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  1. J. E. J. Altham & Ross Harrison (eds.) (1995). World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press.
    Bernard Williams is one of the most influential figures in ethical theory, where he has set a considerable part of the current agenda. In this collection a distinguished international team of philosophers who have been stimulated by Williams's work give responses to it. The topics covered include equality; consistency; comparisons between science and ethics; integrity; moral reasons; the moral system; and moral knowledge. Williams himself provides a substantial reply, which shows both the directions of his own thought and also his (...)
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  2. M. Alvarez (2009). Slaves of the Passions * by Mark Schroeder. Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
    Like much in this book, the title and dust jacket illustration are clever. The first evokes Hume's remark in the Treatise that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’ The second, which represents a cross between a dance-step and a clinch, links up with the title and anticipates an example used throughout the book to support its central claims: that Ronnie, unlike Bradley, has a reason to go to a party – namely, that there will (...)
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  3. Maria Alvarez, Review of Mark Schroeder's 'Slaves of the Passions'. [REVIEW]
  4. Elizabeth Anderson (1996). Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper. Ethics 106 (3):538-554.
  5. Jonathan Anomaly (2007). An Argument Against External Reasons. Sorites 18:56-59.
    In this article I first clarify and then defend Bernard Williams' claim that all practical reasons are internal. I argue that since external reasons are incompatible with a plausible version of the ought-implies-can principle, they are all false. Although some defend internalism by asserting that external reasons fail to explain rational action, a better defense appeals to the fact that only internal reasons are consistent with the ought-implies-can principle.
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  6. Jonny Anomaly (2013). Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
  7. Jonny Anomaly (2008). Internal Reasons and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. Philosophical Forum 39 (4):469-483.
  8. Steven Arkonovich (2013). Reasons: External and Internal. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
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  9. Steven Arkonovich (2013). Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism. Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219.
    Under what conditions do you have a reason to perform some action? Do you only have reason to do what you want to do? Reasons-motives internalism is the appealingly simple view that unless an agent is, or could be, motivated to act in a certain way, he has no normative reason to act in that way. Thus, according to reasons-motives internalism, facts about an individual’s motivational psychology constrain what is rational for that agent to do. This article canvasses several ways (...)
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  10. Steven Arkonovich (2011). Advisors and Deliberation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424.
    The paper has two goals. First, it defends one type of subjectivist account of reasons for actions—deliberative accounts—against the criticism that they commit the conditional fallacy. Second, it attempts to show that another type of subjectivist account of practical reasons that has been gaining popularity—ideal advisor accounts—are liable to commit a closely related error. Further, I argue that ideal advisor accounts can avoid the error only by accepting the fundamental theoretical motivation behind deliberative accounts. I conclude that ideal advisor accounts (...)
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  11. Steven Arkonovich (2007). Goals, Wishes, and Reasons for Action. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):161-184.
  12. Steven Lorin Arkonovich (1998). Reasons for Action and the Roles of Desire. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    It is common sense to say that, at least sometimes, what one has reason to do depends on what one wants. In contemporary ethical theory, "internalists" and "externalists" divide over the issue whether one's practical reasons are always dependent on one's desires. Internalists insist, while externalists deny, that an agent has reason to act only if that agent wants, or could come to want, to so act. ;The present investigation attempts to adjudicate the issue dividing internalists and externalists by assessing (...)
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  13. Orin Thomas Atwater (1977). Wants and Two Kinds of Reasons for Actions. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
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  14. Robert Audi (1990). An Internalist Conception of Rational Action. Philosophical Perspectives 4:227-245.
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  15. Robert Audi (1979). Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (3):227–249.
    This paper replies to criticisms of the author's accounts of intending ("journal of philosophy", 1973), wanting ("philosophical studies", 1973), and common-sense explanations of intentional actions; and it extends the nomological theory of intentional action developed in those and other articles. the paper argues, negatively, that theoretical construct accounts of intentional concepts do not entail implausible views of self-knowledge, nor assimilate reasons to mechanical causes; and, positively, that both the way in which reasons render intelligible the actions they explain and the (...)
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  16. Robert Audi (1974). Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy 5:242.
  17. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  18. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  19. Elvio Baccarini (2013). Having a Reason and Distributive Justice in The Order of Public Reason. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):25-51.
    In the first part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his account of our moral practice from the viewpoint of our moral (...)
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  20. Micah J. Baize, Bernard Williams's Internalism: A New Interpretation.
    There has been significant and continued debate over the nature and truth of Bernard Williams’s internalism. My aim is to resolve much of the dispute over both of those issues by providing a new interpretation of his internalism--the reasonsH interpretation. To explain the new interpretation I make a distinction between there being a reason to perform an action and an agent having a reason to perform an action. For an agent to have a reason to perform an action, it must (...)
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  21. Stephanie Beardman (2000). Affective Deliberation: Toward a Humean Account of Practical Reasons. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    On a Humean account, a person's reasons for action are determined by her desires---in the broadest sense of 'desires', that is, noncognitive pro-attitudes. In four essays, I defend this account against several prominent objections. The first essay addresses the concern that the Humean cannot account for rationalizing reasons . The next three essays concern justifying reasons : reasons for action that are more fully normative than those that merely make action intelligible. Instrumental reasons, prudential reasons, and intrinsic reasons are three (...)
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  22. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.
    Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A's actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other conceptions of rationality can render the (...)
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  23. Daniel Bennett (1965). Action, Reason, and Purpose. Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):85-96.
  24. Rüdiger Bittner (2003). Stronger Reasons. In Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson & Thomas W. Pogge (eds.), Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes From the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press.
    We compare the reasons one has in terms of strength, and the task of the present chapter is to explain what it is for one reason to be stronger than another. Raz offered a criterion, but that is shown to yield unsatisfactory results. The explanation proposed here is this: stronger reasons are states of affairs or events more important to the agent, the notion of importance deriving from Frankfurt's explication of what we care about. This proposal does not reduce the (...)
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  25. Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.) (2015). Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Motivational internalism—the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptoins of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly (...)
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  26. M. S. Brady (2000). How to Understand Internalism. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):91-97.
    Internalism about practical reasons claims that there is a necessary connection between what an agent has reason to do and what he would be motivated to do if he were in privileged or optimal conditions. Internalism is traditionally supported by the claim that it alone can capture two conditions of adequacy for any theory of practical reasons, that reasons must be capable of justifying actions, and that reasons must be capable of explaining intentional acts. Robert Johnson, pp. 53–71) has argued (...)
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  27. Nathan Brett & Katharina Paxman (2008). Reason in Hume's Passions. Hume Studies 34 (1):43-59.
    Hume is famous for the view that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” His claim that “we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” is less well known. Each seems, in opposite ways, shocking to common sense. This paper explores the latter claim, looking for its source in Hume’s account of the passions and exploring its compatibility with his associationist psychology. We are led to the (...)
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  28. Talbot Brewer (2002). The Real Problem with Internalism About Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):443 - 473.
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  29. John Bricke (1988). Hume, Motivation and Morality. Hume Studies 14 (1):1-24.
  30. David O. Brink, Handout #5: Anti-Rationalism and Internalism About Practical Reason.
    Given these worries about strategic ethical egoism, we might conclude that morality and rationality are two independent points of view. We might agree that morality is impartial but insist that practical reason is instrumental or prudential. If so, we can see how there might be conflicts between practical reason and other-regarding morality, because other-regarding duties need not always advance the agent's own aims and interests. If there can be such conflicts, then immoral action is not necessarily irrational. If so, we (...)
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  31. John Brunero (2008). McDowell on External Reasons. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):22–42.
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  32. John V. Canfield (1979). Calculations, Reasons and Causes. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 179--195.
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  33. David K. Chan (ed.) (2008). Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Verlag.
    This book brings together in one volume some of the very latest developments in moral psychology that were presented at a major American conference in 2004. Moral psychology is a broad area at the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind and action. Essays in this collection deal with most of the central issues in moral psychology that are of interest to a large number of philosophers today, including important questions in normative ethical theory, meta-ethics, and applied ethics.
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  34. David K. Chan (ed.) (2008). Values, Rational Choice and the Will. Springer.
    This book brings together in one volume some of the very latest developments in moral psychology that were presented at a major American conference in 2004. Moral psychology is a broad area at the intersection of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind and action. Essays in this collection deal with most of the central issues in moral psychology that are of interest to a large number of philosophers today, including important questions in normative ethical theory, meta-ethics, and applied ethics.
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  35. Allen Coates (2006). Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315.
    Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.
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  36. Rachel Cohon (1993). Internalism About Reasons for Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):265-288.
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  37. Rachel Cohon (1986). Are External Reasons Impossible? Ethics 96 (3):545-556.
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  38. Bradford Cokelet (2009). Book Reviews: Slaves of the Passions by Mark Schroeder. [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (2):386-389.
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  39. Christopher Cordner (2001). Ethical, Necessity and Internal Reasons. Philosophy 76 (4):541-560.
    Against moral philosophers' traditional preoccupation with ‘ought’ judgments, Bernard Williams has reminded us of the importance of locutions such as ‘I must’, ‘I have to’ and ‘I can't’. He develops an account of the ethical necessity and impossibility these locutions are able to mark. The account draws on his thesis that all reasons for action are ‘internal’. I sketch the account, and then try to show that it is insensitive to important aspects of how the concepts of ethical necessity and (...)
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  40. Christopher Cowie (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):605-619.
    Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first-order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to Bernard Williams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. (...)
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  41. Christopher Cowley (2005). A New Defence of Williams's Reasons-Internalism. Philosophical Investigations 28 (4):346–368.
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  42. Jonathan Dancy (2003). Précis of Practical Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423–428.
  43. Stephen L. Darwall (2001). Because I Want It. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153.
    How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the (...)
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  44. Stephen L. Darwall (1992). Internalism and Agency. Philosophical Perspectives 6:155-174.
    have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.' Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethical writing is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear.2 Sometimes writers have in mind the view that sincere assent to a moral (or, more generally, an ethical) judgment concerning what one should (...)
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  45. Stephen L. Darwall (1990). Symposia Papers: Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals. Noûs 24 (2):257-267.
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  46. Stephen L. Darwall (1983). Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
  47. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton (1992). Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends. Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.
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  48. Miranda del Corral (2014). El problema de las razones inadecuadas. Factótum 11:103-111.
    Reasons are of the wrong kind if, despite appearing of the right kind, are not able to justify nor to motivate the formation of a mental attitude. Initially, this problem was thought to apply only within the theoretical realm of reason, but Kavka's Toxin Puzzle showed that reasons of the wrong kind are also found in the practical realm. The aim of this paper is to analyze the scope of this problem, in order to determine the kind of reasons it (...)
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  49. Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.) (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. [REVIEW] Felix Meiner Verlag.
  50. Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...)
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