This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

11 found
Order:
  1. Preamble.Roy Tzohar - 2019 - Sophia 58 (1):55-55.
  2. Phenomenology, Mental Illness, and the Intersubjective Constitution of the Lifeworld.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoffrey Pfeifer (eds.), Phenomenology and the Political. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 199-214.
  3. Husserlian Phenomenological Description and the Problem of Describing Intersubjectivity.H. Williams - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):254-277.
    Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great importance on first-person descriptions, exactly what this entails goes undefined. I will seek to answer what's involved in phenomenological description, with reference to Husserl. I define phenomenological description according to its genus and differentia. I compare description in the natural sciences with description in phenomenology. I discuss how the basic particulars for Husserlian phenomenological description stem from the intentional relation -- particularly the distinction between noesis and noema. I discuss the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Pathologies of Intersubjectivity in Autism and Schizophrenia.T. Fuchs - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):191-214.
    Most mental disorders include more or less profound disturbances of intersubjectivity, that means, a restricted capacity to respond to the social environment in a flexible way and to reach a shared understanding through adequate interaction with others. Current concepts of intersubjectivity are mainly based on a mentalistic approach, assuming that the hidden mental states of others may only be inferred from their external bodily behaviour through 'mentalizing' or 'mindreading'. On this basis, disorders of intersubjectivity for example in autism or schizophrenia (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  5. Objective Styles in Northern Field Science.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:1-12.
    Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Putting a Spin on Circulating Reference, or How to Rediscover the Scientific Subject.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:103-107.
    Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction.Jeff Kochan - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking a socially inflected reliabilism as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy.Katerina Kolozova & Francois Laruelle - 2014 - New York: Columbia University Press.
    Following François Laruelle’s nonstandard philosophy and the work of Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Luce Irigaray, and Rosi Braidotti, Katerina Kolozova reclaims the relevance of categories traditionally rendered “unthinkable” by ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research.Jeff Kochan - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):354-362.
    A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  10. Popper's Communitarianism.Jeff Kochan - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & Robert S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 272). Springer. pp. 287--303.
    In this chapter, I argue that Karl Popper was a communitarian philosopher. This will surprise some readers. Liberals often tout Popper as one of their champions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Popper shared much in common with liberals. However, I will argue that Popper rejected a central, though perhaps not essential, pillar of liberal theory, namely, individualism. This claim may seem to contradict Popper's professed methodological individualism. Yet I argue that Popper was a methodological individualist in name only. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century.Scott Edgar - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
    This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations