Johann Gottlieb Fichte

An interpretation of Jacobi's philosophical realism.

Philosophical reflections about the complex relationship between Jacobi and Fichte on realism and idealism.

The present number gathers papers concerning following topics: Fichte's theory of property and the systematic, conceptual and historic relations between Fichte and Kant, Schelling and Schiller.

The following paper argues that J.G. Fichte, despite his apparent philosophical neglect of art and aesthetics, does develop a strong, original, and coherent account of art, which not only allows the theorization of modern, non-representative art forms, but indeed anticipates Nietzsche and Heidegger in conceiving of truth in terms of art rather than scientific rationality. While the basis of Fichte’s philosophy of art is presented in the essay “On Spirit and Letter in Philosophy,” it is not developed systematically either in (...) this text or anywhere else in his writings, but must be reconstructed through a broad consideration of all his works, including, above all, his political and economic writings. For Fichte, the art-work does not exist as an object possessing “aesthetic value” and which can, in turn, be possessed, consumed, and enjoyed through the subjective act of aesthetic experience. Rather, it involves a mode of praxis which, grounded in a radical and original power of imagination, creatively discloses possibilities for future forms of existence, experience, and political community that cannot be theoretically anticipated. While Fichte cannot himself theorize specific forms of art, since the art that concerns him belongs to the future, we can, however, retrospectively try to understand non-representational painting and non-mimetic dance as concrete realizations of Fichte’s art-work of the future. In this way, Fichte’s philosophy of art ultimately suggests an alternative to Heidegger’s understanding of the work of art as a projective institution of truth. Fichte suggests that the human body, rather than human language, is the fundamental medium of art. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 19. century the call for a general reform of the State rose in Prussia: after the collapse of the German Empire in 1806, the need for reform became still more pressing. A fundamental part of this renovation process was the reform of the Prussian army, to which men like Clausewitz, the general von Scharnhorst, the war ministers von Stein and later von Boyen contributed. All they were convinced that a new way of making war was (...) necessary for freeing Prussia from the French invader: only that the military reform should be founded on a spiritual renovation of the political and military life. In particular, a new conception of the soldier as human being and of the war as spiritual event should be established and trained by means of a new organization of the military forces and of the cultivation of a shared national feeling. The purpose of the present essay is to point out the position of Fichte towards both the problems connected to the war, the Napoleonic invasion and the crisis of the traditional State and the proposals formulated by the reform party in order to solve those problems. In this way it is possible to achieve a better comprehension of Fichte’s political thought in the last period of his life, the so called “national” period, by highlighting the correspondences existing between his thought and the political context of his time.Am Anfang des xix. Jahrhunderts stand Preu.en im Zentrum einer gewaltigen Reformbewegung, die jeden Bereich des staatlichen Lebens neu gestalten wollte. Nach dem Sturz des Reiches im Jahre 1806, als das Reformbedurfnis des Staates mit noch gro.erer Dringlichkeit empfunden wurde, erwarb die Reform des Heeres eine zentrale Stelle. Zu dieser trugen Personlichkeiten bei wie Carl von Clausewitz und der General von Scharnhorst in Zusammenarbeit mit den Ministern von Stein und spater Hermann von Boyen. Die ihrem Engagement zugrunde liegende Uberzeugung war es, dass eine neue Art der Kriegsfuhrung unausweichlich, jedoch nur auf der Basis einer neu gedachten Anthropologie zu verwirklichen sei. In dem Ma.e, in dem die Reformbewegung sich nicht auf eine verwaltungsorientierte Neugestaltung des Staates bzw. des Heeres beschrankte, sondern auf einer grundlegenden Erneuerung des nationalen Geistes beruhen sollte, muss sie in einen weiteren, nicht nur politischen, sondern in erster Linie geistigen, kulturellen und philosophischen Zusammenhang eingeordnet werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag setzt sich zum Ziel, die Stellung Fichtes im Zusammenhang der preu.ischen Reformbewegung hervorzuheben, mit der Absicht, die gegenseitigen Einflusse und die Ubereinstimmungen zwischen Fichtes politischen und padagogischen Ansichten einerseits und dem Reformgeist, seinen politischen Anspruchen und militarischen Vorschlagen andererseits klar herauszustellen. (shrink)

The conception of subjectivity that dominates the Western philosophical tradition, particularly during the Enlightenment, sets up a simple dichotomy: either the subject is ultimately autonomous or it is merely a causally determined thing. Fichte and Freud challenge this model by formulating theories of subjectivity thattranscend this opposition. Fichte conceives of the subject as based in absolute activity, but that activity is qualified by a check for which it is not ultimately responsible. Freud explains the behavior of the self in terms (...) of biological drives and social pressures, yet both forces are actively interpreted by the subject itself. The tensions that arise from these very different approaches show that both Fichte and Freud are trying to overcome this deeply imbedded dichotomy between freedom and determinism. Although some would respond to these tensions by trying to forge a Hegelian synthesis, such a resolution covers over the paradoxical nature of finite subjectivity. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Fichte's critical idealism in an effort to formulate a compelling model of how we can be said to be free, despite our subjection to both rational and nonrational constraints. ;Fichte grounds idealism in a "drive to freedom" that involves two disparate strands of thought: the standpoint of idealism is said to be both the result of an absolutely free adoption of the principle of self-determination and conditioned by reason, to which the finite I is necessarily subject. However, (...) if there is no reason prior to the choice of a first principle, the choice of idealism over dogmatism cannot be motivated, and so is not attributable to a responsible subject. And if there is a prior basis for the election of idealism, the constraints of reason already necessitate the I's attempt to consider itself to be independent and are, therefore, not self-legislated. Fichte's argument strategy thus yields the following question: How can there be an absolute election of the philosophical principle of one's life, when the adoption of such a standpoint is already a manifestation of who one is? Fichte confronts this issue by conceiving of the I as necessarily subject to an original limit and by radically subjectivizing the world in terms of the I's ethical and conceptual demands. ;By locating the tension between these positions, this dissertation reveals how philosophers indebted to Fichte as well as interpreters of the Wissenschaftslehre have mischaracterized Fichte's treatment of rational self-constraint. Fichte's synthesis of freedom and necessity constitutes a model of subjectivity according to which the normatively constrained structure of experience is impossible without my relating that experience to my practical activity, and the ways in which I am able to characterize that experience are answerable to what is practically required of me by that experience. Fichte shows the interdetermination of the givenness of the given and the autonomy of the I by qualifying each in terms of the other. As a description of this interdetermination, Fichte's striving doctrine establishes the tension involved in this mutually constitutive relation as a positive conception of human freedom. (shrink)

Whitehead claims there is only one type of individual in the universe—the actual entity—but there are necessarily multiple tokens of this type. This turns out to be paradoxical. Nevertheless, a type of individuality that is necessarily plural because, for each token, relations to other tokens are constitutive is something familiar from ordinary language, everyday politics, and, not least, 19th century German social thought. Whitehead’s actual entity generalizes the notion of species-being we find in Fichte, Feuerbach, and Marx. The rationale for (...) the concept of species-being brings to light important social and political implications of Whitehead’s cosmology. (shrink)

Sebastian Rödl portrays much of his work as attempts at articulating a German idealist view of self-consciousness. Although he rarely engages directly with German idealist texts, his accounts of first-person and second-person knowledge arrive at strikingly Fichtean theses regarding the necessary identity of subject and object in the former and the necessary reciprocity of subject and other in the latter. Despite this affinity, I argue, Rödl's accounts lack a feature that is essential to Fichte's and, indeed, to German idealism's distinctive (...) orientation: the thought of a first principle. I show that while second-person knowledge between subjects is genetically prior to self-consciousness—for Fichte as for Rödl—first-person knowledge of the I as first principle is systematically prior to self-consciousness—a point of architectonic and anti-nihilistic importance for Fichte, but which goes missing on Rödl's accounts, thereby obstructing their intended German idealist articulation. (shrink)

Even though Fichte's Reden an die deutsche Nation arguably constitutes one of the founding texts of nationalist political thought, it has received little scholarly attention from English-speaking political theorists. The French, by contrast, have a long tradition of treating Fichte as a central figure in the history of political thought, and have given considerable attention to the Reden in particular. While the dominant French interpretation, which construes the Reden as a non-ethnic cultural nationalist text, provides a welcome corrective to those (...) who impute unmediated ethnic nationalism to Fichte, it is ultimately flawed for missing the text's crypto-ethnic character. While Fichte officially defines nationality in terms of language and culture, his linguistic-cultural nationalism ultimately collapses into ethnic nationalism. This collapse, signalled by his appeals to Abstammung and Abkunft, is propelled by the fact that, ultimately, the appeal to language and culture is incapable of securing immortality, which is the supposed source of its motivational power for Fichte. (shrink)

Impermanence is one of the fundamental buddhist principles and of Japan’s typical view on life and world as well. The paper attempts to clear up commonalities and differences between the buddhist view of Impermanence and of Nietzsche’s Nihilism, and to compare the buddhist view with that of Nietzsche. The paper contains five chapters. The first argues for peculiarities of the buddhist, the second for Nietzsche’s view of Impermanence by looking at their common principle of Negation. The third and forth chapter (...) attempts to find and emphasize the superiority of the principle of Negation as transition and development from the negative and passive standpoint to the positive and active. The fifth chapter elucidates essential characteristics of the buddhist view of Impermanence and Nietzsche’s Nihilism, by showing how their principles of Negation differ from each other regarding Naturality and Artificiality, Temporality and Historicity.Unbeständigkeit ist eines der Grundprinzipien des Buddhismus und der typischen Welt- und Lebensanschauung der Japaner. Der Aufsatz versucht, Gemeinsamkeiten und Verschiedenheiten zwischen der buddhistischen Unbeständigkeitssicht und dem Nihilismus Nietzsches herauszustellen, und die buddhistische Sicht mit der Nietzsches zu vergleichen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz gliedert sich in fünf Kapitel. Im ersten werden die Eigentümlichkeiten der buddhistischen Sicht der Unbeständigkeit und im zweiten die des Nihilismus von Nietzsche erörtert, wobei ihr gemeinsames Prinzip der Negation verglichen wird. Das dritte und vierte Kapitel versucht die Überlegenheit des Negationsprinzips zu begründen und hervorzuheben als Übergang und Entwicklung vom negativen und passiven Standpunkt zum positiven und aktiven. Das fünfte Kapitel erhellt die wesentlichen Grundzüge der buddhistischen Unbeständigkeitssicht und des Nihilismus Nietzsches mit dem Aufweis, wie sich das Prinzip der Negation beider Standpunkten im Hinblick auf Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit, Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit voneinander unterscheidet. (shrink)