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  1. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  2. Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language.Kristin Andrews - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.
    Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one (...)
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  3. Review: Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy. [REVIEW]D. Bar-On - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):429-435.
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  4. Acción y construcción lógica.Tomás Barrero - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):3-26.
    By considering Davidson’s analysis of prepositions as defining individual events predicates, I argue against his semantics for action sentences and stress some logico-linguistic puzzles concerning both the interpretive pretension and the referential indifference of this proposal. Inspired by Evans as well as by Grice, I advance another interpretive semantics for those cases which does not take as assumption the individual character of events and argue for a constructivist approach to events in action discourse.
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  5. Why Tropistic Systems Are Not Genuine Intentional Systems.Ansgar Beckermann - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.
  6. Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a Myth.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
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  7. Intentionalität und Interpretation Auffassung, Auslegung und Interpretation in der Phänomenologie Husserls.Matteo Bianchin - 2002 - Studia Phaenomenologica 2 (3-4):45-63.
  8. Waarheid En Interpretatie [Truth and Interpretation].Inigo Bocken - 2003 - Ars Disputandi 3.
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  9. Radical Interpretation and High-Functioning Autistic Speakers: A Defense of Davidson on Thought and Language.Hanni K. Bouma - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):639-662.
    Donald Davidson argues in "Thought and Talk" that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers: linguistic competence requires the possession of intentional concepts and the ability to attribute intentional states to other people. Kristin Andrews (in Philosophical Psychology, 15) has argued that empirical evidence about autism undermines this theoretical claim, for some individuals with autism lack the requisite "theory of mind" skills to be able to interpret, yet are competent speakers. In this paper, Davidson is defended on the grounds (...)
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  10. The Foundations of Cognitive Science.Branquinho Joao (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The Foundations of Cognitive Science is a set of thirteen new essays on key topics in this lively interdisciplinary field, by a stellar international line-up of authors. Philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists here come together to investigate such fascinating subjects as consciousness; vision; rationality; artificial life; the neural basis of language, cognition, and emotion; and the relations between mind and world, for instance our representation of numbers and space. The contributors are Ned Block, Margaret Boden, Susan Carey, Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland, (...)
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  11. Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World.Robert Briscoe - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
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  12. The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1991 - Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
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  13. Interpretivism.Alex Byrne - 1998 - European Review of Philosophy 3:199-223.
    In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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  14. Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language.H. G. Callaway - 1993 - Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  15. Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics.H. G. Callaway - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
    Davidson approaches the notions of meaning and interpretation with the aim of characterizing semantic competence in the syntactically characterized natural language. The objective is to provide a truth-theory for a language, generating T-sentences expressed in the semantic metalanguage, so that each sentence of the object language receives an appropriate interpretation. Proceeding within the constraints of referential semantics, I will argue for the viability of reconstructing the notion of linguistic meaning within the Tarskian theory of reference. However, the view proposed here (...)
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  16. Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  17. No Need to Speak the Same Language? Review of Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language.H. G. Callaway & J. van Brakel - 1996 - Dialectica, Vol. 50, No.1, 1996, Pp. 63-71 50 (1):63-72.
    The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The (...)
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  18. Truth Conditions Without Interpretation.John Collins - 2001 - Sorites 13:52-71.
    Davidson has given us two theses: Tarski's format for truth definitions provides a format for theories of meaning and that the justification for a theory of language L as one of meaning is based upon the theory affording an informative interpretation of L-speakers. It will be argued, on the basis of a consideration of compositionality, that the Tarski format can indeed be re-jigged in line with . On the other hand, in opposition to , I shall commend a cognitive understanding (...)
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  19. Is Davidson a Gricean?John R. Cook - 2009 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 48 (3):557-575.
    In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History (2005), Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). In this paper, I argue that although there (...)
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  20. Review of The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW]Sean Crawford - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):190-193.
  21. Interpretational Semantics.Robert Cummins - 1994 - In Steven P. Stitch & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), mental representation: a reader. Blackwell.
    This is a condensed version of the material in chapters 8-10 in Meaning and Mental Representation (MIT, 1989). It is an explanation and defence of a theory of content for the mind considered as a symbolic computational process. It is a view i abandoned shortly thereafter when I abandoned symbolic computatioalism as a viable theory of cognition.
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  22. How the Radically Interpreted Make Mistakes.Anthony Dardis - 1994 - Dialogue 33 (03):415-.
    Meaning involves normativity: a word has a meaning only if some of its uses are correct and some are incorrect. A full understanding of meaning demands an account of the normativity of meaning. One such account has it that the normativity of meaning stems from conventions for the use of words. Donald Davidson argues that communication does not require linguistic conventions. Ian Hacking has objected to Davidson's theory of meaning on the ground that Davidson is unable to allow for the (...)
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  23. What Thought Requires.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 121.
    Examines further the criteria for attributing thought to an object or creature by illuminating the relation between thought, language, and world on the one hand, and the sort of structure that thought and language require on the other. Examines the implications the Unified Theory has with regards to this relation, and challenges the widespread belief that we will not really understand the intentional attitudes, conceptualization, or language until we can give a purely extensional, physicalist account of them.
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  24. Radical Interpretation Interpreted.Donald Davidson - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:121-128.
  25. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's Is Radical Interpretation Possible?.Donald Davidson - 1993 - In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  26. Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf.Donald Davidson - 1993 - Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  27. The Conditions of Thought.Donald Davidson - 1989 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 193-200.
    This summary paper explains why we are not constrained to start from a solipsistic, or first person point of view in considering the nature of thought. My aim here is to suggest the nature of an acceptable extemalism. According to this view, knowledge of other minds need not be a problem m addition to the problem of empirical knowledge. The essential step toward determining the content of someone else's thought is made by discovering what normally causes those thoughts. Hence I (...)
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  28. The Mind of Donald Davidson.Donald Davidson - 1989 - Netherlands: Rodopi.
  29. Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...)
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  30. Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:1-12.
    The central propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and meaning are interdependent; it is therefore fruitless to analyse one or two of them in terms of the others. A method is outlined in this paper that yields a theory for interpreting speech, a measure of degree of belief, and a measure of desirability. The method combines in a novel way features of Bayesean decision theory, and a Quinean approach to radical interpretation.
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  31. Belief and the Basis of Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1974 - Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323.
    A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can (...)
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  32. Radical Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
  33. Can and Should Interpretation Into a Second Language Be Taught?Karla Dejean le Feal - 2005 - Communication and Cognition. Monographies 38 (1-2):167-194.
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  34. Intentional Systems Theory.Daniel Dennett - 2011 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  35. An Overview of My Work in Philosophy.Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    In my opinion, the two main topics in the philosophy of mind are content and consciousness, and they have received about equal attention from me. As the title of my first book, Content and Consciousness suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: first, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, partly in (...)
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  36. Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  37. Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  38. The Rationality Assumption.Richard Dub - forthcoming - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer. pp. 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be because a presumption (...)
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  39. Radical Interpretation and the Structure of Thought.Pascal Engel - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:161-177.
    It is often argued that a radical interpretation procedure for the analysis of thought (especially davidson's) is committed to the thesis that thoughts are essentially structured entities, And is therefore false because many structures of thought do not match linguistic or semantic structures. The author attempts to defend davidson's theory of radical interpretation against such criticisms and to show that the interdependence of thought and language presupposed by this theory does not mean a primacy of either one over the other.
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  40. Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information.Robin Faichney - 2013 - TripleC - Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation 11 (1):36-45.
  41. Davidson on the Impossibility of Thought Without Language. Comments on Diana I. Pérez.Marcelo Fischborn - 2012 - Principia 16 (3):489-494.
    Diana Pérez (2005) criticizes Davidson’s argument for the thesis that there is no thought without language, and offers an alternative defense of that thesis on the basis of empirical studies on developmental psychology. In this comment I argue that more recent studies do not seem to affect Davidson’s argument in the way Pérez suggests, and that her alternative defense of the thesis that there is no thought without language is insufficient. At the end, I offer a sketch of how a (...)
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  42. Is Radical Interpretation Possible?Jerry A. Fodor - 1993 - In Philosophical Perspectives. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. pp. 101-119.
  43. Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf.Jerry A. Fodor - 1993 - Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  44. Is Radical Interpretation Possible?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:101-119.
  45. The Contextual Stance.Gordon R. Foxall - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar (...)
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  46. Objective Interpretationism.Christopher Gauker - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):136-51.
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  47. The Principle of Charity.Christopher Gauker - 1986 - Synthese 69 (October):1-25.
  48. Craig on Davidson: A Thumbnail Refutation.Anthony C. Genova - 1991 - Analysis (October) 195 (October):195-198.
  49. Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
  50. Knowledge and Error : A New Approach to Radical Interpretation.Olav Gjelsvik - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 167.
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