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  1. Symposium on “the Epistemical Application of the Concept of Probability in the Empirical Sciences”.K. Abt - 1987 - Erkenntnis 26 (3):423-427.
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  2. On the Character of Statistical-Mechanical Probabilities'.D. Albert - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64.
  3. An Interpretation of Probability in the Law of Evidence Based on Pro-Et-Contra Argumentation.Lennart Åqvist - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.
    The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis (...)
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  4. Probability and Evidence.A. J. Ayer - 1972 - [London]Macmillan.
    A. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. Ayer (...)
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  5. Probability, Objectivity, and Induction.Arnold Baise - 2013 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 13 (2):81-95.
    The main purpose of this article is to use Ayn Rand’s analysis of the meaning of objectivity to clarify the much-discussed question of whether probability is “objective” or “subjective.” This results in a classification of probability theories as frequentist, subjective Bayesian, or objective Bayesian. The work of objective Bayesian E. T. Jaynes is emphasized, and is used to provide a formal definition of probability. The relation between probability and induction is covered briefly, with probability theory presented as the basis of (...)
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  6. How to Solve Probability Teasers-Discussion.M. Barhillel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (2):348-358.
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  7. Subjective Probability Assessments of the Incidence of Unethical Behavior: The Importance of Scenario-Respondent Fit.Darlene Bay & Alexey Nikitkov - 2011 - Business Ethics: A European Review 20 (1):1-11.
  8. Richard Johns, A Theory of Physical Probability Reviewed By.Claus Beisbart - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (1):34-36.
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  9. Richard Johns, A Theory of Physical Probability. [REVIEW]Claus Beisbart - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24:34-36.
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  10. The World According to De Finetti.Joseph Berkovitz - unknown
    Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti’s interpretation of probability has been (...)
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  11. Introduction to Probability Vol. 1.Dimitri P. Bertsekas & John N. Tsitsiklis - 2002 - Athena Scientific Belmont, Ma.
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  12. On the Interpretation of Probability Calculi Ernest Nagel.E. Beth - 1946 - Synthese 5 (1-2):92-95.
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  13. Review: A World of Probability. [REVIEW]Eleanor Bisbee - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):360 - 366.
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  14. A World of Probability. [REVIEW]Eleanor Bisbee - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):360 - 366.
  15. Concerning a Controversy on the Meaning of 'Probability'.Siri Blom - 1955 - Theoria 21 (2-3):65-98.
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  16. III.—The Philosophy of Probability.Arthur Boutwood - 1902 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2 (1):74-104.
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  17. The Emergence and Interpretation of Probability in Bohmian Mechanics.Craig Callender - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):351-370.
    A persistent question about the deBroglie–Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics concerns the understanding of Born’s rule in the theory. Where do the quantum mechanical probabilities come from? How are they to be interpreted? These are the problems of emergence and interpretation. In more than 50 years no consensus regarding the answers has been achieved. Indeed, mirroring the foundational disputes in statistical mechanics, the answers to each question are surprisingly diverse. This paper is an opinionated survey of this literature. While acknowledging (...)
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  18. Extensionality and Randomness in Probability Sequences.S. Cannavo - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):134-.
    The charge that the limit-frequency theory of probability is inconsistent due to incompatibility between the required features of randomness and limit convergence is inapplicable when probability sequences are taken to be empirically (i.e., extensionally) generated, as they must be on a strictly empirical conception of probability. All past attempts to meet this charge by formulating constructive definitions of randomness that would still allow for a demonstrable limit-convergence have, in their exclusive concern with logically (i.e., intensionally) prescribed sequences, left the logic (...)
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  19. Probability Theory. I. Background.C. W. Churchman - 1945 - Philosophy of Science 12 (3):147-157.
  20. Total Control and Chance in Musics: A Philosophical Analysis.Robert Charles Clark - 1970 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (3):355-360.
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  21. Some Psychological Implications of Tolerance in the Philosophy of Probability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1984 - Epistemologia 7:213.
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  22. Can Probability Be Subjective and Objective at the Same Time? A Reply to Arnold Baise.Mark Crovelli - 2011 - Libertarian Papers 3.
    My claim that probability ought to be defined as a purely subjective measure of human belief has been challenged in a recent and interesting article on these pages by Arnold Baise . Baise argues that probability ought to be defined, not as a purely subjective measure of human belief, as I have claimed, but rather in the following way: Probability P is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates how plausible it is that proposition A is true, based on (...)
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  23. Carnap's Foundation of Probability Theory.D. Dantzig - 1949 - Synthese 8 (1):459 - 470.
  24. The Concept of Probability.J. P. Day & J. R. Lucas - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (90):83.
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  25. Book Review:Probability, Induction and Statistics Bruno de Finetti. [REVIEW]Bruno de Finetti - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):451-.
  26. Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics. Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Maria Carla Galavotti. [REVIEW]Maria Concetta Di Maio - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):487-.
  27. Frequency Theory of Probability and Single Events.Mauro Dorato - 1987 - Epistemologia 10 (2):323.
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  28. Philosophy of Probability.J. Dubucs (ed.) - 1993 - Kluwer, Dordrecht.
    Philosophy of Probability provides a comprehensive introduction to theoretical issues that occupy a central position in disciplines ranging from philosophy of ...
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  29. Probability: Theory and Examples.Rick Durrett - 2005 - Thomson.
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  30. Subjective Probabilities Inferred From Decisions.Ward Edwards - 1962 - Psychological Review 69 (2):109-135.
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  31. Objective Probability Theory Theory.Ellery Eells - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), Synthese. Springer. pp. 3--44.
    I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequate conceptions of objective probability , they have failed to satisfy a methodological standard -- roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of (...)
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  32. Objective Probability Theory Theory.Ellery Eells - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):387 - 442.
    I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently (...)
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  33. Chance and Structure: An Essay on the Logical Foundations of Probability.Pierre K. Erszberg - 1992 - Philosophical Books 31 (4):226-228.
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  34. Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  35. ANKIN, K. W.: "Choice and Chance". [REVIEW]R. L. Franklin - 1962 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:97.
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  36. Probability in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics.Roman Frigg - unknown
    In two recent papers Barry Loewer (2001, 2004) has suggested to interpret probabilities in statistical mechanics as Humean chances in David Lewis’ (1994) sense. I first give a precise formulation of this proposal, then raise two fundamental objections, and finally conclude that these can be overcome only at the price of interpreting these probabilities epistemically.
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  37. Probability in GRW Theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.
    GRW Theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often the wave function of a quantum system is `hit', which leaves it in a localised state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism? GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the major theories of chance leads us to the conclusion that GRW probabilities can be understood only as either single (...)
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  38. Violations of Probability Theory: What Do They Mean?Deborah E. Frisch - 1988 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (2):137–148.
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  39. Epistemic Probability.Richard Fumerton - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):149–164.
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  40. A Philosophical Introduction to Probability.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2005 - CSLI Publications.
    Not limited to merely mathematics, probability has a rich and controversial philosophical aspect. _A Philosophical Introduction to Probability_ showcases lesser-known philosophical notions of probability and explores the debate over their interpretations. Galavotti traces the history of probability and its mathematical properties and then discusses various philosophical positions on probability, from the Pierre Simon de Laplace's “classical” interpretation of probability to the logical interpretation proposed by John Maynard Keynes. This book is a valuable resource for students in philosophy and mathematics and (...)
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  41. Kinds of Probabilism.Maria Carla Galavotti - unknown
    The first part of the article deals with the theories of probability and induction put forward by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It will be argued that, despite fundamental differences, Carnap's and Reichenbach's views on probability are closely linked with the problem of meaning generated by logical empiricism, and are characterized by the logico-semantical approach typical of this philosophical current. Moreover, their notions of probability are both meant to combine a logical and an empirical element. Of these, Carnap over the (...)
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  42. Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Maria Carla Galavotti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  43. An Objective Theory of Probability (Routledge Revivals).Donald Gillies - 2010 - Routledge.
    This reissue of D. A. Gillies highly influential work, first published in 1973, is a philosophical theory of probability which seeks to develop von Mises’ views on the subject. In agreement with von Mises, the author regards probability theory as a mathematical science like mechanics or electrodynamics, and probability as an objective, measurable concept like force, mass or charge. On the other hand, Dr Gillies rejects von Mises’ definition of probability in terms of limiting frequency and claims that probability should (...)
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  44. Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald Gillies - 2000 - Routledge.
    The Twentieth Century has seen a dramatic rise in the use of probability and statistics in almost all fields of research. This has stimulated many new philosophical ideas on probability. _Philosophical Theories of Probability_ is the first book to present a clear, comprehensive and systematic account of these various theories and to explain how they relate to one another. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
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  45. Inverse Probability and Modern Statisticians.Robert Dean Gordon - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (4):389-399.
  46. 4. Probability and Prodigality.Daniel Greco - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:82.
    I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with Bayesian decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and sensitive invariantism, respectively. (...)
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  47. Probability: An Introduction.Geoffrey R. Grimmett - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
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  48. Introduction to Probability.Charles Charles Miller Grinstead & James Laurie Snell - 1997 - American Mathematical Soc..
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  49. Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  50. The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem Too.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):563--585.
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...)
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