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  1. LA INTUICIÓN EN JACQUES MARITAIN.Miguel Acosta - 2012 - In Manuel Oriol (ed.), Inteligencia y Filosofía. Madrid, Spain: Marova. pp. 383-400.
    La intuición es un tipo de conocimiento que consiste en captar de modo inmediato la esencia de las cosas y comprenderlas de forma directa sin llevar a cabo un proceso discursivo. Algunas filosofías rechazan este modo de conocer por ser falible, otros la enmarcan dentro de los fenómenos extrasensoriales e incluso paranormales. En este trabajo se considera la intuición en Jacques Maritain, no en su aspecto de fenómeno sobrenatural, sino como una vía de aprehensión de la realidad adquirida por métodos (...)
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  2. Intuition.Frederick Anderson - 1926 - Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  3. Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?James Andow - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):523-531.
    The word ‘intuition’ is used frequently both in philosophy and in discussions about philosophical methods. It has been argued that this intuition-talk makes no semantic contribution and that intuition-talk is thus a bad habit that ought to be abandoned. I urge caution in making this inference. There are many pragmatic roles intuition-talk might play. Moreover, according to one plausible story, there is reason to think intuition-talk is actually a good habit for philosophers to have.
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  4. The Nature of Intuition O.A. Nfuropsythologital Approath - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19.
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  5. The Claims of Commonsense.M. C. D' Arcy - 1927 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317.
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  6. A Defense of Intuitions.Gary Atkinson - 1990 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107-117.
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  7. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.D. M. Azraf - 1957 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  8. Types of Intuition.Archie J. Bahm - 1961 - Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  9. A Psychological View of Moral Intuition.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  10. Intuitions in Ethics.Michael D. Bayles - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (3):439-455.
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  11. The Origins of Modal Error.Bealer George - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source ‐ namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  12. Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.
    Non-descriptivists in metaethics should say more about intuitions. For one popular theory has it that case-based intuitions are in the business of correctly categorizing or classifying merely by bringing to bear a semantic or conceptual competence. If so, then the fact that all normative predicates have case-based intuitions involving them shows that they too are in the business of categorizing or classifying things. This favors a descriptivist position in metaethics—normative predicates have descriptive content—and disfavors a purely non-descriptivist position, like pure (...)
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  13. Intuition catégorale et voir comme.Jocelyn Benoist - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
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  14. L'intuition philosophique.H. Bergson - 1911 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
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  15. Désirer Connaître Par Intuition.Rudolf Bernet - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  16. The Limits of Intuition.Thomas G. Bever - 1972 - Foundations of Language 8 (3):411-412.
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  17. Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1880 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
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  18. Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique.J. Boussinesq - 1879 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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  19. Intuition.A. Barratt Brown - 1914 - International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  20. Professor Stuart Metaphilosophy October 7, 2011 Intuitions About Specific Situations and Intuitions About General Principles. [REVIEW]John Bunke - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.
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  21. Stout on Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence. [REVIEW]Wendell T. Bush - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy 5 (9):246.
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  22. Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization.Charles Arthur Campbell - 1948 - London: G. Cumberlege.
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  23. Objective Truth in Matters of Taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  24. Inference, Assent and First Principles in John Henry Cardinal Newman.Gerard Noel Casey - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    This dissertation is an exegetical study of Newman's notions of 'inference,' 'assent,' and 'first principles.' The basic thesis is that the notion of natural inference is equivocal. The object of the dissertation is to show that this equivocation exists, and to explore its ramifications. ;The first chapter clarifies the relationship between formal, informal and natural inference. 'Natural inference' is revealed as being equivocal since it connotes two distinct acts of the mind; the limiting case of informal inference, and intuition. ;The (...)
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  25. Intuition.David Charlton - 2009 - Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  26. Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition.Richard Cobb-Stevens - 1988 - Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  27. Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
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  28. How Empirical is Contemporary Logical Empiricism?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):299-317.
    There is a certain dominant tradition, school, ambiance or intellectual community in contemporary philosophy of science which can conveniently be labelled logical empiricism. Now a curious and (I believe) hitherto unremarked change occurred in the accepted methodology of logical empiricism shortly after the end of World War II. Before then accepted forms of argument for philosophical theses about the logic, analysis, or rational reconstruction of science fell into two main categories. Some arguments appealed to familiar or historically attestable facts about (...)
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  29. ORTEGAT, PAUL, S. J. "Intuition Et Religion: Le Problème Existentialiste". [REVIEW]James Collins - 1948 - Modern Schoolman 26:187.
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  30. Intuition, Thought, and Knowledge in the Domain of Law.Carlos Cossio - 1953 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (4):470-493.
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  31. Logistique et intuition.L. Couturat - 1913 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (2):260 - 268.
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  32. Intuition as Authoritative Knowledge in Midwifery and Homebirth.Thomus Cronlar - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 145.
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  33. Revisited Linguistic Intuitions.Jennifer Culbertson & Steven Gross - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639 - 656.
    Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus (...)
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  34. The Claims of Commonsense.M. C. D'Arcy - 1926 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317 - 336.
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  35. Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong.Michael Devitt - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):669-699.
    In Philosophy without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen challenges the ‘almost universally accepted’ thesis of ‘Centrality’: ‘philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories’. Cappelen takes there to be two arguments for Centrality and rejects both. According to the first, Centrality is supported by the way philosophers characterize key premises in their arguments as ‘intuitive’. Central to Cappelen’s rejection of this is his lengthy argument that philosophers’ ‘intuition’-talk is very hard to interpret, indeed often ‘meaningless’. I argue, in contrast, that this (...)
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  36. Intuition in Metaphysics.Michael Dickson - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):43-65.
    ‘Seeing is believing’ perhaps means that some visual experience provides good evidence for some claims that go beyond the content of the experience. Intuition—intellectual ‘seeming’—does not provide similarly good evidence, at least not for metaphysical claims, or so I shall argue. In §2, I sketch the conception of ‘metaphysics’ that is in use here, a conception that leads naturally to a problem about what counts as evidence in metaphysics. Some have suggested that intuition counts. In §3 I raise some doubts (...)
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  37. Review of Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology. [REVIEW]Tyler Doggett - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (6).
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  38. Intuitions for Inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.
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  39. Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy.Gerard Esser - 1957 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31:165-177.
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  40. Problem : Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy.Gerard Esser - 1957 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 31:165.
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  41. ‘African Intuitions’ and Moral Theory.Douglas Farland - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):356-363.
    On Metz's view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz's particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt that the (...)
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  42. Philosophical Intuitions.Mark Fedyk - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54.
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  43. Chapter 4. Intuitions About Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 12-18.
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  44. A Proof System for Fork Algebras and its Applications to Reasoning in Logics Based on Intuitionism.M. Frias & E. Orlowska - 1995 - Logique Et Analyse 150:151-152.
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  45. Reply to an Objection to Animal Rights.Joseph S. Fulda - 1992 - Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1):87-88.
    Notwithstanding the numerous errors in this piece, the core teaching remains unscathed: Arithmetic (or any other branch of mathematics) cannot do moral work. If it appears otherwise, that simply means some nonstandard version of the relevant area of mathematics will work. -/- Negative results can indeed sometimes be shown using mathematics, but not on such fundamental normative questions as whether something/someone has rights. Also, mathematics can put into relief, sometimes, a fundamental normative question, even though it cannot resolve it.
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  46. Intuition and Science. [REVIEW]L. C. G. - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):143-143.
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  47. Armchair Versus Questionnaire Polled Intuitions: Intuitions Nevertheless.R. Gasparatou - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (11):7-9.
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  48. Experimental Appeals to Intuition.Renia Gasparatou - 2010 - Critica 42 (124):31-50.
    Today, experimental philosophers challenge traditional appeals to intu- ition; they empirically collect folk intuitions and then use their findings to attack philosophers’ intuitions. However this movement is not uniform. Radical experi- mentalists criticize the use of intuitions in philosophy altogether and they have been mostly attacked. Contrariwise, moderate experimentalists imply that laypersons’ in- tuitions are somehow relevant to philosophical problems. Sometimes they even use folk intuitions in order to advance theoretical theses. In this paper I will try to challenge the (...)
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  49. High Standard Epistemology and the Appeal to Intuition}.Renia Gasparatou - 2009 - Filozofia 64 (7):680-692.
    n the analytic tradition, the appeal to intuition has been a common philosophical practice that supposedly provides us with epistemic standards. The authoress argues that the high epistemological standards of traditional analytic philosophy cannot be pursued by this method. Perhaps within a naturalistic, reliable frame intuitions can be evoked more coherently. Philosophers can use intuition as scientists do, in hypothesis- construction or data- collection. This is an ironic conclusion: Traditional analytic epistemologists rely on the appeal to intuition, but cannot justify (...)
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  50. Intellectual Principles: Or, Elements of Mental Science: Intuitions-Thoughts-Beliefs.John Hensley Godwin - 1884
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