Jean-Jacques Rousseau

In this paper, I present the problem of the poor king, from combining Descartes and Rousseau.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau remains an important figure in the history of philosophy, both because of his contributions to political philosophy and moral psychology and because of his influence on later thinkers. Rousseau's own view of philosophy and philosophers was firmly negative, seeing philosophers as the post-hoc rationalizers of self-interest, as apologists for various forms of tyranny, and as playing a role in the alienation of the modern individual from humanity's natural impulse to compassion. The concern that dominates Rousseau's work is to (...) find a way of preserving human freedom in a world where human beings are increasingly dependent on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. This concern has two dimensions: material and psychological, of which the latter has greater importance. In the modern world, human beings come to derive their very sense of self from the opinion of others, a fact which Rousseau sees as corrosive of freedom and destructive of individual authenticity. In his mature work, he principally explores two routes to achieving and protecting freedom: the first is a political one aimed at constructing political institutions that allow for the co-existence of free and equal citizens in a community where they themselves are sovereign; the second is a project for child development and education that fosters autonomy and avoids the development of the most destructive forms of self-interest. However, though Rousseau believes the co-existence of human beings in relations of equality and freedom is possible, he is consistently and overwhelmingly pessimistic that humanity will escape from a dystopia of alienation, oppression, and unfreedom. In addition to his contributions to philosophy, Rousseau was active as a composer and a music theorist, as the pioneer of modern.. (shrink)

« Je me croyais grec ou romain » écrit Rousseau de son enfance genevoise, durant laquelle le patriotisme de son père, son statut privilégié de citoyen et ses lectures de Plutarque se confondent en une même exaltation pour la vertu antique. La pensée politique de Rousseau semble ainsi pétrie de références à une Antiquité exemplaire et fantasmée – à Sparte, tout particulièrement. Elle s’est à ce titre régulièrement vu reprocher son anachronisme. Benjamin Constant, de façon célèbre, accuse Rouss...

For Rousseau, humankind is in a perpetual state of decay—decadency from an earlier, natural, primitive, and perfect state. For Rousseau, the natural man, or man in the state of beast, was of an era where humankind was unencumbered by that which is now entirely associated with society—that is, “. . . establishment of laws and of the right of property . . . the institution of magistracy . . . and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power.” For Kant, humankind (...) is in its natural state. For Kant, nature brings about conditions that continually develop and refine humankind’s dispositions, purposefully setting about societies in order to facilitate a foundation within all civilized society, whereby all of humankind’s goals may be achieved. All matters have their place—placed there by nature, as though with purpose. For Kant, nature intended for humankind to employ reason, to acquiesce to coercion for social cohesion, and to strive to build a society that is ever-increasingly progressing towards perfection. Nature uses humankind’s dispositions, including ‘antagonistic’ behavior to gradually bring about a, “perfectly just civil constitution.” Humankind’s highest goal yet to be achieved is for that just civil constitution to emerge from trial and error (in the form of wars, revolutions, secessions, abdications), over time, ultimately providing for development of other dispositions within a perfect society. (shrink)

The essays in this volume were first presented at the 2023 A.V. Elliott Conference on Great Books and Ideas, the fifteenth annual conference sponsored by Mercer University's Thomas C. and Ramona E. McDonald Center for America's Founding Principles. The volume explores the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. One thread which unites the chapters is the attempt to understand and clarify Rousseau's conception of his own, highly idiosyncratic, philosophic activity, as well as how that activity relates to Rousseau's competing archetypes of (...) natural man and citizen. This exercise requires engaging some of the most fundamental and vexing tensions of human life. Should we be understood and defined as individuals or as members of a community? How can we be free and live together? What in human beings is natural and what is the product of education, nurture, or historical processes? Are we defined more by our reason or by sentiment? How do we come to know something and how might our attempts to know potentially undermine truth itself? In working through all of these problems, the Rousseau that emerges is truly a thinker of the first rank, a subtle and penetrating student of what it means to be a human being, a citizen, and a philosopher. Contributors include Laurence D. Cooper, Christine Dunn Henderson, Christopher Kelly, Emma Planinc, Denise Schaeffer, John T. Scott, Samuel A. Stoner, and John Warner. (shrink)

Kant ascribes two radically different kinds of language—symbolic or pictorial (qua intuitive) and discursive languages—to the “Oriental” and “Occidental” peoples respectively. By his analysis, having a merely symbolic language suggests that the “Orientals” lack understanding—and hence the ability to form concepts and think in abstracto—as well as genius and spirit. Meanwhile, he establishes discursive language as a sine qua non of the continued progress of humanity, primarily because only by means of words—as opposed to symbols—can one think (not just intuit), (...) signify one’s thoughts exactly, and make them universally communicable. Without such a language, one would not be able to make one’s feelings moral or develop a true moral character. In short, humanity would not be able to obtain its cultural or moral ends without discursive language. -/- These points add up to an exclusionary view of progress according to which the Occidental whites alone are equipped with the requisite discursive skills and other talents (including genius and spirit) to accomplish advanced culture and pursue humanity’s moral destiny. The “Orient,” with its “childish language,” is consigned to the childhood of humanity. In holding this view, Kant has departed from some of his predecessors—such as Leibniz, whose vision of the future of humanity includes an East-West harmony facilitated by a “universal symbolism,” and Rousseau, who exalts a livelier connection with the world mediated by a pictorial language. -/- The contrast with Leibniz and Rousseau also suggests that we cannot chalk up Kant’s exclusionary view of progress to mere personal prejudices. His philosophy is what gives meaning to his statements about the nature of the “Oriental” language. That is, the exclusionary view of progress emerges only when we take into account his anti-Leibnizian conceptualization of symbolic language as merely intuitive, his view that humanity is teleologically oriented toward the unique sort of moralization that he envisioned in the Groundwork, and his view that reason must lead the way in humanity’s progress toward this supposed moral end, wherefore only discursive language can facilitate such progress. (shrink)

Although Les Philosophes was an ordinary comedy, and Palissot was far from the caliber of Molière or Voltaire, it successfully consolidated conservative criticisms of the philosophes within a satirical framework, enjoying a successful three-month run in 1760. The reason behind its success was that it was at the center of a debate between the Enlightenment philosophers and the Counter-Enlightenment figures. In addition to being an example of 18th-century French comédie, the play serves as a valuable source for understanding the key (...) points of conservative discourse of the time. While Palissot seemed to focus on attacking individual philosophes’ personalities, he paired these attacks with conceptual critiques, and directed the most of his criticism primarily at Diderot and Rousseau. The play remains significant for two reasons: First, it captures almost all of the concerns and arguments of the conservative reaction to the Enlightenment. Second, it sheds light on Enlightenment thinkers' personal and intellectual struggles. This paper examines Palissot’s Les Philosophes not as a mere literary dispute but as a rich text that reveals the Counter-Enlightenment discourse that emerged in the second half of the 18th century. (shrink)

Rousseau’s account of the “legislator” or “lawgiver” is commonly regarded as one of the most far-fetched, ominous, and baffling parts of his teaching in the Social Contract. In brief, Rousseau’s lawgiver seems to be a proto-totalitarian figure whose self-appointed mission is to found a political community by “denaturing” people at a single stroke and who may be a mere figment of Rousseau’s overheated imagination. Accordingly, this part of the Social Contract threatens to make a mockery of Rousseau’s claim to be (...) “taking men as they are and laws they can be,” as well as his claim that the combination of “ freedom and equality” is “the greatest good” in the civil state. Following and extending Rousseau’s own method of teaching by examples, however, this essay argues that Benjamin Franklin’s influence over the American republic—especially through his posthumous Autobiography—offers a prosaic example of the apparently fantastical phenomenon sketched by Rousseau. In fact, I argue that Franklin’s case corresponds more fully to Rousseau’s description than do any of Rousseau’s own examples (such as Moses, Lycurgus, and Numa) and that Franklin showed in practice what Rousseau suggested in theory: that a lawgiver can succeed without relying on coercion and without undercutting the equality that underlies a just society. Franklin’s denaturing influence, I suggest, has been crucial for the durability of republicanism in the United States, given the country’s size and diversity. (shrink)

This essay inquires whether a constitutional state, understood as one ruled not by natural persons but by laws and legal decisions that free persons can endorse, can accommodate the administrative state, understood as one wherein executive agencies exercise law-making, statute-interpreting, and sanction-levying powers. Drawing from Rousseau and Hegel, it distinguishes between two stringent models of the constitutional state – a democratic-republican model and one ordered to an autonomous concept of Law – and compares their abilities to accommodate an executive with (...) a robust law-making and statute-interpreting authority. The essay concludes that, whereas the democratic-republican model is hostile to the administrative state, the Law-centred model is at ease with it and allows it to flourish within bounds. The Law-centred model is thus the only one to reconcile a stringent concept of the constitutional state with the executive power that state needs to fulfil its positive obligations to its citizens. (shrink)

Curso de Geografia de Jean-Jacques Rousseau integra o X volume da edição de OEuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Édition thématique du Tricentenaire, Slatkine/Honoré Champion (2012), subintitulado Escritos Científicos. Para esta tradução, além do texto consagrado na edição do tricentenário, também utilizamos a edição norte-americana dos textos de Rousseau organizada por Christopher Kelly, intitulada Autobiographical, scientific, religious, moral, and literary writings (2007). Preservamos, integralmente, as indispensáveis notas ao texto em língua francesa, que são de autoria de Christophe Van Staen.

This paper argues that Rousseau’s lawgiver is best thought of as a fictional teacher of peoples. It is fictional as it reflects an idea that is entertained despite its contradictory nature, and it is contradictory in the sense that it describes ‘an undertaking beyond human strength and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing’ (II.7; 192). Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a necessary device for enabling the transferal of individual power to the body politic, for subsuming (...) individual wills under the general will, and for aligning the good of the individual with the common good. For the social contract to be valid, however, it needs to be preceded by a desire to belong to a moral community that can induce people to join willingly, and that will grant legitimacy to the laws established. If the social contract is the machinery that makes the body politic function, the lawgiver is ‘the mechanic who invents the machine’ (II.7; 191). In this paper we will look closer at the pedagogical functions of Rousseau’s mythical lawgiver by first examining the relationship between the social contract, the general will and the lawgiver. Then, we aim to flesh out a pedagogical understanding of the figure of the lawgiver by way of the two educational dimensions of accommodation and transformation. Finally, we will argue for the importance of understanding Rousseau’s lawgiver as a fictional device allowing for the fundamental and enduring educational task of balancing between the preservation and renewal of society. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider what it might mean to approach boredom as a problem of post-history, rather than of modernity as such. Post-history, or ‘end of history’, in this sense, is linked with the impossibility or unlikelihood of political-systemic change, and thus with the disappearance of the contingency or temporal flux that had been understood as the context or prerequisite of political action and political freedom. I will, argue, firstly, that both Rousseau and Fukuyama depict societies that are ‘post-historical’, (...) in this sense, and which are marked by ‘boredom’ of this specifically post-historical kind. Secondly, I will argue that both thinkers link post-historical boredom with the disappearance or diminution of the ‘drive for recognition’ that both understood as both an agent and effect of ‘history’. Thirdly, I will argue that while Fukuyama understands post-historical boredom as an ‘irritant’ that threatens to restart history without quite succeeding in doing so, Rousseau understands it as an essentially stabilising (and happy) condition that maintains post-historical man in an equilibrium modelled on the order of nature itself. And fourthly, I consider certain ways in which this ‘post-historical’ boredom might coexist and overlap with the ‘promise of intensity’ experienced in post-Fordist neoliberal society. (shrink)

O artigo trabalha com a ideia da unidade da obra de Rousseau envolvendo os escritos de diferentes naturezas que ele produz. Busca mostrar seu caráter dinâmico, multifacetado, plástico, mas também preso às verdades práticas, básicas, e interesses e convicções essenciais, urgentes, ligadas ao útil, ao necessário, para a felicidade do gênero humano, recusando que se faça pouco caso dos atributos que dignificam o homem e lhe cobram tomar partido ante os absurdos do tempo, envolvendo a responsabilidade que teria tudo para (...) encontrar no indivíduo a referência que pode explorar suas saídas, fazendo-o um bom uso, elevando seus horizontes, tornando-se mais conhecedor de si mesmo e generoso. Precisa dos atropelos da vida para aprender com os erros, entretanto, que ameaçam sua subsistência, definem o esgotamento de recursos da natureza, privando-o de buscar meios capazes de lhe auxiliarem enquanto mediadores, levando-o a retomar o eixo que facilita o recurso aos remédios, pois nasce-se, virtualmente, para o bem moral, mas fica-se, no entanto, enceguecido, até se chegar ao eixo novamente. (shrink)

Tocado pela empolgação, pelo entusiasmo, até justificado, não propriamente pelo brilho do texto, mas pelo modo do tratamento do tema, fiz o prefácio do livro, publicado em 2021. Este trabalho, na verdade, uma tese de doutoramento em educação, defendido pelo autor em 2017, e convertida em livro. Essa eu pude acompanhar, passo a passo, participando, antes da banca de defesa, que conserva, inclusive, na publicação acadêmica, agora realizada, o mesmo título, permitindo-me notar que há uma pequena diferença, todavia, entre o (...) título mais limitado, e a amplitude, que se nota do conteúdo, no quadro do desenvolvimento do próprio texto que é apresentado enquanto efeito de uma descoberta do próprio pesquisador, por alguma coisa de empatia, que termina um trabalho que redimensiona, aliás, a pesquisa, mesmo que o encanto seja Rousseau [...]. (shrink)

Tradução do artigo “Jean-Jacques Rousseau et sa politique”, de Eric Weil.

El artículo analiza el tratamiento hegeliano del concepto de voluntad general de Rousseau en la Fenomenología del espíritu. Se teje una trama conceptual que enfatiza en: (i) la necesariedad del concepto de voluntad general de Rousseau en el entramado conceptual hegeliano; (ii) las implicancias de este concepto en la estructura política y social, en términos de una ausencia de instituciones de representación política en una sociedad ética; (iii) las consecuencias violentas y nihilistas de la extrapolación práctica de la voluntad general (...) como axioma teórico. (shrink)

It is common to assimilate Marx’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of democracy. In this chapter, I assess the relation between Marx’s early idea of “true democracy” and Spinozist democracy, both the historical influence and the theoretical affinity. Drawing on Marx’s student notebooks on Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, I show there was a historical influence. However, at the theoretical level, I argue that a sharp distinction must be drawn. Philosophically, Spinoza’s commitment to understanding politics through real concrete powers does not support with Marx’s (...) anti-institutional conception of true democracy. And as a matter of social theory, the gap between civil society and the state which so troubles Marx is a development of modernity that has not entered Spinoza's premodern field of view. Marx’s true democracy was also influenced by his study of Rousseau, and theoretically, it is just as close if not closer to Rousseau as to Spinoza. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's main work in political philosophy, the _Social Contract_, contains two beginnings; on the one hand, it commences, quite conventionally, with a social contract between individuals, on the other hand it also states that a lawmaker needs to precede the agreement of such a contract. This curious co-existence of two beginnings in the text has usually been ignored or played down by interpreters. This article, on the other hand, presents a reading of their interplay inspired by Zizek's theory of (...) ideology. It demonstrates how one of the beginnings, if seen from this point of view, may be understood as the truth about the other, and how the figure of the lawmaker specifically reveals the text as torn apart by contradictory internal tendencies. (shrink)

O Essai sur l’Origine des Langues integra o conjunto das reflexões de Rousseau destinadas ainfluenciar a intelligentsia moderna, num campo, o da especulação sobre a linguagem, que cada vezmais passou a interessar os que, como ele, se empenhavam em produzir uma reforma do conteúdo dossaberes com vistas a estabelecer os princípios norteadores duma pretendida renovação das artes e dasciências. Os tópicos tratados aqui dizem respeito a temas considerados ao mesmo tempocontemporâneos ao autor e, supõe-se, aos leitores atuais da obra. Para (...) se ter uma ideia mais clara doque se pretende discutir, optou-se por resenhar os pontos do Essai que têm relação com os objetivosperseguidos e em seguida passar à discussão propriamente dita. (shrink)

In mid-eighteenth-century France, a series of debates revolved around reflections on origins and their epistemological status, elaborating models of historical temporality to frame the present. The origins of the arts, sciences, human inequality, human knowledge, fables or religions reveal a certain relationship between man (individuals and civilisations) and time, articulating forms of past permanence and future anticipation in the present. Within this framework, this article seeks to shed light on the peculiar temporal status of Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger’s reflection on origins. In (...) a close comparison with Rousseau’s ‘atrabilious philosophy’ (philosophie atrabilaire), Boulanger identifies catastrophe as a temporal model for conceptualising the origin of a human history that has always already begun: origin appears not as that which stands at the beginning of time, but rather as a historical form of the relationship between humanity and time – an emotional and cognitive tone – that constitutes the background and precondition of human action. (shrink)

There is a whole tradition of studies that has superimposed a mythical structure on the concepts of the “savage” in the pure state of nature, and of the American peoples who are also called “savages”: the myth of the “good savage”, the golden age, the terrestrial paradise, etc. Despite the efforts made by other authors to dispel this interpretation, it has not been shown that it jeopardises the central thesis of Rousseau’s anthropology: the defence of natural goodness. We are interested (...) here precisely in uncovering these risks, which may be, at least in part, the result of a biased reading of Derrida’s Grammatology. (shrink)

The book explores the ways in which Jean Jacques Rousseau envisaged time as a diagnostic tool for understanding the state of society and the predicaments of modernity. Central to his conceptualization of both nature and history, time also plays a unique role in Rousseau's literary and aesthetic explorations of selfhood and effect. The book brings into dialogue specialists from education, political theory, literature and cultural studies with the aim to underscoring Rousseau's contributions to themes that preoccupy us today such as (...) the appreciation of slow time, the uncounted time of women's lives and temporal challenges related to politics and economy. (shrink)