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  1. added 2019-09-20
    Remarks on the Biology, Psychology and Politics of Religion.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    In my view all behavior is an expression of our evolved psychology and so intimately connected to religion, morals and ethics, if one knows how to look at them. -/- Many will find it strange that I spend little time discussing the topics common to most discussions of religion, but in my view it is essential to first understand the generalities of behavior and this necessitates a good understanding of biology and psychology which are mostly noticeable by their absence in (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-13
    Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):32-58.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
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  3. added 2019-09-13
    The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  4. added 2019-08-29
    Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...)
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  5. added 2019-07-17
    From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):246-249.
  6. added 2019-06-29
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel. Review for Mind. [REVIEW]Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Mind.
    A review of Susanne Mantel's book, Determined by Reasons (Routledge).
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW]Jonathan Anomaly - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
  9. added 2019-06-06
    Reasons From Within: Desires and Values, by Alan H. Goldman.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Jeremy Randel Koons - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1086-1091.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    XV—Agents and Patients, Or: What We Learn About Reasons for Action by Reflecting on Our Choices in Process‐of‐Thought Cases.Michael Smith - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):309-331.
    Can we draw substantive conclusions about the reasons for action agents have from premisses about the desires of their idealized counterparts? The answer is that we can. The argument for this conclusion is Rawlsian in spirit, focusing on the choices that our idealized counterparts must make simply in virtue of being ideal, and inferring from these choices the contents of the desires that they must have. It turns out that our idealized counterparts must have desires in which we ourselves figure (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Are Williams’s Reasons Problematically External After All?Terry L. Price - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):461-478.
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.Daniel Star (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    Slaves of the Passions (Mark Schroeder).Oxford: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Bradford Cokelet - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):386-389.
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  15. added 2019-06-05
    Review Essay: Impartial ReasonImpartial Reason.Marcus G. Singer & Stephen L. Darwall - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):507.
  16. added 2019-05-29
    Internalism and the Evidence From Psychopaths and "Acquired Sociopaths".Kennett Jeanette & Fine Cordelia - unknown
    Morally good action requires both sincere moral judgment and moral motivation. Internalists claim in one way or another that these two things are internally connected. Externalists, on the other hand, claim that the connection between moral judgment and action is forged by motives external to the judgment itself. First we will look at the evidence from psychopathy, then we will turn to cases of so-called acquired sociopathy.
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  17. added 2019-05-04
    Is Motivation Internal to Value?J. David Velleman - 1998 - In C. Fehige & U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences. Walter de Gruyter.
    The view that something's being good for a person depends on his capacity to care about it – sometimes called internalism about a person’s good – is here derived from the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In the course of this derivation, the limits of internalism are discussed, and a distinction is drawn between two senses of the phrase "a person's good".
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  18. added 2019-04-09
    Racje wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne.Bernard Williams & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 67 (1):231-246.
    Artykuł, opublikowany po raz pierwszy w 1979 r., jest jednym z najczęściej cytowanych tekstów filozoficznych z drugiej połowy XX wieku. Tekst Bernarda Williamsa zainicjował kilka ważnych debat, toczących się do dziś w etyce i filozofii działania. Zaproponowana przez niego interpretacja pojęcia racji działania jest, z jednej strony, niezwykle wpływowa, ale z drugiej bardzo niejednoznaczna i często krytykowana. Williams broni stanowiska, które z czasem zaczęto określać jako internalizm racji: pewne względy są racjami działania dla danego podmiotu tylko wtedy, gdy mają ścisły (...)
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  19. added 2019-03-11
    How Reason Can Be Practical: A Reply to Hume.Philip Clark - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):213-230.
    Opponents of Humean skepticism about practical reason do not normally exploit his idea that beliefs can only serve the aims we have. Many have used that idea to argue in favour of Humean skepticism. Others have denied that it supports Humean skepticism. I argue that we need to use this idea. It is only by embracing the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation that we can truly see where Hume went wrong.
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  20. added 2019-02-24
    The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick R. Bondy - 2019 - Synthese:1-21.
    There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they do not offer any normative support for the belief itself. Non-epistemic reasons, as they say, are just the wrong kind of reason for belief. Other epistemologists, however, argue that (...)
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  21. added 2019-01-01
    Subjectivism, Instrumentalism, and Prudentialism About Reasons: On the Normativity of Instrumental Transmission.Arash Abizadeh - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):387-402.
    According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to (...)
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  22. added 2018-12-03
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable (...)
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  23. added 2018-11-27
    Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
    A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.
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  24. added 2018-11-23
    David Sobel, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism , Pp. Vii + 312. [REVIEW]Owen C. King - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):203-207.
    This is a review of David Sobel's monograph, From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism.
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  25. added 2018-09-24
    Motivation and Motivating Reason.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 464--485.
    For quite some time now philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to strike the reader or listener, at least at the outset, as incomprehensible. The story of Abraham on Mount Moriah, who decided to sacrifice his son, Isaac, illustrates this pattern. Killing one’s own child is a horrific thing to do, and it is hard to understand (...)
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  26. added 2018-09-21
    McDowell on External Reasons.John Brunero - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):22-42.
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  27. added 2018-09-18
    Recent Work on Internal and External Reasons.John Brunero - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):99-118.
    This paper examines some recent arguments for internalism that (i) appeal to an analogy between practical and theoretical reasons, (ii) look toward our practices of reasoning with others, or (iii) tie reasons to good deliberation. The conclusion of this paper is a skeptical one: none of these new arguments gives us sufficient reason to think that internalism is true.
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  28. added 2018-09-17
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 224.
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  29. added 2018-09-03
    From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism By David Sobel. [REVIEW]Luke Elson - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):583-586.
    Book review of David Sobel's "From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism".
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  30. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Practical Reasons.Anne Baril - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
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  31. added 2018-08-18
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
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  32. added 2018-08-02
    Moralische Motivation. Kant Und Die Alternativen.Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.) - 2006 - Meiner Verlag.
    Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...
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  33. added 2018-07-07
    The Long Way to “Extreme Psychologism”.Seyyed Mohsen Eslami - 2018 - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):171-177.
  34. added 2018-06-29
    Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.
    Philosophers have long theorised about which things make people’s lives go well (and why) and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation of how exactly it functions and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, (...)
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  35. added 2018-06-22
    Reasons in Moral Philosophy.Carla Bagnoli - 2018 - In G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. New York: Springer.
  36. added 2018-02-18
    Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings.Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.) - 2011 - MIT Press.
    Some of the most challenging questions in philosophical ethics concern the justification of action. Can you have reasons to do something that you are not, and perhaps cannot be, motivated to do? If reasons rest on desires, why respect the rights and interests of others when doing so prevents us from getting what we want? In other words, why be moral? In his 1979 essay, "Internal and External Reasons," Bernard Williams framed the dispute about reason and motivation in a way (...)
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  37. added 2018-02-17
    Reasons and Motivation—Not a Wrong Distinction.Simon Robertson - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):391-397.
    This paper responds to Susan Hurley’s attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism–externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley’s argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.
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  38. added 2018-02-17
    Desires, Whims and Values.Donald C. Hubin - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (3):315-335.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that an agent's reasons for acting are grounded in the agent's desires. Numerous objections have been leveled against this view, but the most compelling concerns the problem of "alien desires" - desires with which the agent does not identify. The standard version of neo-Humeanism holds that these desires, like any others, generate reasons for acting. A variant of neo-Humeanism that grounds an agent's reasons on her values, rather than all of her desires, avoids this implication, but at (...)
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  39. added 2018-01-24
    Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of (...)
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  40. added 2017-11-13
    Review of David Sobel's From Valuing to Value. [REVIEW]Ben Bramble - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201705:2017.05.13.
  41. added 2017-11-13
    Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.
    What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons and argue (...)
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  42. added 2017-09-24
    The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards aren’t intrinsically reason providing (or “substantive”) in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. I here develop a novel account of the (...)
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  43. added 2017-09-14
    Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
    I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational Internalism and (...)
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  44. added 2017-03-18
    Introduction.Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity Berys Gaut (ed.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
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  45. added 2017-03-08
    Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.
    Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...)
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  46. added 2017-03-01
    A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.
    According to a guiding idea in metaethics, there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality. This notion brings up two issues: The exact nature of this link, and the nature of rationality. With regard to the first issue, the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim. With regard to the second issue, the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality, where the latter (...)
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  47. added 2017-02-15
    Julia Markovits: Moral Reason. [REVIEW]David Rocheleau-Houle - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):663-664.
    Julia Markovits’ Moral Reason is a defense of internalism about moral reasons and a desire-based account of reasons for action. Even though she defends this position, she does not consider herself committed to relativism and to a desire-based understanding of what reasons there are. Indeed, it is crucial to make a distinction between two kinds of inquiry about reasons for action. On one side, we find “analytic inquiry” where the purpose is to define what reasons are. On the other, we (...)
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  48. added 2017-02-15
    A Hegelian Critique of Desire-Based Reasons.Kate Padgett Walsh - 2013 - Idealistic Studies 43 (3):171-184.
    This paper approaches Humean accounts of desire from a perspective relatively unexplored in contemporary moral theory, namely Hegel’s ethical thought. I contend that Hegel’s treatment of desire is, ultimately, somewhat more Humean than Hegel himself recognized. But Hegel also goes further than contemporary Humeans in recognizing the sociality of the normative domain, and this difference has important implications for the Humean thesis of desire-based reasons. I develop a Hegelian critique of DBR and conclude by outlining a distinctively Hegelian approach to (...)
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  49. added 2017-02-14
    Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
    Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy (...)
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  50. added 2017-02-11
    Desires, Reasons, and Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
    Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, and T. M. S canlon, among others, all hold that reasons for action are provided by facts about those actions. They also hold that the fact that an action would promote or achieve the object of an agent's desire is not one of the relevant facts, and does not provide a reason. Rather, the facts that provide reasons are typically facts about valuable states of affairs that the action is likely to bring about, or valuable properties (...)
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1 — 50 / 256