About this topic
Summary Although its primary interest is the epistemology of intuition, the philosophical study of intuition begins with the question of the nature of intuition, because epistemological accounts of intuition differ significantly depending on what the nature of intuition is held to be. Various conceptions of the nature of intuition have been proposed: for instance, intuitions as judgements, intuitions as beliefs, intuitions as dispositions to judge (or believe) or intuitions as mental states that are prior to judgement (or belief) or the disposition to judge (or believe).
Key works Bealer 1998BonJour 1998 and Sosa 1998 present positive accounts of the epistemic value of intuition, each based on a different theory of the nature of intuition. Cummins 1998, Stich 1988, Weinberg et al 2001 and Williamson 2004 present sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic value of intuition. Sosa 2007 and Williamson 2007 offer responses to some sceptical arguments. (Note: The ongoing philosophical debate on intuition has proceeded in a way that is largely independent of earlier writings on the topic by authors such as Bergson, Husserl, Kant and Spinoza. These earlier writings may still be regarded as key works in at least a historical sense. In any case, they remain valuable resources for anyone interested in the philosophy of intuition.)
Introductions Reading the following three texts in the order given will make for a good introduction: DePaul & Ramsey 1998Gutting 1998 and Pust 2012.
Related categories

588 found
1 — 50 / 588
Material to categorize
  1. Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds by Édouard Machery. [REVIEW]Jonathan Lewis - 2018 - Metapsychology 22 (48).
  2. Must Philosophy Be Constrained? [REVIEW]Anna Drożdżowicz, Pierre Saint-Germier & Samuel Schindler - 2018 - Metascience 27 (3):469-475.
  3. Epistemology Without Intuition.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53.
    From Plato to present, intuition plays a central role in epistemology. My concern in this paper is with the nature and epistemic status on intuition. To that end, I will be reviewing both Bealer’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of intuition. I will be arguing that by ‘intuition’ Bealer understands modal intuition that has Platonic and metaphysical roles. Subsequently, I shall also show that although Wittgenstein’s view avoids these two issues, it amounts to the idea that intuition is a normative activity with (...)
  4. We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
  5. The Experimental Critique and Philosophical Practice.Tinghao Wang - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):89-109.
    Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a (...)
  6. Demythologizing Intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):386-402.
    Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of (...)
  7. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
  8. Are Philosophers Good Intuition Predictors?Shen-yi Liao - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1004-1014.
    Some philosophers have criticized experimental philosophy for being superfluous. Jackson implies that experimental philosophy studies are unnecessary. More recently, Dunaway, Edmunds, and Manley empirically demonstrate that experimental studies do not deliver surprising results, which is a pro tanto reason for foregoing conducting such studies. This paper gives theoretical and empirical considerations against the superfluity criticism. The questions concerning the surprisingness of experimental philosophy studies have not been properly disambiguated, and their metaphilosophical significance have not been properly assessed. Once the most (...)
  9. Is Intuition Central in Philosophy?Tinghao Wang - 2016 - Philosophical Forum 47 (3-4):281-296.
    Some experimental philosophers criticize standard philosophical methodology on the basis of survey data reporting variation of intuition according to irrelevant factors like culture and order. I will refer to them as “experimentalists” and their critique as the “experimental critique.” Recently, a few philosophers (e.g., Williamson, Deutsch, and Cappelen) have responded by noting that the experimental critique relies on the “Centrality” assumption—the thesis that intuition plays a central evidential role in philosophical inquiry.1 They then deny the Centrality thesis and claim that, (...)
  10. Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism.Fabio Sterpetti - 2016 - In L. Magnani & C. Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer. pp. 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting (...)
  11. The Emperor’s New Intuitions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):127-147.
  12. Believing What We Do Not Believe: Acquiescence to Superstitious Beliefs and Other Powerful Intuitions.Jane L. Risen - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):182-207.
  13. “Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer.Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (3):522-522.
  14. Thought Experiments and the Myth of Intuitive Content.Marcus McGahhey - unknown
    Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are phenomenally conscious, spontaneous, and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of, the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in -; however, they do (...)
  15. The Reliability of Moral Intuitions : A Challenge From Neuroscience.Folke Tersman - unknown
    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (...)
  16. The Nature of Intuitions and Their Role in Material Object Metaphysics.Andrew Higgins - manuscript
    I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue that ‘intuition’ (...)
  17. Review of "The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method". [REVIEW]Richard Kamber - 2016 - Essays in Philosophy 17 (1):213-232.
  18. The Intuition Deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.
    ‘Intuition deniers’ are those who—like Timothy Williamson, Max Deutsch, Herman Cappelen and a few others—reject the claim that philosophers centrally rely on intuitions as evidence. This ‘Centrality’ hypothesis, as Cappelen terms it, is standardly endorsed both by traditionalists and by experimental philosophers. Yet the intuition deniers claim that Centrality is false—and they generally also suggest that this undermines the significance of experimental philosophy. Three primary types of anti-Centrality argument have cross-cut the literature thus far. These arguments, I’ll claim, have differing (...)
  19. Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
  20. The Role of Intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - unknown
  21. Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2006 - SATS 7 (2).
  22. A Defense of the Evidential-Role View of Intuitions.Johnnie R. R. Pedersen - 2015 - Theorema 34:101-121.
  23. What Do the Folk Think About Composition and Does It Matter?Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 187-206.
    Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a (...)
  24. Defending Intuition in Ethics.Phillip H. Wiebe - 2015 - The European Legacy 20 (4):396-399.
  25. Intuitions.Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science—in thought experiments, for instance—as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This collection brings together leading philosophers, from early to late career, to tackle such questions. It presents the state of the art thinking on the (...)
  26. The Role of "Intuition" in Knowledge Development.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - 2000 - In .
  27. The Nature of Intuition : What Theories of Intuition Ought to Be.Hung Nin Lam - unknown
    Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it was extremely common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories. Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the (...)
  28. The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated.James Mccosh - 1860
  29. Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (4):282-285.
  30. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.D. M. Azraf - 1957 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
  31. Novel Intuition: A Philosophical Defense of the Existence of Prelinguistic Apprehension.Alan Paskow - 1971 - Dissertation, Yale University
  32. The Relevance of a Competence/Performance Distinction to Theory Selection in Ethics.Michael Joseph Stingl - 1986 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    While some of our deepest moral intuitions are consequentialist in nature, others are decidedly not. This difference at the intuitive level is reflected at the theoretical level by two equally venerable traditions of moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology. One of the main problems of theory selection in ethics is that neither tradition appears fully able to account for both kinds of intuitions. ;To solve this problem, the thesis posits an epistemological connection between moral intuition and moral theory. The general human (...)
  33. Intuitions.Richard T. Webster - 1982 - Analecta Husserliana 12:429.
  34. ORTEGAT, PAUL, S. J. "Intuition Et Religion: Le Problème Existentialiste". [REVIEW]James Collins - 1948 - Modern Schoolman 26:187.
  35. Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):545-553.
    In order for Herman Cappelen to argue in his Philosophy Without Intuitions that philosophers have been on the whole mistaken in thinking that we actually use intuitions much at all in our first-order philosophizing, he must attempt the task of characterizing what something must be, in order to be an intuition.My discussion here is focused on the latter half of the book concerning the “argument from philosophical practice. I am in wholehearted agreement with the first half’s thesis that the usage (...)
  36. Why so Negative? Evidence Aggregation and Armchair Philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3865-3896.
    This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based tools for (...)
  37. The Πολιτικὸς Στίχος Poetry as Reliable Evidence of Linguistic Phenomena.Jorie Soltic - 2013 - Byzantinische Zeitschrift 106 (2):811-842.
  38. The Epistemic Value of Moral Intuitions.A. W. Musschenga - unknown
  39. Audi, R.(Ed.)-The Cambridge Distionary of Philosophy.A. MacIntyre - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37:183-183.
  40. On Some Difficulties Concerning Intuition and Intuitive.Wise Maxims & Wise Judging - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1).
  41. Appealing to Intuitions.Julia Langkau - unknown
    This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the (...)
  42. Economic Writing on the Pressing Problems of the Day: The Roles of Moral Intuition and Methodological Confusion.Julie A. Nelson - 2010 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 11 (2):37.
  43. AUDI, R.-Epistemology.N. Unwin - 2000 - Philosophical Books 41 (4):285-285.
  44. Robert Audi and the Method of Descriptive Manifestation.Mark T. Nelson - 2003 - Philosophical Books 44 (1).
  45. An Example of Conceptual Analysis Using Intuitions About Cases.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.
  46. The Epistemic Value of Psychological Moral Intuitions.A. W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
  47. Intuition and Ideality.David Weissman - 1987 - State University of New York Press.
    This book shows how idealism is a consequence of the intuitionist method.
  48. Intuitions and Truth.P. Greenough & M. Lynch - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
  49. Theories, Experience, and Probabilistic Intuitions.K. R. Popper - 1968 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 285--303.
  50. Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions.Christopher B. Kulp - 2011 - In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism. pp. 48--66.
1 — 50 / 588