Related categories

245 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 245
  1. added 2019-01-01
    Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism About Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission.Arash Abizadeh - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-12-03
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-11-27
    Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
  4. added 2018-11-23
    David Sobel, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism , Pp. Vii + 312.Owen C. King - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-5.
    This is a review of David Sobel's monograph, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-09-24
    Motivation and Motivating Reason.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. pp. 464--485.
  6. added 2018-09-21
    McDowell on External Reasons.John Brunero - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):22-42.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-09-18
    Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons.John Brunero - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):99-118.
    This paper examines some recent arguments for internalism that (i) appeal to an analogy between practical and theoretical reasons, (ii) look toward our practices of reasoning with others, or (iii) tie reasons to good deliberation. The conclusion of this paper is a skeptical one: none of these new arguments gives us sufficient reason to think that internalism is true.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-09-17
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-09-03
    From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism By David Sobel. [REVIEW]Luke Elson - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):583-586.
    Book review of David Sobel's "From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-08-18
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-08-02
    Moralische Motivation. Kant Und Die Alternativen.Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.) - 2006 - Meiner Verlag.
    Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-07-07
    The Long Way to “Extreme Psychologism”.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):171-177.
  14. added 2018-06-29
    Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers have long theorised about which things make people’s lives go well (and why) and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation of how exactly it functions and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-06-22
    Reasons in Moral Philosophy.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - In G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. New York: Springer.
  16. added 2018-02-18
    Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings.Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.) - 2011 - MIT Press.
    Some of the most challenging questions in philosophical ethics concern the justification of action. Can you have reasons to do something that you are not, and perhaps cannot be, motivated to do? If reasons rest on desires, why respect the rights and interests of others when doing so prevents us from getting what we want? In other words, why be moral? In his 1979 essay, "Internal and External Reasons," Bernard Williams framed the dispute about reason and motivation in a way (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2018-02-17
    Reasons and Motivation—Not a Wrong Distinction.Simon Robertson - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):391-397.
    This paper responds to Susan Hurley’s attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism–externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley’s argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2018-02-17
    Desires, Whims and Values.Donald C. Hubin - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-335.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that an agent's reasons for acting are grounded in the agent's desires. Numerous objections have been leveled against this view, but the most compelling concerns the problem of "alien desires" - desires with which the agent does not identify. The standard version of neo-Humeanism holds that these desires, like any others, generate reasons for acting. A variant of neo-Humeanism that grounds an agent's reasons on her values, rather than all of her desires, avoids this implication, but at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  19. added 2018-01-24
    Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-11-13
    Review of David Sobel's From Valuing to Value. [REVIEW]Ben Bramble - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201705:2017.05.13.
  21. added 2017-11-13
    Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.
    What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons and argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2017-09-24
    The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards aren’t intrinsically reason providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. I here develop a novel account of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. added 2017-09-14
    Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
    I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational Internalism and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-03-18
    Introduction.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity Berys Gaut (ed.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-03-08
    Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.
    Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2017-03-01
    A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.
    According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality, where the latter (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. added 2017-02-15
    Julia Markovits: Moral Reason. [REVIEW]David Rocheleau-Houle - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):663-664.
    Julia Markovits’ Moral Reason is a defense of internalism about moral reasons and a desire-based account of reasons for action. Even though she defends this position, she does not consider herself committed to relativism and to a desire-based understanding of what reasons there are. Indeed, it is crucial to make a distinction between two kinds of inquiry about reasons for action. On one side, we find “analytic inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons are. On the other, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2017-02-15
    A Hegelian Critique of Desire-Based Reasons.Kate Padgett Walsh - 2013 - Idealistic Studies 43 (3):171-184.
    This paper approaches Humean accounts of desire from a perspective relatively unexplored in contemporary moral theory, namely Hegel’s ethical thought. I contend that Hegel’s treatment of desire is, ultimately, somewhat more Humean than Hegel himself recognized. But Hegel also goes further than contemporary Humeans in recognizing the sociality of the normative domain, and this difference has important implications for the Humean thesis of desire-based reasons. I develop a Hegelian critique of DBR and conclude by outlining a distinctively Hegelian approach to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2017-02-14
    Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
    Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. added 2017-02-11
    Desires, Reasons, and Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
    Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, and T. M. S canlon, among others, all hold that reasons for action are provided by facts about those actions. They also hold that the fact that an action would promote or achieve the object of an agent's desire is not one of the relevant facts, and does not provide a reason. Rather, the facts that provide reasons are typically facts about valuable states of affairs that the action is likely to bring about, or valuable properties (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. added 2017-02-09
    Reasons for Action and Desires.Michael Woods & Philippa Foot - 1972 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 46 (1):189 - 210.
  32. added 2017-01-29
    Why Instruments Aren't Reasons.Adrienne M. Martin - 2004 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    "[R]easons for action must have their source in goals, desires, or intentions....[T]he possession of rationality is not sufficient to provide a source for relevant reasons,...certain desires, goals, or intentions are also necessary." ;So says Gilbert Harman. So say many other philosophers, from Aristotle to Hume to Harman and David Gauthier. To these many philosophers, this is a home truth, as obvious as the nose on your face. And yet as many philosophers---from the Stoics to Kant to Nagel and Korsgaard---reject this (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-01-29
    Moral Reasons and Motivation: Prospects for Ethical Externalism.Elizabeth Ann Oljar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    Internalism about rationality, a widely accepted view about the nature of justifying reasons for action, is the thesis that justifying reasons depend on the motivational states of the agent whose reasons they are. According to the Humean version of this view, reasoning about facts is not sufficient to motivate action; thus, Humeans assert what I call "the priority thesis": reasoning only produces motivation by engaging desires that the agent has prior to deliberation. Kantian internalists deny the priority thesis, and assert (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-01-26
    Reasons From Within: Desires and Values, by Alan H. Goldman.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1086-1091.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-01-23
    Desires and Reasons.Alan Goldman - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):291 - 304.
    In an article on whether desires generate practical reasons, Ruth Chang points out that philosophers have gravitated to extreme positions in their answers to this question. Internalists argue that all reasons derive from desires, while externalists argue that none, or virtually none, do. She, by contrast, holds that some reasons derive from desires and some from objective values. According to her, single desires in themselves can provide reasons for actions based simply on the desires' affective nature. But in her view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2017-01-22
    Williams' Argument Against External Reasons.Brad Hooker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (1):42 - 44.
  37. added 2017-01-21
    Internalism, (Super)Fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy.Teresa Robertson - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184.
    Abstract David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ?the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ? (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. added 2017-01-21
    Are Williams's Reasons Problematically External After All?Terry L. Price - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):461-478.
  39. added 2017-01-20
    Reasons From Within: Desires and Values.Alan H. Goldman - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. added 2017-01-19
    Normative Concepts and Motivation.François Schroeter - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-23.
    Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, and Tyler Burge have suggested that the similarities between theoretical and practical reasoning can bolster the case for judgment internalism – i.e. the claim that normative judgments are necessarily connected to motivation. In this paper, I first flesh out the rationale for this new approach to internalism. I then argue that even if there are reasons for thinking that internalism holds in the theoretical domain, these reasons don’t generalize to the practical domain.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. added 2017-01-19
    Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):163–177.
    The paper defends Collingwood's account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologizes the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalizations from rationalizations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of nonpsychologizing internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2017-01-19
    Internalism and the Good for a Person.Connie S. Rosati - 1996 - Ethics 106 (2):297-326.
    Proponents of numerous recent theories of a person's good hold that a plausible account of the good for a person must satisfy existence internalism. Yet little direct defense has been given for this position. I argue that the principal intuition behind internalism supports a stronger version of the thesis than it might appear--one that effects a "double link" to motivation. I then identify and develop the main arguments that have been or might be given in support of internalism about a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  43. added 2017-01-18
    Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  44. added 2017-01-18
    Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
    Hume said that the reasons that determine the rationality of one's actions are the desires one has when acting: one's actions are rational iff they advance these desires. Thomas Nagel says this entails calling rational, actions absurdly conflicting in aims over time. For one might have reason, in one's current desires, to begin trying to cause states one foresees having reason, in one's foreseen desires, to prevent. Instead, then, real reasons must be timeless, so that current and foreseen reasons cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2017-01-15
    Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study.Christopher Cowie - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):605-619.
    Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first-order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to Bernard Williams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2017-01-10
    Value Realism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):231-258.
  47. added 2017-01-06
    Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Velislava Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2017-01-05
    Internalism, Factivity, and Sufficient Reason.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    How radical is the idea that reasons are factive? Some philosophers consider it a dramatic departure from orthodoxy, with surprising implications about the bearing of the external world on what credences it’s reasonable to have, what beliefs are epistemically appropriate, and what actions are rational. I deny these implications. In the cases where external matters imply differences in factive states, there will inevitably be important weaker factive states in common. For example, someone who knows it is raining has many factive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2017-01-04
    Sound Advice and Internal Reasons.Ariela Tubert - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):181-199.
    Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel's and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. added 2017-01-04
    Review of Mark Schroeder's 'Slaves of the Passions'. [REVIEW]Maria Alvarez - unknown
1 — 50 / 245