John Duns Scotus

The difference between Suarez and Scotus's ideas of "denomination" has given rise to the development of two different theories: 1) the theory of the dependence of actual universals on man's mind; and 2) Scotus's nominalist theory.The examination of such accidental and essential views of denomination reveals that, according to Suarez, the denomination of universal natures is of the accidental type, and the result of the referential similarity which is based on the causal relation between the existing objective truth and the (...) actual universal in the mind. He also rejects the essential denomination of univresals. Accordingly, the universal concept is the product of a process of mental abstraction; moreover, there is a kind of real similarity among the individuals of the same kind which is the basis of common nature and quiddity. However, the distinctions among external natures are of the type of real and objective affairs. Nevertheless, the genetic psychology of universal concepts considers the theories of Suarez and Scotus on universals as being quite similar to each other. (shrink)

In this chapter I want to focus on what it might mean to speak of the “Trinitarian friendship circle.” There are at least two ways to consider this friendship circle. One way is to consider the Trinity in itself, which is what theologians call the “immanent Trinity.” If we consider a “Trinitarian friendship circle” with regard to the immanent Trinity, then we would be talking about whether before the creation of the world, the three di- vine persons were in some (...) sense “co-lovers.” Another way is to consider the Trinity in relation to creatures, which is what theologians call the “economic Trinity.” The latter includes discussion of God the Son’s incarnation, and the work of the Holy Spirit among creatures. In what follows, I am interested in exploring what some medieval theologians, whom McCord Adams wrote so much about, had to say about this Trinitarian friendship circle with regard to the immanent Trinity. This is speculative stuff. Some theologians might object that this kind of speculation is unwarranted. They would contend that (e.g.,) the ecumenical councils were mostly focused on the Trinity with regard to creation. At most, we find in Nicaea I (325 CE) the claim that God the Father and God the Son are of the same essence (“homoousia”). This doesn’t signal anything specific regarding whether God the Father and God the Son each have their own act of loving the divine essence (or another divine person) in eternity past. This sort of view is what is today sometimes called Social Trinitarianism, according to which we should count the number of divine acts of knowing and loving according to the number of divine persons. On this Social Model of the Trinity, the Father loves the divine essence, the Son loves the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit loves the divine essence, and none of these acts of loving are numerically the same acts of loving the divine essence. There are three acts of loving, one by each divine person. (I should mention here that I reject this Social Model of the Trinity.) [...] -/- [...]. In what follows, I give a brief history of different interpretations of Augustine’s claim that the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit. This history supports my contention that a majority report among scholastics has it that the Holy Spirit, as a divine person, is not a unique object of an act of love, nor is any other divine person a unique object of an act of love. What the divine person’s love is their shared divine essence. This is what can be called a reductive interpretation of Augustine’s statement. A minority position, held by Henry of Ghent, is that the Holy Spirit (as the Holy Spirit) makes it the case that the divine persons love that they love the divine essence. Henry is distinctive in defending an interpretation according to which the Holy Spirit, as a specific divine person, uniquely contributes something to a certain act of loving that is shared by all divine persons. I believe Henry’s claim that a specific divine person can contribute something unique to an intellectual act or an act of will that can be used in the development of a “Latin” Model of the Trinity that accounts for the divine persons’ de se propositional knowledge. That is, a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity offers an account of how it could be that, e.g., God the Father can be aware of the proposition that I know that I love God the Son. Nonetheless, Henry himself does not develop a view in which a divine person has de se propositional knowledge. So far as I am aware, no scholastic teaches that a divine person makes use of “I” for self-reference (apart from, e.g., the Incarnation) or de se propositional knowledge. If one wanted to develop McCord Adams’s contention that the divine persons are mutual friends, then if we look at what Henry of Ghent has done then we can develop his insights into what I have labeled a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity. While there are likely several ways that Henry’s moves can be developed into a Latin Social Model of the Trinity, I will summarize one way it could be done, that is, the way I have done it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus by Wouter GorisClaus A. AndersenGORIS, Wouter. Scientia propter quid nobis—The Epistemic Independence of Metaphysics and Theology in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei attributed to Duns Scotus. Münster: Aschendorff, 2022. viii + 296 pp. Paper, € 49.00The central claim of Wouter Goris's new book is that the Quaestio de (...) cognitione Dei traditionally (both in one late medieval manuscript and in some modern scholarship) attributed to John Duns Scotus not only is inauthentic but in fact represents an early reaction against Scotus's teaching on the scientific nature of metaphysics. The Quaestio in particular explores Scotus's distinction between a science "in itself" and one "for us" and, going beyond Scotus's own doctrine, shows how this distinction is applicable to metaphysics.The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 offers a critical edition of the Quaestio de cognitione Dei, which has hitherto been available in a plain transcription published by C. R. S. Harris in 1927. Harris's text was based on a single manuscript from the fifteenth century (Oxford, Merton College, Ms. 90); Goris bases his edition on a manuscript from the early fourteenth century (Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 172), one that does not attribute the text to Scotus. Goris highlights that the text has significant parallels in the prologue of John of Reading's Scriptum on the first book of the Sentences; there is presently not sufficient evidence for claiming that Reading is the author of the De cognitione Dei, but it does seem clear that either Reading or some other Franciscan friar relying on Reading's Scriptum authored the text between 1316 and 1325. The Quaestio itself consists of two articles. Two appendices to the edition document longer passages from Reading's Scriptum.Part 2 investigates the use of the distinction between a science in itself and one for us in Duns Scotus and some of the early Scotists. Scotus's doctrine developed over time. At Oxford Scotus taught that theology in se is about the divine essence in its particularity; theology for us is about the most perfect concept of God attainable for human beings by natural means, that is, the concept "infinite being." It falls to metaphysics to prove that there is such a kind of being. At Paris Scotus rather taught that both theology in se and theology for us are about the divine essence in its [End Page 549] particularity. The implication is that a strictly demonstrative science about God is possible for human beings in this present life, a knowledge of God that is completely independent of metaphysics. Goris argues that this shift in the view of theology explains the absence of Scotus's famous "twin doctrines" of the univocal concept of being and of being as the first adequate object of the intellect from his theological epistemology of the Parisian period. Not too surprisingly, in the wake of Scotus we find several authors grappling with the relationship between theology and metaphysics. The positions investigated by Goris vary considerably. Richard of Conington distinguishes between human metaphysical knowledge of being and God's own metaphysical knowledge of being; the latter represents a more perfect knowledge of both God himself and creatures as included under the concept of being. Francis of Marchia employs a distinction between a general metaphysics (about being as being) and a special metaphysics (about divine being), but on the level of science for us the special part of metaphysics is subordinated to the general one. Nicolas Bonetus, by contrast, advocates a sharp distinction between metaphysical knowledge of being and natural theology; he structures his metaphysics as a purely ontological discipline and treats natural theology as a separate science; Goris sees this reorganization as Bonetus's most decisive contribution to the history of metaphysics.Part 3 analyzes the fundamental doctrines defended in the Quaestio de cognitione Dei and compares them with those of Scotus and John of Reading. The first article of the Quaestio introduces two important distinctions, the first of which is between metaphysics in itself and metaphysics for us; these two... (shrink)

ResumoNo presente artigo procura-se oferecer uma análise e avaliação críticas da posição de João Duns Scotus (ca. 1265 – 1308) a respeito do problema dos universais. Para tanto, é levada a cabo primeiramente uma breve exposição dos argumentos e conceitos centrais dos quais ele se utiliza para defender seu realismo. Em seguida, algumas críticas à posição de Scotus, em especial o cerne da que devemos a Guilherme de Ockham (ca. 1287 – 1347), são apresentadas em detalhes e então respondidas.Palavras-chave: Scotus, (...) Ockham, escolástica, universais, realismo, nominalismo.AbstractThe current paper aims to offer an analysis and evaluation of John Duns Scotus’ (ca. 1265 – 1308) position regarding the problem of universals. In order to do so, a brief exposition of the central arguments and concepts he employs to defend his realism is first carried out. Some criticisms of Scotus’ position, especially the core of the one we owe to William of Ockham (ca. 1287 – 1347), are then presented in detail and answered. (shrink)

The disagreement between Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on divine illumination is usually recognized as a high point in the history of medieval epistemology. Still, there is much obscurity surrounding that debate, including the specific nature of the disagreement between those two thinkers. In this paper, I argue that the point at issue is the relationship between sense and intellect. Henry of Ghent, who posits a close tie between sense and intellect, holds that the senses are the only (...) natural source of both content and certainty for the intellect. By contrast, Duns Scotus holds that, in our natural state, the senses are the source of content but not of certainty for the intellect, which can achieve knowledge of the truth of first principles true by virtue of the meaning of their terms independently of the sensory input it receives. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus offered an alternative perspective to respect on the mystery of salvation by examining the motive behind the incarnation. Scotus believed that salvation is Christocentric: Motive wise, God incarnate is not primarily anthropocentric, which focuses on the sinfulness of humankind, as traditionally understood in the Catholic Scholastic Theology and taught by Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas, but as a total manifestation of His love. Scotus’ Christocentric approach to salvation is in line with his thought on freedom and (...) charity. Scotus believed that God would still have become incarnate even if man had never sinned in the Þ rst place because by taking the form of man, God embodied His love in a total way to His beloved creations.Scotus’ Christocentric salvation is relational because God is involved with the whole creation in person. Consequently, the Cross is not merely the means of redemption, but as manifestation of God’s inÞ nite loveand His self-giving. Through this essay, the author aims to compare those two approaches and to show the unique character of John Duns Scotus’ soteriology. Abstrak Yohanes Duns Scotus menawarkan perspektif alternatif untuk merefleksikan misteri keselamatan dengan mengkaji motif di balik inkarnasi. Dalam refleksi tradisional Teologi Skolastik yang dikembangkan Anselmus Canterbury dan Thomas Aquinas, motif inkarnasi dipahami dalam perspektif antroposentris: keberdosaan manusia menjadi alasan inkarnasi. Bagi Scotus, inkarnasi dan keselamatan bersifat Kristosentris: inkarnasi merupakan manifestasi total kasih Allah. Pendekatan Kristosentris Scotus terkait keselamatan sejalan dengangagasannya tentang kebebasan dan kasih. Scotus percaya bahwa Allah. Kata kunci: Yohanes Duns Scotus, Anselmus Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, soteriologi, inkarnasi, cinta kasih, kebebasan. (shrink)

This discussion note aims to call into question the first part of Gloria Frost’s article, Aquinas and Scotus on the Source of Contingency, devoted to Aquinas’s thought on the source of contingency in creation. I shall discuss three controversial claims that represent the key points of Frost’s interpretation of Aquinas’s account on contingency: with re spect to existence, every creature exists contingently on the grounds that no creature is necessarily willed by God; with respect to cause-and-effect relationship, only those effects (...) that derive from a voluntary cause are contingently caused; God’s will, as a voluntary cause, is a contingently operating cause and thus cannot immediately produce a necessary effect. According to my analysis, Frost’s misinterpretation of Aquinas’s position on contingency in creation derives from the erroneous assumption that, for Aquinas, the freedom of a cause implies the contingency of such a cause and of all the effects following from it. I shall prove that Frost’s misunderstanding consists in neglecting that Aquinas does not endorse this co-implication between freedom and contingency: in fact, if the freedom of a cause indicates that it can refrain from producing its effect, the contingency of a cause means its mutability and fallibility, namely that it can be prevented in producing its effect. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or (...) analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor. (shrink)

The metaphysical and theological writings of John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308)—one of the most intriguing, albeit if now nigh-forgotten philosophers of the late Middle Ages—were seminal in the emergence of modernity. A Metaphysics of Creation for the Information Age: A Dialogue with Duns Scotus uses the prism of the concept of Creation as the leitmotif to assemble and interpret Scotus’s system of thought in a unified manner. In doing so, Liran Shia Gordon reframes Scotus’s metaphysics such that it confronts the challenges (...) posed by information technology and its impact on our lives, thought, and actions. Surprisingly, although there has been great interest in the emergence and dissemination of information technology through the popular media, there has not yet been a genuine and vigorous philosophical consideration of the multiple ways information technology alters the basic categories by which we perceive and understand reality. Juxtaposing medieval philosophy and information technology offers an unconventional horizon to frame the foundational changes brought about by the information revolution and reassess the relevancy of medieval philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Categories and Meaning is a key text for the origins of Martin Heidegger's concept of "facticity." Originally submitted as a doctoral thesis in 1915, it focuses on the 13th-century philosopher-theologian John Duns Scotus. Heidegger first analyzes Scotus's doctrine of categories, then offers a meticulous explanation of the Grammatica Speculativa, a work of medieval grammar now known to be authored by the Modist grammarian Thomas of Erfurt. Taken together, these investigations represent an early foray into Heidegger's lifelong (...) philosophical concerns, "the question of being in the guise of the problem of categories and the question of language in the guise of the doctrine of meaning." This new and unique translation of one of Heidegger's earliest works offers an important look at his early thinking before the question of being became his central concern and will appeal to readers exploring Heidegger's philosophical development, medieval philosophy, phenomenological interpretations of the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

A presentation of Franciscan theologian John Duns Scotus as a significant contributor to the medieval theology of grace, worthy of careful contemporary consideration.

In this historical contribution, we assess Duns Scotus’s analysis of atonement (Commentary on the Sentences bk. III). We also include a partial exploration of his analysis of penance (Sentences bk. IV), because certain topics which we tend to discuss within atonement-theory, for example the analysis of the virtue of punishment, pertained to the subject of penance for Scotus. In recent scholarship, Andrew Rosato has argued that Scotus adapted the Anselmian non-penal view of Christ’s substitutionary satisfaction to the penal understanding of (...) satisfaction operative in penance. In this contribution, however, we argue that Scotus’s understanding remained non-penal: his view of the atonement depends on meritorious supererogatory acts of love. Additionally, we harvest some valuable Scotistic insights for atonement-theory, some of them applicable to penal theories as well. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es parte de una investigación de magíster en la cual se examina el problema de los universales en el período medieval, específicamente en los autores Avicena, Enrique de Gante y Duns Scotus. En él se analiza la comprensión escotista de los universales, así como también su relación con el conocimiento, Dios y el principio de individuación. Scotus dedica el conocimiento abstractivo a los universales, o sea, el conocimiento abstractivo es el tipo de conocimiento que permite a los (...) seres humanos conocer a los universales. Estos, por su parte, son totalmente contingentes, siendo creados o destruidos por Dios con base solamente en la voluntad divina. Además, un universal adquiere una existencia material cuando es concretado por la haecceitas, cuando “está presente” en un individuo existente en acto. Para tal análisis se utilizan partes de textos como Quodlibet q. 13, Ordinatio II, d. 3, Lectura I, d. 39, Reportatio I-A, d. 38. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Duns Scotus’s treatment of accidents existing without substances (= homeless accidents) in the Eucharist to shed light on how he thinks Aristotle’s metaphysics should be modified to make room for miracles. In my reconstruction, Duns Scotus makes two changes to Aristotle’s metaphysics. First, he distinguishes a given thing’s natural inclinations (its “aptitudes”) from the manifestations of those inclinations. Second, he argues that it is up to God’s free decisions (organized in systematic policies) whether a thing’s (...) aptitudes manifest or do not manifest themselves in any given situation. In this way, Duns Scotus tries to find a point of equilibrium between the necessary causal order he attributes to Aristotle and his followers on the one hand, and God’s freedom to break the natural order at any moment on the other hand. (shrink)

This article examines the reception of Robert Grosseteste by John Duns Scotus on two related questions in epistemology. The first concerns the need of phantasms for cognition, and the second concerns divine illumination. The study first examines Scotus’s Questions on the De Anima with comparison to Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, a text Scotus cites specifically. It is argued that Grosseteste is the main influence behind Scotus’s opinion that the need for phantasms is not proper to human nature as (...) such. The second part shows how Scotus disagrees with Grosseteste on a related question. Grosseteste retains a version of divine illumination with a qualified need for phantasms, whereas Scotus maintains the strict necessity of phantasms in this life and rejects illumination. The two parts of this study taken together indicate that Scotus saw Grosseteste as an authority but also felt free to ignore him where the two disagreed. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that John Duns Scotus offers two arguments to support his well-known supralapsarian Christological position: a formal argument based on the ordering within God’s will, and a material argument based on the ordering of God’s love. While the latter is constructively more fruitful, its most natural reading, according to which God becomes incarnate so as to be loved not just by Godself but also by another, is also inconsistent with Scotus’s own account of the metaphysics of (...) the incarnation. An alternative reading, according to which God hypostatically unites with the human soul of Christ because God falls in love with it, is equally untenable. I offer therefore an alternative reading that, while not consistent with the letter of Scotus’s argument, I believe nonetheless to be consistent with its spirit. On this reading, the love expressed in the incarnation is directed at creation. In deciding to become incarnate, God decides to give Godself to that what is not God; the embodiment of this decision is Christ. The incarnation is not an expression of divine self-love, or love for one particular soul, but an expression of love for others. (shrink)

This article is intended to offer a textual and evaluative presentation of the theory of original sin as elaborated by the Franciscan master John Duns Scotus, the “Subtle Doctor.”While there are many studies and articles about Scotus’ ethics, few are devoted to what is considered the root of evil human behavior, and hardly any analyze the text of the Subtle Doctor in any sufficient depth.1 Perhaps because this topic belongs more strictly to theology, it is seldom considered in depth by (...) philosophers. On the other hand, since Catholic theology after Vatican II has virtually narrowed its treatment of medieval topics and figures to all but Thomas Aquinas, it is rare to find any theologians interested in other... (shrink)

I argue that Scotus's formal distinction is a mereological fusion relation rather than an identity relation. I construct mereological models which adequately represent Scotus's theory.

Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 5, Page 1270-1306, October 2021.

John Duns Scotus is commonly recognized as one of the most original thinkers of medieval philosophy. His influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians is enormous and extends well beyond the limits of the Middle Ages. His thought, however, might be intimidating for the non-initiated, because of the sheer number of topics he touched on and the difficulty of his style. The eleven essays collected here, especially written for this volume by some of the leading scholars in the field, take the (...) reader through various topics, including Duns Scotus's intellectual environment, his argument for the existence of God, and his conceptions of modality, order, causality, freedom, and human nature. This volume provides a reliable point of entrance to the thought of Duns Scotus while giving a snapshot of some of the best research that is now being done on this difficult but intellectually rewarding thinker. (shrink)

Abstrak: Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah menginterpretasi dan mengafirmasi bahwa Ada (das Sein) dalam “pertanyaan tentang Ada” (die Seinsfrage) dalam pemikiran Heidegger adalah univok sebagaimana konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikiran Duns Scotus. Oleh karena itu, pertanyaan utama yang menuntun artikel ini adalah, bagaimana dapat ditunjukkan hubungan antara konsep Ada itu univok antara Dun Scotus dan Heidegger? Untuk memahami dengan baik tema ini, kita akan mengulasnya dalam empat bagian. Pertama, kita akan berkonsentrasi pada pengertian konsep ekuivok, analog, univok. Kedua, kita (...) fokus pada konsep analogi dan univok dalam pemahaman Abad Pertengahan. Bagaimana Duns Scotus memahami Ada itu univok akan dijelaskan pada bagian ketiga. Kemudian, kita akan mengelaborasi sebuah penafsiran Ada itu univok dalam pemi- kiran Heidegger pada bagian keempat. Pada akhirnya, konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikian Heidegger terletak pada konsepnya tentang waktu. Kata-kata kunci: Ekuivok, analog, univok, metafisika, Ada, Dasein, In- nerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ekstasis, transendental. Abstract: The scope of this article is to interpret and affirm that Being (das Sein) in Heidegger’s “question of Being” (die Seinsfrage) is similarly univocal to Duns Scotus’ concept of the univocity of Being. Therefore, the central question which guides this article is, how can it point to the relationship between Duns Scotus and Heidegger in regards to the concept of the univocity of Being? To understand well this theme, we will explain it in four parts. First, we concentrate on the definitions of equivocity, analogy and univocity. Second, we focus on the concepts of analogy and univocity in the Middle Ages. How Duns Scotus understands the univocity of Being will be pointed out in third part. After that, we will elaborate an interpretation of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought in fourth part. In the end, concept of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought is put in his concept of time. Keywords: Equivocity, analogy and univocity, metaphysics, Being, Dasein, Innerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ecstatic, transcendence. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham disagree over how and whether virtues are specified by their objects. For Thomas, habits and acts are specified by their formal objects. For instance, the object of theft is something that belongs to someone else, and more particularly theft is distinct from robbery because theft is the open taking of another’s good, whereas robbery is open and violent. A habit such as a virtue or a vice shares or takes the act’s (...) object. For Scotus, although the same virtue or act cannot have objects which differ formally, different virtues and acts can have an object which is identical according to its formal ratio, in the way that the different theological virtues might even formally have God as their object. Ockham accepts Scotus’s view that charity and hope are two kinds of love, we will see how, unlike Scotus, he argues that these theological virtues differ on account of their immediate complex objects. The disagreement between these three figures raises important difficulties concerning what it even means to be a formal object. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the development of Duns Scotus’ thought on the causes of the will: is the intellect a contributory cause of the choice (as claimed in the writings of the Oxford period), or is it only an occasion for it (as stated in the last works, written in Paris)? The collatio 6, probably discussed in 1301, immediately after the arrival of the Scottish theologian in Paris, still defends the doctrine of the intellect as a contributory (...) cause of the will, and therefore represents the last text preceding the turn of Scotus towards the theory that assigns to the intellect the role of mere causa sine qua non. This theory was widespread in Paris and supported by the Master of Scotus, Gonsalvus of Spain, who probably heavily influenced the doctrinal change of Scotus. (shrink)

Raccolta di saggi sulla storia della filosofia rinascimentale e moderna.

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto (...) etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

The problem of divine impassibility, i.e., of whether the divine nature in Christ could suffer, stands at the center of a debate regarding the nature of God and his relation to us. Whereas philosophical reasoning regarding the divine nature maintains that the divine is immutable and perfect in every respect, theological needs generated an ever-growing demand for a passionate God truly able to participate in the suffering of his creatures. Correlating with the different approaches of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns (...) Scotus, the paper develops an incarnation model that aims, on the one hand, to solve the dualistic problem between the divine and human natures, and on the other hand to make room for both impassible and passible elements in God, and so to make room within the patristic impassible model for genuine suffering in God. The discussion, though centered around Christ's im/passibility and passions, can easily be modified to approach the body-mind problem since the essence of the problems is the same. (shrink)

Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports a (...) different interpretation of the way God acts according to right reason. (shrink)

Becoming is a process in which a thing moves from one state to another. In Section 1, the study will elaborate on the discussion of the Aristotelian causes taken broadly, primarily focusing on the relation between efficient and final causes. In Section 2, the study discusses the implications of Scotus’s conception of freedom, as it is reflected in the relation of the future to the past, for the efficient and final causalities. Similarly in Section 3 an examination of Scotus’s conception (...) of matter is conducted. Based on the ideas established in these sections, the study attempts to present an initial Scotistic view of becoming. -/- . (shrink)

An overview of debates in ethical theory within Christian Scholasticism in the decades after Thomas Aquinas.

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute (...) to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation ex nihilo and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine Duns Scotus’ account of divine omnipotence. I shall firstly consider his doctrine of the objective possible and the distinction between logical potency and metaphysical potency. Secondly, by drawing on Scotus’ main texts on divine omnipotence (especially the Quodlibet VII), I will argue that, in his view, God’s omnipotence is not demonstrable, but at the same time is not an irrational concept, as Aristotle and many Medieval philosophi claimed. Finally, I shall discuss the (...) connection between Scotus’ theory of being and that of the superiority of the will over the intellect. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus recognizes complexity in God both at the level of God’s being and at the level of God’s attributes. Using the formal distinction and the notion of “unitive containment,” he argues for real plurality in God, but in a way that permits him to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. We argue that his allegiance to the doctrine of divine simplicity is purely verbal, that he flatly denies traditional aspects of the doctrine as he had received it from (...) Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, and that his denial of the doctrine allows him to escape certain counterintuitive consequences of the doctrine without falling afoul of the worries that motivated the doctrine in the first place. We note also an important consequence of Scotus’s approach to simplicity for the correct interpretation of his view of the foundation of morality. (shrink)

In his ethical writings, Duns Scotus emphasized both divine freedom and natural goodness, and these seem to conflict with each other in various ways. I offer an interpretation of Scotus which takes seriously these twin emphases and shows how they cohere. I argue that, for Scotus, all natural laws obtain just by the natures of actual things. Divine commands, such as the Ten Commandments, contingently track natural laws but do not make natural laws to be natural laws. I present textual (...) evidence for this claim. I also show how this view of Scotus on the natural law is consistent with a number of troubling passages. Scotus’s ethical theory implies that there are genuinely moral reasons for acting which are not absolutely binding (because subject to a divine command or permission otherwise) and also some moral reasons for acting which are absolutely binding (because not thus subject). (shrink)

Till just few decades ago, scholars used to use the label ‘Ockhamism’ to mark a turning-point in the history of mediaeval philosophy, above all in the history of natural philosophy. That turning-point was exemplified by the once so-called ‘Buridanian school’, today known simply as ‘Parisian school of natural philosophy’, whose leading representative was for sure John Buridan. But looking carefully at some crucial points of the Picard master’s idea of ‘nature’, concerning specifically the relationship between God and secondary causes on (...) one side, and the role played by free will, both the divine and the human one, on the other side, one will find out that Buridan’s ‘Ockhamism’ is at least questionable: Scotus’ modal logic is the conceptual framework, within which he redetermines the boundaries of natural laws, but the ‘pure ockhamist’ idea of the prevalence of the will on the intellect in God’s nature is the source of an image of the world in which voluntary behaviours and natural laws are intertwined. Therefore, Buridan’s natural philosophy results as a peculiar synthesis of two of the main divergent lines of thinking of late mediaeval philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I present an interpretation of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. I argue that this concept is best understood in relation to the problematic of individuation or differentiation, which Deleuze inherits from Duns Scotus. After analysing Scotus' critique of Aristotelian or hylomorphic approaches to the problem of individuation, I turn to Deleuze's account of differentiation and his interpretation of the calculus in chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition. The paper seeks thereby to explicate Deleuze's dialectics or theory of (...) Ideas, his approach to the principle of sufficient reason, and the concept of the virtual itself. (shrink)

Although Descartes’s ideas regarding consciousness and memory have been studied extensively, few attempts have been made to address their systemic relations. In order to redress this deficiency, I argue in favor of three interrelated theses. The first is that intellectual memory has a crucial role to play in Descartes’s concept of consciousness, especially when it comes to explaining higher forms of consciousness. Second, the connection between memory and consciousness has been obscured by the fact that intellectual memory, taken as a (...) subject in its own right, was relatively neglected in Descartes’s philosophy: By and large, his views on the matter remained within the limits of late scholastic Scotism. Third, what makes the question of intellectual memory so fascinating in Descartes is not some ground-breaking insight into its nature; rather, it is his gradual recognition of the role that intellectual memory plays in the constitution of higher forms of consciousness. With these arguments, and relying on Descartes’s 1648 correspondence with Antoine Arnauld, where he progressed beyond the substance-based approach to the self, I try to show that he deserves to be credited with a more prominent status in the history of the self and personhood than has previously been the case. (shrink)

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Johannes Duns Scotus (1266-1308) was one of the greatest medieval theologians. He joined the Franciscan order and soon stood out because of his acumen. The ideas he developed about the non-necessity of reality became very influential, also in Reformed theology. The life of Duns Scotus is difficult to reconstruct. This biography provides an overview of the state of research and therefore of the life of Duns in his native Scotland, England, where he was educated, France, where he taught, and Germany, (...) where he died. (shrink)

Even amongst those with only a cursory knowledge of the moral philosophy of John Duns Scotus, the association of Scotus's thought with voluntarism is well known. Next to his much-discussed, highly controversial theory of the univocity of being, Scotus's ethical thought, particularly his interpretation of the role of God's will in dictating moral norms, remains one of the most disputed – and arguably most misunderstood – areas of his philosophical synthesis. As Efrem Bettoni noted many years ago, Scotus's understanding of (...) the relationship between the divine will and the created moral order is one of the 'most badly treated' areas of his thought. Not surprisingly, therefore, no general consensus has emerged... (shrink)