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  1. added 2020-06-03
    The Trouble with Ultra-Externalism.Robert Kirk - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:293.
  2. added 2020-06-03
    Perpertual Content and Local Supervenience.Martin Davies - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:21.
  3. added 2020-03-13
    The Relationship Between Empirical Knowledge and Experiences.Mika Suojanen - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat (10):102-112.
    Experience has been described as a mental state with properties that it represents and possesses. Nevertheless, the existence of experience as a mental entity has been questioned by eliminative materialism, which states that everything that goes on in the world is physical, and thus there are no mental states. Experience can be analysed as a dependent entity known introspectively by living subjects. However, when experience is necessary in order to be connected with the environment and informed of its facts, it (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-25
    Internalism and the Snapshot Conception of Phenomenal Experience: A Reply to Fisher.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):652-664.
    Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noe) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-11
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  6. added 2019-09-23
    Merleau-Ponty Sonha com Ovelhas Elétricas? Ou Androides, ginóides, e a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty.Sandro Rinaldi Feliciano - manuscript
    Este pequeno ensaio tem como objetivo verificar se, e como, a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty pode ser aplicada a androides. Androides são “autômatos com forma humana”, enquanto robôs são “aparelhos automáticos capazes de manipular objetos ou executar operações segundo um programa” (Larousse Do Brasil, 2009) assim podemos dizer que um androide é um robô, mas nem todo robô é um androide Devido à diversidade de gêneros, foi criado o termo ginóide, separando se assim os androides de aparência masculina (andros) da feminina (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by (...)
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  8. added 2018-09-06
    Theorizing About a Mystical Approach.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Create Space.
    The theme of the work concerns the so-called ‘unity experience’ of these mystics. The unity or oneness or the realization of ‘being oned’ with, can be referred to the beatific vision. In the case of Christian mystics it is unity experience of The Gottheit (or Godhead) of Meister Eckhart, in Sufism it is being united with The Beloved, in Buddhism it could be said to realize The Buddha mind or Cosmic Buddha’s consciousness and in Vedanta, the realization of The One (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-24
    Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.
    Annotated bibliography of works on externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind.
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  10. added 2018-03-18
    Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
  11. added 2018-03-09
    Science and Meaning.Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - The Philosophers' Magazine 18:15-16.
    How can we understand our human world, embedded as it is within the physical universe, in such a way that justice is done to both the richness, meaning and value of human life on the one hand, and what modern science tells us about the physical universe on the other hand? I argue that, in order to solve this problem, we need to see physics as being concerned only with a highly selected aspect of reality – that aspect which determines (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    Intersubjective Science.Max Velmans - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):299-306.
    The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be (...)
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  13. added 2018-01-13
    The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...)
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  14. added 2017-09-29
    Are We Out of Our Minds?Max Velmans - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):109-116.
    This paper is a commentary on Rupert Sheldrake’s analysis of theories of perception (in JCS, 2005, 2006). As Sheldrake points out in his fascinating review of ancient and modern thinking on this subject, theories of vision have ranged from “extramissive” theories that posit some active influence emanating from the eyes that both illuminates and influences the external world, “intramissive” theories that stress the influence of the external world on the (passive) brain, and theories in which intramissive and extramissive influences combine. (...)
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  15. added 2017-09-28
    Physical, Psychological and Virtual Realities.Max Velmans - 1998 - In John Wood (ed.), The Virtual Embodied: Presence, Practice, Technology. London: Routledge. pp. 45-60.
    This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might (...)
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  16. added 2017-09-20
    The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.
    This paper summarised the main arguments presented in "Consciousness, brain and the physical world" Philosophical Psychology (1990) to introduce a symposium on that paper. This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism). This summary of the 1990 paper was followed by three critiques (by Robert Rentoul, Norman Wetherick, and Grant Gillett) followed by two replies. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points in the 1991 paper (...)
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  17. added 2017-09-15
    A Reflexive Science of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1993 - In Gregory Bock & Joan Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 81-99.
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...)
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  18. added 2017-09-15
    Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
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  19. added 2017-05-16
    Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  20. added 2017-02-02
    Hitting on Consciousness: Honderich Versus McGinn.J. Andrew Ross - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):109-128.
    Ted Honderich, 74, formerly Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at the University of London, recently published a short book on consciousness (Honderich, 2004). Colin McGinn, 57, his former colleague at University College London and now a professor of philosophy at the University of Miami, Florida, reviewed it (McGinn, 2007a). The review is quite long and detailed, but the first sentences set the tone. McGinn on Honderich: 'This book runs the full gamut from the mediocre to the (...)
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  21. added 2017-01-19
    Some Questions About Radical Externalism.Derek Matravers - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):95-108.
    It is hard not to sympathise with Professor Honderich's starting point. It is easy to feel pessimistic about philosophy's ability to throw light on the nature of consciousness. What, then, to do? One option is to persist with the various current approaches. It is clear that Honderich thinks this would be akin to putting more effort into trying to work out the temporal priority of the chicken and the egg. The thought of the orthodox is that an account of consciousness (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-19
    Comment on Radical Externalism.Harold Brown - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):14-27.
  23. added 2017-01-19
    Consciousness and Absence.James Garvey - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):44-60.
  24. added 2016-12-12
    Why Ultra-Externalism Goes Too Far.R. Kirk - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):73-79.
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Memory, Past and Self.Jordi Fernández - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):103 - 121.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...)
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  26. added 2016-12-08
    Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism.Gregory McCulloch - 2002 - Routledge.
    _The Life of the Mind _presents an original and striking conception of the mind and its place in nature. In a spirited and rigorous attack on most of the orthodox positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, McCulloch connects three of the orthodoxy's central themes - externalism, phenomenology and the relation between science and common-sense psychology - in a defence of a throughly anti-Cartesian conception of mental life. McCulloch argues that the life of the mind will never be understood until we (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-13
    Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2004 - Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium 12:408-409.
    There has been recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are “in the head”. Putnam makes use of Twin-Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus “mean”) and that we rely also on external factors, which are not “in the head”. This suggests to me that we in some way mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls “Intentional contents”, (...)
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  29. added 2016-07-12
    On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  30. added 2015-03-28
    Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):682-684.
  31. added 2015-02-05
    Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by familiar objects. (...)
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  32. added 2014-12-31
    The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  33. added 2014-04-18
    The Real Trouble for Phenomenal Externalists: New Empirical Evidence (with Reply by Klein&Hilbert).Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. pp. 237-298.
  34. added 2014-04-01
    Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  35. added 2014-04-01
    Comment on Dretske.Paul Horwich - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:167-170.
  36. added 2014-04-01
    Dretske's Qualia Externalism.Jaegwon Kim - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:159-165.
  37. added 2014-04-01
    The Roundsquare Copula: A Semantic Internalist's Rejoinder.Paul Tappenden - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):395-400.
  38. added 2014-04-01
    Dretske on Phenomenal Externalism.John Biro - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:171-178.
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  39. added 2014-03-31
    Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision.Robert M. Francescotti - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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  40. added 2014-03-29
    An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-28
    Externalism and Scientific Cartesianism.Graeme R. Forbes - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):196-205.
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  42. added 2014-03-27
    Radical Externalism Concerning Experience.Crispin Sartwell - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (1):55-70.
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  43. added 2014-03-26
    Experience and the Swamp Creature.Willem A. Devries - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):55-80.
  44. added 2014-03-26
    A Few Remarks Concerning a Science of Sensory Phenomena.Solomon Igel - 1995 - Axiomathes 6 (1):105-118.
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  45. added 2014-03-25
    Intentionality and Qualia.Brendan Lalor - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):249-290.
  46. added 2014-03-23
    Externalism and Phenomenal Content.Johan Veldeman - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):155-177.
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  47. added 2014-03-21
    An Externalist Approach to Understanding Color Experience.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):968-969.
    Palmer demarcates the bounds of our understanding of color experience by symmetries in the color space. He claims that if there are symmetries, there can be functionally undetectable color transformations. However, even if there are symmetries, Palmer's support for the possibility of undetectable transformations assumes phenomenal internalism. Alternatively, phenomenal externalism eliminates Palmer's limit on our understanding of color experience.
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  48. added 2014-03-19
    The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  49. added 2014-03-18
    Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
    I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-18
    Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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