Islam

Shykh Ahmad Sirhindi, popularly known subsequently as Muhaddid-e-Alfe Thani (Renovator of Islam in the second Millenium) is generally acknowledged by the Muslim historian as a key figure in Indian history who, at a critical moment tried successfully to resist secularization of state and society. Among unama and at section of sufia of not only the Indian sub-continent but of Central Asia and North Africa also, he is acknowledged as a great Sufi reformer who purged Islam of some un-Islamic beliefs and (...) precipices which had crept into the religion. While concentrating mainly on Muhaddid’s thought I have given a brief sketch of the person delving on the circumstances which led him to play a vital role in the history of Islam and sub-continent in the second millennium. I have shown that he was neither just a reform minded Sufi. Nor a zealot revolutionary-rebel against the secular Mughal rulers. He was a thinker in his own right and if philosophy is pursuit of wisdom is action in the light of knowledge, he was a thinker with an intense concern for changing the society and the state. In the absence of the modern political paradigm of aprty politics, he used the Sufi order for his objective, continuously avoiding direct confrontation with the ruling and the religious/Sufi elite. But the required a new “theology” (in the literal sense of the word) and a new metaphysics. Misticism had been transformed into the philosophy of Absolutism. And the main stream of Muslim tasawwuf had taken the fateful leap from monotheism to monism. I have shown the without antagonizing of Sufi follwers of lbn ‘Arabi, Junaid Bughdadi, et al, how did he try to re-establish the pristine Islamic view point of oneness of God. The only relationship which God has with the universe is that of the creator and the created. Those who see otherwise. (i.e Unity of Existence) are to be excused for they are ma’zur, the reason for their states of mind are elaborated. I have explained that in tasawwuf. Muhaddid does not approve the traditional seclusion and the ascetic practice. Which were so much emphasized by the Sufia. To him they are of no use. When the grand agenda is not just personal salvation but restructuring the entire society on the lines paradigmed by the Prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings of Allah) the individual has no recourse but to play an active role in the society. For him this is the desired “task of prophethood” To him the “achievement” generally covered by the common people-miracles, revelations, prophesying-are of no importance. Tasawwuf. Therefore is instrumental in self-realization through a struggle for collective salvation. Myustic thought is revamped into a new dimension in his life and though. Though not a metaphysician in the conventional sense, Mujaddid, I have shown, denies the material existence of the perceptible world. The world of sense experience according to him is a construct of our categories of understanding, which we cannot transcend. And since the universe by itself does not have an objective existence of its own, our knowledge of it cannot be designated as objective. Although Muhaddid’s ultimate Reality (God) is not kant’s “Noumena” nor his world of “shadows” is latter’s “phenomena” yet, both are in agreement that our inability to transcend our categories of understanding, renders it impossible to have a real knowledge of either. Mujaddid thus appears to stand at the confluence of George Berkeley and immanual Kanu. All Sufi orders except Naqshbandiyyah claim Ali to be the first imam of their silsilah after the Prophet (upon whim be peace and blessings of Allah). Though he was initiated in other orders as well, he chose the Naqshbandi order, which has its beginning with Abu Bakar the first Khalifah of the prophet (Uponwhom be peace and blessings of Allah). This order to him provided the nearest and the most easy path through shariah to haqiqah. I have proved that he did not lapse into the shi’i tradition in his later life (as some readers find to their astonishment). I have also contested Y. Friedmants view that being a Sufi, he “was not completely free from Shi I elements in his thoug” and that he often lapsed to the traditional Sufi position of superiority of sainthood over propherhood. I have shown that Muhaddid’s view regarding the nature of prophethood is different from both the Sufis and the scholars. Sainthood. Even of the prophets. Is not superior to prophethood. Even a lesser companion of the prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings of Allah) is superior to the Sufi of the highest order. The Naqshbandi way, is the most direct path to higher spiritual attainments, precisely because it is the nearest path to the Prophet (upon whom bepeace and blessings of Allah). It is generally believed that Muhaddid is a strictler to shari ah. But it is also held (and Friedmanis emphatic) that he does not elaborate the shari ah practive in tariqat. I have contested the view and elaborated Muhjaddi diconcdccpt of Sumnah and shari ah: the conflict between shari at and tariqat is resolved by a loud and clear declaration that all beliefs. Practives and rituals which are not in conformity with shari ah are reject. At the end Muhaddids concept of Ijtehad is discussed. He does not wholly subscribe to the position of “Ulama or sufia” one may have exhibited lack of subtle perception whereas the other sometimes strays from the straight path. Shari ah in the light Ihehad, therefore is not blind following. Shari ah in reality is extraction of rules using the faculty of reasoning. Sunnah of the prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings of Allah) is his Ijrehad since the Quran is the basic source of all knowledge and legislation. Sunnah, which is binding is in fact his divinely guided Ijtehad and interpretation of the Book. But all opinions Ijtehad of the Prophet (upon whom be peace and blessings of Allah) are not binding as during his life time he gave his companions a right to differ with him in matters which not given through revelation, but were his personal judgements. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

The major argument in this article is that the contemporary concept of jihad inclines to have a heavy personal political baggage. In Southeast Asia, the talibanization and the influence of the al-Qaeda interpretation of the jihad appear to have made their inroad in regional radical salafi movements such as the Jamaah Islamiyah, Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, and Hizbut Tahrir. Radical salafi differs from the traditional salafi given its belief in the use of force to achieve religious-political objectives. Indonesia has been the (...) center for these movements and their presence has been felt in Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand and Philippines. Some of them have been active in propagating the new concept of jihad. Therefore, this article maps out the conception of jihad as it is propounded by the three movements. It discusses how the conception of these movements of jihad has departed from the earlier salafi movements. In addition, it discusses how the idea has been expanded from Indonesia to other parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago. (shrink)

Aparecen muchos sufíes en la obra de Ibn al-?Arabi- al-Futu-ha-t al-Makkiyya, un tratado en el que el autor presenta sus ideas principales. En esta obra se menciona a Abu- Yazi-d al-Bista-mi un total de 143 veces, más que a cualquier otro sufí. Este artículo tiene el propósito de examinar la actitud de Ibn al-?Arabi- hacia su predecesor sufí considerando la personalidad de al-Bista-mi- tal y como aparece en la obra de Ibn al-?Arabi-, además de analizar las ideas de Ibn al-?Arabi- (...) sobre las prácticas al-Futu-ha-t sufíes de al-Bista-mi-, su presencia como modelo de conducta moral y sus ideas filosóficas místicas. Ibn al-?Arabi- no acepta todas las ideas y declaraciones de al-Bista-mi. A veces suaviza sus afirmaciones más atrevidas y de esta manera revela su actitud negativa hacia �ataha-t. Sin embargo, en algunos casos Ibn al-?Arabi- se sirve de las afirmaciones de al-Bista-mi para corroborar sus tesis. (shrink)

First, I argue for historical contextualization of the Qur’an as a given historical collection of discourses propagated by Muhammad as divine inspiration. Secondly, I argue for a distinction between the Qur’an and Islam, since the latter is the outcome of human efforts to construct their lives in accordance with what they understood to be the teachings of the Qur’an. The last point is to show how the role of Muhammad in his interaction with the communities of his time in Hijaz (...) shaped the Qur’an. So, the article is organized as (1) introduction; (2) the Qur’an and lslam; (3) the Qur’an and history: open hermeneutics; (4) Muhammad and the Qur’an; (5) the divine—human communication; (6) Muhammad: the first recipient; (7) Muhammad in the Qur’an; and (8) the community of believers and the need for legal regulations; followed by (9) conclusion. (shrink)

Peter Adamson presents the first full history of philosophy in the Islamic world for a broad readership. He traces its development from early Islam to the 20th century, ranging from Spain to South Asia, featuring Jewish and Christian thinkers as well as Muslim. Major figures like Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides are covered in great detail, but the book also looks at less familiar thinkers, including women philosophers. Attention is also given to the philosophical relevance of Islamic theology and mysticism--the Sufi (...) tradition within Islam, and Kabbalah among Jews--and to science, with chapters on disciplines like optics and astronomy. The first part of the book looks at the blossoming of Islamic theology and responses to the Greek philosophical tradition in the world of Arabic learning, the second discusses philosophy in Muslim Spain, and a third section looks in unusual detail at later developments, touching on philosophy in the Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid empires. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, few topics are so relevant to today's cultural and political landscape as philosophy in the Islamic world. Yet, this remains one of the lesser-known philosophical traditions. In this Very Short Introduction, Peter Adamson explores the history of philosophy among Muslims, Jews, and Christians living in Islamic lands, from its historical background to thinkers in the twentieth century.Introducing the main philosophical themes of the Islamic world, Adamson integrates ideas from the Islamic and Abrahamic faiths to consider (...) the broad philosophical questions that continue to invite debate: What is the relationship between reason and religious belief? What is the possibility of proving God's existence? What is the nature of knowledge? Drawing on the most recent research in the field, this book challenges the assumption of the cultural decline of philosophy and science in the Islamic world by demonstrating its rich heritage and overlap with other faiths and philosophies. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la visión que Ibn Hazm de Córdoba (m. 456 / 1064) tenía del concepto de fitra, que aparece en el Corán (azora XXX, aleya 30) y en algunas tradiciones exegéticas. Basándose en este texto, Ibn Hazm afirma que todos los seres humanos nacen musulmanes, incluso los idólatras y otras clases de infieles, y que todos han de ser considerados musulmanes hasta que alcancen la mayoría de edad. En ese momento de sus vidas han de elegir entre reafirmar (...) su fe y, si no son hijos de musulmanes, de elegir entre la religión en la que han nacido o renunciar a ella. Su decisión afectará a su destino en el Más Allá. La creencia de Ibn Hazm de que todos los niños son musulmanes hasta la edad en que puedan discernir y, por tanto, de que en caso de que mueran niños irán al Paraíso, tiene también implicaciones legales y, a través de ellas, se puede observar cómo actúan los principios zahiríes. Ibn Hazm muestra una tendencia a otorgar a los musulmanes la custodia de niños no musulmanes, así como a evitar que los nacidos musulmanes queden desvinculados de su religión. Este es el caso de los niños expósitos o cuya paternidad es dudosa. Aunque, en general, no requiere que los niños no musulmanes fallecidos, que en el fondo son considerados creyentes, sean enterrados de acuerdo con el rito islámico, ordena que un niño, cuyos padres no sean musulmanes y hayan sido hechos cautivos, reciba un entierro musulmán. Aunque, a primera vista, estas normas parezcan confirmar las afirmaciones de Goldziher sobre "el fananatismo personal contra los seguidores de otras religiones" de Ibn Hazm, se observa también que, según su punto de vista, la indemnización que se debía pagar por la lesión del feto de una mujer no musulmana era igual al que le correspondía a una musulmana que hubiese perdido su hijo en las mismas circunstancias. (shrink)

The contemporary viewpoint of many scholars is that politics and religion are two parallel discourses which never meet; or that religion is a personal matter which should not be injected into politics. Their argument for taking this stand is that the two are incongruent and therefore, it is better these are left apart. But religion is associated with morals, truthfulness, honesty and a host of moral virtues all of which are mere playthings in the hands of so-called politicians, the consequence (...) of which may affect the citizens of the country negatively. The view taken here is the relationship between religion and politics has become symmetrically impossible to divorce one from the other. More importantly, the paper brings the democratic contribution of the Prophet Mohammed towards establishing a just and equitable society through his activities and the Medina Constitution, drafted during his time. Attention is given to the democratic administration of the successors of the Prophet with a view to establishing the fact that if Islam is practiced in its truest form, there are democratic values to be found in it. And if such Islamic virtues are made use of, they can not only sustain democracy, but also improve on it. (shrink)

Drawing upon certain concepts of contemporary hermeneutics,linguistics and philosophy of language, this study undertakesMawdudi’s hermeneutical approach to the Qur’an lopsidedly orientedby his commitment with the political ideology of fundamentalist type.In the perspectives of certain pragmatic and stylistic themes, this paperreviews Mawdudi’s interpretation of the Qur’anic symbols being thebuilding blocks of his political thought. It argues that there is a widegap between the semantic givenness of the Qur’anic meanings and theirpragmatic interpretations of Mawdudian type owing to the ideology ofthe universal political (...) dominion of Muslims being the telos of Islam.Through the application of certain pragmatic concepts like deixis,presupposition, implicature and felicity etc. as well as the stylisticdevices like simplicity/decoration, decisiveness/vagueness,succinctness/long-windedness and objectivity/subjectivity, this papertends to establish that Mawdudi’s political approach toward theteleology of Islam and his hermeneutic approach toward the Qur’anicsymbols sound infelicitous. (shrink)

In spite of orientation of philosophy in the western philosophy after renaissance when the relation between religion and philosophy was weakened and broken, in the Islamic world in particular Iranian society the strong relation appeared between religion and philosophy. However this relationship alleviated diversity and audaciousness of philosophical thought, but it deepened and widened religious thoughts. In fact, entrance of philosophical discussions in the realm of religion causes the rational interpretation of religion and lessens fanaticism and dogmatism and it excludes (...) superstition from religious thoughts. Philosophers like Averroes, Avicenna and Mulla Sadra have discussed the interaction of religion and philosophy. Islamic philosophy is completely an intellectual knowledgewhich differs from theology is based on revelatory texts. The title of Islamic philosophy displays the relationship between religion and philosophy. (shrink)