Jean-Paul Sartre

Don't fence me in : Rorty and Sartre -- On freedom and action : Dewey and Sartre -- A (neo) American in Paris : Bourdieu and Mead -- Mead on cosmopolitanism, sympathy, and war -- W.E.B. Du Bois : double-consciousness, Jamesian sympathy, and the cosmopolitan -- Self-concept in the new sociology of ideas : reflections on Neil Gross's Richard Rorty : the making of an American philosopher -- Eros and self-determination -- What if Hegel's master and slave were women?

Sartre seeks both to overcome solipsism and clarify how the individual becomes an object—with a seemingly fixed char acter—through his account of The Look in Being and Nothingness. While his description of how The Look of the other transforms one into an object may at first appear to be confirmed by experience, the account proves to be inade quate as a refutation of solipsism and in showing exactly how one becomes an object. On the other hand, G.H. Mead has a (...) convincing approach to how the self comes into being as an object. In the first section of this paper I present and criticize Sartre's position, especially his explanation for how one can experience The Look when the other is not empirically present. The second section investigates Mead's approach to the genesis of the self as social object, and then shows how Mead's ideas can be employed to clarify inconsistencies in Sartre's account, highlighting why Sartre's description ap pears to be confirmed by experience. (shrink)

To compare a novel to a work of philosophy is, admittedly, a risky exercise in analogy. When the novelist is Lawrence and the philosophical text is the ponderous and dialectical Being and Nothingness, such a comparison may seem willfully perverse and peculiarly open, insofar as it deals with Lawrence's great theme of sexuality, to his anathema of "sex in the head." Furthermore, modern criticism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has tended to be wary of critical approaches that lean on notions (...) that are not derived from literature itself - a tendency that is being reinforced these days by the structuralist insistence on the "literariness" of the Text. Now, despite its metaphorical statement as a form of dramatic "gesture," Sartre's book is very definitely not a work of literature. T.H. Adamowski, associate professor of English at Erindale College, the University of Toronto, has written articles on English, American, and French literature. This essay is part of a larger study on progress on Lawrence's "sexual poetics.". (shrink)

Finally, a separate section of the Index has been reserved for the works of Flaubert which have been analyzed in detail by Sartre in The Family Idiot. Each work is indexed separately and comprises in some cases a general index coupled with entries related to the protagonists. ;It is hoped that the present Index will be of use both as theoretical and historical instrument. ;The indexing of words or themes--literary, philosophical, or both--such as "Alienation," "Art," "Beauty," "Being," "Death," "Desire," "Dreams," (...) "Estrangement," "Hate," "Imagination," "Inferiority," "Laughter," "Literature," "Negation," "Nothingness," "Passivity," "Pride," "Reality," "Resentment," "Sexuality," "Temporality," "Writing," ... was made intentionally detailed in order to provide a convenient and accessible instrument for research in Sartre's philosophy. ;This complexity presented great problems. For example, under the central theme "passivity," the reader will find a number of sub-categories establishing the distinction between Gustave Flaubert's passivity and that of some of his contemporaries. The reader will also find "passivity" as a recurrent theme in Flaubert's works, as well as "passivity" analyzed by Sartre in more general terms as a purely philosophical item. ;The philosophical terms have been indexed with special care, and in certain cases, for words such as "Being," "Nothingness," "Non-Being" and "Other," different classifications have been made according to whether, in Sartre's text, these words were capitalized or not. ;The Index of The Family Idiot is much more extensive and is, we feel, quite unique in its design. This is due in large part to the nature of Sartre's work itself. From the time of the conception of this project, it became clear that, due to the originality and complexity of Sartre's thought, the Index of The Idiot would require a special structure. Indeed, Sartre's "Flaubert," a truly colossal work, is a maze of references and cross-references on different levels and relates to disciplines as diverse as history, anthropology, sociology, psychology and politics. Thus in the "Flaubert" Sartre brings together and integrates in a unique and harmonious fashion literature, criticism, and philosophy. ;The indices of Being and Nothingness and of the Critique of Dialectical Reason are essentially traditional indices. They are detailed and are intended to permit researchers to have at hand all possible references pertaining to the themes and topics contained in these two works. ;With the passing of time, one has come to realize that at the center of Sartre's philosophical enterprise there is one fundamental question: What is human being in all possible manifestations of being? The three above mentioned works represent the main steps in Sartre's "unified field theory" of being and human being which constitutes Sartre's answer to this question. ;The present Index du Corpus philosophique de Sartre is not only, as the title indicates, an analytical index, but also an instrument intended to aid Sartrians and other researchers in better understanding the general evolution of Sartre's philosophy. For this purpose three main philosophical works have been chosen: Being and Nothingness, Critique of Dialectical Reason and The Family Idiot. (shrink)

This paper deals with atheism, Sartre's notion of absolute freedom and Jean-Paul Sartre's claim of the irreconcilability of human freedom with God’s existence. For Sartre, man to be truly human must continuously create his own essence and continuously assert himself. Man can achieve this because he is absolutely free; the affirmation of God would undermine the exigencies of man's freedom and creativity. The question on the impossibility of the coexistence between the affirmation of God's existence and the recognition of human (...) freedom raises certain points against Sartre's notion of God and human freedom. The paper urges the believer to fully understand his beliefs and be also critical of his faith. (shrink)

Sartre posited a (nondual), nonreflexive, nonthetic, nonpositional awareness which makes all consciousness possible, and which underlies dualistic, thetic, positional consciousness of object. Though his description assumes dualistic, thetic, positional consciousness of object to be inherent in nondual, nonreflexive,nonthetic, nonpositional awareness and hence to be ineradicable, with some modifications it can explain the view of rdzogs-chen that the sems-sde series of teachings illustrate in nonphilosophical terms with the example of the primordial mirror in which both dualistic consciousness and its objects manifest (...) as the play of the mirror’s energy. Dualistic consciousness: (1) is not inherent in nondual awareness, but arises when the threefold thought structure (Tib. ’khor-gsum) causes the mental subject—an illusory, incorporeal phenomenon—to manifest in nondual awareness coemergently with the phenomenon of being that makes the subject in question appear to involve self-being, and as the (co)Gnitive capacity and motility of nondual awareness seems to lie in this subject, the latter seems to be a separate perceiver of experiences, thinker of thought and doer of action—so that the mental subject appears to be an individual, separate, autonomous dualistic consciousness; (2) together with the phenomenon of being, is the core of the basic human delusion at the root of unhappy consciousness (duhkha); and(3) can dissolve in nirvana, putting an end to the unhappy consciousness inherent in it. (shrink)

_Existentialism: An Introduction_ provides an accessible and scholarly introduction to the core ideas of the existentialist tradition. Kevin Aho draws on a wide range of existentialist thinkers in chapters centering on the key themes of freedom, being-in-the-world, alienation, nihilism, anxiety and authenticity. He also addresses important but often overlooked issues in the canon of existentialism, with discussions devoted to the role of embodiment, the movement’s contribution to ethics, politics, and environmental and comparative philosophies, as well as its influence on contemporary (...) psychiatry and psychotherapy. The enduring relevance of existentialism is shown by applying existentialist ideas to contemporary philosophical discussions of interest to a wide audience. The book covers secular thinkers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, and Beauvoir as well as religious authors, such as Buber, Dostoevsky, Marcel, and Kierkegaard. In this engaging and accessible text Aho shows why existentialism cannot be easily dismissed as a moribund or outdated movement. In the aftermath of 'God’s death', existentialist philosophy engages questions with lasting philosophical significance, questions such as 'Who am I?' and 'How should I live?' By showing how existentialism offers insight into what it means to be human, the author illuminates existentialism’s enduring value. _Existentialism: An Introduction_ provides the ideal introduction for upper level students and anyone interested in knowing more about one of the most vibrant and important areas of philosophy today. (shrink)

I’m certainly not alone in noting that the year 2011 brings, for those of us who are students of the work of Frantz Fanon, two different anniversaries. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Les damnés de la terre , Fanon’s final book and, for many, his most lasting achievement. But it also marks the fiftieth anniversary of Fanon’s death: he died, tragically young, on December 6, 1961, not long after the book’s publication. It is no exaggeration (...) to say that Les damnés de la terre was composed by Fanon from his deathbed, and that he was well aware that he was racing death as he rushed to complete the manuscript, as his publisher François Maspero remarked, “in pitiful haste.” Fanon had managed to complete it by July, although, as he told a friend, “I should have liked to have written something more.” As David Macey notes in his indispensable biography, “Fanon did see copies of his last book, but for its first readers, Les damnés de la terre was a posthumous work.” The book and Fanon’s death thus come to us bound inextricably together, fifty years later. So it would seem that we have an anniversary to celebrate (and in doing so, we would thus be celebrating the continuing relevance of a classic work, as this special issue intends us to do), but also a death to mourn. If I proceed to make a suggestion that will seem at first to be the height of perversity, let me preface it by saying that this suggestion is occasioned by what I believe to be Fanon’s greatest legacy, a legacy of unsparing intellectual and political commitment. For I want to begin by suggesting that this year brings us the mournful fact that fifty years on, Les damnés de la terre remains, in many ways, as relevant to our contemporary world as it was in 1961; but conversely, the anniversary of Fanon’s death offers us a cause for celebration. . (shrink)

This essay revisits the question of Sartre's method with particular emphasis on the posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics, Critique of Dialectical Reason, and “Morale et histoire.” I argue that Sartre's method—an ever-evolving though never seamless blend of phenomenological description, dialectical analysis, and logical inference—is at once the seed and fruit of his mature ontology of praxis. Free organic praxis, what Sartre more than once calls “the human act,” is neither closed nor integral, but is rather intrinsically open-ended and integrative. (...) Thus a philosophical method that seeks at once to illuminate human experience and human history must itself be both a reflection and inflection of the essential openness and integrativity of praxis itself. In the conclusion, I argue that the openness and integrativity of Sartre's method are its core strengths and the sources of its continued philosophical worth. (shrink)

This essay revisits the question of Sartre's method with particular emphasis on the posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics , Critique of Dialectical Reason ( Volume II ), and “Morale et histoire.” I argue that Sartre's method—an ever-evolving though never seamless blend of phenomenological description, dialectical analysis, and logical inference—is at once the seed and fruit of his mature ontology of praxis. Free organic praxis, what Sartre more than once calls “the human act,” is neither closed nor integral, but is (...) rather intrinsically open-ended and integrative. Thus a philosophical method that seeks at once to illuminate human experience and human history must itself be both a reflection and inflection of the essential openness and integrativity of praxis itself. In the conclusion, I argue that the openness and integrativity of Sartre's method are its core strengths and the sources of its continued philosophical worth. (shrink)

This dissertation presents a constructive reading of Jean-Paul Sartre's Morale et histoire, the undelivered 1965 Cornell Lectures. My thesis is that this unpublished and largely unknown investigation of the relationship between morality and history provides significant resources for a novel Sartrean argument for human freedom. This argument begins with concrete moral experience and makes its way toward freedom, thus effecting an illuminating reversal of the conventional logic of philosophical inquiry. The argument achieves much of its persuasiveness because it stays close (...) to lived-experience, adhering as nearly as possible to an ideal of methodological exemplarism by drawing its conclusions from analyses of concrete moral events. Briefly, the text of Morale et histoire presents Sartre's most systematic inquiry into the nature and significance of ethical norms and moral praxis. Sartre's dialectical-phenomenological account of moral praxis culminates in what he calls the "paradox of ethos." Careful examination of the paradoxical nature of morality, I argue, yields a vision of concrete, situated, historical freedom that surely counts among "the varieties of free will worth wanting" . The task of this dissertation is to defend these claims using Sartre's Morale et histoire as the chief philosophical resource. (shrink)

Sartre builds up his notion of Bad Faith and then develops it by borrowing the method used in psychoanalytic theory. Thus, he treats Bad Faith as the model of a mental illness and inquires into its nature, origins, symptoms, and treatment. Following this procedure, he isolates consciousness as the origin of Bad Faith and describes in his examples from Nausea (1938) to Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr (1952) a variety of symptoms of varying degrees of severity. These and other questions (...) are extensively treated in Being and Nothingness. Some critics, however, tend to relate Sartre’s ideas of Bad Faith solely to this latter exposition. I believe this is a mistake, and that Sartre’s conception may be shown to have changed and developed in other writings. (shrink)

Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason depends upon an ideal of subjectivity that operates linguistically. The subject of the Critique progresses through three transformations: first, the organic subject; second, the serial subject; third, the common subject. Each stage reveals different configurations of the expressive possibilities inherent in Sartre’s late conception of subjectivity and his materialistic view of language. The organic subject emerges in the initial contradiction between the human organism and its material environment. This contradiction results in the primordial movement of (...) signification that projects a future structured in response to the material system. The serial subject then emerges within the system of language and a social structure of antagonistic struggle. Finally, the common subject emerges out of the dissolution of the serial subject by means of a repetition of the original expressive gesture. This common subjectivity is the site of a complete communication occurring within the group-in-fusion. (shrink)