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  1. added 2017-09-27
    Situation et probabilité chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin.Edmund F. Byrne - 1966 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 64:525-549.
    Il s'agit ici de la dimension existentielle de la theorie morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin. Pour lui, le domaine de l'incertain est generalement coextensif a celui de la contingence, de ce qui peut etre autre qu'il n'est. En general, S. Thomas envisage la contingence de la meme maniere qu'Aristote, mais dans une perspective totalement differente. Theologien, il s'interesse au monde physique surtout comme manifestation de la sagesse divine vers laquelle il desire monter. Il ne dedaigne pas pour autant les outils (...)
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  2. added 2017-03-15
    Cold Turkey - Kicking the Habit of Justification (Review of Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence). [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1994 - New Scientist (1939).
  3. added 2017-02-03
    Why Throwing 92 Heads in a Row is Not Surprising.Martin Smith - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    Tom Stoppard’s “Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead” opens with a puzzling scene in which the title characters are betting on coin throws and observe a seemingly astonishing run of 92 heads in a row. Guildenstern grows uneasy and proposes a number of unsettling explanations for what is occurring. Then, in a sudden change of heart, he appears to suggest that there is nothing surprising about what they are witnessing, and nothing that needs any explanation. He says ‘…each individual coin spun (...)
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  4. added 2015-08-24
    On Some Scientific Modalities: Propensities, Randomness and Causation.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The essays that constitute this dissertation explore three strategies for understanding the role of modality in philosophical accounts of propensities, randomness, and causation. In Chapter 1, I discuss how the following essays are to be considered as illuminating the prospects for these strategies, which I call reductive essentialism, subjectivism and pragmatism. The discussion is framed within a survey of approaches to modality more broadly construed. ;In Chapter 2, I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability as a physical property (...)
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  5. added 2015-04-27
    Hans Reichenbach. The Concept of Probability in the Mathematical Representation of Reality. Trans. And Ed. Frederick Eberhardt and Clark Glymour. Chicago: Open Court, 2008. Pp. Xi+154. $34.97. [REVIEW]Flavia Padovani - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):344-347.
    Hans Reichenbach has been not only one of the founding fathers of logical empiricism but also one of the most prominent figures in the philosophy of science of the past century. While some of his ideas continue to be of interest in current philosophical programs, an important part of his early work has been neglected, and some of it has been unavailable to English readers. Among Reichenbach’s overlooked (and untranslated) early works, his doctoral thesis of 1915, The Concept of Probability (...)
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  6. added 2015-02-16
    On the Possibility of Stable Regularities Without Fundamental Laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2014 - Dissertation, Autonomous University of Barcelona
    This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields (...)
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  7. added 2015-02-06
    The Objective-Subjective Dichotomy and its Use in Describing Probability.Arnold Baise - manuscript
    This article deals with the nature of the objective-subjective dichotomy, first from a general historical point of view, and then with regard to the use of these terms over time to describe theories of probability. The different (metaphysical and epistemological) meanings of “objective” and “subjective” are analyzed, and then used to show that all probability theories can be divided into three broad classes.
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  8. added 2014-12-01
    Chance.Carl Hoefer & Alan Hájek - 2006 - In Donald Borchert (ed.), Macmillan's Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
    Much is asked of the concept of chance. It has been thought to play various roles, some in tension with or even incompatible with others. Chance has been characterized negatively, as the absence of causation; yet also positively—the ancient Greek τυχη´ reifies it—as a cause of events that are not governed by laws of nature, or as a feature of the laws themselves. Chance events have been understood epistemically as those whose causes are unknown; yet also objectively as a distinct (...)
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  9. added 2014-07-31
    The Meta-Reversibility Objection.Christopher J. G. Meacham - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Time's Arrow and the Probability Structure of the World.
    One popular approach to statistical mechanics understands statistical mechanical probabilities as measures of rational indifference. Naive formulations of this ``indifference approach'' face reversibility worries - while they yield the right prescriptions regarding future events, they yield the wrong prescriptions regarding past events. This paper begins by showing how the indifference approach can overcome the standard reversibility worries by appealing to the Past Hypothesis. But, the paper argues, positing a Past Hypothesis doesn't free the indifference approach from all reversibility worries. For (...)
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  10. added 2014-07-12
    Bayesianizm w polskiej tradycji probabilizmu – studium stanowiska Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza.Pawel Kawalec - 2012 - Ruch Filozoficzny 69 (1).
    Abstract The opening section outlines probabilism in the 20th century philosophy and shortly discusses the major accomplishments of Polish probabilist thinkers. A concise characterization of Bayesianism as the major recent form of probabilism follows. It builds upon the core personalist version of Bayesianism towards more objectively oriented versions thereof. The problem of a priori probability is shortly discussed. A tentative characterization of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s standpoint regarding the inductive inference is cast in Bayesian terms. His objections against it presented in Pragmatic (...)
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  11. added 2014-03-21
    Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.
    In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered (...)
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  12. added 2014-03-11
    Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism.László E. Szabó - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (3):626-634.
    I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-07
    Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
    The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), (...)
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  14. added 2013-11-04
    The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2012 - In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
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  15. added 2012-10-06
    Elliott Sober, Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? Philosophical Essays on Darwin’s Theory. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 230 Pp., $21.00. [REVIEW]Charles H. Pence, Hope Hollocher, Ryan Nichols, Grant Ramsey, Edwin Siu & Daniel John Sportiello - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):705-709.
  16. added 2011-12-23
    Objective Bayesianism Defended?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2012 - Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
    This is a review of Jon Williamson's 'In Defence of Objective Bayesianism'.
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  17. added 2011-07-13
    Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic.J. L. Mackie - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
    Classic work by one of the most brilliant figures in post-war analytic philosophy.
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  18. added 2011-06-09
    Semantics of Probability.John C. Bigelow - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  19. added 2011-05-25
    Stochastic Independence and Causal Connection.Michael Strevens - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):605-627.
    Assumptions of stochastic independence are crucial to statistical models in science. Under what circumstances is it reasonable to suppose that two events are independent? When they are not causally or logically connected, so the standard story goes. But scientific models frequently treat causally dependent events as stochastically independent, raising the question whether there are kinds of causal connection that do not undermine stochastic independence. This paper provides one piece of an answer to this question, treating the simple case of two (...)
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  20. added 2011-04-12
    Probability, Credibility and Acceptability.Richard G. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):275 - 283.
    THE PAPER EXAMINES WHAT IS MEANT BY ’EVIDENCE’ WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A THEORY IS PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE. IT CONSIDERS WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE, A THEORY BEING BELIEVED, AND A THEORY BEING CREDIBLE. IT DISTINGUISHES VARIOUS SENSES OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH SCIENTISTS ARE SAID TO ACCEPT THEORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS THE SENSE OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH IT IS EQUATED WITH ’BELIEVE’. IT ANALYSES THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A THEORY (...)
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  21. added 2011-03-08
    The Natural-Range Conception of Probability.Jacob Rosenthal - 2009 - In Gerhard Ernst & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Time, Chance and Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 71--90.
    Objective interpretations of probability are usually discussed in two varieties: frequency and propensity accounts. But there is a third, neglected possibility, namely, probabilities as deriving from ranges in suitably structured initial state spaces. Roughly, the probability of an event is the proportion of initial states that lead to this event in the space of all possible initial states, provided that this proportion is approximately the same in any not too small interval of the initial state space. This idea can also (...)
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  22. added 2009-06-23
    Intersubjective Corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
    How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t (...)
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  23. added 2008-12-31
    Jenann Ismael's 'Probability and Physics'.Benj Hellie - manuscript
    Jenann’s central metaphysical thesis is that there is an objective conditional probability function PrG(A/B), the domain of which includes a great many, perhaps all, pairs of contingent propositions. This pair can be synchronic or diachronic: both can concern how things are at the same time, or not. Jenann’s central epistemological thesis is antiskepticism about PrG, in the following sense: prima facie, the subjective credence functions of epistemically reasonable agents converge on PrG: roughly, if you’ve done a lot of science, for (...)
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