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  1. "On Vaguenss, Sorites and Putnam"'s "'œIntuitionistic Strategy".Timothy Chambers - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):343--8.
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  2. Bivalence and Vagueness.Michael Dummett - 1995 - Theoria 61 (3):201-216.
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  3. On What It is to Be in a Quandary.Patrick Greenough - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408.
    A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The (...)
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  4. Wright on Borderline Cases and Bivalence.Hamidreza Mohammadi - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is, firstly to explain Crispin Wright’s quandary view of vagueness, his intuitionistic response to sorites and the relation of borderline cases and bivalence, and, secondly assess the objections to his ideas.
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  5. Replies and Comments.Hilary Putnam - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):401--24.
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  6. Vagueness and Alternative Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):297 - 314.
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  7. Degrees of Truth Versus Intuitionism.George Rea - 1989 - Analysis 49 (1):31 - 32.
    The purpose of this article is to compare the theory that there are degrees of truth with putnam's intuitionist theory as rival solutions to the sorites paradox. I argue that intuitionist logic lacks explanatory support and is self-Defeating. The degree theory on the other hand offers an illuminating explanation of the sorites fallacy.
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  8. Hairier Than Putnam Thought.Stephen Read & Crispin Wright - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):56 - 58.
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  9. Quandary and Intuitionism: Crispin Wright on Vagueness.Stephen Schiffer - manuscript
    SI is a paradox because it presents four appearances that cannot all be veridical: first, it appears to be valid—after all, it’s both classically and intuitionistically valid; second, its sorites premiss, (2), seems merely to state the obvious fact that in the sorites march from 2¢ to 5,000,000,000¢ there is no precise point that marks the cutoff between not being rich and being rich; third, premiss (1), which asserts that a person with only 2¢ isn’t rich, is surely true; and (...)
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  10. Intuitionism and Vagueness.S. P. Schwartz & William Throop - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):347 - 356.
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  11. Intuitionism Versus Degrees of Truth.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):43 - 47.
    Putnam's intuitionist proposal for a logic of vague terms is defended. It is argued that both classical logic and the degrees of truth approach are committed to treating vague terms as having hidden precise borderlines. This is a crucial failing in a logic of vagueness. Intuitionism, because of the nature of intuitionist negation, avoids this failing.
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  12. Intuitionism and Sorites.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):179 - 183.
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  13. Fuzziness and the Sorites Paradox.Marcelo Vasconez - 2006 - Dissertation, Catholic University of Louvain
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  14. 4. Contradictorial Gradualism Vs. Discontinuism: Two Views On Fuzziness And The Transition Problem.Marcelo VÁsconez - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (195).
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  15. Putnam on the Sorites Paradox.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (1):47-56.
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  16. Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach.C. J. G. Wright - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press.
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  17. On Being in a Quandary. Relativism Vagueness Logical Revisionism.C. J. G. Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):45--97.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement - Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived (...)
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  18. “Wang's Paradox”.Crispin Wright - manuscript
    There is now a widespread accord among philosophers that the vagueness of natural language gives rise to some particularly deep and perplexing problems and paradoxes. It was not always so. For most of the first century of analytical philosophy, vagueness was generally regarded as a marginal, slightly irritating phenomenon, —receiving some attention, to be sure, in parts of the Philosophical Investigations and in the amateur linguistics enjoyed by philosophers in Oxford in the 1950s, but best idealised away in any serious (...)
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  19. Rosenkranz on Quandary, Vagueness and Intuitionism.Crispin Wright - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):465-474.
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