Josiah Royce

While acknowledging a certain affinity between his own thought and the Vedanta concept of a world-soul or universal spirit, Josiah Royce nevertheless locates this concept primarily in what he terms the Second Conception of Being—Mysticism. In his early magnum opus, The World and the Individual, Royce utilizes aspects of the Upanishads in order to flesh out his picture of the mystical understanding of and relationship to being. My primary concern in the present investigation is to introduce some nuance into Royce’s (...) conception of Indian thought, which may then serve to suggest similar possibilities for nuance for Royce’s conception of the Absolute. I will attempt to do in two primary ways: first, I will consider Royce’s use of Indian thought via the Upanishads in explicating his second historical conception of Being. I will then turn briefly to Emerson’s poem ‘Brahma’ and the Bhagavad Gita to see if a certain reversal that occurs in both places problematizes Royce’s depiction of the universal spirit in Indian thought as well as opens up new possibilities for Royce’s own Absolute. (shrink)

This article raises questions about what it means to be a diverse academic community and about why such diversity is worth struggling to achieve. The controversial arguments of Walter Benn Michaels are critically examined as a stimulus and prelude to considering the more constructive perspectives supplied by Amartya Sen and Josiah Royce. Royce's early 20th century philosophical writings, in particular, are evaluated as resources for thinking about the ideal nature of a college or university community in the 21st century.

Contained among the Josiah Royce Papers, housed at the Harvard University Archives, are three unpublished lectures on the topic of loyalty delivered by Royce in Pittsburgh some time after the publication of The Philosophy of Loyalty in April 1908. The titles of the Pittsburgh Lectures are, respectively, “The Conflict of Loyalties,” “The Art of Loyalty,” and “Loyalty and Individuality.” The precise dates and location of these lectures has been the subject of longstanding uncertainty. Witness this sample of conjectures. Atop the (...) first page of “The Conflict of Loyalties,” one finds written in archivist Ronald A. Wells’s hand, “1908? 1910?” Royce’s student, Jacob Loewenberg—compiler of Royce’s posthumously published .. (shrink)

The power, depth, and humanity of the work and life of Josiah Royce gains in richness by following his reflections on the problems of philosophical pedagogy. While engaged as a professor of philosophy, author, advisor, and administrator, Royce developed and refined guidelines for the philosophy of education, and the art of philosophical pedagogy. Except for a few personal recollections from his students and colleagues, an article by Frank M. Oppenheim that appeared thirty-five years ago, and the annotated bibliography to his (...) writings, Royce's works on pedagogy have not been collected, nor have they received critical attention. The scope of this study is to follow Royce's pedagogical reflections from 1883 to 1913, providing contextual support and critical receptions so that the student of the philosophy of Royce may profit from his studies on the embodiment of ideals as the philosophical engagement of the art of education. (shrink)

Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counterexemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three (...) kinds of entitlement are characterized and given prima facie support, and a fourth is canvassed. Certain foreseeable limitations of the suggested antisceptical strategy are noted. The discussion is grounded, overall, in a conception of the sceptical paradoxes not as directly challenging our having any warrant for large classes of our beliefs but as crises of intellectual conscience for one who wants to claim that we do. (shrink)

This is a splendid, important book. It is original, masterfully researched, clearly written, and compellingly argued. Both beginners and more advanced readers will find it a valuable guide to the development, meaning, and importance of Royce’s philosophy of religion as set forth in The Problem of Christianity. As such, it is without question one of the very best books on one of the very best philosophers. More significantly, like Royce’s philosophy itself, Oppenheim’s book offers careful reasoning, rich suggestions and fundamental (...) challenges to all reflective persons grappling with, not merely idly considering, issues of individuality, community, love, loyalty, commitment, and salvation. (shrink)

Abstract The founding of the Division of Philosophical Psychology of the American Psychological Association is reviewed in the light of the relations between psychology and philosophy at that time. A history of events leading to the formation of the division (24) in 1962 is presented by its first president?elect. The major issues were the role of philosophy in scientific psychology, teleology, dualism, and freedom versus determinism.

Long in the making, large in scholarship and scope, this work is a worthy rival to H. W. Schneider’s A History of American Philosophy. With the possible exception of a few of the treatments of technical developments in logic, the material is accessible to the general reader. Flower and Murphey accomplish this not by any dilution of philosophical substance, but by the supplying of relevant background. This includes a statement of Aristotle’s causes, the medieval distinction between nominalism and realism, Locke’s (...) distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley’s and Hume’s critiques of Locke, and, most importantly, a detailed explanation of Scottish realism. (shrink)

In his first summer lecture at Berkeley in 1914, Josiah Royce, American philosopher of community, confessed as follows.

Now back in print, and in paperback, these two classicvolumes illustrate the scope and quality of Royce’sthought, providing the most comprehensive selection ofhis writings currently available. They offer a detailedpresentation of the viable relationship Royce forgedbetween the local experience of community and thedemands of a philosophical and scientific vision ofthe human situation.The selections reprinted here are basic to any understandingof Royce’s thought and its pressing relevanceto contemporary cultural, moral, and religious issues.

A clear and thorough exposition which makes royce's subtle moral philosophy accessible to contemporary ethical theorists understandably put off by his style. fuss convincingly presents royce's moral philosophy as independent of his much ridiculed metaphysical absolutism and argues that his ethical theory is instead dependent on his surprisingly elaborate and sophisticated social psychology. much of this psychology is to be found in unpublished writings of which fuss makes extensive use, but he also performs a service by intelligently piecing together remarks (...) scattered in the published works. significant unpublished meta-ethical remarks are also discussed. included is a treatment of his intricate and apparently unique argument for the principle of harmony as a second-order procedural moral principle. his famous insights into the relations between the individual and society are also painstakingly analyzed. (bp). (shrink)

In his final years, Josiah Royce worked to develop his theories of community and interpretation in practical directions. In particular, he developed an account of insurance as a special community of interpretation, and proposed the creation of an international board of insurance as a deterrent for war. Rather than evaluating Royce’s policy recommendations, this paper explores how his conception of insurance clarifies his account of interpretation. For Royce, insurance provides the best model for communal interpretation thus far because an insurer (...) seeks to prevent loss in the face of risky action, in addition to adjudicating between competing claims. This paper concludes with some reflections on how the problem of moral hazard can inform a Roycean conception of philosophy. (shrink)

In Loyalty to Loyalty: Josiah Royce and the Genuine Moral Life, Matthew Foust richly examines the nature of a controversial virtue: loyalty. It is well known that for Royce loyalty was not only a fundamental moral concept but an anthropological one since, in his view, loyalty to a cause allows individuals to become selves, creatures with unity of purpose in life. However, this ground level of loyalty is not the only one existing for him. Simultaneously to a particular cause one (...) must adhere to loyalty to loyalty, a universal cause that is a moral obligation for each human being. Foust attempts to recover this dual aspect of the Roycean conception of loyalty with the purpose of defending his contemporary relevance .. (shrink)

Few American thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were acquainted with Eastern traditions of thought. Early Transcendentalists, including Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, were happy exceptions to this, with each showing passing familiarity of and an approving attitude toward the Bhagavad-Gita and other early Vedic texts. Other thinkers of the period, including Walt Whitman and Bronson Alcott, were influenced to varying degrees by Indian thought. Despite this limited fascination with the intellectual traditions of the East, rare (...) was the thinker who made an effort to encounter these texts on their own terms by learning the languages in which they were written. One notable exception .. (shrink)

This essay examines how, in the early twentieth century, ontological arguments were employed in the defense of metaphysical idealism. The idealists of the period tended to grant that ontological arguments defy our usual expectations in logic, and so they were less concerned with the formal properties of Anselmian arguments. They insisted, however, that ontological arguments are indispensable, and they argued that we can trust argumentation as such only if we presume that there is a valid ontological argument. In the first (...) section I outline the history of this metalogical interpretation of the ontological argument. In the subsequent sections I explain how Royce and Collingwood each developed the argument, and how this impacted their respective conceptions of both logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

The philosophical ramifications of modern science—physical, biological, and formal and mathematical—figure centrally in Royce's philosophy. Even the most cursory of glances at his corpus reveals a systematic and deep engagement with many of the leading developments in nineteenth-century science, from the nebular hypothesis, or evolution in both its Darwinian and Spencerian forms, to the work of Cantor and Dedekind. It would perhaps not be going too far to suggest that, from his first to last writings, the development of Royce's philosophy (...) is in no small measure driven by an attempt to come to terms with these developments. And yet, while this has received some attention from the scholarly community, it remains an .. (shrink)

At the end of the 19th century, Josiah Royce participated in what has come to be called the great debate (Royce, 1897; Armour, 2005).1 The great debate concerned issues in metaphysical theology, and, since metaphysics was primarily idealistic, it dealt considerably with the relations between the divine Self and lesser selves. After the great debate, Royce developed his idealism in his Gifford Lectures (1898-1900). These were published as The World and the Individual. At the end of the first volume, Royce (...) added a Supplementary Essay. The Essay, continuing themes from the great debate, developed an intriguing mathematical model of the relations between the divine Self and lesser selves. The second volume went on to .. (shrink)

Herr Royce ist doch ein bedeutender Denker und darf nur als solcher behandelt werden.("Royce is an important thinker, and may only be treated as such.")Scholars of pragmatism and of phenomenology have observed striking similarities between Josiah Royce and Edmund Husserl, foundational thinkers at the origins of two major philosophical movements whose effects are still strongly felt in the present day—Royce being considered a central founder of American pragmatic idealism, and Husserl of modern German phenomenology. Other scholars have noted striking similarities (...) between Royce's thought and that of the broader circle of phenomenology.2Can we discover in these relations definitive historical influences, rather than .. (shrink)

In the opening sentence of his Methods of Logic, W. V. O. Quine writes, “Logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one.”1 Quine is referring to the year in which Gottlob Frege presented his Begriffschrift, or “concept-script,” one of the first published accounts of a logical system or calculus with quantification and a function-argument analysis of propositions. There can be no doubt as to the importance of these introductions, and, indeed, Frege’s orientation and advances, (...) if not his particular system, have proven to be highly significant for much of mathematical logic and research pertaining to the foundations of mathematics. Nevertheless, Quine’s assessment, often repeated, obscures other .. (shrink)

Royce’s sustained interest in technical logic is beyond doubt. One of his first publications, which appeared while he was still teaching at the University of California at Berkeley, was a logic primer, and many of the productions of his later career were articles on logic. Indeed, it can well seem that Royce spent at least ten or eleven years working almost exclusively on logic following his attendance at Peirce’s 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures, entitled Reasoning and the Logic of Things. During (...) this period he filled dozens of notebooks with minute explorations of Boolean functions and relations, investigating them mostly by using fourcircle Venn diagrams. Less obvious than Royce’s devotion to logic .. (shrink)

Between 1903 and 1913, Royce was recovering from the intensity of having written The World and the Individual. He had experienced family tragedies and an intense lecture schedule, speaking at a variety of American universities as well as at venues abroad. In this period Royce dedicated fewer pieces to the philosophy of pedagogy. These pieces, taken together, closely circumscribe his later works on religion, logic, and ethics. After dedicating lectures and pieces on the psychological underpinnings of pedagogy, and following the (...) publication of Outlines of Psychology (1903), written to help teachers understand the process of learning, Royce again turned to working out his earlier reflections on religious .. (shrink)

After almost two years of armed conflict between Arab militias and African farmers in Sudan, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1556 in July 2004, calling upon the Sudanese government to end the violence or face possible diplomatic and economic sanctions. The militias, known as the Janjiwid, arose after African farmers in the Darfur region formed the Sudanese Liberation Army and attacked the government in February 2003. Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, claim that the government gave the (...) militias logistical assistance to attack the farmers. Since 2003, tens of thousands have been killed and more than a million people displaced from their homes, pushed into concentration .. (shrink)

In his 1905 work on the logical foundations of geometry, Royce proposed a logic based on the “obverse” or O-relation that could provide a means of understanding any system of order. Royce explains that this relation, which he calls the O-relation, “in logical terms, . . . is the relation in which (if we were talking of the possible chances [choices] open to one who had to decide upon a course of action) any set of exhaustive but, in their entirety, (...) inconsistent choices would stand to one another” (Royce, 1951, 385). This focus on the process of making choices turns on the idea that the action of making a choice produces an asymmetrical relation and so a key part of Royce’s project was to demonstrate the .. (shrink)

Henry Sheffer’s 1908 Harvard Ph.D. thesis contains an interesting appendix on a central feature of the logical work of his thesis advisor, Josiah Royce. This is the claim in Royce’s 1905 article “The Relations of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry” that an unsymmetric ordering relation can be defined on the single symmetric O-relation for which he gives postulates in that paper. Sheffer criticizes Royce’s specific definition from the point of view of the evolving twentieth century conception (...) of axiomatic method and also shows more generally that an unsymmetric1 order relation cannot be defined in the system of the 1905 paper based on the O-relation. In this article I wish to consider the nature .. (shrink)

The study of community is an integral part of pragmatist thought, as is the continual reminder to reconstruct and re-evaluate our theories in light of changing conditions. A contemporary, literal, and significant source of changing conditions is anthropogenic global climate change, conjoined with a general increase in concern for non-human life. Already, a great deal of work has been done on applying pragmatist conceptions and insights to these issues.1 However, other pragmatist resources remain to be marshaled. One such resource is (...) Josiah Royce’s philosophy of insurance, which, while primarily offered as a way of preventing international conflicts, also concerned the mitigation of natural calamities, such as.. (shrink)

Josiah Royce’s The Problem of Christianity has been studied in numerous ways since its publication in 1913. The most common approaches to studying PC among historians of classical American philosophy and Royce scholars are to regard it as a contribution to the psychology of religion, as a contribution to philosophy of religion, or as an application of Royce’s logical theory to the study of religion. Scholars who study PC as a contribution to the psychology of religion often emphasize such things (...) as the continuity between Royce’s phenomenological description of a range of religious insights in The Sources of Religious Insight and his... (shrink)

In this article, I contend that there are at least two contemporary types of Kantian transcendental pragmatism: Sami Pihlström’s naturalistic transcendentalpragmatism and Josiah Royce’s absolute pragmatism. Each one of these transcendental pragmatisms represents one side of the Kantian transcendentaltradition. Pihlström’s naturalistic transcendental pragmatism represents the side of the Kantian transcendental tradition that is familiar to most philosophers, namely, the transcendental inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of human experience. Royce’s absolute pragmatism represents the other, more neglected, side of the (...) Kantian transcendental tradition, namely, the transcendental analysis of the meaningfulness of moral, aesthetic, and religious experience, especially theistic religious experience. I contend that Royce’s pragmatism is more representative of the Kantian transcendental tradition than is Pihlström’s pragmatism. (shrink)

This paper aims to sever the tie between Josiah Royce's ethico-religious insight and his idiosyncratic absolutistic idealism. The first section of this paper sets the stage for this severance by explaining what it is that Royce's ethico-religious insight needs to be separated from: his absolutistic idealism and its conception of God. This explanation will consist mainly of a concise description of Royce's phenomenology of concept formation in chapter nine of his Religious Aspect of Philosophy and a critical exegesis of his (...) 1895 Berkeley lecture, "The Conception of God." The second section of this paper actually severs the tie between Royce's ethico-religious insight and his absolutistic conception of God via a Marcellian critique of Royce's conception of God. The third section of this paper places Royce's ethico-religious insight in a more hospitable environment — namely, the philosophical orbit of a Marcellian existential phenomenology. (shrink)