Intrinsic Value

Edited by Francesco Orsi (University of Tartu, Scuola Normale Superiore)
About this topic
Summary This section contains works falling under three main remits: 1) meta-ethical analysis of the concept of intrinsic value, and discussion of whether it is definable at all or not, and whether the concept is intelligible at all; 2) structural relations between intrinsic value and other kinds of value, such as extrinsic value, final value, instrumental value, and so on; 3) application of the category of intrinsic value to specific objects, for example non-human animals and the environment.
Key works Moore 1998 Classical work introducing the notion into contemporary moral philosophy. Feldman 1998 Clarificatory article, spells out some misconceptions about intrinsic value. Chisholm 1980, Chisholm 2005 Chisholm's 2-page proposal of a definition. Korsgaard 1983, Korsgaard 1983 Groundbreaking paper on the relation between intrinsic value and final value or value as an end. Zimmerman 2001 A contemporary classic defending intrinsic value and articulating its various dimensions. Bradley 2006 An assessment of current disputes between "Mooreans" and "Kantians" about intrinsic value.
Introductions Zimmerman 2008 Thorough Stanford Encyclopedia introduction. See also Schroeder 2008. Bradley 2013 Accessible and uptodate introduction. Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005 Introduction to the collection: Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmerman 2005. Feldman 1998 This can also be used as introduction, easily accessible.
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226 found
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  1. Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics, and Nature.Nicholas Agar - 2001 - Columbia University Press.
    Are bacteriophage T4 and the long-nosed elephant fish valuable in their own right? Nicholas Agar defends an affirmative answer to this question by arguing that anything living is intrinsically valuable. This claim challenges received ethical wisdom according to which only human beings are valuable in themselves. The resulting biocentric or life-centered morality forms the platform for an ethic of the environment. -/- Agar builds a bridge between the biological sciences and what he calls "folk" morality to arrive at a workable (...)
  2. Still Lives: The History and Philosophy of Mourning Texts.Veronica Alfano & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - Routledge.
    “Call no one happy until they are dead.” “Never speak ill of the dead.” If we still heed the injunctions of Solon and Chilon of Sparta, then obituaries, which represent a prominent way of expressing the human universal of grief, are a resource for philosophical anthropology. Philosophers have emphasized that we can determine what counts as a virtue for a given type of person in a given cultural context by analyzing what people say about the dead (Zagzebski 1996, p. 135). (...)
  3. Deep Ecology and Intrinsic Value.Robin Attfield - 1990 - Cogito 4 (1):61-66.
  4. Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action.Robert Audi - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 30-56.
  5. Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life.Robert Audi - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):331-355.
    Abstract I distinguish various ways in which human life may be thought to be meaningful and present an account of what might be called existential meaningfulness. The account is neutral with respect to both theism and naturalism, but each is addressed in several places and the paper's main points are harmonious with certain versions of both. A number of important criteria for existential meaningfulness are examined, and special emphasis is placed on criteria centering on creativity and excellence, on contributing to (...)
  6. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value.Robert Audi - 2004 - Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
  7. Intrinsic Value, Inherent Value, and Experience: A Reply to Stephen Barker.Robert Audi - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):323-327.
  8. Intrinsic Value and Moral Obligation.Robert Audi - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):135-154.
  9. Intrinsic Value of Species.Frank Glen Avantaggio - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    This is an essay about ethics and environmental responsibility. The thesis is that biologic species qua species--not only as collections of individuals or as elements of ecosystems--deserve moral regard. The argument establishes moral considerability on powers and freedoms of relative self-determination and autonomy. It is argued that species are living beings in their own right with their own projects and interests which deserve special regard. The essay draws from the arguments of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Boethius, Avicenna, Maimonides, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, (...)
  10. On Intrinsic Value.John A. Bailey - 1979 - Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good if it were to (...)
  11. La valeur intrinsèque chez Brentano et Moore.Thomas Baldwin - 1999 - Philosophiques 26 (231):243.
    In Principia Ethica Moore expresses his great admiration for Brentano's ethical writings, and a comparison between Moore and Brentano reveals that their ethical theories have much in common. But they disagree fundamentally on the metaphysics of intrinsic value. Moore adopts an abstract realist position, whereas Brentano interprets intrinsic value by reference to “correct love” : that which is good is that which merits correct love. Brentano's position has many advantages over that of Moore ; but it raises the question as (...)
  12. The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value.Stephen Barker - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):57-61.
  13. Intrinsic Value.Monroe C. Beardsley - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):1-17.
    Many philosophers apparently still accept the proposition that there is such a thing as intrinsic value, i.e., that some part of the value of some things (objects, events, or states of affairs) is intrinsic value. John Dewey's attack seems not to have dislodged this proposition, for today it is seldom questioned. I propose to press the attack again, in terms that owe a great deal to Dewey, as I understand him.
  14. G.E. Moore and the Relation Between Intrinsic Value and Human Activity.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1981 - Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (1):69-78.
  15. Intrinsic Value.M. Bernstein - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):329 - 343.
  16. Book Reviews:The Nature of Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW]Reid D. Blackman - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):375-377.
  17. Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians (...)
  18. Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?Ben Bradley - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.
    Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.
  19. Goodness, Values, Reasons.Johan Brännmark - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329-343.
    Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern (...)
  20. Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik.Franz Brentano - 1952 - Francke.
    Erstmals 1951 publiziert, bilden die Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen und den Aufbau der Ethik ein geschlossenes und harmonisches Ganzes. Der Band geht zurück auf ein im Wintersemester 1876 niedergeschriebenes Manuskript, das Brentano 1894 als Kolleg an der Universität Wien vortrug.
  21. Intrinsic Value, Organic Unity and Environmental Philosophy: Grounding Our Values.Douglas Jon Buege - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    By arguing that current theories of ontology and intrinsic value in environmental ethics are inadequate in informing a truly ecological ethic, I show that new theories need to be developed if environmental philosophers are going to be able to address environmental policy issues. I offer an ecologically-informed ontology that fulfills the need for an adequate ontology by identifying the various beings that should be considered by an environmental ethic. This ontology includes various ecological entities, e.g., ecosystems, bioregions and populations, as (...)
  22. Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.C. Dussault Antoine - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for the alternate requirement (...)
  23. Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction.J. Baird Callicot - 1992 - Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
  24. The Convergence Hypothesis Falsified: Implicit Intrinsic Value, Operational Rights, and de Facto Standing in the Endangered Species Act.J. Baird Callicott - 2009 - In Ben A. Minteer (ed.), Nature in Common?: Environmental Ethics and the Contested Foundations of Environmental Policy. Temple University Press.
  25. Intrinsic Value in Nature: A Metaethical Analysis.J. Baird Callicott - 1995 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (5).
  26. Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics.J. Baird Callicott - 1985 - Environmental Ethics 7 (3):257-275.
    The central and most recalcitrant problem for environmental ethics is the problem of constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and for nature as a whole. In part one, I retrospectively survey the problem, review certain classical approaches to it, and recommend one as an adequate, albeit only partial, solution. In part two, I show that the classical theory of inherent value for nonhuman entities and nature as a whole outlined in part one is inconsistent with (...)
  27. The Intelligibility of Intrinsic Value.Richmond Mullowny Campbell - 1970 - Dissertation, Cornell University
  28. Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value.Erik Carlson - 2001 - Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
    Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs whose (...)
  29. The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs.Erik Carlson - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 85 (1):95-107.
  30. Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality. [REVIEW]Thomas L. Carson - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):441–446.
  31. C. I. Lewis and the Immediacy of Intrinsic Value.Robert E. Carter - 1975 - Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3):204-209.
    Immediate experiences may be found good or bad at the time of occurrence, and this value contributes to the goodness or badness of life in general. In addition, they may continue to affect later experiences to the very end of a lifetime. The final assessment of an experience, therefore, cannot be made until a lifetime has come to an end, at which point one would no longer be in a position to assess. It remains instructive, nevertheless, to apply the standard (...)
  32. Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer.Robert Edgar Carter - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):504-514.
  33. The Importance of Intrinsic Value.Robert Edgar Carter - 1968 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):567-577.
  34. Philosophy, Religion and Love: Ellis on the Fundamental Need for Inspiration.David K. Chan - 2008 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (2):82-90.
    Ralph Ellis has written about how we have a fundamental need for ‘inspiration’ that can help us come to terms with human finitude. Arguing against the self-deceptive path of religious fundamentalism, Ellis discusses how the experience of a transcendent object of intrinsic value through love enables us to break out of a ‘circle of egocentricity.’ In this paper, I explore the problem of finitude in the movie Stranger Than Fiction, faced by someone who has to make choices knowing that he (...)
  35. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol. 25. Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    ‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...)
  36. Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press. pp. 1-34.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
  37. Intrinsic Value in Environmental Ethics.Jim Cheney - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):227-235.
  38. Defining Intrinsic Value.R. M. Chisholm - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 15--16.
  39. Brentano and Intrinsic Value.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about (...)
  40. The Intrinsic Value in Disjunctive States of Affairs.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1975 - Noûs 9 (3):295-308.
  41. On the Logic of "Intrinsically Better".Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):244-249.
  42. Autonomy, Life as an Intrinsic Value, and the Right to Die in Dignity.Raphael Cohen-Almagor - 1995 - Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (3):261-272.
    This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not (...)
  43. Instrumental Value Without Intrinsic Value?Earl Conee - 1982 - Philosophia 11 (3-4):345-359.
  44. Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck.Roger Crisp - 2005 - Analysis 65 (285):80–85.
  45. Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?Leon Culbertson - 2008 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (3):302 – 320.
    This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with (...)
  46. A Moorean Argument for the Full Moral Status of Those with Profound Intellectual Disability.Benjamin L. Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):41-45.
    This paper is about the moral status of those human beings with profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to ‘normal’ human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. We start with an admission, however: we don’t know how to give a fully satisfying theoretical account of the grounds of moral status that explains this view. And in fact, not only do we not know how to give such an account, (...)
  47. Moral Worth and Severe Intellectual Disability – A Hybrid View.Benjamin L. Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2013 - In Jerome E. Bickenbach, Franziska Felder & Barbara Schmitz (eds.), Disability and the Good Human Life. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-49.
    Consider: You can save either a human or a normal adult dog from a burning building (with no risk to yourself and at little cost), but not both. However, the human is a human with a severe intellectually disability (or, as we shall say, a “SID”). -/- Which one should you save? There is disagreement in the literature about which this issue. Two opposing camps exist, which we call “the intrinsic property camp ” and “the special relations camp.” Those in (...)
  48. Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (4):434-444.
    I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare (...)
  49. Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value.Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
  50. Review: Pasternack, Intrinslc Value and Overridingness in Kant's Groundwork. [REVIEW]Darian C. DeBolt - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):121-125.
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