About this topic
Summary Although its primary interest is the epistemology of intuition, the philosophical study of intuition begins with the question of the nature of intuition, because epistemological accounts of intuition differ significantly depending on what the nature of intuition is held to be. Various conceptions of the nature of intuition have been proposed: for instance, intuitions as judgements, intuitions as beliefs, intuitions as dispositions to judge (or believe) or intuitions as mental states that are prior to judgement (or belief) or the disposition to judge (or believe).
Key works Bealer 1998BonJour 1998 and Sosa 1998 present positive accounts of the epistemic value of intuition, each based on a different theory of the nature of intuition. Cummins 1998, Stich 1988, Weinberg et al 2001 and Williamson 2004 present sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic value of intuition. Sosa 2007 and Williamson 2007 offer responses to some sceptical arguments. (Note: The ongoing philosophical debate on intuition has proceeded in a way that is largely independent of earlier writings on the topic by authors such as Bergson, Husserl, Kant and Spinoza. These earlier writings may still be regarded as key works in at least a historical sense. In any case, they remain valuable resources for anyone interested in the philosophy of intuition.)
Introductions Reading the following three texts in the order given will make for a good introduction: DePaul & Ramsey 1998Gutting 1998 and Pust 2012.
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  1. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
  2. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.D. M. Azraf - 1957 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
  3. Intuition catégorale et voir comme.Jocelyn Benoist - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
  4. L'intuition philosophique.H. Bergson - 1911 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
  5. Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1880 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
  6. Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
  7. ORTEGAT, PAUL, S. J. "Intuition Et Religion: Le Problème Existentialiste". [REVIEW]James Collins - 1948 - Modern Schoolman 26:187.
  8. Logistique et intuition.L. Couturat - 1913 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (2):260 - 268.
  9. Must Philosophy Be Constrained? [REVIEW]Anna Drożdżowicz, Pierre Saint-Germier & Samuel Schindler - 2018 - Metascience 27 (3):469-475.
  10. Intuitions and Truth.P. Greenough & M. Lynch - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
  11. Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
    In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...)
  12. The Role of Intuition in Some Ethically Hard Cases.Daniel Guevara - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):149 - 167.
    Among the hardest cases in the ethics of killing are those in which one innocent person poses a lethal threat to another. I argue in favour of the intuition that lethal self-defence is permissible in these cases, despite the difficulties that some philosophers (e.g., Otsuka and McMahan) have raised about it. Philosophers writing in this area?including those sympathetic to the intuition (e.g. Thomson and Kamm)?have downplayed or ignored an essential and authoritative role for intuition per se (as against discursive general (...)
  13. The Necessity of Intuition.Pete A. Y. Gunter - 1986 - Southwest Philosophy Review 3:199-207.
  14. Replies to Margolis, Lycan, and Henderson.Gary Gutting - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):133-140.
  15. Die Funktion von Grenzbegriffen. Symposium zu: Eckart Förster: Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie.Johannes Haag - 2012 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6):993-1001.
    The discussion of the hermetical §§ 76/77 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is the centerpiece of Eckart Förster’s groundbreaking Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. The decisive methodological tool employed by Kant in those sections is the use of limiting concepts such as intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect. Förster’s discussion of the use of limiting concepts in those paragraphs is outlined and ultimately – despite some criticism in exegetical detail – assessed as the right way to reconstruct the (...)
  16. Infinite Totalities and the New Intuitionism.Michael Hand - 1988 - Idealistic Studies 18 (3):230-238.
  17. Knowing Our Own Concepts: The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy.Péter Hartl - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):488-498.
    Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will (...)
  18. Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis.Jussi Haukioja - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):81-93.
    Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about (...)
  19. The Nature of Intuitions and Their Role in Material Object Metaphysics.Andrew Higgins - manuscript
    I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue that ‘intuition’ (...)
  20. The Emperor's New Intuitions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):127 - 147.
  21. The Emperor’s New Intuitions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):127-147.
  22. We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
  23. Book Review. Principles of Intuitionism. Michael Dummett. [REVIEW]Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):253-62.
  24. The Role of "Intuition" in Knowledge Development.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - 2000 - In .
  25. Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination.Frank Hofmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.
    Recently, a new movement of philosophers, called 'experimental philosophy', has suggested that the philosophers' favored armchair is in flames. In order to assess some of their claims, it is helpful to provide a theoretical background against which we can discuss whether certain facts are, or could be, evidence for or against a certain view about how philosophical intuitions work and how good they are. In this paper, I will be mostly concerned with providing such a theoretical background, and I will (...)
  26. Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2.Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):283-292.
    In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.
  27. Explaining Away Intuitions.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):94-116.
    What is it to explain away an intuition? Philosophers regularly attempt to explain intuitions away, but it is often unclear what the success conditions for their project consist in. I attempt to articulate some of these conditions, taking philosophical case studies as guides, and arguing that many attempts to explain away intuitions underestimate the challenge the project of explaining away involves. I will conclude, therefore, that explaining away intuitions is a more difficult task than has sometimes been appreciated; I also (...)
  28. Intuition.Felix Irmer - 2009 - Teaching Ethics 10 (1):115-118.
  29. Understanding Unconscious Intelligence and Intuition: "Blink" and Beyond.Lois Isenman - 2013 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 56 (1):148-166.
    The importance of unconscious cognition is seeping into popular consciousness. A number of recent books bridging the academic world and the reading public stress that at least a portion of decision-making depends not on conscious reasoning, but instead on cognition that occurs below awareness. However, these books provide a limited perspective on how the unconscious mind works and the potential power of intuition. This essay is an effort to expand the picture. It is structured around the book that has garnered (...)
  30. Intuitions and Objectivity.W. D. Joske - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):215 - 217.
  31. A Model of Heuristic Judgment.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 267--293.
    The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples. The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned (...)
  32. Review of "The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method". [REVIEW]Richard Kamber - 2016 - Essays in Philosophy 17 (1):213-232.
  33. Fallible Intuitions: The Apriori in Your Mathematics.Charles F. Kielkopf - 1988 - Philosophica 42.
  34. Intuition, Incubation, and Insight: Implicit Cognition in Problem-Solving.J. F. Kihlstrom, V. A. Shames & J. Dorfman - 1996 - In G. Underwood (ed.), Implicit Cognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 257--296.
  35. Philosophers and Grammarians.Jens Kipper - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):511-527.
    In the essay, I compare the aims and especially the methods of philosophers and grammarians. It transpires that there are several interesting similarities to be found with the method and aim in particular of traditional 'armchair philosophers'. I argue that these similarities go far enough to suggest that if armchair philosophers' method is in a state of challenge, as is claimed by a number of experimental philosophers, then the same can be said about the method of grammarians. However, I also (...)
  36. From Intuition to Understanding.Theodore Kisiel - 1995 - Études Phénoménologiques 11 (22):31-50.
  37. Discovering the Forms of Intuition.Patricia Kitcher - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):205-248.
  38. Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):86-105.
  39. Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).
  40. What Do the Folk Think About Composition and Does It Matter?Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206.
    Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a (...)
  41. L2 Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?Hilary Kornblith - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 195.
  42. Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25.
  43. Philosophical Explanations and Sceptical Intuitions.Frederick W. Kroon - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):391-395.
  44. “Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer.Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (3):522-522.
  45. Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions.Christopher B. Kulp - 2011 - In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. pp. 48--66.
  46. The Nature of Intuition : What Theories of Intuition Ought to Be.Hung Nin Lam - unknown
    Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it was extremely common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories. Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the (...)
  47. Appealing to Intuitions.Julia Langkau - unknown
    This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the (...)
  48. Towards a Non-Rationalist Inflationist Account of Intuitions.Julia Langkau - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):18.
    In this paper, I first develop desiderata for an ontology of intuitions on the basis of paradigmatic cases of intuitions in philosophy. A special focus lies on cases that have been subject to extensive first-order philosophical debates but have been receiving little attention in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. I show that none of the popular accounts in the current debate can meet all desiderata. I discuss a view according to which intuitions reduce to beliefs, Timothy Williamson's (...)
  49. The Nature of Intuition: A Neuropsychological Approach.Charles Laughlin - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19--37.
  50. Review: Michael Huemer: Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW]N. Lemos - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):483-486.
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