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  1. Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  2. Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl's Account of Intentionality.Lilian Alweiss - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):53-78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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  3. Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases.David Bain - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
    I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving (...)
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  4. On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes.Gary Bartlett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  5. On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal (...)
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  6. Dretske on Phenomenal Externalism.John I. Biro - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:171-178.
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  7. Comment on Radical Externalism.Harold Brown - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):14-27.
  8. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  9. Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
    Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have (...)
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  10. The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel.David J. Chalmers - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  11. Comment on Ted Honderich's Radical Externalism.Tim Crane - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):28-43.
    Ted Honderich's theory of consciousness as existence, which he here calls Radical Externalism, starts with a good phenomenological observation: that perceptual experience appears to involve external things being immediately present to us. As P.F. Strawson once observed, when asked to describe my current perceptual state, it is normally enough simply to describe the things around me (Strawson, 1979, p. 97). But in my view that does not make the whole theory plausible.
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  12. Externalism and Experience.Martin Davies - 1997 - In Ned Block & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press. pp. 244-250.
    In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to (...)
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  13. Aims and Claims of Externalist Arguments.Martin Davies - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 4:227-249.
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  14. Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience.Martin Davies - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
  15. Individualism and Perceptual Content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  16. Experience and the Swamp Creature.Willem A. de Vries - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):55-80.
  17. Phenomenal Externalism.Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7.
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  18. Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  19. A Puzzle About Perception.Andy Egan & James John - manuscript
    experience supervene on the intrinsic properties of the experience.
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  20. Can an Externalist About Concepts Be an Internalist About Phenomenal Character.Jonathan Ellis - manuscript
    Many philosophers today believe that what an individual is thinking does not depend entirely on the individual.
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  21. Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  22. Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  23. Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):682-684.
  24. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  25. Objects of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - forthcoming - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
  26. Memory and Time.Jordi Fernandez - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
    The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...)
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  27. Memory, Past and Self.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Synthese 160 (1):103 - 121.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...)
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  28. Externalism and Scientific Cartesianism.Graeme R. Forbes - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):196-205.
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  29. Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision.Robert Francescotti - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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  30. Radical Externalism: Honderich's Theory of Consciousness Discussed.Anthony Freeman (ed.) - 2006 - Exeter: Imprint Academic.
    What is it for you to be conscious? To be conscious now, for instance, of the room you are in? Theories on offer divide into just two categories, labelled by Ted Honderich as devout physicalism and spiritualism. The first reduces consciousness to no more than the physical, while the second takes it out of space and into mystery. But none of the proposed solutions has worked convincingly, and the reason, according to Honderich, lies in the persistent and resilient human belief (...)
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  31. Special Issue on Radical Externalism - Editorial Preface.Anthony Freeman - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):1-1.
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  32. Consciousness and Absence.James Garvey - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):44-60.
  33. Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  34. Why Humeans Are Out of Their Minds.John Hawthorne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):351-58.
  35. It's Still There!Benj Hellie - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer.
    The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies surrounding (...)
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  36. An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  37. Radical Externalism.Ted Honderich - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):3-13.
    If you want a philosophically diligent exposition of a theory, something that has got through review by conventional peers, go elsewhere (Honderich, 2004). If you want an understanding made more immediate by brevity and informality, read on. The theory is a Radical Externalism about the nature of consciousness. If it is not a complete departure from the cranialism of most of the philosophy and science of consciousness, it is a fundamental departure.
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  38. Comment on Dretske.Paul Horwich - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:167-170.
  39. A Few Remarks Concerning a Science of Sensory Phenomena.Solomon Igel - 1995 - Axiomathes 6 (1):105-118.
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  40. Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where (...)
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  41. Dretske's Qualia Externalism.Jaegwon Kim - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:159-165.
  42. Why Ultra-Externalism Goes Too Far.R. Kirk - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):73-79.
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  43. Consciousness, Information, and External Relations.Robert Kirk - 1998 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):249-71.
  44. The Trouble with Ultra-Externalism.Robert Kirk - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:293-307.
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  45. Review of M. Rowlands, Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again[REVIEW]Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):487-490.
  46. Intentionality and Qualia.Brendan J. Lalor - 1999 - Synthese 121 (3):249-290.
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  47. Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism.Stephen Law - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):61-70.
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  48. Beyond the Internalism/Externalism Debate: The Constitution of the Space of Perception.Charles Lenay & Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):938-952.
    This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally (...)
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  49. Radical Externalism or Berkeley Revisited?E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):78-94.
    Ted Honderich's 'Radical Externalism' concerning the nature of consciousness is a refreshing, and in many ways very appealing, approach to a long- standing and seemingly intractable philosophical conundrum. Although I sympathize with many of his motivations in advancing the theory and share his hostility for certain alternative approaches that are currently popular, I will serve him better by playing devil's advocate than by simply recording my points of agreement with him. If his theory is a good one, it should be (...)
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  50. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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