionalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties are those playing a certain causal role in producing spatial experience while spatial presentationalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties include those presented in spatial experience. I argue that each view, in its own way, leads to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism: whereas spatial functionalism leads to primitivism about phenomenal representation, spatial presentationalism (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita, and the Planet Xenon.Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.), Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. MIT Press.
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  4. The Impoverished Representations of Brains in Vats.Jan Almäng - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):475-494.
    In the present paper, the notion that brains in vats with perceptual experiences of the same type as ours could perceptually represent other entities than shapes is challenged. Whereas it is often held that perceptual experiences with the same phenomenal character as ours could represent computational properties, I argue that this is not the case for shapes. My argument is in brief that the phenomenal character of a normal visual experience exemplifies shapes – phenomenal shapes – which functions as the (...)
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  5. Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
  6. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  7. Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  8. Theorizing About a Mystical Approach.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Create Space.
    The theme of the work concerns the so-called ‘unity experience’ of these mystics. The unity or oneness or the realization of ‘being oned’ with, can be referred to the beatific vision. In the case of Christian mystics it is unity experience of The Gottheit (or Godhead) of Meister Eckhart, in Sufism it is being united with The Beloved, in Buddhism it could be said to realize The Buddha mind or Cosmic Buddha’s consciousness and in Vedanta, the realization of The One (...)
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  9. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...)
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  10. Is There a Deductive Argument for Semantic Externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):675-681.
    Juhani Yli-Vakkuri has argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premisses widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument depends, however, on premisses that, on standard formulations of internalism, cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously. It does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this article is to explain why.
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  11. Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.
    Annotated bibliography of works on externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind.
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  12. Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
    Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have (...)
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  13. Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):682-684.
  14. Objects of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2015 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
  15. Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
    Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his (...)
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  16. On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  17. The Relationship Between Empirical Knowledge and Experiences.Mika Suojanen - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat (10):102-112.
    Experience has been described as a mental state with properties that it represents and possesses. Nevertheless, the existence of experience as a mental entity has been questioned by eliminative materialism, which states that everything that goes on in the world is physical, and thus there are no mental states. Experience can be analysed as a dependent entity known introspectively by living subjects. However, when experience is necessary in order to be connected with the environment and informed of its facts, it (...)
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  18. The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  19. It's Still There!Benj Hellie - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer.
    The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies surrounding (...)
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  20. Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...)
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  21. The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence (with Reply by Klein&Hilbert).Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. pp. 237-298.
  22. Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In D. Platchias & F. E. Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 291.
    There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s (...)
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  23. Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? Vehicle Externalism and Dynamical Explanations.Michael Madary - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins.
    Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle (...)
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  24. Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...)
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  25. ‘Self-Consciousness, Anti-Cartesianism and Cognitive Semantics in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2011 - In S. Houlgate & M. Baur (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Hegel. Blackwell.
    If Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology is to justify our capacity to know the world as it is, by examining a complete series of forms of consciousness, why and with what justification does he omit the Cartesian ego-centric predicament? By augmenting Franco Chiereghin’s explication of Hegel’s concept of thought, and of why Hegel provides it only at the start of the second half of ‘Self-Consciousness’, this paper shows how Hegel showed that Pyrrhonian, Cartesian and Humean scepticism, and also mental content internalism, all (...)
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  26. Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  27. An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  28. Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where (...)
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  29. Beyond the Internalism/Externalism Debate: The Constitution of the Space of Perception.Charles Lenay & Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):938-952.
    This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally (...)
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  30. Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality.Lilian Alweiss - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):53-78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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  31. Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?Robert Schroer - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):93-110.
    : Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth (...)
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  32. Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by (...)
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  33. On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal (...)
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  34. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  35. Memory and Time.Jordi Fernandez - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
    The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...)
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  36. Memory, Past and Self.Jordi Fernández - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):103 - 121.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...)
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  37. Hitting on Consciousness: Honderich Versus McGinn.J. Andrew Ross - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):109-128.
    Ted Honderich, 74, formerly Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at the University of London, recently published a short book on consciousness (Honderich, 2004). Colin McGinn, 57, his former colleague at University College London and now a professor of philosophy at the University of Miami, Florida, reviewed it (McGinn, 2007a). The review is quite long and detailed, but the first sentences set the tone. McGinn on Honderich: 'This book runs the full gamut from the mediocre to the (...)
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  38. Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
    I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving (...)
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  39. Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    I argue that, if content externalism is in tension with privileged access to content, then content externalism is also in tension with privileged access to phenomenal character. Content externalists may thus have a new problem on their hands. This is not because content externalism implies externalism about phenomenal character. My argument is compatible with the conviction that, unlike some propositional content, phenomenal character is not individuated by environmental factors. Rather, the argument involves considering in tandem two ideas which have become (...)
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  40. Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  41. On the Content of Experience.Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590-611.
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it's like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske, Mike Thau, Michael Tye and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we thereby have special access to the nature of these contents. In this paper, we take advantage of this fact (...)
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  42. Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious (...)
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  43. Humeans Aren’T Out of Their Minds.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):529–535.
    Humeanism is “the thesis that the whole truth about a world like ours supervenes on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities.” (Lewis, 1994, 473) Since the whole truth about our world contains truths about causation, causation must be located in the mosaic of local qualities that the Humean says constitute the whole truth about the world. The most natural ways to do this involve causation being in some sense extrinsic. To take the simplest possible Humean analysis, we might say that (...)
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  44. Comment on Radical Externalism.Harold Brown - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):14-27.
  45. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  46. Comment on Ted Honderich's Radical Externalism.Tim Crane - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):28-43.
    Ted Honderich's theory of consciousness as existence, which he here calls Radical Externalism, starts with a good phenomenological observation: that perceptual experience appears to involve external things being immediately present to us. As P.F. Strawson once observed, when asked to describe my current perceptual state, it is normally enough simply to describe the things around me (Strawson, 1979, p. 97). But in my view that does not make the whole theory plausible.
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  47. Radical Externalism: Honderich's Theory of Consciousness Discussed.Anthony Freeman (ed.) - 2006 - Exeter: Imprint Academic.
    What is it for you to be conscious? To be conscious now, for instance, of the room you are in? Theories on offer divide into just two categories, labelled by Ted Honderich as devout physicalism and spiritualism. The first reduces consciousness to no more than the physical, while the second takes it out of space and into mystery. But none of the proposed solutions has worked convincingly, and the reason, according to Honderich, lies in the persistent and resilient human belief (...)
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  48. Special Issue on Radical Externalism - Editorial Preface.Anthony Freeman - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):1-1.
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  49. Consciousness and Absence.James Garvey - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):44-60.
  50. Radical Externalism.Ted Honderich - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):3-13.
    If you want a philosophically diligent exposition of a theory, something that has got through review by conventional peers, go elsewhere (Honderich, 2004). If you want an understanding made more immediate by brevity and informality, read on. The theory is a Radical Externalism about the nature of consciousness. If it is not a complete departure from the cranialism of most of the philosophy and science of consciousness, it is a fundamental departure.
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