About this topic
Summary This section contains works falling under three main remits: 1) meta-ethical analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, and discussion of whether it is definable at all or not, and whether the concept is intelligible at all; 2) structural relations between intrinsic value and other kinds of value, such as extrinsic value, final value, instrumental value, and so on; 3) application of the category of intrinsic value to specific objects, for example non-human animals and the environment.
Key works Moore 1998 Classical work introducing the notion into contemporary moral philosophy. Feldman 1998 Clarificatory article, spells out some misconceptions about intrinsic value. Chisholm 1980, Chisholm 2005 Chisholm's 2-page proposal of a definition. Korsgaard 1983, Korsgaard 1983 Groundbreaking paper on the relation between intrinsic value and final value or value as an end. Zimmerman 2001 A contemporary classic defending intrinsic value and articulating its various dimensions. Bradley 2006 An assessment of current disputes between "Mooreans" and "Kantians" about intrinsic value.
Introductions Zimmerman 2019 Thorough Stanford Encyclopedia introduction. See also Schroeder 2008. Bradley 2013 Accessible and uptodate introduction. Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005 Introduction to the collection: Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005. Feldman 1998 This can also be used as introduction, easily accessible.
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  1. added 2020-05-22
    Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:295-324.
    I first distinguish between different forms of the buck-passing account of value and clarify my target in other respects on buck-passers' behalf. I then raise a number of problems for the different forms of the buck-passing view that I have distinguished.
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  2. added 2020-05-08
    On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-04
    The Explanatory Objection to the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Francesco Orsi & Andrés G. Garcia - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-23
    On the Intrinsic Value of Everything. [REVIEW]Edward N. Martin - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84:251-261.
  5. added 2020-03-25
    Solving the Most Valuable Player Problem.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):141–159.
    In this essay, I argue for the claim that the MVP is the player who provides the greatest net benefit to his team. I then argued for the following model of a player’s net benefit to her team. (1) A person’s, X’s, net benefit to the team is a function of the difference in team success when X plays and when her actual or likely backup plays. I argued that this model best satisfies our intuitions, measures actual value rather than (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-24
    The Most-Valuable-Player Problem Remains Unsolved.Stephen Kershnar - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 38 (2):167-174.
    Stephen Kershnar’s model of the most valuable player fails. It does not track total value and this is what a team values, although perhaps the best model should focus on player-related value. In any case, the model does not succeed as a model of player-value because player-value is indeterminate. The indeterminacy results from boundary problems with the player-role and, perhaps also, indeterminacy in the baseline state. In addition, Kershnar’s framework is misguided because winning is not intrinsically valuable and is not (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-24
    A Complex Experiential Account of Pleasure.Stephen Kershnar - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):153-165.
    In this paper, I argue for the Complex Experiential Theory. It asserts that pleasure is a pro-attitude toward a de se experience. I argue that it is better than its competitors. In particular, it is better than monadic theories that view pleasure as a distinct type of experience or a pro-attitude in isolation. It is also better than other non-monadic theories. In particular, it is better than accounts that involve pro-attitudes and beliefs in states of affairs or propositions (or ones (...)
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  8. added 2020-03-24
    Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar - 2009 - Lexington Books.
    Desert and Virtue: A Theory of Intrinsic Value presents a comprehensive examination of desert and what makes people deserve things. Stephen Kershnar demonstrates how desert relates to virtue, good deeds, moral responsibility, and personal change and growth through the life process. He persuasively argues that desert is a function that relates well-being, intrinsic value, and a "ground," which is defined as a person's character or act.
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  9. added 2020-03-24
    Desert Tracks Character Alone.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
    In this paper, I argue that character alone grounds desert. I begin by arguing that desert is grounded by a person’s character, action, or both. In the second section, I defend the claim that character grounds desert. My argument rests on intuitions that other things being equal, it would be intrinsically better for virtuous persons to flourish and vicious persons suffer than vice versa. In the third section, I argue that actions do not ground desert. I give three arguments in (...)
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  10. added 2020-03-24
    Explaining the Geometry of Desert.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.
    In the past decade, three philosophers in particular have recently explored the relation between desert and intrinsic value. Fred Feldman argues that consequentialism need not give much weight – or indeed any weight at all – to the happiness of persons who undeservedly experience pleasure. He defends the claim that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is determined by the “fit” between the amount of well-being that a person receives and the amount of well-being that the person deserves. (...)
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  11. added 2020-03-24
    Intrinsic Moral Value and Racial Differences.Stephen Kershnar - 2000 - Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (3):205-224.
    In this paper, I argue for the following thesis: racial and ethic groups differ in their per capita intrinsic moral value. My argument rests on the notion that autonomy is a ground for intrinsic moral value and the notion that there are individual and group differences in autonomy. I then argue that the implications of this per capita difference between racial and ethnic groups are in some cases significant in that they are relevant to both public policy and private action.
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  12. added 2020-03-10
    Ethics for an Uninhabited Planet.Erik Persson - 2019 - In Konrad Szocik (ed.), The Human Factor in a Mission to Mars: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Springer. pp. 201-216.
    Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...)
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  13. added 2020-02-08
    The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.J. Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):540-542.
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  14. added 2020-01-10
    Richard Rowland, The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value. [REVIEW]Francesco Orsi - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly.
  15. added 2019-10-21
    Ethics for an Uninhabited Planet.Erik Persson - 2019 - In Konrad Szocik (ed.), The Human Factor in a Mission to Mars – An Interdisciplinary Approach. Springer. pp. 201-216.
    Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...)
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  16. added 2019-10-01
    Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection.Vuko Andrić - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):101-109.
    Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-25
    Hurka's Theory of Virtue.Stephen Kershnar - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):159-168.
    Thomas Hurka has put forth a powerful account of virtue. The account rests on a specification of intrinsically good mental states and then explains what unifies them. On his account, virtue and desert also share the same structure. His theory of virtue has some difficulties that threaten the structure that unifies it. First, Hurka's account cannot provide a principled account of virtue and vice when they are constituted by attitudes toward things are not intrinsically good (e.g., nonexistent state of affairs). (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: A Defense of Indefinability.Miles Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Perspective‐Neutral Intrinsic Value.Justin Klocksiem - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):323-337.
    Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective‐neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective‐dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective From Intrinsic Value: Tara Smith.Tara Smith - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):126-148.
    This essay contends that the debate between subjectivism and objectivism in ethics is better understood as a dispute among three alternatives: subjectivism, objectivism, and intrinsicism. Ayn Rand has identified intrinsicism – the belief that certain things are good “in, by, and of” themselves – as the doctrine that is actually operative in many defenses of moral objectivity. What intrinsicism fails to appreciate, however, is the significant role of the subject, the person to whom and for whom anything can be valuable. (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389-403.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion pre-supposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Does the Failure of Utilitarianism Justify a Belief in Intrinsic Value?: Ross’ and Moore's Default Arguments.Imtiaz Moosa - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):123-142.
    Intrinsic goodness is a non-Ielational property, in that the worth of an intrinsically good thing does not consist in it standing in a beneficial relationship to anyone. Except for the non-relational intrinsic goodness, which if it exists must be acknowledged by all beings, the only relational good we humans can logically and plausibly deem good is the “human-related” good. Thus, only these two options exist: from our human viewpoint, either all good things are human-related goods, or some good things are (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Pasternack on Intrinsic Value and Overridingness in Kant’s Groundwork.Darian C. DeBolt - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):121-125.
  24. added 2019-06-06
    Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653-666.
    This paper argues that Moore's principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality of merely (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils: Michael J. Zimmerman.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):1-15.
    The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and that moral behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has led several of its supporters to infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary to what has been traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall challenge this inference. My purpose in doing so is to expose and acknowledge something that has been inadequately appreciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral goods and evils. I hope thereby to show that, even (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    In Defense of the Concept of Intrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):389-409.
    The concept of intrinsic value has enjoyed a long, rich history. From the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day, philosophers have placed it at the foundation of much of their theorizing. This is especially true of G.E. Moore, who made it the cornerstone of his Principia Ethica. Yet this venerable concept has recently come under serious, sustained attack. My aim in this paper is to show that this attack has been unsuccessful.When Principia Ethica appeared, its impact on (...)
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Intrinsic Value in Environmental Ethics: Beyond Subjectivism and Objectivism.Jim Cheney - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):227-235.
    It is widely held that all hope for a satisfactory environmental ethic rests on the question whether intrinsic value can be discovered in non-human nature, for it is also widely held that intrinsic value is what, if anything, grounds human obligations to non-human nature. The work of J. Baird Callicott on intrinsic value has been central to the contemporary discussion of environmental ethics and the present paper leads off with an overview of some aspects of his work in this area.
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair in Environmental Ethics.Eric Katz - 1987 - Environmental Ethics 9 (3):231-241.
    Anthony Weston has criticized the place of “inttinsic value” in the development of an environmental ethic, and he has urged a “pragmatic shift” toward a plurality of values based on human desires and experiences. I argue that Weston is mistaken for two reasons: his view of the methodology of environmental ethics is distorted: the intrinsic value of natural entities is not the ground of all moral obligations regarding the environment; and his pragmatic theory of value is too anthropocentric and subjective (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    Intrinsic Value: Some Comments On The Work Of G. E. Moore: PHILOSOPHY.Austin Jones-Duncan - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (126):240-273.
    The object of this paper is to review and examine some of the things which G. E. Moore says about the nature of intrinsic value, about the sort of objects which possess it, and about the method of ascertaining the intrinsic values of things. Most of the discussion will be based on Principia Ethica : for in that work Moore stated the substance of his ethical theories once and for all. He explicitly changed his mind later on a few specific (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsRobert Audi,. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. 244. $45.00. [REVIEW]Sean D. McKeever - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):403-405.
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  32. added 2019-06-03
    Each-We Dilemmas and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer & Matthew Clark - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (1):24-32.
    In his interesting and provocative article ‘Being Good in a World of Need’, Larry Temkin argues for the possibility of a type of Each-We Dilemma in which, if we each produce the most good we can individually, we produce a worse outcome collectively. Such situations would ostensibly be troubling from the standpoint of effective altruism, the project of finding out how to do the most good and doing it, subject to not violating side-constraints. We here show that Temkin’s argument is (...)
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  33. added 2019-04-02
    A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
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  34. added 2019-03-27
    Scheffler’s “Afterlife Conjecture” is Not That Compelling: How His “Doomsday” and “Infertility” Scenarios Might Robustly Preserve Value and Meaning.Jason Gray - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):637-646.
    Samuel Scheffler postulates that we derive more value and meaning from our lives because we have confidence in the indefinite continuation of humanity than we do from our own or our loved ones’ continued existence. Scheffler believes that this shows humans to be less egocentric than some believe. He offers two thought experiments to motivate this intuition. The first thought experiment depends on the second to control for certain intuitions that run counter to the intuitions Scheffler wants to elicit. So, (...)
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  35. added 2019-03-06
    Between Values and the World: Studies in Second-Order Value Theory.Andrés Garcia - 2018 - Dissertation, Lund
    Value is an inescapable part of the human experience and what life must be like for a conscious and feeling person. Philosophical questions about value are therefore naturally invited: What sort of thing would value be if it were part of the furniture of the world? How should we understand the relations that value is thought to stand in to other things? In a broad sense, these are formal questions calling for philosophical studies into the understanding of value notions. The (...)
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  36. added 2019-02-21
    Spectrum Arguments and Hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.
    Larry Temkin famously argues that what he calls spectrum arguments yield strong reason to reject Transitivity, according to which the ‘all-things-considered better than’ relation is transitive. Spectrum arguments do reveal that the conjunctions of independently plausible claims are inconsistent with Transitivity. But I argue that there is very strong independent reason to reject such conjunctions of claims, and thus that the fact that they are inconsistent with Transitivity does not yield strong reason to reject Transitivity.
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  37. added 2018-11-16
    From an Axiological Standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
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  38. added 2018-10-27
    Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):979-996.
    This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...)
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  39. added 2018-10-26
    Doing Unto Others: A Phenomenological Search for the Ground of Ethics.Richard Oxenberg - manuscript
    Can we find a phenomenological basis for the ethical 'ought'? This essay addresses this question through a reflection on Husserl's fifth Meditation. In the fifth Meditation Husserl endeavors to show the manner in which I constitute the other through an associative pairing of the other with my own subjectivity. This essay argues that this same associative pairing forces me to acknowledge the other as a person of intrinsic worth insofar as I recognize myself as one. Having acknowledged the intrinsic worth (...)
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  40. added 2018-10-24
    What If All Value Were Conferred?Carlos Soto - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):217-221.
    I argue that the claim that all value is conferred is incompatible with the view that the capacity to set ends is unconditionally valuable. While this objection has been made, I offer a rebuttal and then a counterexample to the rebuttal. I also argue that, if all value were conferred, then the Kantian notion that moral wrongness consists in a practical contradiction is undermined.
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  41. added 2018-08-27
    Towards Gratitude to Nature: Global Environmental Ethics for China and the World.Bo R. Meinertsen - 2017 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 12 (2):207-223.
    This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics. As Gao Shan has argued, the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature, and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics. This is related to Gao’s rejection of most—if not all—Western “rationalist” environmental ethics, a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I (...)
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  42. added 2018-08-07
    Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?Anne Schwenkenbecher & Michael Rubin - 2019 - Environmental Values 28 (4):405-427.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it (...)
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  43. added 2018-07-06
    Recognition and Personhood: A Critique of Bernstein's Account of the Wrongfulness of Torture.Johnny Brennan - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):211-226.
    J. M. Bernstein argues that to capture the depths of the harm of torture, we need to do away with the idea that we possess intrinsic and inviolable worth. If personhood is inviolable, then torture can inflict only apparent harm on our standing as persons. Bernstein claims that torture is a paradigm of moral injury because it causes what he calls “devastation”: The victim experiences an actual degradation of his or her personhood. Bernstein argues that our value is given to (...)
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  44. added 2018-03-15
    Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
    Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-22
    Freedom and the Value of Games.Jonathan Gingerich - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):831-849.
    This essay explores the features in virtue of which games are valuable or worthwhile to play. The difficulty view of games holds that the goodness of games lies in their difficulty: by making activities more complex or making them require greater effort, they structure easier activities into more difficult, therefore more worthwhile, activities. I argue that a further source of the value of games is that they provide players with an experience of freedom, which they provide both as paradigmatically unnecessary (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    The Pen, the Dress, and the Coat: A Confusion in Goodness.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1911-1922.
    Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-17
    On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so- called for-someone's-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone's-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued (...)
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  48. added 2017-12-14
    Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics of Ethical Value.Julian Friedland - 2006 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 5 (1):91-102.
    This paper develops Wittgenstein’s view of how experiences of ethical value contribute to our understanding of the world. Such experiences occur when we perceive certain intrinsic attributes of a particular being, object, or location as valuable irrespective of any concern for personal gain. It is shown that experiences of ethical value essentially involve a characteristic ‘listening’ to the ongoing transformations and actualizations of a given form of life—literally or metaphorically speaking. Such immediate impressions of spontaneous sympathy and agreement reveal ethics (...)
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  49. added 2017-12-06
    Simply Good: A Defence of the Principia.Miles Tucker - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (3):253-270.
    Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...)
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  50. added 2017-09-27
    Truth is Not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
    We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation (...)
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