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Subcategories:History/traditions: Intuition
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  1. Michael J. Almeida (2004). "Review of" Intuitions as Evidence". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):3.
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  2. Frederick Anderson (1926). Intuition. Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  3. Andow James (forthcoming). Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue? Philosophia:1-9.
    The word ‘intuition’ is used frequently both in philosophy and in discussions about philosophical methods. It has been argued that this intuition-talk makes no semantic contribution and that intuition-talk is thus a bad habit that ought to be abandoned. I urge caution in making this inference. There are many pragmatic roles intuition-talk might play. Moreover, according to one plausible story, there is reason to think intuition-talk is actually a good habit for philosophers to have.
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  4. Andow James, How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?
    The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The (...)
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  5. James Andow, Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  6. James Andow, Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  7. James Andow, How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?
    The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The (...)
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  8. James Andow, Intuitions in the Face of Diversity.
    In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent (...)
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  9. A. Nfuropsythologital Approath (1997). The Nature of Intuition O. In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19.
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  10. M. C. D' Arcy (1927). The Claims of Commonsense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317.
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  11. Gary Atkinson (1990). A Defense of Intuitions. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107-117.
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  12. Robert Audi (2015). Intuition and Its Place in Ethics. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: This paper provides a multifaceted account of intuition. The paper integrates apparently disparate conceptions of intuition, shows how the notion has figured in epistemology as well as in intuitionistic ethics, and clarifies the relation between the intuitive and the self-evident. Ethical intuitionism is characterized in ways that, in phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology, represent an advance over the position of W. D. Ross while preserving its commonsense normative core and intuitionist character. This requires clarifying the sense in which intuitions (...)
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  13. D. M. Azraf (1957). Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  14. Archie J. Bahm (1961). Types of Intuition. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  15. Derek Ball (forthcoming). The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  16. David Barnett (2008). The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind. Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  17. Jonathan Baron (1995). A Psychological View of Moral Intuition. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  18. Avner Baz (2012). Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions? Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  19. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  20. Matthew S. Bedke (2016). Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.
    Non-descriptivists in metaethics should say more about intuitions. For one popular theory has it that case-based intuitions are in the business of correctly categorizing or classifying merely by bringing to bear a semantic or conceptual competence. If so, then the fact that all normative predicates have case-based intuitions involving them shows that they too are in the business of categorizing or classifying things. This favors a descriptivist position in metaethics—normative predicates have descriptive content—and disfavors a purely non-descriptivist position, like pure (...)
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  21. Matthew S. Bedke (2015). Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    Non-descriptivists in metaethics should say more about intuitions. For one popular theory has it that case-based intuitions are in the business of correctly categorizing or classifying merely by bringing to bear a semantic or conceptual competence. If so, then the fact that all normative predicates have case-based intuitions involving them shows that they too are in the business of categorizing or classifying things. This favors a descriptivist position in metaethics—normative predicates have descriptive content—and disfavors a purely non-descriptivist position, like pure (...)
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  22. John Bengson (2015). A Noetic Theory of Understanding and Intuition as Sense-Maker. Inquiry 58 (7-8):633-668.
    The notion of a non-sensory mental state or event that plays a prominent role in coming to understand, an epistemic achievement distinct from mere knowledge, featured prominently in historical writings on philosophy, and philosophical methodology. It is, however, completely absent from contemporary discussions of the subject. This paper argues that intuition plays an epistemic role in understanding, including philosophical understanding, and offers an explanation of how intuition manages to play this role, if and when it does. It is argued, subsequently, (...)
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  23. John Bengson (2015). The Intellectual Given. Mind 124 (495):707-760.
    Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a (...)
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  24. Jocelyn Benoist (2001). Intuition catégorale et voir comme. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
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  25. Gustav Bergmann (1949). On Non-Perceptual Intuition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (2):263-264.
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  26. H. Bergson (1911). L'intuition philosophique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
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  27. Rudolf Bernet (2001). Désirer Connaître Par Intuition. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  28. Ned Block (2014). The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  29. Paul Boghossian (2014). Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):368-381.
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  30. Laurence BonJour (2001). Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):151-158.
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  31. Stephen J. Boulter (2007). The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Commonsense. Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
    Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised (...)
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  32. J. Boussinesq (1880). Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
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  33. J. Boussinesq (1879). Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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  34. Thomas Boysen (2004). Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):92-104.
  35. Raymond D. Bradley, How Good Are Your Logical Intuitions?
    Some children seem blessed, almost from birth, with a capacity for critical thinking. They won't let a fallacious argument pass unnoticed or unscathed. And some are fortunate enough to be exposed at an early age to fine examples of good reasoning. In their listening and their reading they learn, by intellectual osmosis as it were, to think logically. Yet even these fortunate ones, like the rest of us, can benefit by having their logical intuitions and reasoning skills sharpened by precept (...)
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  36. A. Barratt Brown (1914). Intuition. International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  37. Anthony Alan Bryson, The View From the Armchair: A Defense of Traditional Philosophy.
    Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield (...)
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  38. Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich (2010). Gender and Philosophical Intuition. In . Oxford University Press. pp. 307-346.
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  39. John Bunke (forthcoming). Professor Stuart Metaphilosophy October 7, 2011 Intuitions About Specific Situations and Intuitions About General Principles. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy.
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  40. Charles Arthur Campbell (1948). Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization. London: G. Cumberlege.
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  41. Herman Cappelen (2013). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford University Press UK.
    The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
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  42. Herman Cappelen & Douglas G. Winblad (1999). Intuitions. Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie 1 (1):197-216.
    This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from (...)
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  43. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2016). Objective Truth in Matters of Taste. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  44. Glenn Carruthers (2015). Intuitions, Edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):187-190.
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  45. David J. Chalmers (2014). Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):535-544.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen focuses on the metaphilosophical thesis he calls Centrality: contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Using linguistic and textual analysis, he argues that Centrality is false. He also suggests that because most philosophers accept Centrality, they have mistaken beliefs about their own methods.To put my own views on the table: I do not have a large theoretical stake in the status of intuitions, but unreflectively I find it fairly obvious that (...)
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  46. Carsun Chang (1960). Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition. Philosophy East and West 10 (1/2):35-49.
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  47. David Charlton (2009). Intuition. Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  48. Steve Clarke (2013). Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge. Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.
    Appeals to intuitions as evidence in philosophy are challenged by experimental philosophers and other critics. A common response to experimental philosophical criticisms is to hold that only professional philosophers? intuitions count as evidence in philosophy. This ?expert intuitions defence? is inadequate for two reasons. First, recent studies indicate significant variability in professional philosophers? intuitions. Second, the academic literature on professional intuitions gives us reasons to doubt that professional philosophers develop truth-apt intuitions. The onus falls on those who mount the expert (...)
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  49. Richard Cobb-Stevens (1988). Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition. Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  50. L. Jonathan Cohen (1982). Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way. The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
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