About this topic
Summary Although its primary interest is the epistemology of intuition, the philosophical study of intuition begins with the question of the nature of intuition, because epistemological accounts of intuition differ significantly depending on what the nature of intuition is held to be. Various conceptions of the nature of intuition have been proposed: for instance, intuitions as judgements, intuitions as beliefs, intuitions as dispositions to judge (or believe) or intuitions as mental states that are prior to judgement (or belief) or the disposition to judge (or believe).
Key works Bealer 1998BonJour 1998 and Sosa 1998 present positive accounts of the epistemic value of intuition, each based on a different theory of the nature of intuition. Cummins 1998, Stich 1988, Weinberg et al 2001 and Williamson 2004 present sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic value of intuition. Sosa 2007 and Williamson 2007 offer responses to some sceptical arguments. (Note: The ongoing philosophical debate on intuition has proceeded in a way that is largely independent of earlier writings on the topic by authors such as Bergson, Husserl, Kant and Spinoza. These earlier writings may still be regarded as key works in at least a historical sense. In any case, they remain valuable resources for anyone interested in the philosophy of intuition.)
Introductions Reading the following three texts in the order given will make for a good introduction: DePaul & Ramsey 1998Gutting 1998 and Pust 2012.
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  1. Testing for the Phenomenal: Intuition, Metacognition, and Philosophical Methodology.Miguel Egler - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):48-66.
    Recent empirical studies raise methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that have precisely this phenomenology to argue that the above reply fails. Furthermore, it shows that empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant (...)
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  2. Zagadnienie intuicji w kontekście współczesnego dyskursu metafizycznego.Karol Lenart - 2015 - Filozoficzne Rozważania o Człowieku, Kulturze I Nowoczesności.
    Istnieje spór w obrębie filozofii sięgający już starożytności i polemiki Platona z Sofistami, dotyczący ugruntowania metafizyki jako dziedziny autonomicznej, która byłaby zdolna do badania swoistych elementów rzeczywistości, przysługujących tylko i wyłącznie metafizyce. We wstępnych rozważaniach przedstawiamy sposób, w jaki ten spór można rozumieć oraz jak można go rozwiązać. Tezą metafilozoficzną naszych analiz będzie stwierdzenie, że w celu ugruntowania metafizyki musimy wskazać na swoiste doświadczenie, które mogłoby zapewnić bezpośredni dostęp poznawczy do abstrakcyjnego przedmiotu metafizyki. W niniejszych badaniach, rolę tego doświadczenia będzie (...)
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  3. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
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  4. The Role of "Intuition" in Knowledge Development.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - 2000 - In .
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  5. The Nature of Intuition : What Theories of Intuition Ought to Be.Hung Nin Lam - unknown
    Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it was extremely common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories. Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the (...)
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  6. The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated.James Mccosh - 1860
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  7. Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (4):282-285.
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  8. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.D. M. Azraf - 1957 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  9. Novel Intuition: A Philosophical Defense of the Existence of Prelinguistic Apprehension.Alan Paskow - 1971 - Dissertation, Yale University
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  10. The Relevance of a Competence/Performance Distinction to Theory Selection in Ethics.Michael Joseph Stingl - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    While some of our deepest moral intuitions are consequentialist in nature, others are decidedly not. This difference at the intuitive level is reflected at the theoretical level by two equally venerable traditions of moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology. One of the main problems of theory selection in ethics is that neither tradition appears fully able to account for both kinds of intuitions. ;To solve this problem, the thesis posits an epistemological connection between moral intuition and moral theory. The general human (...)
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  11. Intuitions.Richard T. Webster - 1982 - Analecta Husserliana 12:429.
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  12. Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):545-553.
    In order for Herman Cappelen to argue in his Philosophy Without Intuitions that philosophers have been on the whole mistaken in thinking that we actually use intuitions much at all in our first-order philosophizing, he must attempt the task of characterizing what something must be, in order to be an intuition.My discussion here is focused on the latter half of the book concerning the “argument from philosophical practice. I am in wholehearted agreement with the first half’s thesis that the usage (...)
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  13. Why so Negative? Evidence Aggregation and Armchair Philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3865-3896.
    This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based tools for (...)
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  14. The Πολιτικὸς Στίχος Poetry as Reliable Evidence of Linguistic Phenomena.Jorie Soltic - 2013 - Byzantinische Zeitschrift 106 (2):811-842.
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  15. The Epistemic Value of Moral Intuitions.A. W. Musschenga - unknown
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  16. Audi, R.(Ed.)-The Cambridge Distionary of Philosophy.A. MacIntyre - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37:183-183.
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  17. On Some Difficulties Concerning Intuition and Intuitive.Wise Maxims & Wise Judging - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1).
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  18. Appealing to Intuitions.Julia Langkau - unknown
    This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the (...)
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  19. Economic Writing on the Pressing Problems of the Day: The Roles of Moral Intuition and Methodological Confusion.Julie A. Nelson - 2010 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 11 (2):37.
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  20. AUDI, R.-Epistemology.N. Unwin - 2000 - Philosophical Books 41 (4):285-285.
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  21. Robert Audi and the Method of Descriptive Manifestation.Mark T. Nelson - 2003 - Philosophical Books 44 (1).
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  22. An Example of Conceptual Analysis Using Intuitions About Cases.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.
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  23. The Epistemic Value of Psychological Moral Intuitions.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
    In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of (...)
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  24. Intuition and Ideality.David WEISSMAN - 1987 - State University of New York Press.
    This book shows how idealism is a consequence of the intuitionist method.
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  25. Intuitions and Truth.P. Greenough & M. Lynch - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  26. Theories, Experience, and Probabilistic Intuitions.K. R. Popper - 1968 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 285--303.
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  27. Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions.Christopher B. Kulp - 2011 - In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. pp. 48--66.
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  28. A Model of Heuristic Judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
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  29. And the Role of Intuitions.William G. Lycan - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
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  30. Moral Intuitions and Philosophical Method.Martin Perlmutter - 1998 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham University Press. pp. 10--203.
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  31. Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?Hilary Kornblith - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 195.
    Some philosophers believe that epistemological theories are a priori knowable. Others weaken this claim slightly, arguing that epistemological theorizing is properly conducted “from the armchair.” It is argued here that even this claim is far too strong. This paper defends the view that epistemological theorizing must take account of empirical work in psychology, and, without this, epistemology inevitably loses touch with the very phenomena it seeks to account for.
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  32. Semantic Intuitions: Conflict Resolution in the Formal Sciences.John Woods - 1996 - In J. F. A. K. van Benthem (ed.), Logic and Argumentation. North-Holland. pp. 170--179.
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  33. The Nature of Intuition: A Neuropsychological Approach.Charles Laughlin - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19--37.
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  34. Intuition in the Development of Scientific Theory and Practice.Evelyn H. Monsay - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 103--120.
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  35. Intuition, Incubation, and Insight: Implicit Cognition in Problem-Solving.J. F. Kihlstrom, V. A. Shames & J. Dorfman - 1996 - In G. Underwood (ed.), Implicit Cognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 257--296.
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  36. Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25.
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  37. Linguistic Evidence, Status Of.Carson T. Schütze - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  38. Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism.Janet Levin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.
    In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional (...)
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  39. Die Funktion von Grenzbegriffen. Symposium zu: Eckart Förster: Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie.Johannes Haag - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):993-1001.
    The discussion of the hermetical §§ 76/77 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is the centerpiece of Eckart Förster’s groundbreaking Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. The decisive methodological tool employed by Kant in those sections is the use of limiting concepts such as intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect. Förster’s discussion of the use of limiting concepts in those paragraphs is outlined and ultimately – despite some criticism in exegetical detail – assessed as the right way to reconstruct the (...)
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  40. Intuition and Inquiry.Anand Vaidya - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):16.
    Recent work in philosophical methodology by experimental philosophers has brought to light a certain kind of skepticism about the role of intuitions in a priori philosophical inquiry. In this paper I turn attention away from a priori philosophical inquiry and on to the role of intuition in experimental design. I argue that even if we have reason to be skeptical about the role of intuition in a priori philosophical inquiry, we cannot remove intuition from inquiry altogether, because appeals to intuition (...)
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  41. Towards a Non-Rationalist Inflationist Account of Intuitions.Julia Langkau - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):18.
    In this paper, I first develop desiderata for an ontology of intuitions on the basis of paradigmatic cases of intuitions in philosophy. A special focus lies on cases that have been subject to extensive first-order philosophical debates but have been receiving little attention in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. I show that none of the popular accounts in the current debate can meet all desiderata. I discuss a view according to which intuitions reduce to beliefs, Timothy Williamson's (...)
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  42. Poetic Intuition: Spinoza and Gerard Manley Hopkins.Joshua M. Hall - 2013 - Philosophy Today 57 (4):401-407.
    As one commentator notes, Spinoza’s conception of “the third kind of knowledge”—intuition, has been “regarded as exceptionally obscure. Some writers regard it as a kind of mystic vision; others regard it as simply unintelligible.” For Spinoza, the first kind of knowledge, which he calls “imagination,” is a kind of sense-experience of particulars; the second kind, which he calls “understanding,” involves the rational grasp of universals, and the third, in his words, “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of (...)
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  43. And Intuitions.Jennifer Saul & Simple Sentences - 2008 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (4):541-545.
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  44. Vilijamsonova kritika filozofskog ekscepcionalizma-Williamson T., 2007: The philosophy of philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell. [REVIEW]Duško Prelević - 2009 - Theoria: Beograd 52 (3):99-119.
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  45. Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-105.
    In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically Quine’s version of empiricism. In doing so, Bealer identifies three fundamental principles of Quine’s empiricism. First, the principle of empiricism states that.
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  46. Knowing Our Own Concepts: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy.Péter Hartl - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):488-498.
    Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will (...)
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  47. Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2):86-105.
  48. Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):17.
    Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one can only argue that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and that philosophical practice is justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.
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  49. Knowing From the Armchair That Our Intuitions Are Reliable.Ram Neta - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):329-351.
    In recent years, a growing body of experimental literature has called into question the reliability of our intuitions about hypothetical cases, and thereby called into question the use of intuitions in philosophy. In this paper, I critically assess one prominent example of this challenge, namely, Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg’s recent study of order effects on the Truetemp intuition. I argue that the very data that Swain,Alexander, and Weinberg find do not undermine, but instead support, the reliability of intuition. I also (...)
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  50. Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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