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  1. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
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  2. Intuition.Frederick Anderson - 1926 - Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  3. Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?Andow James - unknown
    The word ‘intuition’ is used frequently both in philosophy and in discussions about philosophical methods. It has been argued that this intuition-talk makes no semantic contribution and that intuition-talk is thus a bad habit that ought to be abandoned. I urge caution in making this inference. There are many pragmatic roles intuition-talk might play. Moreover, according to one plausible story, there is reason to think intuition-talk is actually a good habit for philosophers to have.
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  4. How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?Andow James - unknown
    The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The (...)
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  5. Intuitions in the Face of Diversity.James Andow - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Nottingham
    In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent (...)
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  6. The Nature of Intuition O.A. Nfuropsythologital Approath - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19.
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  7. The Claims of Commonsense.M. C. D' Arcy - 1927 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317.
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  8. A Defense of Intuitions.Gary Atkinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107-117.
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  9. Intuition and Its Place in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: This paper provides a multifaceted account of intuition. The paper integrates apparently disparate conceptions of intuition, shows how the notion has figured in epistemology as well as in intuitionistic ethics, and clarifies the relation between the intuitive and the self-evident. Ethical intuitionism is characterized in ways that, in phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology, represent an advance over the position of W. D. Ross while preserving its commonsense normative core and intuitionist character. This requires clarifying the sense in which intuitions (...)
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  10. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.D. M. Azraf - 1957 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  11. Types of Intuition.Archie J. Bahm - 1961 - Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  12. The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):414-415.
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  13. The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  14. A Psychological View of Moral Intuition.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  15. Intuitions in Ethics.Michael D. Bayles - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (3):439-455.
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  16. Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions?Avner Baz - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  17. The Origins of Modal Error.Bealer George - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source ‐ namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  18. A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  19. Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):144-177.
    Non-descriptivists in metaethics should say more about intuitions. For one popular theory has it that case-based intuitions are in the business of correctly categorizing or classifying merely by bringing to bear a semantic or conceptual competence. If so, then the fact that all normative predicates have case-based intuitions involving them shows that they too are in the business of categorizing or classifying things. This favors a descriptivist position in metaethics—normative predicates have descriptive content—and disfavors a purely non-descriptivist position, like pure (...)
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  20. A Noetic Theory of Understanding and Intuition as Sense-Maker.John Bengson - 2015 - Inquiry 58 (7-8):633-668.
    The notion of a non-sensory mental state or event that plays a prominent role in coming to understand, an epistemic achievement distinct from mere knowledge, featured prominently in historical writings on philosophy, and philosophical methodology. It is, however, completely absent from contemporary discussions of the subject. This paper argues that intuition plays an epistemic role in understanding, including philosophical understanding, and offers an explanation of how intuition manages to play this role, if and when it does. It is argued, subsequently, (...)
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  21. The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2010 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
    Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a (...)
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  22. Intuition catégorale et voir comme.Jocelyn Benoist - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
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  23. On Non-Perceptual Intuition.Gustav Bergmann - 1949 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (2):263-264.
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  24. L'intuition philosophique.H. Bergson - 1911 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
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  25. Désirer Connaître Par Intuition.Rudolf Bernet - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  26. The Limits of Intuition.Thomas G. Bever - 1972 - Foundations of Language 8 (3):411-412.
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  27. The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye.Ned Block - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  28. Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen.Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):368-381.
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  29. The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Commonsense.Stephen J. Boulter - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
    Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised (...)
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  30. Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1880 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
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  31. Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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  32. Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition.Thomas Boysen - 2004 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):92-104.
  33. How Good Are Your Logical Intuitions?Raymond D. Bradley - unknown
    Some children seem blessed, almost from birth, with a capacity for critical thinking. They won't let a fallacious argument pass unnoticed or unscathed. And some are fortunate enough to be exposed at an early age to fine examples of good reasoning. In their listening and their reading they learn, by intellectual osmosis as it were, to think logically. Yet even these fortunate ones, like the rest of us, can benefit by having their logical intuitions and reasoning skills sharpened by precept (...)
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  34. Intuition.A. Barratt Brown - 1914 - International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  35. The View From the Armchair: A Defense of Traditional Philosophy.Anthony Alan Bryson - unknown
    Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield (...)
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  36. Gender and Philosophical Intuition.Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2010 - In . Oxford University Press. pp. 307-346.
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  37. Professor Stuart Metaphilosophy October 7, 2011 Intuitions About Specific Situations and Intuitions About General Principles. [REVIEW]John Bunke - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.
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  38. Stout on Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence. [REVIEW]Wendell T. Bush - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy 5 (9):246.
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  39. Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization.Charles Arthur Campbell - 1948 - London: G. Cumberlege.
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  40. Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
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  41. Intuitions.Herman Cappelen & Douglas G. Winblad - 1999 - Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie 1 (1):197-216.
    This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from (...)
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  42. Objective Truth in Matters of Taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  43. Intuitions, Edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom. [REVIEW]Glenn Carruthers - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):187-190.
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  44. Inference, Assent and First Principles in John Henry Cardinal Newman.Gerard Noel Casey - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    This dissertation is an exegetical study of Newman's notions of 'inference,' 'assent,' and 'first principles.' The basic thesis is that the notion of natural inference is equivocal. The object of the dissertation is to show that this equivocation exists, and to explore its ramifications. ;The first chapter clarifies the relationship between formal, informal and natural inference. 'Natural inference' is revealed as being equivocal since it connotes two distinct acts of the mind; the limiting case of informal inference, and intuition. ;The (...)
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  45. Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense.David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):535-544.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen focuses on the metaphilosophical thesis he calls Centrality: contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Using linguistic and textual analysis, he argues that Centrality is false. He also suggests that because most philosophers accept Centrality, they have mistaken beliefs about their own methods.To put my own views on the table: I do not have a large theoretical stake in the status of intuitions, but unreflectively I find it fairly obvious that (...)
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  46. Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition.Carsun Chang - 1960 - Philosophy East and West 10 (1/2):35-49.
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  47. Intuition.David Charlton - 2009 - Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  48. Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.
    Appeals to intuitions as evidence in philosophy are challenged by experimental philosophers and other critics. A common response to experimental philosophical criticisms is to hold that only professional philosophers? intuitions count as evidence in philosophy. This ?expert intuitions defence? is inadequate for two reasons. First, recent studies indicate significant variability in professional philosophers? intuitions. Second, the academic literature on professional intuitions gives us reasons to doubt that professional philosophers develop truth-apt intuitions. The onus falls on those who mount the expert (...)
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  49. Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition.Richard Cobb-Stevens - 1988 - Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  50. Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
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